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Mr Secretary
WALSINGHAM
and the policy of
QUEEN ELIZABETH

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

Sir Francis Walsingham
from the original in the National Portrait Gallery

Emery Walker ph. sc.

Mr Secretary
WALSINGHAM
and the policy of
QUEEN ELIZABETH

by

CONYERS READ

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CONTENTS

VIII. The Second Alençon Courtship 1

IX. Scottish Affairs, 1570–85 118

X. Catholics and Puritans 258

XI. Plots and Counter Plots 340

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Sir Francis Walsingham. From the original in the National Portrait Gallery . . . . . *frontispiece*

Michel de Castelnau, Seigneur de Mauvissière, French Ambassador to England, 1575–85. From the engraving by Jaspar Isac published in *Les Mémoires de Messire de Castelnau*, Paris, 1621 . *facing p.* 102

The original draft in Walsingham's hand and the letter as sent to Wm. Davison, 12 July 1584. From the originals in the P.R.O., S. P. Scotland, xxxv, nos. 55, 54 . . . . . ,, 231

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VIII

THE SECOND ALENÇON COURTSHIP

The four years which followed Walsingham's return from the Low Countries were perhaps the most critical years in Elizabeth's reign. In 1578 the Jesuits began to invade England in force and English Catholics under their stimulus revealed a militant spirit which made them thereafter a force to be reckoned with and a danger to be prepared against in all consideration of foreign and domestic affairs. At the same time Catholic forces abroad began to stir themselves and to draw nearer together for a concerted attempt to impose upon England the rule generally supposed to have been formulated at the Council of Trent, that no heretic should be allowed to reign. The Pope, in alliance with Philip of Spain, organized and dispatched expeditions to assist Catholic uprisings in Ireland; the Catholic Guisan party in France, once again collaborating with the Spanish King, developed elaborate schemes for attacking Elizabeth through Scotland. Plots were brewing during these four years to invade England from the south; other plots to kill the Queen and enthrone 'the competitor', Mary Stuart, in her place. To complicate the situation still further, it was at this time that the question of the Portuguese succession presented itself and was solved in a manner to increase the strength of Spain, the foreign enemy from whom England had the most to fear. The situation was as bewildering as it was dangerous. A half-hundred threads of policy were so knotted and joined that the pulling of any one meant the displacement of all the rest. What Spain would do in Ireland depended largely upon what Elizabeth would do with the Catholics at home, with the Dutch rebels across the Channel, with the Portuguese pretender. What the Guises would do in the north depended upon the Queen's behaviour towards her Scottish partisans and her treatment of the French King's brother. Everything reacted upon everything else. From the north, south, and west, within and without the gates, Elizabeth

and her counsellors had to face a combination of dangers well calculated to test their courage and their wisdom to the uttermost.

To confound the confusion still further, increasing discord became apparent in the ranks of the Queen's most trusted advisers. Differences of opinion upon fundamental questions of policy, which had revealed themselves earlier in the reign, began to crystallize during these years into mutually antagonistic factions within the Privy Council, which at critical moments interfered seriously with the smooth workings of the governmental machinery. The councillors no longer presented a united front against common enemies. They were no longer agreed as to who the common enemies were. Conservatives looked askance at Radicals; the friends of peace laboured underhand to thwart the schemes of the war party, and vice versa. Foreign ambassadors realized this state of affairs and made their profit accordingly. Spies were set upon colleagues, bribes were offered and accepted, and sometimes in the advancement of partisan measures councillors were guilty of acts which savour of treachery to the common cause.

It is well to realize the complexity of the situation at the outset, although it is not the purpose of this chapter to develop it as a whole. For the foreign situation, or, more precisely, the relations of England to France and Spain during the years 1578 to 1582, which is the subject of this present chapter, was profoundly influenced by forces of great importance in themselves, which, in the interests of clearness, must be relegated here to a subordinate place.

It became apparent in the preceding chapter that the two separate threads of Elizabeth's policy, towards France and towards Spain in the Netherlands, had woven themselves together into one strand in the year 1578 when Francis, Duke of Alençon, younger brother of the French King, undertook to interfere in behalf of the Dutch rebels. At first Elizabeth had witnessed this interference with apprehension, and had made half-hearted attempts to prevent it. She had feared that it was preliminary to the absorption of the Netherlands by France, which she considered even more antagonistic to her interests than their recovery by Spain. It was with a view to preventing this that she had originally decided to send Walsingham and

Cobham to the Low Countries in the early summer of 1578. Later, when she became better acquainted with the facts, she took a different view of the situation. It appeared that Alençon did not represent the power of France, but was acting upon his own initiative in opposition to the wishes of his brother the King. In that case Elizabeth believed that his expedition was robbed of most of its terrors and might even be turned to her advantage.

She desired to keep alive the cause of the Dutch rebels in order to weaken the power of Spain to harm her, but she was anxious to do this at the least possible expense to herself and in such wise as not to force her into open war with Spain. Alençon might be employed, at his own charge, to accomplish this for her. The problem was to make sure that he would fight his battles in her interests. Being a free lance, there was always the danger that his ambition might run counter to her plans, and lead him to make terms either with Rome or with Spain upon a basis unfavourable to herself. There was the further danger, more remote, that his brother the French King might die, and that Alençon, having gained control of the Netherlands, might succeed to the throne of France and so accomplish the union which she was determined to prevent if she could. It was therefore part of her policy to maintain him as an efficient force against Spain in the Low Countries without permitting him to become so strong there as to constitute a menace to England in himself. Her main business, however, was to place him in a position in which he could be depended upon to subserve her interests. The occasion offered in a form particularly pleasing to her vanity when Alençon in the summer of 1578 renewed his proposal of marriage. It need not be supposed that Alençon was any more moved by sentimental considerations in the amorous *rapprochement* which followed than was Elizabeth herself. As Walsingham put it, she was the best marriage in her parish, and brought a kingdom with her for dowry. Nor need it be supposed that she alone profited by the protraction of the courtship. Alençon had his own ambitions to serve, and though they would have been better served by marriage, they were materially assisted by the fact that he could pose as the favoured suitor of the English Queen. It has often been assumed that Elizabeth played fast and loose with the young French Duke. In point of

fact, both of them went into the game for solid diplomatic considerations. To be sure, the Queen, as a woman, had the advantage in the game of courtship. It was the accepted part of the sixteenth-century suitor to be bold and of the maiden to be difficult. Elizabeth was shrewd enough to see that rules framed for chivalrous love-making might very aptly be applied to diplomatic purposes, and very probably for that reason she always liked to mingle an element of love-making in her diplomacy. But any prince in Europe in the year 1578 was a fool if he supposed that her love-passages had any deep personal significance. Alençon played his game for all it was worth, and made a substantial profit from it. So did Elizabeth. The wooing continued as long as it did because it was mutually profitable.

It is as well to clear our minds of any sentimental reflections in the matter. Elizabeth never revealed her very considerable diplomatic talents to greater advantage than in her most amorous discourses. The woman in her served very admirably the purposes of the Queen. Yet again and again she deceived her contemporaries, as she has deceived posterity, into believing that the Queen would eventually bow before the woman. Hence in that very form of diplomacy in which she was most at home, not only her neighbours, but even her intimate and trusted advisers were most at sea.

At the beginning of October 1578 Walsingham had just returned from his unsuccessful diplomatic adventure in the Low Countries very much disgruntled with public service and pretty far out of favour with the Queen. He had hoped that his mission would result in committing Elizabeth definitely to the cause of the Dutch rebels. He found instead that his plans had been completely thwarted by the revival of negotiations for marriage, which he knew from experience would be long and had great reason to expect would be fruitless. He suspected that some of the councillors at home who were opposed to his aggressive policy had been instrumental in bringing this to pass, and had very hard words to say about them. No doubt he had Sussex in mind and possibly Burghley. Sussex was the staunchest advocate of the marriage in the Council.[1] Burghley, less out-

[1] Cf. Sussex to Elizabeth, 28 Aug. 1578, printed in Lodge, *Illustrations of British History*, ii. 107.

spoken in his opinions, weighing the arguments pro and con in his usual cautious, pedantic fashion, inclined to the same view.[1] In the tedious negotiations which followed, these two in the main supported the marriage project, as Leicester and Walsingham opposed it. For the moment those who favoured the marriage were popular with Elizabeth and Walsingham was back in England with the disagreeable consciousness that his labours abroad had been pretty nearly as damaging to his reputation as to his plans.

He had left the Low Countries early in October and reached the English court on the seventh of that month. He found the Queen troubled with a pain in her face and out of humour accordingly. 'By the reason of her indisposition', he wrote to Hatton a few days later, 'there has as yet been no consultation for the Low Country causes. I find her Highness greatly altered from that I left her touching these causes, so that I am out of hope of any good resolution; for the which I am very sorry, knowing that upon this resolution dependeth either the conservation or alienation of the Low Country peoples' hearts for her Majesty.'[2] What troubled him most at the moment was that Elizabeth was in no wise disposed to send over her bonds for £100,000, which she had promised the rebels earlier in the year, and upon the security of which they had already begun to negotiate loans. It was clear to Walsingham that the marriage business was chiefly responsible for this change of face. 'The

[1] Cf. *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 239. Perhaps the best statement of the attitude of the various councillors towards the match at this juncture is to be found in the English Public Record Office among the French manuscripts; cf. particularly vol. x, *passim*. Some of these letters are printed in part by J. H. Pollen in *The English Catholics under Elizabeth*, pp. 315 ff. On the 21st of March 1580 Mauvissière wrote to Henry III that Burleigh, Sussex, Hunsdon, Secretary Wilson, Lords Howard, Oxford, Northumberland, Rutland, and Rochester favoured the match (P. R. O., French Transcripts).

[2] Printed in Nicolas, *Life of Hatton*, p. 93. Mauvissière wrote to the French King on 17 Oct. 1578 that those who were opposed to the match were of the Spanish party. He said they were telling the Queen that Alençon was deformed and pock-marked and had a foul breath, but that Walsingham had reported that he found Alençon 'très beau et agréable pour estre noir et de fort bonne grace et de taille médiocre, mays que quant à l'esprit si tout le monde le luy eust dict et ne l'eust point veu, qu'il ne l'eust jamais creu par ce qu'il l'avoit trouvé aussi prudent, aussi saige et advisé en ses responces que l'on pourroit voir non seullement ung prince mays quel que gentilhomme que ce peust et . . . quant à l'allayne (haleine) . . . qu'il s'estoit approché de son altesse et avoit eu si bon loysir d'en faire jugement qu'il se pouvoit asseurer . . . la dicte royne qu'il n'y avoit rien de tel.' (French Transcripts, x, f. 28.)

French ambassador,' he continued in his letter to Hatton, 'having received letters from the King and the Duke of Anjou, requesteth audience. I would to God her Majesty would forbear the entertaining any longer the marriage matter. No one thing hath procured her so much hatred abroad as these wooing matters, for that it is conceived she dallieth therein. I have discharged my duty in that behalf, but in very temperate sort, for that she hath been heretofore jealous of my liking of her marriage; and therefore I cannot speak so frankly as others may.'

Having 'discharged his duty', Walsingham retired for a fortnight to his country house and did not return to court again until towards the end of October.[1] Meanwhile the marriage project hung fire. Paulet, the English ambassador in France, wrote that the French King and his mother were doing their best to break it off.[2] It is not at all certain, however, that Paulet was well informed. There is no doubt that Catherine, earlier in the year, had been proposing other marriages to her young son. On the other hand, she does not seem to have revealed any positive antagonism to the English match. A little while before she had professed to Walsingham her keenest sympathy with it,[3] and a little while later was making considerable effort to bring it to pass. The truth seems to be that Catherine wished to get rid of her troublesome youngest son and would have welcomed any marriage conducive to that end. If she proposed alternatives to the English match, it was probably not so much because she opposed the match in theory, as because, with very good reason, she had reason to fear it was 'but dalliance'. Alençon himself was for pushing matters. He announced his intention of sending Jean de Simier, his master of wardrobe and one of his closest favourites, to England forthwith, and of crossing himself as soon as arrangements could be made. It will be recalled that he had made a formal proposal of marriage to Elizabeth through Bacqueville in the midsummer. Elizabeth's reply, although non-committal, had been mildly provocative. She would never marry any man, she had declared, whom she did not first see.[4]

[1] *Cal. S. P. Foreign*, 1578–9, pp. 244–6.
[2] Ibid., p. 229; but cf. Catherine de Médicis to Henry III, 2 Oct. 1578, *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vi. 46. [3] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vi. 36.
[4] *Cal. S. P. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 183; cf. also Paulet's letter to Elizabeth, 7 Oct. 1578, ibid., pp. 229–31.

Bacqueville had returned to France with this message early in September. The proposed mission of Simier and the promised visit of Alençon were the outcome of this mission.

Elizabeth was not much taken with the idea of Simier's coming. She read in it an intention to bind her to a treaty of marriage before she had seen the prospective bridegroom. Her first impulse was to prevent his coming. On second thought she directed Walsingham to write that if he came he should come without proclamation or display or any large company. Sir Edward Stafford, the son of one of Elizabeth's ladies-in-waiting, a protégé of Burghley's and a strong advocate of the match, had words with the Queen on the subject at this time and found her 'still with a meaning in the matter, howbeit not so earnest as before'.[1] It was characteristic of Elizabeth to begin a retreat as soon as she saw any line of policy advancing to a point which would demand a positive decision. Simier was acute enough to realize Elizabeth's purpose in keeping the mission secret. As she had surmised, his hope was to commit her to terms before his master's coming. Her insistence upon an interview he regarded as a 'rock to hinder this happy navigation', and he urged Mauvissière, the French ambassador in London, to labour for its removal. 'For God's sake, Sir, so deal that the Queen stay not upon the interview.'[2]

Mauvissière did his best. He went to court at once and urged Elizabeth earnestly to declare herself one way or the other, promising that if she were no longer disposed to consider Alençon as a suitor, he would still remain her friend. But it was no part of the Queen's plans to break off the courtship, whatever her ultimate intentions as to marriage might be. 'She will consent to break off [in no wise],' Walsingham wrote to Leicester on the 11th of November, 'though I see her no ways a[ffected], which will breed an immorta[l hatred] in the gentleman whose means [of re]venge will be great whe[n he shall] come to enjoy the crown of [France] which surely I suppose will come to pass.'[3]

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 219.

[2] *Cal. S. P. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 260.

[3] Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 119. This letter is much damaged by fire, missing words and letters have been conjecturally supplied between brackets. It is interesting to note that Mauvissière found means of getting hold of some of Elizabeth's letters to Alençon through a traitor on Walsingham's own staff. He wrote to Henry III on the 20th of December 1578: 'J'ay fait en sorte que

For all this Elizabeth kept straight on in her course of dalliance, and Walsingham wrote again to Simier on the 20th of November a letter sufficiently ambiguous to leave him as much at sea about her intentions as ever he was.[1] While he made a great show of setting out, he lingered in Paris until he had heard further from his master.[2] Paulet announced his departure on the 6th of December,[3] but he did not in fact reach England until the 5th of January 1579.[4] He brought with him full powers to negotiate and conclude the marriage.[5]

Simier had his first audience on the 11th of January. He was, as Camden puts it, ' a most choice courtier, exquisitely skilled in love toys, pleasant conceits and court dalliances ',[6] and as such he found his way to the feminine vanity of the Queen in short order. She professed to his master that she was delighted with him,[7] and very soon had dubbed him, as she did all of her intimates, with a nickname. Thereafter he was her ape—*le singe*. In fact, she went so far in her dalliance with him as to give some colour to scandalous rumours which found their way later to the ears of the royal prisoner, Mary Stuart. All this was disconcerting enough to the councillors, but so far as Elizabeth herself was concerned it was mere by-play. When it came to business Simier was directed to treat with the four men who formed the Queen's inner council, Burghley, Sussex, Leicester, and Walsingham. To them he displayed his credentials and made as though he would begin at once to arrange the terms for the marriage. But the councillors checked him. The Queen, they said, had sworn that she would marry no man until she had seen him. Before they discussed marriage they must arrange for an interview. Simier inveighed against an interview, enforcing his arguments with ' apt illustrations out of old histories ', but the councillors were not moved. They referred him to the Queen herself. He had five different interviews with her on the subject in as many days, but made no progress. Whereupon he declared that he had no power to treat of an interview and must refer the

j'ay retrouvé par ung des clercs du Sr de Walsingham la coppie de la lettre que la dicte royne d'Angleterre escript à mon dict Seigneur' (P. R. O., French Transcripts).

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 297. [2] Ibid. 302. [3] Ibid. 328.
[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 627. [5] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 310.
[6] Camden's *Annals*, Eng. Trans., ed. 1635, p. 200.
[7] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 231.

matter to his master.[1] While he attended Alençon's answer he kept up his pretty play with the Queen.

The general opinion in England was that Alençon would come, and a good many people at court were convinced that he would not come in vain.[2] Walsingham believed that the Queen's favourable attitude towards the match grew out of the situation in the Low Countries. Since he had left there in the previous autumn matters had gone from bad to worse. Don John, to be sure, had fallen a victim to the plague on the 2nd of October,[3] an accident which Walsingham regarded as a stroke of luck for his policy,[4] but the Prince of Parma had been named in his place, and although English agents wrote that he was 'light brained' and would be little respected[5] he was soon to prove himself far more formidable both as a warrior and as a diplomat than his gallant predecessor had been. Meantime serious dissensions had broken out in the ranks of the rebels. The difficulty was mainly religious, though there were mingled with it elements of ancient rivalry between nobles and burghers. Calvinism had been spreading rapidly in the Flemish cities and in Ghent particularly had made itself dominant. There its adherents displayed an even greater degree of intolerance than the Catholics themselves. On the other hand, the nobles in the Walloon provinces were very zealous for the old faith and at swords' points with the Calvinistic townsmen. Orange saw the danger and sought to provide against it by a scheme of toleration,[6] but to very little purpose. To make matters worse, these domestic difficulties were increased by the presence of two foreign armies which had entered the Low Countries in the course of the year 1578. John Casimir had come in July at the instigation of Elizabeth and practically in her pay, with a force of about 10,000 men. He found, as many others found after him, that the

[1] A good brief summary of Simier's negotiations at this point is given in the instructions of Sieur de Palerne, a gentleman whom Alençon sent to his brother, to explain the situation and to seek his advice. *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vi. 274.

[2] Lodge, *Illustrations*, &c., ii. 138; cf. also Randolph to Davison, 21 Feb. 1578/9, in *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 424.

[3] The date is given so in Davison's letter to Burghley of 12 October 1578, *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 233. Blok, *History of the People of the Netherlands*, trans. by R. Putnam, iii. 131, gives the date 1st October.

[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 231.

[5] Ibid., p. 236.

[6] Blok, *op. cit.* iii. 127.

English Queen was a bad paymaster. His troops began to mutiny and he himself became more and more discontented with the treatment which he was receiving at the hands of the Estates. Moved partly by these considerations, partly by his violent Calvinistic proclivities and partly by a desire to fish in troubled waters, he went to Ghent on his own initiative and took up the cudgels for the Calvinistic faction there.[1] Meanwhile the Duke of Alençon had also led an army into the Low Countries in July and had been engaged by treaty to serve the rebels' cause. Like Casimir, he never co-operated effectually with the plans of the Prince of Orange ; he suffered, like Casimir, from lack of money with which to pay his troops and revealed in his turn a tendency to identify himself with the cause of the Catholic malcontents in Flanders.[2] In fact, both the French and the German allies of the rebels proved in the long run to be a good deal more of a bother than they were an aid.

Elizabeth, no doubt, was partly to blame for Casimir's shortcomings. If she had kept him supplied with money as she had practically agreed to do, he might have served her turn and the turn of the rebels a good deal better than he did. As it was, he got at loggerheads not only with the Prince of Orange but also with the English. Some show of reconciliation between him and the Prince took place in December 1578,[3] and he made his peace with Elizabeth and her councillors when he visited England in January 1579.[4] But as an effective fighting ally in the Low Countries he never amounted to much, and most of his troops found their way back to Germany in the course of the next few months. The truth seems to be, as it has appeared once or twice already, that with the advent of Alençon into Dutch affairs, Elizabeth practically abandoned the course of policy which had induced her to subsidize Casimir's mercenary troops. It was a good deal cheaper for her to have the French Duke fight her

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 287.
[2] Blok, *op. cit.* iii. 132.
[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 349.
[4] Camden, *op. cit.*, p. 204, gives an account of this visit. Dr. Beutrich, Casimir's right-hand man, made himself particularly unpopular in England. Secretary Wilson wrote to Davison on the 16th of October 1578 : 'I saw an insolent letter written by drunken Beutryke against my Lord Treasurer and me addressed to you. I think if he writes in the forenoon he will be better advised, or else I shall esteem him a drunken beast all day long.' (*Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 237.)

battles. So she lost interest in Casimir, refused to send the bonds upon which the Estates were depending for his support, and left him to his own slim devices.

So far as military achievement went Alençon proved himself to be quite as frail a reed for the rebels to lean upon as their German allies. His army, which had crossed the frontiers gaily enough in July, occupied one or two insignificant positions, but otherwise did nothing. By the end of the year it was rapidly falling to pieces for lack of pay and making itself generally unpopular by indiscriminate plundering. The Dutch, always suspicious of the French, refused to harbour them. Towns of security had been promised the Duke, but the Estates General could not induce any one of them to open its gates. Consequently, late in December, after a treacherous attempt to possess himself of Mons, Alençon, very much out of humour with the whole business, withdrew to France.

It was believed both in the Low Countries and in England that his withdrawal was only temporary. He lingered for a time near the border and maintained diplomatic relations with the Estates General. Elizabeth certainly saw nothing in the move to induce her to change her plans. Walsingham found her less disposed than ever to follow him in his own favourite policy of direct interference and more than ever disposed to look to the marriage as a solution of her difficulties. ' I see little cause ', he wrote to Davison on the 28th of February, ' why you should stay there longer, especially as we have here no disposition to deal any further in these countries' causes, in respect of the low ebb we see them fallen into, of which we have as little regard as if we were not all interested in their fortunes. . . . The negotiation of Monsieur here takes greater foot than was at first looked for, and receives no small furtherance upon occasion of the decayed state of things in the Low Countries ; for her Majesty foreseeing that if the King of Spain once came to have his will there, he will prove no very good neighbour, thinks this the best means to provide for her safety, in which respect it is to be thought she will in the end consent to the match, though otherwise not greatly to her liking.'[1] Mauvissière, the French ambassador in

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, pp. 437–8. Leicester wrote on the same subject to Davison, two days earlier, as follows : ' Touching the other matter at home here for Monsieur which you desire to understand of, for that many speeches

London, was even more confident. He wrote to one of Alençon's gentlemen that nothing was lacking to the achievement of the marriage save the coming of the Duke in person.[1] That seemed to be the universal conviction. Even Catherine de Médicis, experienced as she was in Elizabeth's love-affairs, urged her son to go over. 'I am sure', she wrote, 'she will not be so ill advised as to let you return discontented, for she knows the wrong she would do in abusing the brother of so great a king. The sooner the interview can take place the better, for matters long in train, especially with her, never come to any good.'[2]

Alençon, for his part, appeared to be keen enough for the adventure. He wrote to Elizabeth that his real reason for leaving the Low Countries had been in order that he might come to her.[3] Simier promised that he would come in April,[4] and Paulet, the Queen's ambassador in Paris, had like assurance from one of the Duke's gentlemen.[5] Yet he still delayed, waiting perchance for Elizabeth to commit herself further, somewhat suspicious, no doubt, of her sincerity. This delay gave rise in turn to suspicions on the part of the English. It was known that he had paid a secret visit to his brother the King at Paris in the middle of March,[6] and the old rumours began to float about again that he was seriously considering a Spanish match.[7] 'I am at the end of my Latin,' Paulet wrote from Paris on the 20th of March, 'when I consider these French doings

are of it, I think none but God can let you know yet. Only this I must say, outwardly there is some appearance of good liking, for the messengers are very well used and her Majesty's self doth seem to us all that she will marry if she may like the person. And if the person adventure without condition on assurance to come hither, if she then like him it is like she will have him. His ministers say he will adventure his coming and stand upon that matter of liking, &c. And this is all, I assure you, that can yet be said to you. As for mine own opinion, if I should speak according to former dispositions I should hardly believe it will take place. And yet if I should say conjecturally by that I newly hear and find in her deep consideration of her estate and that she is persuaded nothing can more assure it than marriage, I may be of mind she will marry if the party like her.' (Harleian MSS. 285, f. 77.)

[1] Muller and Diegerick, iii. 24. Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in England, held very much the same opinion. 'As far as can be judged by appearances and the Queen's own actions,' he wrote home on the 21st of March 1579, 'nothing more certain can be imagined than that she will marry Alençon if she can.' *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 658.

[2] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, 29 Mar. 1579.

[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 421.

[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 655.

[5] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 463.

[6] Ibid., p. 462.

[7] Ibid., p. 474.

which are so tickle and uncertain that nothing comes sooner to pass than what was least expected.'

But these passing clouds hardly shadowed for a moment the steady sunshine of royal favour which Simier and his Frenchmen continued to enjoy at the English court. Elizabeth still insisted upon an interview, but she was perfectly willing to settle the details of the marriage contract at once, so long as it was clearly understood that she might revoke any such arrangements at will if the suitor was not to her liking. Simier had received a commission from his master to open negotiations upon these terms and a beginning was made late in March.[1] Gilbert Talbot wrote from the court on the 4th of April: 'These five days past, Privy Council has sat from eight A.M. till dinner time and presently after dinner, and an hour's conference with her Majesty, to council again and so till supper time. And all this, as far as I can learn, is about the matter of Monseigneur's coming here, his entertainment here and what demands are to be made to him in the treaty of marriage.'[2] On the last day of March Simier had in fact laid before the Privy Council his master's proposals as to the marriage, based upon those presented by the French when the Anjou marriage had been under consideration in 1571. The council, after three days of deliberation, had returned an answer in which all the salient points in dispute had been reserved for settlement until the Duke arrived, so that with great show of deliberation little or no progress was made.[3] The matter was debated this way and that in various conferences between Simier and the council during April with no better result.

So far Elizabeth had left the main question in suspense and had merely referred the discussion of details to her council. But she decided at the end of April to put the main question to her councillors, demanding that they give their answers in writing. The Spanish ambassador, Mendoza, said that she had expressed herself so strongly in favour of the marriage that even those councillors who opposed it dared not speak their mind, but contented themselves with submitting the objections on both sides.[4] This was probably the case, and we are so fortunate as to be able to examine these very memoranda, which were

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 291.
[2] Lodge, *op. cit.* ii. 149.
[3] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 291.
[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 669.

intended for Elizabeth's private eye. It appears from them that Mendoza is not quite accurate when he says that the councillors contented themselves with stating the objections on both sides. Such is the form which the memoranda take, but the substance of them reveals clearly enough the sympathies of their authors.[1] Burghley, for instance, was plainly in favour of the match; Walsingham, on the other hand, was plainly against it. He expressed himself at some length on the subject, and the main points of his argument are worth noting, because they furnish the best index to his opinions at this time.

He went about the matter in a methodical fashion, discussing its advantages and disadvantages from the point of view of the general welfare of England. More precisely, he entitled his memorandum 'A Consideration of the diseased state of the realm and how the same may in some kind of sort be cured'. As he himself remarked in his opening sentence, 'the readiest way in all cure is to consider what the disease is'. He proceeded forthwith to his diagnosis, drawing a broad distinction between domestic and foreign or, as he termed them, inward and outward diseases.

'The inward diseases', he declared, 'be those that follow. First, discontentment in the subjects for that her Majesty seeketh neither by marriage nor establishing of succession to provide for the continuance of the happy quiet they enjoy under her blessed government.

'The second, the disunion of the subjects minds in respect of the diversity of religion.

'The third, the falling away in devotion of the subjects of this realm unto the competitor [Mary Stuart] in respect of religion and the expectation she hath of this crown.'

Here then, very concisely, Walsingham set down what were evidently the three great domestic problems of Elizabeth's reign: the problem of succession, the problem of enforcing religious uniformity, and the problem of dealing with Mary Stuart.

Having formulated these, he proceeded to the examination of the outward perils,

'which are', he said, 'in appearance these which follow:

'First, the evil affection borne to her Majesty by two great

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 239.

monarchs, France and Spain, which is like to bring forth dangerous effects when their home troubles shall be stayed.

'Secondarily, the growing age of the Scottish King, who in respect of the expectation of this crown will daily be sought for by the great princes to match either with their children or their next of blood, a matter already set afoot.

'Thirdly, the discontentment that Monsieur will fall into in case he miss this purpose and so may be driven by some match with Spain to be an executor of the revenge of both the princes' malice.'

In such wise Walsingham defined his problems. Then he turned at once to the matter of the marriage, asking himself in the first place whether it was sincerely intended by the French and in the second whether it was expedient. The first question was preliminary; the second drove to the very heart of the subject. It is clear, from his handling of the first, that he distrusted the French. He called attention to the delays practised by Alençon in renewing his proposal and in pressing it, and though he admitted that the French King has been seemingly in favour of the match and that Alençon has much to gain by it, he pointed out that it would be against the King's interests, in view of the rivalry between the two, to strengthen his brother's position any further in France, as such a marriage would inevitably do, and he protested that although the Duke has much to gain by the match he would very likely jeopardize his chances of succession by a marriage which gave little or no promise of children. Facing the further objection that there would be little point in Alençon's fervent prosecution of the marriage unless he wished to bring it to pass, Walsingham maintained that the show of a match with England would be the best way to advance his hopes of a match with Spain. In a word, Walsingham did not believe, or at least professed not to believe, in the sincerity of the Duke in the business.

Yet even assuming him to be sincere, the question of the expediency of the match still remained to be faced. In stating the arguments against it Walsingham merely repeated those which were current in England at the time. He alluded first to Elizabeth's well-known disinclination to marriage, maintaining that by marrying against her will she would hasten her own death, 'which we seek to avoid, she being our only comfort and

stay'. This must have struck him as being a trifle far-fetched. His second point was sound enough, though he saw fit to mar it in the making with a very bad pun : 'the danger that women of her Majesty's years are most commonly subject unto by bearing of children, and so it may fall out that Madonna may prove morbe deterior'. These two points he grouped together as 'general incommodities', that is to say, those which would oppose themselves to any project of marriage. The 'incommodities' peculiar to the match in question he discussed more at length. He touched on the difference in years as likely to breed discord between the pair and to shorten the Queen's days, on the possibility of Alençon's becoming King of France and subjecting England to the discomforts of a viceregal government, and on the ancient unpopularity of the French in England, but he laid greatest stress upon the diversity in religion, which he described as a 'matter principally to be weighed by Christian counsellors in giving advice to a Christian prince, seeing the prosperity or adversity of kingdoms dependeth of God's goodness who is so long to extend his protection as we shall depend of his providence and shall not seek our safety (carried away by human policy) contrary to his word'. 'He that beholdeth', Walsingham went on to say, 'how in these late years the mighty potentates that have bent themselves against God, have been by Him bridled contrary to man's expectation, shall have no cause to distrust neither His power nor goodness if we could soundly, without wavering and distrust, depend on Him. And what success is to be looked for from those marriages that are not made a domino, . . . let the dolorous success of the King of Navarre's marriage teach us, of which most horrible spectacle I was an eye witness.'

He was not, however, so foolish as to ignore the strong arguments which those who favoured the match brought forth. There was a disposition in Burghley's camp to regard it as a universal panacea for all ills, domestic and foreign. Walsingham, while admitting much, controverted much. He gravely questioned its beneficent working upon the 'inward perils'. Even though it would satisfy the desire of Elizabeth's subjects that she should marry, he believed that on the whole they would rather she remain unmarried than make a match with the unpopular

French house and risk her own life in the perils of child-birth. It would certainly, he maintained, aggravate rather than alleviate the religious difficulty if the Queen's own husband gave countenance to the Catholics, and even if it checked 'the falling away to the competitor' on the one hand, it would not prevent those subjects who had an eye to the future paying court to Mary's son in Scotland on the other.

The advantages of the match from the point of view of foreign policy were more obvious and much less easy to controvert. Walsingham admitted that it would very likely join France and England in an alliance sufficiently strong to bridle the malice of Spain and to obviate any peril which might threaten from Scotland. Of course it would eliminate the young suitor himself as a source of danger. But Walsingham questioned whether these advantages were worth the price and whether they could not be obtained another way. He pooh-poohed at Alençon's malevolence. We have seen, he said, how much that amounted to in his late performance in Flanders. He saw no reason to fear the hostility of France, pointing out that the Huguenots were as strong as ever they were, nay stronger, by reason of their growing confidence in their capable young leader, Henry of Navarre. If Elizabeth would lend them money to subsidize troops in Germany, she would then have little to fear from France. In the case of the Spanish danger likewise, Walsingham maintained that so long as the Dutch rebels held their own and the Spanish forces were kept out of the seaports along the Channel, there was little to be feared from Spain. She was too far off; England was too strong at sea. The danger of a coalition of the Pope, France, and Spain, which might follow a marriage between Alençon and a princess of the Spanish house, Walsingham declared to be at least as old as the marriage of Philip of Spain and Elizabeth of France in 1559. It came to nothing then, although England was then weak and France and Spain untroubled by domestic difficulties. How much less was it to be feared now when the enemies were much weaker and England, 'through God's goodness and her prudent government', much stronger both in ships and in treasure.

In a word, Walsingham took advantage of the discussion about the marriage to lay bare to Elizabeth once more a comprehensive

plan for the conduct of her foreign policy. He still insisted that her proper course was to avoid entangling alliances with the Catholic powers and to prevent their malice by maintaining the Protestant rebels within their own domains. He distrusted the French almost as much as he distrusted the Spaniards. Tossing aside old diplomatic expedients for keeping the peace, like the balance of power, he wished to build up for England a foreign policy based simply upon religious principles. He trusted the religious bond of union as he trusted none other, partly because he felt that the religious instinct was one of the strongest of human impulses, largely because he believed that God Almighty would fight for the faith. 'Let God arise,' was the burden of his chant, 'and let his enemies be scattered.' That same fine confidence in the co-operation of the eternal powers which gives to the Elizabethan buccaneers an heroic cast, inspired Walsingham at the council table. He represents the traditional Elizabethan spirit much better than either the Queen herself or Lord Burghley.[1]

But if Walsingham strongly opposed the marriage, Burghley as strongly supported it, and the net result of Elizabeth's reference of the problem to her most trusted councillors was to show them hopelessly divided. The main question thus remained unanswered while Simier and the Privy Council undertook to reach an agreement on the details of the marriage contract. Here again no progress was made, and Simier finally came to the conclusion that nothing more could be done until Alençon himself came over. He secured the Queen's consent to this; in fact, she herself wrote to Paulet commanding him to inform the French King and his brother that she had consented and to exact from them a promise that they would remain friendly to her if the interview came to nothing.[2] Paulet found Alençon eager to make the venture but unwilling to fix a date for his departure and not disposed to consider the consequences of an unfruitful interview. A little later, however, the King assured Paulet that

[1] The memorandum containing Walsingham's views is in Harleian MSS. 1582, f. 46. It is undated, but from internal evidence it may be assigned with confidence to the spring of 1579. A draft of a portion of the same paper, somewhat differently worded, is in S. P. Domestic, cxxxiii, no. 23. Both papers are in Walsingham's own hand.

[2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 293. Mauvissière's views about the marriage at this juncture may be read in Muller and Diegerick, *op. cit.* iii. 118.

whatever came of the marriage his affection for Elizabeth would be in no way diminished.[1]

Englishmen abroad were confident that the marriage would take place. It was reported from Italy that many there were having rich garments made in preparation for the ceremony.[2] Yet those in England who were best informed about the matter were still in doubt as to whether Alençon would come or not. In May the betting men in London were giving odds of two to one against his coming and three to one against the marriage.[3] Early in August Walsingham wrote to Burghley: 'It is given out that Monsieur will be here at the time limited, yet her Majesty gives no order for receiving him, which maketh us to muse what will become of the matter. And therefore it is suspected that between her Majesty and Simier (for few others are acquainted with the cause) it is concluded that he shall come over shortly in secret manner. I am of opinion that the wise men of France will never assent thereto. But matters of love and affection be not guided by wisdom. God send this cause better success than I hope after.'[4]

This uncertainty upon Walsingham's part simply bears out the universal testimony that it was part of Elizabeth's plan to keep the Duke's visit very secret. In point of fact, on 3rd August, three days before Walsingham wrote the words just cited, Alençon departed from Paris for England.[5] He was, however, delayed by storms in the Channel and did not arrive in England until the 17th.

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 2, 14.
[2] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vii. 78, n. 2.
[3] Lodge, *op. cit.* ii. 156.
[4] S. P. Domestic, cxxxi, no. 54.
[5] Muller and Diegerick, *op. cit.* iii. 119. *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 688. Mauvissière wrote the 7th of September 1579 to M. du Haillan: 'La Royne d'Angleterre ne fust jamais plus joli ny plus belle. Il n'y a rien de vieil en son faict que les ans qui ont esté ce jour d'huy 7e de ce mois quarante six. J'en auray tant le vingtiesme de ce mois et sommes d'un mesme age et non pas d'une mesme fortune. Ceux qui naissent en ce signe ne sont jamais sterilles et ne meurent gueres sans heritiers. J'ay ce jour d'huy mesme veu en mon logis l'un des miracles du monde. C'est une Anglaise de cinquante six ans qui estoit grosse de huict mois, ma voysine, et qui n'est point autrement treuvée une chose estrange en Angleterre mais naturelle à toutes les femmes du pais qui sont de bonne temperature et condition. Comme il n'y en a mille en Angleterre de meilleure que leur reyne qui fera bientôt le Roy oncle et la Royne nostre bonne maistresse grand mere, si Dieu plait. . . . Voila comme j'en parle librement, si les aversaires me blament, vous excuserés ce que je vous en dis en avant. Nous croyrons à la fin ce que nous verrons.' (P. R. O., French Transcripts.)

It is not necessary to enter into the details of his short visit. Every attempt was made to conceal his presence, and only a favoured few caught sight of him. There is no record of any significant interviews to which he was a party. Most of his time seems to have been devoted to the lighter side of courtship. There were private dinner parties, private dances, and every kind of ' love dalliance ' all day long and most of the night. The Duke got his nickname straightway ; thereafter he was the Frog, hardly a graceful pseudonym, yet received as an especial token of favour. In spite of his swart countenance, badly disfigured by small-pox, Elizabeth appeared to be vastly taken by her young suitor. Both the Spanish and the French ambassadors report that the interview had been a great success.[1] Certainly those who favoured the match had every reason to be pleased.

The opposing party in the Privy Council, of which Leicester was the recognized leader, was correspondingly despondent. They cursed roundly at the French. If Mendoza is to be believed, they even talked of thwarting the match in Parliament.[2] The agitation against the marriage, which assumed considerable proportions at this time in London, came very aptly to their purpose. Indeed, it came so aptly as to give ground for the suspicion that it was inspired by some one of the interested parties at court, possibly by Walsingham himself. The popular objections advanced so exactly coincided with his views that it is difficult to believe that he was not in some way answerable for them. It was said in Paris that Walsingham also had something to do with John Stubbs's famous pamphlet, ' The Discovery of a Gaping Gulf in which England is like to be swallowed by another French marriage ', which appeared about the same time.[3] Possibly also Sir Philip Sidney's eloquent letter to Elizabeth in condemnation of the match reflected other views than his own.[4] Sidney was Leicester's nephew and was soon to be Walsingham's son-in-law.

[1] For the reaction of the French ambassador cf. Muller and Diegerick, *op. cit.* iii. 128 ; for that of the Spanish ambassador cf. *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 693.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 693. Mendoza even went so far as to predict civil war if the match took place.

[3] *Cal. Venetian*, 1558–80, p. 261.

[4] This famous letter which called down upon Sidney the violent wrath of the Queen is printed in *Sidney Papers*, ed. Collins, i. 287–92.

At all events, from whatever source it sprang, there is no doubt that a good deal of opposition to the marriage found expression at this time in circles outside the Privy Council.[1] Furthermore, it had the effect which its authors designed. Elizabeth, who had been exchanging ardent love-letters with her suitor ever since he had left England, and who had convinced every one of her intention to marry, thought it wise to reconsider her position before she took a step which threatened to damage her prestige.

Accordingly she called a meeting of her Council to discuss the whole situation once more. They met at Greenwich on the 2nd of October and continued their sessions for five days.[2] The matter was so earnestly debated that they sat on one occasion from eight o'clock in the morning until seven in the evening without stirring from their places.[3] It was clear to Burghley that a great change had taken place in the sentiments of the councillors since the matter had been last laid before them. He found them much more united in opposition to the match, as dangerous to religion, to her Majesty and to the realm.[4] In fact, Burghley himself and Sussex seem to have been the only ones who spoke in favour of it.[5] Nevertheless the sentiments of the Queen were known to be so strongly favourable to the match that the Council as a whole did not venture to come to any formal decision in the matter. They reported to the Queen that they were unwilling to commit themselves until she had stated her own views. This evasion angered her a good deal. She

[1] By far the best account of the Puritan opposition to the match at this juncture is to be found in Mauvissière's Correspondence (French Transcripts, x, *passim*). On the 29th of October 1579 he wrote that the Puritans feared the marriage would mean their ruin, and that they did not lose an hour of time to preach, write and incite the people of England to oppose it, and that they composed books, letters and posters night and day against it. He added that the Queen was much shaken by these tactics and that at one time she thought of adding to her Council four Catholics of influence in order to counterbalance the rest. Two, Viscount Montague and the Master of the Rolls [Sir Wm. Cordell], had been in Mary's Council. The other two were the Earl of Northumberland and a fourth, for which post several were named (French Transcripts, x, f. 142, printed in part by Pollen, *op. cit.*, pp. 316–17). On the 9th of November Mauvissière wrote a good account of the agitation following the arrest of John Stubbs (ibid.). On the 15th of October 1579 he wrote of Elizabeth's opposition to the Puritans and attributed a remark to her which forecasts the famous remark of James I on the same subject. The Queen told him, Mauvissière wrote, 'aucune foys qu'a la fin ils [the Puritans] vouldroient reconnoistre ny Dieu ny roy' (ibid. x, f. 138).

[2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 268.

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, 702.

[4] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 271.

[5] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, 702.

exclaimed, 'not without shedding many tears', that she had rather expected them as a body to have petitioned her to carry the marriage through than to have cast doubts upon it. But even at that they refused to shoulder the responsibility of a definite decision. The next day they offered their services in furtherance of the marriage if it so pleased her. But they would say no more. She stormed at them again, particularly at those whom she thought opposed to the match, but in the end she had to content herself with their protestations of loyalty.[1]

Walsingham was not present at the debate, but his views upon the matter were well known to the Queen, and he came in for his share of her wrath a few days later when, in discussing the matter with her, she suddenly lost her temper and bade him begone, swearing that the only thing he was good for was as a protector of heretics.[2] Possibly this remark simply sprang from the hot temper of an angry woman. Possibly, as it was rumoured in Paris, Elizabeth had discovered Walsingham's dealings with Stubbs, the pamphleteer.[3] At any rate, he took her at her word and left court in disgrace. He does not appear to have returned again until the end of the year.[4]

Nevertheless, Elizabeth decided to continue the marriage negotiations. After a month's hesitation, during which time Simier, Alençon's agent, was constantly plying her for a decision, she suddenly, on the 10th of November, called her Council and announced to them that she had made up her mind to marry. She bade them urge no further objections but to consider what was necessary to effect her purpose. This looked like business, but in a few days she once more began to waver. Sir Edward Stafford had set out on his way to France with a message to Alençon. She ordered him back. Having made up her mind on the 11th to marry, on the 12th she demanded a further expression of opinion on the subject from her councillors. When Simier, having got wind of this, protested, she swore that her councillors were mere sieves. A little later she tried to coerce the Council into writing a joint letter to Alençon to hasten his coming.

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 273. [2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, 704.
[3] *Cal. Venetian*, 1558–80, p. 621.
[4] Cf. on his disgrace *Cal. Irish*, 1574–85, p. 197; *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 111.

When they refused once more to shoulder the responsibility, she stormed again.[1]

Finally, on the 20th, she appointed a small committee of her Privy Council, from which Leicester and Walsingham were excluded, to arrange the terms of the marriage contract with Simier.[2] On the 24th they came to a hasty agreement with him and he left for France the same day. But before he left he had to provide Elizabeth with another loophole of escape. This time she turned the popular hostility towards the marriage to diplomatic purposes. She could not marry without the consent of her subjects. She must be allowed two months to win them over. As soon as she had done so she would write personally to the French King and have him send over commissioners to confirm the contract and accomplish the marriage. If she did not write within the time appointed, the terms agreed upon were to be considered null and void. Simier was obliged to sign a paper to this effect before he left.[3] No doubt this was merely another device of the Queen to avoid committing herself irrevocably one way or the other. She saw grave objections to any decisive course, but she was very anxious to keep the negotiations open.

Notwithstanding Elizabeth's efforts to conduct her affair with Alençon according to the rules of private courtship, it must never be forgotten that he was a public personage whose chances as a suitor for Elizabeth's hand were governed much more by his public position than by his personal qualities. In the past he had figured prominently in the French religious wars. As the leader of the joint forces of the Huguenots and Politiques after St. Bartholomew's he had become so strong as to be able to make peace with his brother upon terms which had granted him a substantial apanage in the very centre of France. He could therefore command a considerable following independent of the French King. But his real strength rested not so much in his private estates as in his prospects. Henry III was childless and seemed likely to remain so. Alençon was next in line for the French throne. If he outlived his brother he would pretty certainly be King of France. As heir presumptive he commanded

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, pp. 704–5.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 95.
[3] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 275–6.

a part of the loyalty of every Frenchman, and in some sort involved the honour of France in all his schemes. In spite of the rivalry which existed between him and his brother, it was virtually impossible to dissociate the two in matters of foreign policy. Whatever Francis did Henry was to some exent obliged to countenance. It was for that reason that Elizabeth had been so strongly opposed to Alençon's interference in the affairs of the Low Countries. Not until she was quite sure that he was acting independently of the French King was she willing to acquiesce in his projects in that quarter. The same complication entered into the question of marriage. Private considerations apart, marriage with Alençon was practically synonymous with alliance with France. The problem which faced Elizabeth was not so much whether she wanted a short, swart, pock-marked fellow for a husband, as whether she wanted a close alliance with France.

In the past it had been her policy to avoid entangling alliances with either of her two great neighbours on the Continent and to seek her safety by playing one against the other. This policy was well suited to her temperament; so far she had pursued it with marked success, and for both reasons she was very loath to abandon it. On the other hand, she began to realize that in spite of all her efforts her relations with Philip of Spain were becoming yearly more and more strained. His connexion with the Ridolfi Plot had been passed over. Her dealings with the Dutch rebels had not been resented very strongly, if they were not ignored. But there was ample justification for suspicion and bitter feelings on both sides. In consequence, when Elizabeth heard in the summer of 1579 that Philip was making large military preparations by land and sea she was naturally alarmed. Hard upon this news came the report that a foreign expedition had been landed in Ireland to assist the Catholic uprising there against the English rule. It was said that there were Spanish troops among the invaders. Elizabeth complained at once to the Spanish ambassador in London. He denied the fact, but not in very reassuring terms. To make matters worse, in September word reached England of Drake's plundering exploits in the South Seas. This was not calculated to improve the situation. English traders in Spain feared that the Spanish King would

retaliate upon their property, and as though in confirmation of their fears came the news that Philip had issued a decree prohibiting the exportation of all merchandise from Spain in foreign bottoms.[1] The relations between the two countries were not cordial, to say the least. Philip had long been regarded as a secret enemy and it seemed likely at any minute that he might become an open one.

While matters hung in these doubtful terms the question of the Portuguese succession presented itself as a new factor in Spanish affairs. The young King of Portugal, Don Sebastian, had been killed on the 4th of August 1578 at the battle of Alcazar Kebir. He had no children, but was succeeded by his great-uncle Henry, a Cardinal of the Roman Church, who naturally had no children and who was himself past sixty years of age. It was plain that the new old king had not long to live and the question at once arose as to who should succeed him. There were plenty of pretenders. Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy and Alexander of Parma had some claims to recognition. Catherine de Médicis traced a shadowy title through the repudiated wife of a thirteenth-century Portuguese monarch. The Portuguese themselves were disposed to favour the claims either of Catherine of Braganza, the niece of the King, or of Don Antonio, Prior of Crato, his bastard nephew. Philip II of Spain had, however, the clearest title, and was moreover in the best position to enforce it. It was obvious to all Europe that he would enforce it when the time came. Meanwhile he contented himself with thwarting the attempts of the old king to secure a dispensation from Rome to marry and continue the old dynasty.

The news of the disastrous battle of Alcazar reached England early in September 1578.[2] The first thought which appears to have struck the English councillors in regard to it was that it would probably lead Philip to make peace in the Low Countries in order to have his hands free to deal with Portugal.[3] But the Portuguese ambassador in London soon set other thoughts to work in their heads. He made them realize how dangerous it would be for England to allow her secret enemy to add Portugal

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, pp. 686, 694, 697–8.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 171.
[3] Ibid., pp. 185, 195.

and all the wealth of the Portuguese Indies to his resources.[1] Such an acquisition would upset the balance of power and threaten the integrity of western Europe. No doubt it was largely due to his prompting that Elizabeth dispatched a special envoy, Edward Wotton, to Portugal late in May 1579. Wotton went ostensibly to congratulate the Cardinal King upon his accession, but he was also directed to investigate the state of affairs in that country, and to determine so far as he could the situation there in regard to the succession. Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in London, said that Wotton was carrying presents to Don Antonio, the Portuguese pretender, and that he had commission to offer troops. This can hardly have been true, but at any rate it is clear that Elizabeth had begun to realize that the question of the Portuguese succession had a very considerable bearing upon her own welfare.[2]

The matter appeared in the same light to the French crown. Catherine de Médicis, although she pinned little faith to her own claims to the Portuguese throne, saw the danger of letting it pass without dispute to Spain. In order to maintain the balance of power she felt the necessity of an alliance with England. Probably that explains in part the very friendly attitude which she began to take towards the English marriage early in the year 1579. Elizabeth of England was impelled by similar considerations to draw nearer to France. The increasing enthusiasm for the match on both sides of the Channel which led up to the secret visit of Alençon to England in August 1579 was clearly stimulated by the Portuguese question.[3]

Catherine de Médicis, her son the King, and Alençon himself all seem to have been very much encouraged by the results of the

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 629. The French ambassador in Madrid was urging the same point upon the French monarch, *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vii. 228 n., 447.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, pp. 672–4, 678; cf. also Wotton's report in *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 45.

[3] Not long after Alençon left England, Elizabeth had some words with Mendoza upon the subject of Portugal. She told him she knew that his master had designs upon Portugal and was raising large armies to that end. Mendoza replied that if that were indeed so his master would merely be asserting his just claims. Elizabeth replied that every one did not agree upon that point and that there were those at hand who would very effectually maintain the contrary. Mendoza retorted, in order as he said to show her that he had wind of her negotiations with France, that his master was strong enough to maintain his rights in spite of hostile alliances: *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, p. 696.

short visit to England.[1] The King announced his intention of sending 'two persons of rank' to England presently to complete the negotiations, after which Alençon was to go over and the marriage to be concluded. But Simier, who had returned to France in November, was far less confident. His letters to Elizabeth from Paris reveal clearly the fact that he was very much afraid that in his absence Leicester and those opposed to the match would win her over to their views. In particular he warned her against trusting false rumours set afoot by Walsingham's agents for the purpose of prejudicing her against her young suitor.[2]

Simier's fears were justified. When Sir Edward Stafford returned from France on the 1st of January 1580 with a bag full of promising messages from the French court, he found Elizabeth grown strangely cold.[3] Events were going ahead altogether too rapidly to suit her. She did not want the King to send over his 'two persons of rank'. Still less did she incline to the idea of a second visit from the Duke. She was not prepared at the time to commit herself so far. In consequence, those of her councillors who were less eager for the match began to find favour in her eyes.[4] Leicester appeared again at court; Walsingham

[1] On Alençon's attitude cf. his letter to Champvallon of 3 Nov. 1579, in Muller and Diegerick, iii. 158; on Catherine's cf. her letter to Mauvissière of 27 Dec. 1579, in *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vii. 212.

[2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 283.

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 1. Another version of the famous emerald story which Mendoza relates at this place will be found in Mauvissière's letter of 16 January 1580 (French Transcripts, x, f. 161).

[4] Mauvissière remarked this change of attitude, though he did not regard it as indicating a growing coldness on Elizabeth's part towards the marriage. In this connexion he wrote of Leicester and Walsingham as follows: 'Toutefois M. le comte de Lestre et le Sr. de Walsingham et quelques autres, qui estoient soubsonnez de la dicte royne de n'avoir pas faict trop bons offices en la conclusion du dict mariage sur la recommandation qu'a généralement faict S. A. [Son Altesse, Alençon], commencent ung peu à se remettre, s'excusant n'avoir point failly si n'estoit en disant leurs oppinions comme conseillers pour les inconvénians qui pourroyent venir à l'Angleterre de ce mariage, tant pour le changement d'estat que de religion; mais voyant la resolution de leur royne, ils juroient que mon dict seigneur n'auroit point de meilleurs serviteurs que eulx et leurs amys, chose de quoy ils m'ont parlé et qu'on communicque assez ouvertment et principallement le dict Sr. comte de Lestre. . . . Entre les affectionnez serviteurs qu'il a en ce royaume c'est messieurs les grand tresorier et comte de Sussex et le sécretaire Wilson, qui n'obmectent nulle chose pour luy faire service et a advencer fort honorablement le dict mariage et l'amitie de France. Le Sr. de Walsingham retournera à la court comme auparavant qui avoit esté absent et mallade, promect de faire le semblable et

returned after two months' exile. No doubt their arguments against the match encouraged her to persist in her policy of delay.[1] That, at any rate, was what she decided to do. Stafford was dispatched again to France in haste with a letter to Alençon very well designed to dampen his ardour.[2] She protested that she had done her utmost to win the assent of her subjects to the match, as she had promised to do, but she had found them

comme estant subtil et advisé et homme d'entendement s'il prent le frein aux dents comme autrement ce ne seroit pas son proffict, il pourra faire de grans services à monseigneur duquel il a tousjours fort honorablement parlé et disoit qu'il meritoit plus que l'Angleterre pour ses grandes vertus et louables calites.' (Mauvissière to Henry III, 16 Jan. 1580, French Transcripts, x, f. 161.)

[1] For Leicester's views at this juncture cf. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 2.

[2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 298. This letter is undated, but it is clearly the one to which Alençon replied in his letter of 28 January 1580, ibid. ii. 307. About the same time that Elizabeth wrote this letter Mauvissière informed his master that the English Parliament which was to have reassembled 20 January had been postponed until the end of February in order that Alençon's answer should first be received. Mauvissière's observations on the attitude of Parliament towards the marriage and on the more general question of the influence of the Crown on Parliamentary elections are worth quoting at length. He wrote to Henry III, 27th of January 1580: 'Mais à la fin il a esté consideré prudemment par ceulx qui tiennent le party du dict mariage, de quelles personnes est composé le dict parlement, qui sont tous à la fin ceux qui désirent et demanderoient la religion puretaine et calviniste, qui furent nommez et mis il y a trois ans par ceulx qui ont voullu advencer les dictes religions et destruire l'anglicane, avec ce peu qui restoient encores de pauvres catholiques, qui estoient alors diversement tourmentez, chose qui a estée remonstrée prudemment à la royne et qu'il lui failloit licentier tous ceux de ce parlement, desquelz elle ne seroit jamais bien servie, ny les trouveroit à sa dévotion, que au contraire ilz avanceroient les religions puretaines et calvinistes et tacheroient de primer l'anglicane qui estoit la sienne, où elle a presté dilligement l'oreille, et à connoistre que tous ceulx de ce dict parlement avoyent esté mis et nommez par ceulx qui commandoient il y a près de quatre ans, que le temps estoit autre qu'il n'est à ceste heure, et avoyent tousjours eu le désir de la brider en son mariage et en sa relligion, ce qu'elle commence a voulloir connoistre, puis on luy a allégué ung remède du quel elle ce debveroit servir contre les praticques présentes: se servit d'assembler ceulx de ce parlement icy pour sept ou huict jours, leur proposer quelques affaires du royaume, leur demander une légere imposition, puis après les casser et renvoyer ceste compaignie, comme il se peult faire selon la loy et coutume du royaume, et quinze jours, ou quelque temps après, ordonner une nouvelle assemblée d'autres estatz où la dicte royne pourroit mettre gens de sa main et à sa dévotion, ausquelz, en mesme temps qu'elle feroit son mariage, assembleroit ung nouveau parlement et leur proposeroit et feroit ratiffier tous ensemble sa volunté; seroient asseurez de ceulx qui seroyent par elle nommez audict parlement nouveau et de tout ce qu'elle vouldroit establir et ordonner pour la loy, relligion ou quelque chose que ce fust. Voyla, Sire, le conseil qu'on luy donne si elle se veult oster de la subjection de ce parlement icy, qui a tousjours esté prolongé par le conseil de ceulx qui ont esté cause d'y nommer les hommes qui en sont aujourdhui, qui répugnent entièrement à l'alliance de France et ne parlent que des meurtres qui s'y sont faicts et de la St. Bertelmy et de l'entienne inimitié d'entre ces deulx royaumes.' (P. R. O., French Transcripts.)

obstinate upon the point of conceding to him the free exercise of his prescribed religion. If he could not give up that demand, she thought they had better drop the question of marriage and remain faithful friends.

The raising of the old religious objection was an ominous sign. It had been the rock upon which former marriage projects with France had split. Burghley, for his part, was convinced that the match was quite broken off, and cast about for other measures to provide for the safety of the realm.[1] Alençon, when he received the Queen's letter, complained bitterly. He said that he had yielded practically every one of his demands to her. He hinted that if she exerted herself she might very easily win over her subjects, and he made it sufficiently plain that he regarded the religious difficulty merely as a pretext to break the match off.[2] Simier, writing by the same post with 'douleur infinie', declared that he recognized easily enough that the Queen's change of feeling was due to the devices of those who wished 'to break the neck of the affair'. He exhorted her not to let them betray her and concluded with the prayer that she would preserve her monkey from the paw of the bear, an evident allusion to the bear in Leicester's coat of arms.[3]

So the matter rested for something like a month. Meanwhile events in Europe were moving with startling rapidity and in a direction which appeared to make a close alliance with France more necessary to England than ever. On the last day of January 1580 'God called to his mercy the old Cardinal King of Portugal'. The news reached Paris on the 22nd of February, and with it the further news that Philip of Spain was preparing to invade Portugal and make good his claims to the throne.[4] At the same time Elizabeth was getting disquieting news from Scotland. Ever since the last adherents of the Marian faction had been crushed in Edinburgh Castle in 1573 the Regent Morton had been governing Scotland in the name of the young King. Morton was by no means scrupulous in his methods, but he was a strong man, he kept the peace and he was favourably disposed towards the English. So long as he remained in power Elizabeth

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 308. [2] Ibid. 307.
[3] Ibid. 311; cf. also Stafford's letter to Burghley of 28 January 1580 in *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 143.
[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 166–7.

had little to fear from the north quarter. He had, however, many enemies, and the most formidable of these, joining together, compelled him to resign his position as regent in the spring of 1578. The King, not yet thirteen years of age, declared his intention of ruling in his own name. A little later in the year Morton succeeded in regaining his position again, but his second term was a brief one. In September 1579 a man landed in Scotland who was destined to bring about his disgrace and his death. This was Esmé Stuart, Sieur d'Aubigny, a nephew of the King's grandfather, who had long been living in France and who came to Scotland at the King's invitation. D'Aubigny, a man of middle age and of many accomplishments, quickly gained an ascendancy over the young James. What made him particularly dangerous to the English was the fact that he was a Catholic and was shrewdly suspected to be working upon James in the interests of his mother, the captive Mary Stuart. He was in fact an emissary of the Guisan party in France and represented in his own person a reactionary tendency in Scotland towards its old policy of alliance with France and hostility towards England. As such he constituted a menace to Elizabeth in the north, and she watched him grow in favour there month by month with increasing concern. Her efforts to thwart his influence in Scotland will be discussed at length elsewhere. For the present we are concerned with the Scottish question only in so far as it affected the relations of England to France.

From this point of view what Elizabeth chiefly feared about d'Aubigny was that his success in Scotland would induce the French King to revert once more to the traditional French policy of alliance with Scotland against England. Her enemies in France, the House of Guise, were strong advocates of this course and were constantly exerting themselves to win Henry III to their way of thinking. They always had the Church on their side, and Henry was a pious churchman on occasions; they always had the cause of his sister-in-law, Dowager Queen of France, the captive Mary Stuart, to appeal to. The most obvious objection to their schemes was that they were impracticable. The triumph of the reformers in Scotland had shut the 'postern gate' against French intrigue. But what if d'Aubigny's influence should open it again? How then would Henry III

feel about the matter? These questions troubled Elizabeth considerably.

To make matters worse, at the beginning of the year 1580 civil war had once more broken out in France. It was a small affair, to be sure, but it set the Protestants temporarily against the King and increased the danger of an alliance between him and the ultra-Catholic Guises.

Elizabeth then, while she saw the necessity of securing an ally against Spain on the one hand, saw much in the situation in Scotland to induce her to keep fast hold upon the goodwill of France upon the other. In a word, the arguments from every quarter were overwhelmingly in favour of a French alliance. This was apparent not only to the Queen herself but even to those of her councillors who had most strongly opposed the alliance in the past. On the 5th of March 1580 the Archbishop of York wrote from the English court: 'The French matter hath been long asleep and seemed as dead, but now is revived again.... The Earl of Leicester, Mr. Hatton and Mr. Walsingham have earnestly moved her Majesty to go forward with the marriage as her most safety. It is looked for that both Simier and other French commissioners will be here before Easter to make up a conclusion.'[1] Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, noted the same revival of enthusiasm for the match. In his letter of 12th March to the Spanish King he gave an account of a visit which Elizabeth paid on the 10th to the French ambassador. 'It was considered', he added, 'a great innovation for the Queen to go to his house and it is looked upon by some as a sure indication that the marriage will take place; beside which Walsingham and others who opposed it are now declaring that it is necessary in order to avoid troubles which otherwise might befall them as a consequence of disagreement with France at this time.'[2]

For the moment the significant members of the English Council seemed to be united in favour of the marriage. Elizabeth herself professed to be very well affected towards it. She kept up an active correspondence with Alençon, full of the most extravagant professions of affection.[3] Mauvissière, the French ambassador

[1] Lodge, *Illustrations*, ii. 162. [2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 16.

[3] It seems likely that she even made some concessions at this time upon the point of religion, offering Alençon the privilege of some sort of very private ceremony; cf. *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 181.

at London, found her irresolute and fearful at times, 'swayed divers ways like all women', but he believed the general situation to be distinctly hopeful.[1] Alençon was persuaded to send over his secretary, de Vray, to England to try his luck once more.[2]

De Vray reached England early in May, but contrary to the general expectation he accomplished nothing. The Spanish ambassador, who in March had been certain that the marriage would take place, wrote in May that it was entirely broken off and that a pretence of negotiations was maintained merely to save the young suitor's face.[3] Catherine de Médicis, when she heard de Vray's report, abandoned the matter with a sigh.[4] One of Walsingham's agents in Paris wrote to him early in June that the marriage had grown out of remembrance and served merely to provoke a smile.[5]

All of which is very perplexing. The Portuguese situation had not changed; the Scotch situation had not improved; the Irish rebellion fostered by Philip of Spain had not been completely suppressed. How was it then that Elizabeth still ventured to play fast and loose with her one promising ally in Europe? It is hard to find any explanation for her vacillation outside of her own feminine caprice, unless it be the secret workings of Leicester and his partisans. The situation in the Low Countries certainly influenced her calculations not a little at this time, but it served on the whole rather to strengthen the arguments for marriage than to weaken them. It will be remembered that Alençon, after his first futile expedition in aid of the Dutch in the summer of 1578, had withdrawn to France, leaving des Pruneaux, his agent, at Antwerp to represent his interests. While he lingered in France, busy for the most part about his marriage affairs, the fortunes of the Dutch rebels went from bad to worse. The Pacification of Ghent proved to be a hollow truce at best, and Orange's scheme for settling religious differences by mutual toleration far too broad-minded to appeal to the rank

[1] Mauvissière to des Pruneaux, 20 Mar. 1580, Muller and Diegerick, iii. 275.

[2] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vii. 244.

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 31–4. The Venetian ambassador at Paris held very much the same opinion; cf. *Cal. Venetian*, 1558–80, pp. 640, 642.

[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 275.

[5] Ibid., p. 292.

partisans for whom it was devised. The discontented Catholic nobles in the south and west worked with the excesses of the Calvinists in Ghent and elsewhere to widen the breach between the adherents of the two faiths, joined for the moment under one banner. The outcome of this was the formation, in January 1579, of two leagues or unions, one of the Catholic malcontents at Arras, the other of the northern Protestant provinces at Utrecht. Both unions professed fidelity to the Pacification of Ghent, but the Union of Arras was formed primarily for the defence of Catholicism and plainly looked towards reconciliation with Spain, while that of Utrecht, the kernel of the Dutch Republic, was manifestly Protestant in its spirit and absolutely anti-Spanish in its intentions. Five months later, at the Abbey of Saint Vaast in Arras, the Catholic confederacy was formally reconciled with Spain, and the seven northern provinces were left alone to continue the war against Philip II.

The situation, from the point of view of Orange and the rebels, was a desperate one at best. It was rendered still more grave by the very conspicuous ability which the new regent, Alexander of Parma, at once began to display both as a diplomatist and as a soldier. It was largely due to his tact that the malcontents had been won back to Spain. His vigorous campaigning in the spring and early summer of 1579 was alike disastrous to the cause of the rebels. It became obvious to Orange that the Dutch were not strong enough by themselves to cope with the situation. He turned therefore once more for foreign aid. There was little to be hoped for from England. Elizabeth and the Dutch were at cross-purposes. She protested that they kept her completely in the dark as to their plans and, what was worse, did not pay back the money they owed her. In May 1579 she recalled Davison, the English agent at Antwerp, and sent no successor.[1] Clearly she was in no mood to come to their assistance, and Orange made little or no effort to induce her. Alliance with France had always been more to his taste; the relations with Alençon, though strained, were not broken. Though the French were unpopular with the Dutch in general, the wisest heads among them believed that the French alliance was indispensable and that it could be gained only through the medium of Alençon.

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, Introd., p. l.

Orange and his advisers succeeded in impressing this fact upon the majority of members in the Estates General, and induced them in June 1579 to make fresh advances to the Duke.[1]

Meantime Alençon on his part was displaying a livelier interest in the affairs of the Low Countries. In the early summer of 1579 he received vague assurances from them that they would receive him as their lord if they did not very shortly come to terms with Spain. If Rossel, a rather unreliable agent of Walsingham's in the Low Countries, is to be trusted, deputies were passing between Alençon and the Estates in August.[2] Throughout the autumn of 1579 and the spring of 1580 these negotiations continued. They were carried on for the most part by Des Pruneaux in Antwerp, but early in May 1580 they had got so far that two deputies left for France to deal with Alençon directly.[3]

Rumours of all these negotiations came, for the most part through Walsingham's agents, to Elizabeth's ears. It appeared quite likely that the Duke would win his point and be accepted as sovereign of the warring provinces practically on his own terms. This Elizabeth did not altogether relish. She relished it still less when she discovered from her French correspondents that Alençon was doing his best to compose the civil dissensions in France, in order to secure the joint support of the Huguenots and of his brother the King in his Flemish designs. In that case she was faced once more by the danger she had long dreaded, a union of the Netherlands with France. Necessary as the French alliance appeared to her, on many counts, in the early summer of 1580, she was by no means disposed to be a party to plans which would end in making the Dutch French.

The civil war in France complicated Elizabeth's problem still further. The rebellious Huguenots were her inveterate allies. She had assisted them in the past; their leaders looked to her for assistance again. Henry of Navarre sent Duplessis Mornay begging to her in March 1580.[4] The Prince of Condé visited her on his way to muster German mercenaries in June.[5] What was

[1] Muller and Diegerick, iii. 98 n.; cf. also Des Pruneaux to the Queen of Navarre, ibid. iii. 101, and Japikse, ii. 602.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, 36.

[3] Ibid. 291, 293.

[4] Ibid. 180; cf. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 34–5.

[5] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 329; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 39–40. From a letter from Thomas Milles to Leicester, dated 23 July 1580, it appears that Leicester was instrumental in getting for Condé the sum of £300, though

the Queen to do? She disliked to abandon the Protestant allies. On the other hand, she could hardly afford to hazard the goodwill of the French King by meddling with his rebellious subjects.[1] It was possible that she might induce Alençon to join forces with the Huguenots as he had done once before. In that way he might be diverted from the question of the Low Countries, and stir up enough trouble in France to prevent danger from that quarter. But if France were weakened, where could Elizabeth hope to find an ally against Spain? The position was certainly a difficult one in the extreme. As Elizabeth looked at it two facts became clear. She must not antagonize the King of France, but she must prevent him from getting control of the Low Countries. The cause of the Huguenots in France was under the circumstances a secondary consideration.

Fortunately for her, in the civil war then waging in France, generally known as the Lovers' War, the question of religion played a minor part. The privileges of the Huguenots were not seriously menaced and a large number of their partisans were consequently out of sympathy with the taking of arms. Navarre and Condé seem to have been largely influenced by private grievances and private ambitions. The love-affairs of the Queen of Navarre and her ladies-in-waiting had a good deal to do with the actions of the leaders. A desire for plunder animated the rank and file. Under these circumstances Elizabeth was clearly not justified in interfering except in the cause of peace. She therefore decided to refuse the aid which Navarre and Condé demanded and to co-operate with the French King in arranging terms with his rebels.[2] Possibly, as Mendoza asserted, she

whether this money came from Leicester's private purse or from the royal treasury is not revealed (B.M. Harl. MSS. 287, f. 54). Some account of Condé's visit to England at this time will also be found in *Memoirs of Mme. de Mornay* (ed. de Witt), i. 130. Two envoys of Condé had arrived in England in December 1579, Sarazin and La Huguerye. There is an account of their mission in *Mémoires de la Huguerye*, ii. 31 ff. In the course of his account La Huguerye speaks of Master Geoffrey, a French surgeon, who, La Huguerye says, dominated Walsingham. I have not been able to identify this surgeon. He may have been, like so much else of which La Huguerye wrote, a creature of the imagination. Mme. de Mornay and La Huguerye both assert that Condé came to England to propose marriage to Elizabeth, but there is no other evidence in support of this statement and it is on the face of it highly improbable.

[1] *Cal. Venetian*, 1580–90, p. 640.

[2] She even thought of sending a special envoy to France, but probably did not. *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 346.

promised Condé that she would assist him if her efforts for peace fell through, but she gave him no further countenance except in the presence of the French ambassador, and explained to the French King at length that she had only received him because he had desired her to use her good offices in the cause of peace.[1]

So the Queen avoided entangling herself in French domestic toils, won for herself the gratitude of the French monarch, and increased his goodwill towards her. But she still realized that in furthering the cause of peace with France she increased the danger of a united effort on the part of France in the Low Countries. This matter bothered her a good deal. She laid it before her Council at large and discussed it privately with Burghley. Burghley believed that the best way to check the French advance in the Low Countries was for Elizabeth herself to go to their aid with men and money. He scouted the idea, which the Queen herself was disposed to cherish, that the Dutch might be induced to come to terms with Spain. Differences of religion he justly held to be an insurmountable obstacle to that conclusion. He frankly admitted that the relations between England and the Low Countries were strained, but he thought that if substantial offers of assistance were made the Dutch would prefer her protection before that of France. He therefore proposed that Elizabeth should send a trustworthy man to the Prince of Orange at once with this end in view, and a second agent to the King of Spain, to protest that until he was willing to make terms with the rebels by conceding the religious freedom which they demanded, she felt herself compelled to assist them in order to keep them out of the hands of France. Finally Burghley advised that she should dispatch a third agent to the Duke of Alençon, to remonstrate with him for dealing with the Low Countries without taking her into his confidence and to point out to him that if he concluded with them without consulting her he was more than likely to spoil his chances of marriage. She was to beg him therefore to suspend his decision and to dispatch the commissioners for completing the marriage negotiations at once, so that they might discuss the question of the marriage and of the Low Countries together.[2]

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 39; *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 316–17.

[2] Cf. Burghley's excellent statement of the general situation at this time in *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 343.

It is clear enough that Burghley did not regard the French civil war as a factor of importance in the situation. It is equally clear that he feared the intentions of the French in the Low Countries more than he feared a war with Spain in consequence of the direct intervention of England on behalf of the Dutch. Evidently he still favoured the Alençon marriage. One sees always at the back of his mind the solid considerations of trade. It is not to be believed, however, that he really favoured war against Spain. Apparently he calculated that if Elizabeth strengthened her hand by a marriage with France on the one hand, and asserted herself vigorously on behalf of the Dutch on the other, Philip II would find it expedient to come to terms with his rebels, and the lucrative trade between England and Burgundy would resume its accustomed flow.

Walsingham's attitude is a little harder to get at, but it was certainly at odds with Burghley's. For one thing, he was evidently much more interested in the cause of the Huguenots. Both Navarre and Condé regarded him as their chief advocate in the Queen's Council. Navarre appealed to him particularly 'as to one who has ere now shown true zeal and singular affection towards the Church of God in general and our poor churches in France in particular'.[1] Condé depended chiefly upon his backing at the time of his visit to England, and there is some reason to believe that he and Hatton and Leicester worked hard to get for him the financial support which he sought.[2] In a letter to Cobham, the new English ambassador at Paris, in April, Walsingham expressed his belief that the new war against the Huguenots formed part of a design concerted by Spain and France against Protestantism at large. Although he lacked evidence to support such views his exaggeration of the religious motive in international politics made him scent holy alliances against his faith in every unfavourable breeze.[3] A little later he entertained the possibility of reopening the breach between the French King and his brother and of uniting Alençon with the Huguenot rebels. His opposition to the marriage was as strong as ever, his eagerness to support the Dutch rebels equally so.

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 180.
[2] Hume, *Great Lord Burghley*, 342–3.
[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 267.

A letter which he wrote to the Earl of Leicester on the 15th of July contains the best available expression of his views upon the general situation at the time.

'[Her Majesty discloses, in the copies] of such letters as she sent to Monsieur and unto Monsieur [Simier, which] it pleased her to show [me upon my] return to the court, that so[mewhat she abandoneth] that course that you did put her [in upon your] departure hence, touching the [Low] Country causes. Besides she [thinketh] still that the commissioners [that are] to be sent hither may have [commission] to deal as well for fri[endship as] for marrying. [By the] answer that shall be made to [Mr. Stafford's] despatch by Monsieur we sha[ll be] able to guess what will be [the end of] this matter of marriage which [the] fautors thereof are not without hope still to bring to [pass], relying chiefly upon the p[erils] which they see do daily in[crease] which they think [argue] a necessity of marriage [as the] only refuge of surety and . . . . I find by them that nothin[g doth] content them more than w[hen they] hear of any mischief [likely] to light upon this realm, [for the] prevention whereof it is stra[nge to] see how coldly they are aff[ected].

'The copy of Gilpin's letter [which] your Lordship shall receive here[with hath] put me in good comfort [of a better intention on the part of the States towards us. It appears] that they determine to [acquaint] her Majesty with their proceedings by the sending over of one hither from the [States] for that purpose. I doubt [not] but that they consider that there is no great difference between a French and a Spanish tyrant.' They are not thrown into that necessity for the present but that they may take good advice before they conclude. The Prince of Orange is no fool and St. Aldegonde knoweth well enough the French insolence.'[1]

As between Burghley's and Walsingham's policy Elizabeth plainly preferred Burghley's. She told Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, that she meant to assist the Dutch unless his master conceded to them the religious liberty which they demanded. She bade Davison prepare for a mission to the Prince of Orange and she dispatched Sir Edward Stafford to France to revive the

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula E vii, f. 140. This original holograph letter is much damaged by fire. The sense of it is clear enough, but I have had to patch out the wording in many cases by additions of my own, which are enclosed in square brackets. The letters of the Queen referred to in the opening sentence are possibly those printed in *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 358, 366. The policy which Leicester had urged in Low Country causes was possibly that one revealed in Walsingham's letter to Gilpin of 4 June 1580 (*Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 291).

marriage negotiations. Stafford was directed to request that the French King send over commissioners to arrange for the match at once. It was, however, quite characteristic of Elizabeth that she instructed Stafford at the same time to arrange that the French commissioners be empowered to treat of an alliance as well as a marriage and to discuss the question of the Low Countries.[1]

Stafford found Alençon in a compliant mood. He saw clearly enough that Elizabeth's desire to have the commissioners empowered to treat of an alliance as well as a marriage proceeded from a desire on her part to juggle still with the marriage question, and he would have none of it. But he yielded upon the matter of the Low Countries and consented to dispatch the commissioners at once.[2] The fact is that Alençon, who was at this juncture deep in his negotiations for the sovereignty of the Low Countries, found it necessary to keep the negotiations for the marriage open on almost any terms. The possibility of his alliance with England made him so much the more desirable to the Dutch.

Indeed Alençon was a little too compliant to suit the Queen's taste. He sought to excuse himself to her for his dealings with the Dutch,[3] but his excuses were thin, and it became increasingly apparent that he meant to go ahead in the matter whether she liked it or not. She began to suspect that he was overreaching her at her own game and exploiting the marriage negotiations for purposes of which she manifestly disapproved. In that case the coming of the commissioners had better be prevented. Such probably was her feeling when she received Alençon's letter late in July. She at once sent a dispatch to Cobham instructing him to make new difficulties. The war against the Huguenots in France would give him his cue. He was to protest to the King that his persecution of the Protestants had aroused such opposition to the French alliance in England that it would be inexpedient to send commissioners at this time.[4] And so Cobham, who had been reporting that the King and his mother were keener for the match than ever and were prepared to make

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 333–5.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 373 cf. also *Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 335.

all sorts of concessions to bring it to pass, was obliged to dampen their ardour forthwith.[1] But he had hardly done so before Elizabeth began to blow hot again. On the 30th of August, in commenting upon Cobham's letter from France, Walsingham wrote to Burghley :

'Her Majesty, seeing by these letters that the King of Spain prevails in Portugal, and seeing a disposition in the French King in spite of the Queen Mother's speech, to persecute the war against those of the Religion, has put on a disposition to proceed in her marriage and has therefore caused me to qualify the former message sent to the Queen Mother, letting her know that the causes why she wished the commissioners to stay until a peace was concluded was because she was advised that this was likely to take place out of hand ; which if it had come to pass before the coming of the commissioners would have wrought great satisfaction in the subjects here. Her meaning was not that in case no peace should be concluded the commissioners should not come at all.' [2]

On the 30th of August this message went off to Cobham. On the 7th of September he delivered it to the Queen Mother at Fontainebleau.[3] She replied in friendly terms, but nothing more came of the matter for some months. Alençon was apparently too busy with his negotiations with the Dutch, and the French King and his mother too anxious to settle their difficulties with the Huguenots to give much thought to it. The silence on the subject through September, October, and November in the state papers of the time is remarkable. Elizabeth, for her part, as the French grew more indifferent, appears to have grown more eager. She maintained her correspondence with Alençon on the one hand, and on the other redoubled her expressions of goodwill to the King and his mother. Apparently she abandoned all thought of turning the Duke from his course in the Low Countries. When he was treating with the embassy from the Estates in September he sent her a copy of their offers. She did not express any disapproval, although she advised him not to be too extravagant.[4] The Treaty of Plessis le Tours, signed on the 19th of September, by which he became sovereign of the Low Countries, passed her almost unnoticed. So far was

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80 p. 401.
[2] Ibid., p. 400.
[3] Ibid., p. 411.
[4] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 365, 358.

she from alarm lest the King of France should impatronize himself in the Netherlands, that she actually urged Alençon to secure his brother's assistance if he could.[1]

In view of Elizabeth's previous fears upon this point, her attitude at this juncture is little short of amazing. It may perhaps be explained in part by the fact that her fears of Spain made her welcome any measure calculated to weaken his power. No doubt she was considerably alarmed also by the ambiguous behaviour of France. The vigorous prosecution of the Huguenot wars there, the favours which the House of Guise were receiving at the French court, the increasing ascendancy of their agent d'Aubigny in Scotland, and the indifference which Catherine and her son were displaying towards the Portuguese question, all seemed to point to the fact that France was swinging over to a policy favourable to Spain and antagonistic to England.[2] It is pretty certain that Elizabeth misread the signs of the times, but all the evidence which she had on hand convinced her that she must keep fast hold upon the friendship of the French King and avoid all topics calculated to estrange him.

For the rest of the year 1580 her policy towards France was shaped with that end in view. Her first aim in France was to restore peace between Henry III and his rebellious subjects. Early in October she dispatched Sir Edward Stafford to Alençon with the request that he should use his good offices as a mediator.[3] This was exactly what Alençon had been trying to do for some months in furtherance of his own plans. Stafford, in fact, found him at Fleix engaged with the King of Navarre upon that very topic.[4] Naturally he was well received and was allowed to take some part in the negotiations during November. No doubt his arguments in favour of peace, as representing the views of Elizabeth, had something to do with bringing these negotiations to a successful termination. On the 26th of November 1580 the Peace of Fleix restored the Huguenots to their obedience upon terms not unfavourable to themselves. This was proof enough that the French King was not at any rate ultra-Catholic in his sympathies. Elizabeth breathed more freely.

[1] Ibid. ii. 358.

[2] Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, played upon this sentiment (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 62).

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 52–3.

[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 473.

Meanwhile the Portuguese question had been occupying a good deal of her attention. Apart from her half-hearted attempts to join with France for the defence of Portugal, she had been dealing secretly with the party in that country directly opposed to Philip. Attention has already been drawn to Wotton's mission of observation in 1579. About the middle of June 1580 an envoy came to England secretly from Don Antonio, the Portuguese pretender, whose object was apparently to secure the Queen's recognition of the rights of his master and such other aid as she would give. Elizabeth was not prepared at that moment to commit herself so far.[1] Similar appeals made to her about the same time by Catherine of Braganza met with no better results. Even if we assume that the Queen was considering the advisability of supporting some candidate against Philip, in the multitude of pretenders it was hard for her to choose. She contemplated sending an envoy to Portugal in July in order that she might get some first-hand reports on the situation, but events moved so rapidly there that before the envoy got started it was almost too late for him to go.[2] Late in June Philip's armies under the Duke of Alva crossed the Portuguese frontier. Before the end of July news reached England that Alva had traversed the country to the sea and had captured the important position of Setubal, just south of Lisbon. A month later he was in Lisbon.[3] The matter appeared to be quite past mending. If any hope was to be gathered by Philip's antagonists, it lay in the popular support which the bastard Don Antonio had found among his countrymen and which offered some nucleus for an opposition to Spanish rule. He had been crowned king by the Lisbon populace ; he had offered what slight opposition had been offered to Alva's advance. Thereafter whatever plans Elizabeth entertained for opposing Spain from that quarter centred about his person.

Don Antonio sent a second envoy to England early in August, one Juan Rodriguez da Sousa. He brought with him letters to the Queen, to Leicester, to Walsingham, and to the other Principal Secretary, Thomas Wilson. It is worth while observing,

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 37.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 325, 367 ; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 43.
[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 361, 416.

in passing, that he was plainly directed to the Leicesterian faction in the Privy Council rather than to Sussex or Burghley, who were generally held to be more kindly disposed towards Spain. Da Sousa's visit was kept very dark. If the Queen saw him at all, she did so very privately ; he carried on his negotiations with Wilson and Walsingham. The substance of his request was that Elizabeth should supply Don Antonio with twelve ships of war, 2,000 arquebusiers, a large quantity of powder and ball, and as much bronze ordnance as she could spare. Da Sousa promised that all these things would be handsomely paid for in Portugal. Neither Walsingham nor Wilson fell in with these demands. They pointed out to da Sousa that it was too late to accomplish anything with a few ships and a couple of thousand soldiers in Portugal. They thought that more could be done by sending English ships to the outlying possessions of Portugal, and talked of expeditions under Drake, just back from his three years' trip around the world, against Brazil and the Portuguese Indies. But apparently none of these projects materialized.[1] Da Sousa lingered in England until early in November, when he left for the Low Countries with letters from the Queen to the Prince of Orange and some vague promises of an alliance between the English and the Dutch rebels on his master's behalf.

Meantime Elizabeth, through the ambassador in Paris, had been urging upon the French King and his mother the necessity of some joint action by England and France in Portuguese affairs. So long as the Huguenot wars continued these advances met with a very half-hearted response, but immediately after the Peace of Fleix was signed both the King and his mother showed every disposition to join with England in a vigorous opposition to Spain. The offers which Cobham had been making throughout the autumn to negotiate a treaty of alliance were accepted and preliminaries were begun in Paris early in December. The King announced his intention to send commissioners to England at once to negotiate the marriage. He even hinted that he would be willing to support his brother in his Flemish enterprises if Elizabeth would co-operate with him.[2]

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 47, 52, 55 ; cf. also *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 448, 454.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 505, 510, 520.

Looking at the matter from the point of view of the French crown, it is not hard to explain the sudden revival of the French King's interest in the English marriage at this juncture. While Henry III was at war with the Huguenots he was constantly disturbed by the fear that his brother would join forces with them as he had before, and he was consequently opposed to a match which might simply serve to unite his brother, his rebellious subjects, and Protestant England together against him. When that fear was banished by the Treaty of Fleix the question of the marriage took on quite another aspect. Alençon had been chiefly instrumental in negotiating the treaty in order that he might secure his brother's assistance in his Flemish projects. Henry III had pledged himself, in the event of peace, to help him.[1] Now that peace was accomplished Francis called upon his brother to redeem his pledge. The situation was embarrassing in the extreme. Contrary to the opinion prevalent in England, neither Henry nor his mother wished to get mixed up in the Dutch wars. They lacked both the means and the inclination for a fight with Spain. On the other hand, especially in view of the King's pledges, they could not altogether abandon Alençon in his schemes.

From this dilemma the English marriage offered an available means of escape. If Elizabeth could be induced to marry Alençon, then she would be virtually bound to assist him and the French crown would at least escape the danger of having to fight Spain alone. Marriage would secure this for France much more certainly than the alternate plan of a close alliance without marriage. Catherine de Médicis herself thought that in the event of marriage fighting might altogether be avoided and Philip II be prepared to make peace on reasonable terms. Like Elizabeth, she preferred peace to war. The English marriage seemed to her to promise peace with honour.

It was generally expected that the commissioners would cross the Channel early in January, but January passed and February also and they still lingered in France. Elizabeth seems to have had some misgivings at the last moment and to have aroused the distrust of the French. She raised again some of the old objections to the personnel of the embassy, and when that matter was

[1] Muller and Diegerick, iii. 573.

adjusted and they were ready to set out she seriously considered the expedient of refusing to grant them passports. But they got away at last and reached England on the 16th of April.[1]

Meantime the situation in England had been confused not a little by the arrival of a special envoy from Alençon on the 16th of February. This was the Sieur de Marchemont, a man destined to play a considerable part in the marriage negotiations during the next year.[2] He came to fill the place, which Simier had formerly filled, of special agent of Alençon at the English court. It will appear that as time went on he resorted to very much the same methods of winning the Queen's favour that Simier had used, although he conducted himself with rather more dignity. No doubt Alençon sent him in order to have some one at hand in England more trustworthy than he held his brother's agent to be, to watch over his interests. But he had a special commission as well. Alençon was busy in France making preparations to march into the Low Countries and assume his sovereignty there. He needed assistance in money and men. The aid which his brother had promised was not forthcoming.[3] He therefore turned to Elizabeth and Marchemont was the instrument he used. His idea was apparently to cut athwart the tedious negotiations of the commissioners, dash over to England secretly, and either marry the Queen off-hand or else obtain money for his Flemish enterprises. The whole matter was kept so secret that it is difficult to follow in detail, but it is certain that Alençon made the proposal through Marchemont, that Elizabeth received it rather lightly at first,[4] but that when she saw it was really meant seriously advised strongly against it on the grounds that she saw little hope of the marriage and did not wish to bring dishonour upon the Duke. She added,

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 27, 65; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 91; *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 305, 377; *Walsingham's Diary*, p. 41. The commissions for the French envoys both from the King and from Alençon are printed in *Mémoires de Castelnau* (ed. Laboureur), i. 674.

[2] Most of Marchemont's correspondence is in *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii, *passim*. Hume's conjecture (*Courtships of Queen Elizabeth*, 235) that the correspondent who signed himself 'le moyne' was Marchemont himself is confirmed by a passage in a letter from Walsingham to Sir E. Stafford dated 8 February 1583–4 (S. P. France, x, f. 46), which runs as follows: 'I send you herewith two letters from her Majesty, one directed to Monsieur and the other to Marchemont under the name of the moyne.'

[3] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 393.

[4] Ibid. ii. 484.

however, that if he thought the Flemish enterprises might be used to explain his coming, she would be glad enough to see him and debate these matters with him.[1] This seemed fair enough, and the fact that Alençon persisted in his intentions in spite of the small hope of marriage which Elizabeth held out to him bears out the opinion of the Spanish ambassador that he was more interested in getting the Queen's support for his Flemish enterprises than in winning her hand.[2] Whether he was actually demanding money from her at this juncture, as he did later, it is difficult to say. Mendoza thought so, and one of Marchemont's letters, which is undated but which probably belongs to this time, seems to bear him out.[3] At all events, Alençon determined to come to England and try the effect of a personal interview. Apparently he had intended to come in April, but Flemish affairs detained him. He wrote to Marchemont on the 20th of May that he was like a bird on the branch and must make his flight suddenly when he could. In order to save time he sent over ' quelques abillemans ' in advance. Some days later he suddenly left Évreux with a few servants and passed to Dieppe. There he took ship for England, but the sea was high, the wind unfavourable, and after knocking about the

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 495.

[2] Ibid. 478; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 85, 127.

[3] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 449. The difficulty of following these dealings concerning Alençon's visit is considerably increased by the careless editing of the documents bearing on the subject at Hatfield House which are printed in full in *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. A great many of the letters are undated and the editor has done little or nothing to supply the dates. Where he has made the effort he has often merely made wild guesses when internal evidence makes possible a fair degree of certainty in fixing the dates. For instance, among the letters which he has assigned to the year 1581 I have found one (no. 1108) which belongs to 1579, six (nos. 1103, 1107, 1113b, 1114, 1124, 1134) which belong to 1580, and four (nos. 1098, 1100, 1109, 1110) which belong to 1583. Equally grave blunders have been made under other years. There are also a great many errors in printing, which the difficulties involved in attaining access to the originals make even more serious than in the case of similar errors in the calendars of papers in public archives. A second and a much more careful edition of the earlier volumes of the *Cal. of Salisbury MSS.* is a desideratum. The most important documents bearing upon the particular topic under discussion are those in vol. ii, numbered 1130, 1133, and 1121. I have little hesitation in ascribing 1130 to February 1581, 1133 and 1121 to April of the same year. These dates are pretty easily determined from internal evidence. Document No. 1186, which mentions certain financial transactions between Marchemont and Walsingham, is harder to place, but it was plainly written either just before Alençon's proposed visit to England in May or before his actual visit in November.

Channel for some hours and getting very sea-sick he decided to return to port again. He was back in Évreux, professing himself to Elizabeth to be quite disconsolate, on the 30th of May.[1]

His failure was not known at once in England. One of Walsingham's agents, coming post-haste from the coast, reported that Alençon after the first failure had put out to sea a second time and made a landing in England at Rye. Elizabeth sent at once for Marchemont and told him the good news and he spent some days in his lodgings anxiously awaiting his master's arrival. There was naturally some stir at court, and in spite of every effort to keep the matter secret Mendoza got wind of it and wove a fine story about it for his master's benefit. A few days later, however, the French ambassador had certain news to the contrary, and this was confirmed in turn by Cobham's letters from Paris. Alençon returned again to his Flemish enterprises and deferred his visit to England until later in the year.[2]

Meantime the commissioners of the French King, with their gentlemen and officers and lackeys and pages, a gallant company of nearly 500 persons, had landed at Dover on the 16th of May and had been conducted with great pomp and ceremony to London.[3] On the 24th they had their first audience, and the next day Burghley, with many apologies for his bad French (Walsingham was to have delivered the speech, but he had a bad cold), bade them formally welcome.[4] The same evening they dined with the Queen in the new banqueting hall at Westminster, which had been specially constructed for the occasion.[5] On the 26th of April negotiations were formally opened by the presentation of credentials by the French commissioners to a committee of seven from the English Privy Council, of whom Burghley, Sussex, Leicester, Hatton, and Walsingham were the

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 102; *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 189; *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 325.

[2] Hume (*Courtships of Queen Elizabeth*, pp. 248 ff.) asserts positively that Alençon came to England at this time, basing his statement upon the Spanish ambassador's report to that effect and upon a curiously perverted reading of Marchemont's letter to Alençon in *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 359 ff. The evidence to the contrary is overwhelming—cf. particularly *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 325, 483, 360; and *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 194–5.

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 110. [4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 131.

[5] At a cost of £1,744 19s. and odd money, so the surveyor of the Queen's works told Stowe (Holinshed, *Chronicles* (ed. 1587), ii. 1315). It was apparently a very frail affair, of painted canvas for the most part.

most important figures. The next day there was a second banquet at Leicester's house, at which the Queen was present and made a long speech in which she summarized the course of the marriage negotiations up to that time.[1] A third banquet followed at Burghley's house on the 30th, where they finally got down to business.

Walsingham opened the discussion with a speech in which the English revealed their tactics. The Queen, he said, had taken advantage of the recent session of Parliament to inform herself how Englishmen at large felt upon the question of the French marriage. She had discovered considerable opposition to it both upon religious and upon secular grounds. Some feared that a marriage with a Catholic prince would encourage the English Catholics, already alienated by the Jesuit priests, in their disobedience to the laws. Others objected that since Alençon was already committed to the cause of the Dutch, marriage with him would undoubtedly involve war with Spain. Her Majesty, Walsingham added, in view of these difficulties and complaints thought it expedient to communicate with Alençon himself and hear what he had to say before the commissioners came to terms.

In a word, Elizabeth wished to suspend negotiations for the marriage. Very likely she prompted Walsingham to make these difficulties in order to clear the way for the other matter which she believed the French had been instructed to consider if the marriage failed, namely, the offensive and defensive alliance. But she discovered to her surprise that they would have nothing to do with it. They protested that their commission confined them strictly to the question of marriage.

'Her Majesty finds this very strange,' Walsingham wrote to Cobham a few days later, 'considering that both the king and his mother have heretofore by their letters, as also by the mouth of their ambassador here, promised to satisfy her desire herein. For both, in their speeches to you, have sundry times shown how necessary it was, in respect of the growing greatness of Spain, that some straiter league should be made between the two crowns whatsoever became of the marriage, that being subject to sundry difficulties of importance such perhaps that its proceedings could not be profitable to either party, and therefore for more security

[1] *Walsingham's Diary*, p. 41.

it was always thought requisite that such as should be sent hither to treat of marriage should also have authority to treat of amity.'[1]

Yet so the matter stood. The Queen did not wish to refer the question of marriage to the commissioners. She expected to settle that with Alençon herself. The commissioners would treat of nothing else. Consequently the outcome was a foregone conclusion, but ordinary decencies were preserved and a grave show was made of discussing the terms of the marriage treaty,[2] always with the understanding, however, that these were not to be binding until ratified by the Queen. Upon this basis an agreement was reached and signed by the commissioners on the 11th of June.[3] Even from this tentative arrangement Elizabeth insisted upon reserving the most important points for private consideration with Alençon.[4] The whole thing was pure farce; the wiser heads among the French commissioners were unpleasantly conscious of that fact. They took their leave of the Queen herself on the 12th of June and were about to leave London when they received letters from the French King which caused them to linger another day or two. Henry had written that if Elizabeth would consent to marry, he would agree to assist his brother in the Low Countries and to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with her. The commissioners communicated this news to the Queen. She sent Burghley and Walsingham to them to inquire whether they had received authority to treat upon the particulars of such a league. They replied that they had not, but desired her to frame her demands and to give her ambassador in France instructions to deal further in the matter. The next day they left London. Their mission had failed; the net result of their conferences had been a deadlock. Nevertheless, in their parting words they made it clear that the French King was disposed to continue the negotiations.[5]

Elizabeth herself could hardly choose. The Jesuits were more active than ever in England. Parsons and Campion, who had

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 172.

[2] The form of ceremony devised is interesting; cf. *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 190.

[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 174; *Walsingham's Diary*, p. 42.

[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 131.

[5] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 209; *Walsingham's Diary*, pp. 42, 43.

landed in the previous June, were still at large and were making dangerous headway among the discontented English Catholics. Meanwhile in Scotland d'Aubigny was daily increasing his power and influence. In December 1580 he had thrown the Regent Morton, his ablest rival and Elizabeth's strongest friend in the north, into prison, upon the charge of having been a party to the murder of the King's father. At the very time that the French commissioners were feasting in England, in spite of every effort on the Queen's part to save him, Morton was tried, found guilty, and executed. This meant that d'Aubigny was practically supreme in the north, and that the ' postern gate ' was wide open to Elizabeth's enemies. With the English Catholics astir, Scotland estranged, and the King of Spain hostile, to say nothing of the Guisan faction in France, Elizabeth was placed in a position in which a French alliance became a positive necessity. That appeared to her councillors to be past debate. The only question was as to whether she could win the alliance without marriage.

Of course when Elizabeth and her advisers thought of an alliance they did not have in mind a mere matter of ink and parchment. That might have been had cheaply enough, but its very cheapness was a fair indication of its value. What the English intended was a league, offensive and defensive, frankly directed against Philip of Spain, with provision for a vigorous attack upon him in the Low Countries through Alençon, and in Portugal through Don Antonio. Such a league, if stoutly maintained, could hardly mean less than war, but war was the last thing that either Elizabeth or Catherine de Médicis desired. Both of them wished to make trouble for Spain, but each one hoped that the other might be tricked into fighting her battles. That was why there was so much backing and filling on both sides. That was why Elizabeth protested so vigorously against the abandonment of Alençon by his brother, and why Henry III insisted that no league should be arranged until the marriage was first consummated. He knew that no pen-and-ink engagement would hold Elizabeth to an agreement if she saw it was to her advantage to break it, just as she knew that the only sure way of getting him embroiled with Spain was to leave him no alternative. The matter turned chiefly, of course, upon the attitude of both parties towards Alençon's projects in the Low Countries.

In the Portuguese question the interests of both England and France were less immediate, and it consequently presented itself rather in the form of an opportunity to be seized than of a problem to be solved.

Nevertheless, the cause of Don Antonio was a constant factor in the negotiations for the league, and although it was a subsidiary question it must not be neglected.

At the beginning of the year 1581 Don Antonio, with a price of twenty thousand ducats on his head, was practically a fugitive. His whereabouts were not even certainly known; his cause appeared to be absolutely desperate. Elizabeth still kept in some sort of touch with his affairs through his agent da Sousa, who had come to England in the previous summer and still remained there, but she made no move in his behalf.[1] Early in April, however, there was a distinct revival of interest in his affairs in England. The impulse seems to have been supplied rather from commercial than from political quarters. Drake had but just returned from his voyage around the world with a shipload of Spanish plunder. Both Leicester and Walsingham had money invested in that famous adventure and their profits had been enormous. No wonder if their interest was quickened in further projects against Spanish commerce.

On the 3rd of April Walsingham came forward with a plan designed at once to assist Don Antonio and to yield a handsome profit. Two plans were in fact considered,[2] but the one which found most favour proposed that Drake should be sent out with a fleet of eight ships and six pinnaces to establish a base of operation at Terceira in the Azores, and there to lie in wait for

[1] There appears to be no sound evidence for Mendoza's statement (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 64) that Elizabeth sent four ships to assist Don Antonio in November 1580.

[2] Mendoza spoke of still a third plan (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 70–1). The so-called 'Second Enterprise' which was abandoned is interesting because it outlines a plan for the establishment of direct trade between England and India nearly twenty years before the formation of the East India Company. It was briefly as follows: The ships fitted out were to be loaded with merchandise for trade and were to go to Calicut on the Malabar Coast and there to establish a trade in spices 'in her Majesty's right as a party with the king of Portugal'. It was calculated that if the enterprise were successful there would be fifty English ships engaged in the trade within a year, 'to utter our commodities and to search the trade of the Moluccas and the (*sic*) China to the infinite commodity of this realm'. By the same right the adventurers contemplated a share in the Portuguese trade with the Cape Verde Islands, the 'Geney' Coast, and Brazil. (S. P. Domestic, cxlviii, no. 47.)

the coming of the Spanish treasure fleet from the West Indies. If he missed the fleet, he was to cross the ocean to his old cruising grounds and pick up his profit from the Spanish colonies around the Caribbean. Drake was to have his commission from Don Antonio and to sail under his flag. The capital was to be contributed as a joint stock, of which Don Antonio was to subscribe for one-quarter. The plunder was to be divided (one-third being reserved for prize money to the crews) among the adventurers 'according to the rate of every man's adventure'. Walsingham and Drake and Hawkins appear to have been the principal promoters. Leicester was probably interested as well. It was proposed that Elizabeth herself, in her private capacity of course, should subscribe for a quarter of the stock. The realm of England was not committed. With Drake in command and a convenient harbour on the highway to the Indies as a base of operations, the scheme looked like an amazingly good one. If any one doubted its possibilities, he had only to go down to Deptford and watch the good ship *Golden Hind* swinging with the tide.[1]

Walsingham himself was confident of its success, and was strongly in favour of trying it, both because it promised private profit and because it fitted in with his general policy. Elizabeth was tempted by the prospect of large profits, but frightened by the danger of war. Drake's plundering had already called forth protests and threats from Spain. An organized attack upon the Indian plate ships could hardly mean less than war. She therefore made her own assent contingent upon the co-operation of France. As in the case of the Low Countries, her attitude towards Don Antonio really depended upon the French alliance.

She was more than ever moved to press that alliance forward and to carry it through if possible without the accompaniment of marriage which Henry III demanded. When the French commissioners had parted early in June they had indicated that their master did not wish to abandon the negotiations, and Elizabeth hastened to take advantage of this suggestion. On the 20th of June she sent John Somers to France with instructions to join with Cobham, her ambassador there, and

[1] S. P. Domestic, Eliz., cxlviii, nos. 43, 46, 47. It is worth noting that when Don Antonio appealed to the Dutch for assistance a little later they also tried to turn his cause to commercial advantage; cf. Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, vi. 208–9.

propose an offensive and defensive alliance to the King. They were directed to point out to the King the necessity of common action against Spain and to make offer of her co-operation to that end. In respect to the marriage, they were to say that unless it could be effected without in any way involving her in Alençon's Dutch enterprise, she could not consider it. They were to indicate frankly that she preferred a league without marriage and were well prepared with arguments to meet the King's probable objections to such a course. If they found him satisfied with these and disposed to consider a league, they were to find out upon what terms he was disposed to treat. Elizabeth anticipated that he would demand from her an open declaration of war upon Spain. She bade her envoys oppose such a demand, and propose instead her co-operation underhand. They were to declare her willing to pay one-quarter of the costs of the war and, with obvious reference to Drake's proposed expedition, to attempt 'something by sea that shall more annoy the King of Spain than the employment of ten thousand men by land'. Her plan was clear enough. French armies, subsidized in part by England, were to fight Spain in the Low Countries; the English fleet, flying the colours of Don Antonio, was to strike at Spanish trade and at Spanish colonies. It was just such a plan as William Pitt might have framed two centuries later.

Somers reached France before the end of June,[1] and he and Cobham had their first interview with the King and his mother on the 2nd of July. The matters in dispute were stated but not seriously discussed, the King deferring his answer until another time. Somers gathered, however, from a conference with the King's secretary a few days before,[2] that Henry meant to insist upon the marriage. 'Nothing else will be hearkened for her Majesty', he wrote to Burghley, 'until they know her yea and no. If yea, then shall she have what she will desire, even to break with Spain or otherwise as she please her . . . if

[1] He visited Alençon on his way to the French court as he had been instructed to do (*Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 213). Probably the letter printed in *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 219, is his report of his interview. If so, it is certainly misdated, but this seems to be a simpler explanation than that of the editor (ibid., Introd., xiii) that another envoy was conferring with Alençon on the same subject at about the same time, especially since no other trace of this other envoy is to be found.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 238.

no, yet amity and league as formerly has been made, which has no great sinews for the King (say they) must respect those with whom his brother may match failing this, as they will seek to match him as soon as conveniently may be.'[1]

Somers had read the King's meaning aright. That fact became plain in a long conference which he and Cobham had with three whom the King had appointed to deal with them upon the subject on the 10th of July. If Elizabeth would agree to the marriage, all else would be arranged to her pleasure. Failing that, the French refused to entertain any project of an offensive league either secret or overt with regard to the Low Countries or to Portugal. 'For anything we could say,' the English envoys wrote to the Queen, 'we find that nothing is plausible here but the continuance to the consummation of the marriage.' The best news that Somers could send to Walsingham was that he had made matters no worse than he found them.[2]

It seemed that Elizabeth would either have to consent to the marriage or give up her hope of the league. But she was not yet disposed to do either. Marchemont, Alençon's agent in England, had been urging her to send Walsingham himself over to France to complete the negotiations, believing him to be more disposed to push matters to a conclusion than the other councillors who enjoyed the Queen's confidence.[3] 'The confidence you have in him', Marchemont wrote to the Queen, 'assures me that you will not disavow him, and that you would not send him except with instructions well designed to content the French.' Elizabeth resolved to act upon this advice. But the considerations which prompted it were not those which determined her decision. She had no notion of pushing matters or of sending messages 'well designed to content the French'.[4] She still wished to carry her point or, failing that, to win more time. The reasons why she chose Walsingham were the same as those which had prompted her to send him to the Low Countries three years before. He was easily the ablest

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 240. [2] Ibid., pp. 255, 263, 265.

[3] 'Lorsque je vous nomme Vulsingnan, sçait [c'est] pour le trouver plus disposé à faire diligence des quatre que vous retenez à la resolution de ses affaires' (*Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 461). No doubt the other three whom Marchemont had in mind were Burghley, Leicester, and Sussex.

[4] She made this clear in her letter to Alençon of 21st July, *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 400.

diplomatist in her service, and the situation was such as to demand the best talent she could command.[1]

But before Walsingham left for France one important step in the relations of England to the Portuguese question is to be noted. Elizabeth had taken the stand that she would not assist Don Antonio unless France would co-operate with her. For all that, the plan of dispatching Drake to the Azores was pushed forward during the spring, and the joint-stock scheme was haggled over at length with the representatives of the pretender in France.[2] Meanwhile Don Antonio, after having been variously reported dead and in Barbary and in France, put into Calais about the 10th of June, remained there in hiding for ten days, and then crossed to England.[3] Walsingham announced his arrival to Burghley on the 25th of June. 'As far as I can gather,' he wrote, 'he is like to return with as evil satisfaction as the poor Prince of Condé did. . . . I guess his coming hither had the French King's assent. I could have wished he had gone directly into the Low Countries where he might have solicited both the King and her Majesty. Her Majesty feareth the reception of him will provoke the King of Spain to revenge and so desires his speedy departure. When the King of France discovers her coldness towards this poor prince I suppose he will not be over forward.'[4]

Don Antonio was lodged at Stepney, near Greenwich, as the guest of a London Alderman. His equipment was extremely slim, so slim that he had to defer his audience with the Queen until he could get decent clothes.[5] Mendoza wrote that he even had to borrow shirts.[6] His presence in England was kept a profound secret. On the 1st of July he spoke with the Queen.[7] Walsingham wrote to Cobham on the 2nd that Don Antonio had asked the Queen to furnish him 'with some ships out of hand', but that she had refused him until she knew what course the French King meant to take in the matter.[8] Walsingham

[1] Cf. Mendoza's observations on this point in *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 151.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 111, 132, 164, 184.
[3] Mendoza reported his arrival in England on 24 June. He described Don Antonio as being 'under the middle height, with a thin face and very dark, the hair and beard being somewhat grey and the eyes green' (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 138–9).
[4] S. P. Domestic, cxlix, no. 53.
[5] Ibid., no. 55.
[6] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 144.
[7] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 241.
[8] S. P. France, v, f. 192.

himself was not at all sanguine of the outcome. On the 7th of July he wrote to Burghley, 'Her Majesty hath determined that the preparation of ships shall proceed, and yet in the end, howsoever France shall incline to assist Don Antonio, I see reason to judge there will be nothing done in his favour—or rather to assist her Majesty by the abating of the pride of Spain, as by effects I fear will appear, especially the gate of Scotland being now, as it were, wide open to the malice of her enemies.' [1]

It is clear that Don Antonio discussed at length with Leicester and Walsingham and Drake and Hawkins the proposed expedition to the Azores and that his presence in England had a stimulating effect upon the preparations. The arrangement as finally made was that Elizabeth herself should advance five thousand pounds for the venture which was to be in the nature of a loan to Don Antonio, Walsingham to advance two thousand pounds, and the balance, estimated at six or seven thousand pounds, to be advanced by the adventurers. Of the profits which accrued, one-half was to be divided between the shipowners and the ship's company, one-quarter was to go to Don Antonio himself, and one-quarter to Walsingham and the other investors.[2] The original intention had been for the adventurers to advance their capital upon the hope of recompense from Spanish plunder, but there was so much delay in getting the project under way that the adventurers refused to partake on these terms, and Don Antonio had to assume the burden of the whole equipment, the money furnished by the adventurers being taken to represent so much loaned to him. The profits apparently were to be distributed as already described.[3] These

[1] S. P. Domestic, cxlix, no. 64.

[2] 'A Discourse of the Voyage for the Azores.' B.M. Lansdowne MSS., xxxi, f. 197.

[3] Corbett (*Drake and the Tudor Navy*, i. 327) interprets this whole transaction rather differently from this, but it seems to me that an examination of the papers in Lansdowne MSS. xxxi confirms my view of the case, especially if taken in connexion with the following passage from a letter of Walsingham to Burghley of 28 August 1581: 'As touching the contract by the which the K. [Don Antonio] saith it was agreed that the satisfaction should be made of such money as should be taken for Spanish goods, the said contract was rejected by the Count Vimioso in the beginning of the last spring and afterwards upon motion to have the same revived at a conference between the C. Emmanuel de Sylva and me in Mr. Aburrough's house in the presence of Sir Francis Drake, D. Lopez and Mr. John Hawkins, the same was again rejected for that the time was so far past as such as were before willing to venture refused the same.' Cotton MSS., Galba E vi, f. 114.

would seem to be rather hard terms for the pretender, but it must be remembered that with one exception he borrowed the money without security and with only remote promise of repayment. Naturally under these circumstances the adventurers expected large returns. Walsingham was the one exception. He was clever enough to secure his own investment by getting into his hands one of Don Antonio's diamonds.[1] Yet, despite these preparations, Elizabeth still insisted that she would not allow the expedition to depart until she was sure of the co-operation of France.

Elizabeth expressed her intention of sending Walsingham to France about the middle of July, and he was not particularly pleased at the prospect. On the 19th he wrote to Somers in France: 'Her Majesty (as the bearer can inform you) hath some intention to send me over the seas, notwithstanding I will labour by all the means I may to break the journey off. Yourself can tell how hardly I was used in my last voyage, and as this is a matter of more danger than that, so have I cause to fear to be served with harder measure than I was. Yet if it please her Majesty to continue her resolution to employ me, as one that is ready to serve her Majesty without respect of himself I will not refuse to sustain any charge, leaving the success of my negotiation to the good pleasure of God.' Four days after he wrote these words his instructions were ready, and on the 25th of July he left the court for France.[2]

There are no less than seven different documents in the Public Record Office at London, drafted in Burghley's hand, which concern themselves with Walsingham's instructions. Since these are in some particulars inconsistent with one another, it is not easy to say just what his orders were. The impression is that he was given a good deal of latitude in the matter and that the Queen's idea was rather to indicate a number of alternate courses which he might follow than to confine him to any one. He was in the first place directed to confer with Alençon himself, and throughout the course of his subsequent dealings with the King to keep the Duke constantly informed, 'for we mean not you should deal any wise with the King, but that Monsieur

[1] Digges, *Compleat Ambassador*, p. 394.
[2] S. P. France, v, f. 237; *Walsingham's Diary*, p. 43.

should be made privy thereof by you '.[1] Having conferred with the Duke, he was to repair to the King. With both the brothers he was to follow practically the same course. In framing his method of procedure Elizabeth started with the three points which had been propounded by the King in his dealings with Cobham and Somers :

(1) That the Queen would appoint a day for the consummation of the marriage.

(2) That he would, upon her naming of the day, enter into an offensive and defensive treaty with her, and deliver the treaty signed at the instant the marriage was performed.

(3) That he would thereupon frame a secret agreement with her for matters of the Low Countries.

Walsingham was directed to point out that the King in urging the first point had misunderstood the situation. The negotiations for marriage had not yet reached the stage in which it was expedient to ' name the day '. She could not bring her subjects to assent to a match which, as the case stood, would doubtless mean war with Spain. Yet she was prepared to join with the King to assist his brother, provided it might be done secretly. She would even go further. If Walsingham found that Alençon would not entertain such a proposition, he might even at a pinch commit her to an open alliance. If this in turn was rejected, Walsingham, according to the first draft of his instructions, was to press the matter no further, but report home for other direction. The later drafts, however, allow further concessions at this point. According to them, he might even, as a last resort, agree to the marriage, ' so as the King and his brother will devise how we shall not be brought into a war therewith '.[2] To ensure against that, she insisted that the French King should give his brother such adequate support in the Low Countries that her own co-operation would be unnecessary, although she was not unwilling to lend secret aid. In a word, she was prepared to concede much at a pinch, but she depended upon Walsingham's skill to reduce these concessions to a minimum. At least so it appears, but Walsingham himself was not at all certain about what the Queen really intended. In an interview which he had with her after she had

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 281. [2] Ibid.

signed his instructions he found her deviating in speech a good deal from her written word.[1] His general impression of her wishes, which he stated later in a letter to her, probably contains the gist of the matter. 'The principal cause', he wrote, 'why I was sent over, as I conceive it, ... was to procure a straiter degree of amity between the King and you, without marriage, and yet to carry myself in the procuring thereof as might not altogether break off the matter of marriage.'[2]

At the time of Walsingham's dispatch Elizabeth wrote a letter to Alençon in which she set forth a somewhat different explanation of his mission than her instructions convey. 'I am thinking', she wrote, 'of sending Walsingham with all speed to the King, with instructions to let him know that for countless reasons he ought to maintain you as an honourable instrument to increase the welfare of France and keep your feet in the straight course you are following. For my part, so far as it seems reasonable, I will not fail you in your enterprises.'[3] No doubt Elizabeth was anxious to draw the French King further into Alençon's projects, mainly because she wished to commit him more fully to a policy hostile to Spain. No doubt Walsingham was instructed to that end, but his main business was to secure the league and avoid the marriage.[4]

After a tiresome voyage by land and sea Walsingham, 'somewhat distempered in body', arrived in Boulogne on the morning of the 27th of July.[5] There he received letters from Cobham at Paris full of encouraging news. Cobham wrote that the King had 'moneyed' his brother, had granted him a 'placet' worth one hundred thousand crowns, had ordered the arrest of certain sums destined for transport to the Prince of Parma, and had recalled his ambassador from Madrid.[6] It looked very much as though Henry III were preparing to make trouble for Spain. 'If the contents of the said letter be true,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 'a little egging on with a resolution to assent to an open assistance (though it were performed with a less sum)

[1] Digges, 357. [2] Ibid. 391. [3] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 401.

[4] Mendoza wrote that Walsingham took with him to France £22,000 for Alençon, but this is unlikely. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 156.

[5] Digges, p. 356; but cf. Galba E vi, f. 68 (the original letter) for the correction of the date of arrival, which Digges misprints 28th.

[6] Digges, 357.

would set the two great ones [i.e. France and Spain] a work, and keep them from uniting of themselves against our sovereign, a matter greatly or rather assuredly to be feared and therefore, in respect of a little charge, not to be stuck at.' [1]

In point of fact Cobham was misinformed, yet the outlook was distinctly hopeful, and Walsingham went forward to meet Alençon with a good deal more confidence than he had felt when he left England. He was further encouraged by a letter from Leicester which he received at this juncture in answer to one he had written upon his arrival at Boulogne. ' I imparted your letter to her Majesty,' Leicester wrote, ' who expressed very great favour with many gracious words towards you, and perusing your postscript she willed me to say thus to you, that as she doth know her Moor cannot change his colour, no more shall it be found that she will alter her old wont, which is always to hold both ears and eyes open for her good servants.' [2]

Walsingham had written to Alençon immediately upon his arrival at Boulogne, requesting an interview, and had been invited to meet the Duke at La Fère-en-Tardenois.[3] He reached there on the 2nd of August, somewhat sooner than he had been expected, but found a lodging already furnished and prepared for him and arrangements made for the stabling of his horses. As soon as his arrival was known, Alençon sent at once to apologize for not sending an escort to meet him on the way, and Walsingham was careful to assure Burghley that his reception was all that could be desired. On the afternoon of the day of arrival he was received by the Duke and without more ado plunged into the subject of his mission. He began by setting forth the three points which the King had proposed to Somers and Cobham, but before he had time to explain Elizabeth's position in regard to them the Duke interrupted. His brother the King, he said, was most resolute not to consider any league until the question of marriage was settled. Walsingham stated the Queen's objections to the marriage, dwelling particularly upon her fear of war with Spain. Alençon replied that he saw

[1] Digges, pp. 356–7, original in Galba E vi, f. 68.

[2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 403. Unfortunately the letter from Walsingham which provoked this reply is missing. The Moor was Elizabeth's pet name for Walsingham. It suggests that he was of swarthy complexion.

[3] Digges, p. 358.

no reason why that impediment should be brought forward again. It had already been considered by the commissioners and the marriage treaty arranged in spite of it. Walsingham then proceeded to develop the matter in more detail. He assured Alençon that the Queen, so far as she regarded her private affections, had no opposition to the matter whatever. Quite the contrary. The difficulty arose from the fact that as a Queen she could not proceed as her private wishes dictated. She had never understood, he said, when the marriage was in treaty, that it would saddle her with a war. Her view of the matter had been that since the French and the Dutch were to reap the advantages of her suitor's enterprises, that they would bear the charges of them. She was prepared, nevertheless, to consent to an offensive alliance and to join with the French King in assisting his brother underhand. Under these circumstances she could not comprehend why the King insisted upon the marriage as a preliminary to further alliance. Marriage or no marriage, she held that the necessity for a league 'as well for common defence, as for the preventing and staying of the overgreatness of Spain', was sufficiently apparent.

In this fashion Walsingham and Alençon debated the matter back and forth, the ambassador holding stoutly to his points, the Duke expressing great regret that the match which he had so much at heart should be fobbed off in this fashion. The room where they were conversing was full of courtiers who were so noisy as to make conversation difficult. Walsingham therefore withdrew, with the request that he might at a second audience discuss the subject more quietly.

A little later three of Alençon's councillors came to Walsingham to debate the matter further. Their arguments followed the same line which their master had pursued, and Walsingham met them with a reiteration of the points he had already made. They retorted that since the King refused to co-operate with his brother unless the marriage were effected his enterprises were likely to fail. Walsingham replied that he saw no reason why the King's attitude should depend upon the marriage. The necessity for attacking Spain was apparent. His mistress was prepared to co-operate to that end. What more could be expected of her? The marriage liked her well enough, but her

subjects were opposed to it and she could not venture to hazard their goodwill in order to satisfy her personal inclinations. It was no use, Walsingham concluded, to rake over the past and 'to call in question such errors as perhaps had been committed in the prosecuting of the cause', but rather to consider how the enterprises of the Duke might be furthered and France and England joined in perfect amity. After some three hours of this sort of thing the conference ended. It is interesting to observe with what skill Walsingham presented the Queen's side of the case. He was more than a match for the Duke of Alençon and his advisers and plainly carried the day in the exchange of courtesies between them.[1]

The following morning Alençon called the ambassador to a second conference, 'the substance whereof', he wrote to Burghley, 'I have thought meet to impart unto her Majesty, with such letters as I do presently send unto her, for that I know her Majesty doth look that I should reserve something to be imparted to herself'.[2] At this conference the Duke withdrew from his chattering court, and leading Walsingham 'into a place between the wall and his bed', sat him down and bade him speak freely as one of the Queen's servants to another. He first asked Walsingham whether he did not have some more comfortable message for him than the one just delivered. Walsingham protested, probably with secret reservations, that he had not. Alençon referred once more to his brother's insistence upon the marriage. Walsingham replied that such a stand appeared to be unreasonable. Then the Duke went to the real root of the matter. The King, he said, took the stand he did because he feared that unless Elizabeth were bound by marriage she would somehow or other contrive to 'slip the collar' and after having got France and Spain to fighting would herself become a 'looker on'. This was the plain truth, and Walsingham knew his mistress well enough to appreciate the justness of the King's suspicions, but of course he made the obvious retorts. His mistress would never be capable of a course so contrary at once to her honour and to her best interests. Alençon no doubt had his own opinion as to that, but he turned from the matter to point out to Walsingham the situation at

[1] Digges, pp. 365–7. [2] Ibid., p. 367.

the French court and the difficulties he had experienced in bringing his brother to his own views. After some further talk the conference ended.[1]

The next morning, when Walsingham was just about to depart for Paris, he received a visit from the Viscount of Turenne, ' a gentleman very dear to Monsieur for many respects and one whose advice he doth use in matters of great trust '. Turenne pointed out that Alençon's creditors were furnishing him with money for his Low Countries' enterprises practically upon the security of his marriage. If Elizabeth, therefore, broke off the match, he would be left almost without resources and would have to abandon his campaign. The only alternative, Turenne thought, was for Elizabeth to lend his master at once one hundred thousand crowns, which would enable him to pay his army and keep the field for three months. Turenne protested that he made this suggestion without his master's knowledge, but Walsingham suspected otherwise.[2] At all events it opened the door to a new line of policy and offered an alternative to courtship. If Elizabeth would not bind Alençon to her by marriage, she might still keep him in leading strings by judicious loans.

Walsingham himself spoke strongly for the loan in his letters home.

' Her Majesty,' he wrote to Burghley, ' I doubt not considering how great the yielding of support importeth her, will take some such like resolution therein as the weight of the cause meriteth. Besides, if it so touch not her Majesty in surety as it doth, yet the Duke's well deserving of her Highness (which is as great as ever any prince did show by effect) requires some princely consideration of this present necessity, especially her Majesty having by her late letters put him in comfort thereof.' [3] To Sussex, Walsingham wrote : ' I understand . . . that Monsieur's affairs are reduced to such extremity from want of money that unless her Majesty do relieve him he is like to remain at a stay. I beseech your Lordship therefore, who can consider of what importance it is to her Majesty not to suffer the gentleman to quail in his enterprise, put your helping hand to procure that he may be relieved.' [4]

[1] Ibid., p. 360. A somewhat different account of this interview is given by Mendoza, *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 158.
[2] Digges, pp. 367–8.
[3] Ibid., p. 368.
[4] Cotton MSS., Titus B ii, f. 231.

Walsingham was already ten leagues on the road to Paris when he was recalled for an interview with Catherine de Médicis. The Queen Mother had arrived at La Fère a few hours after his departure. The object of her coming was to attempt once more to dissuade her son from his projected expedition into the Low Countries. The Cardinal of Bourbon and two of her most astute advisers, Bellièvre and Pinart, accompanied her.[1] They conferred with Alençon on the 5th of August. No doubt he informed them of his interview with Walsingham and of Elizabeth's project of a league against Spain without promise of marriage. Neither of these proposals appealed to Catherine. She did not want to embroil herself with Spain, but she did want to provide an outlet for her young son's ambitions. Marriage without a league would have been very much more to her taste. Seeing very little hope of that and fearing Spain she tempted Alençon with another proposition. She offered to dispatch Bellièvre to the Prince of Parma to induce him to recognize the neutrality of Cambray, to the defence of which Alençon was particularly committed, and to withdraw from besieging it. These measures were to save Alençon's face. She proposed further that instead of chasing the elusive Elizabeth he should marry one of the daughters of Philip II, and suggested perhaps that the question of the Low Countries might be solved to the satisfaction of all concerned if they came with the Infanta's hand by way of dowry. Here, then, Catherine was working with her son exactly counter to Walsingham; instead of an English alliance and war with Spain, she was proposing a Spanish marriage and peace with Spain. For the time being, at least, she won her son over to her views. The very day after his interview with Walsingham he secretly promised his mother that if the truce could be arranged with Parma upon such terms as she offered he would disband his army and give up the enterprise altogether.[2]

[1] Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, vi. 156 ff.

[2] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vii. 398; on the negotiations in Spain for the hand of the Infanta cf. Brémond d'Ars, *Jeanne de Vivonne*, chap. ii, *passim*; cf. also an anonymous letter to Turenne in Muller and Diegerick, iv, pp. 155–6. A copy of Alençon's agreement with his mother, dated 5 August 1581, is in B.M. King's MSS., cxii, f. 122. It is worth noting that Cobham in Paris got wind of Catherine's intentions and wrote of them to Burghley. Cobham heard that Catherine as an additional inducement offered to her son the Marquisate of Saluzzo and Provence to augment his apanage (*Cal. Salisbury*

It must not be presumed, of course, that Catherine's proposals to her son indicated a definite abandonment on her part of an alliance with England. It was simply a possible alternative. She had very little assurance that the King of Spain would fall in with her views. Alençon's acquiescence depended upon Parma's consent to a truce, which, to say the least, was improbable. It would have suited her purposes far better to have married her son and all his hare-brained projects to Elizabeth. But she was not prepared to fight Spain alone and have her turbulent son still on her hands, and she felt pretty certain that Elizabeth would leave her in the lurch when it came to fighting unless she were secured by marriage.

Her conference with Walsingham was designed with a view to discovering if she could what Elizabeth's intentions as to the marriage were. Walsingham gave her little satisfaction upon this point, but urged instead the necessity of a league independent of marriage. Catherine retorted that she thought the marriage would be the best security for the league, and she intimated very plainly that she did not think Elizabeth could be trusted to abide by her engagements without it. Walsingham, ignoring the innuendo, undertook to point out the solid considerations to the contrary. He enumerated the various offences of Philip II against Elizabeth, from the Ridolfi Plot to the Irish expedition, as sufficient reasons to prevent friendship between the two sovereigns. He insisted that the Anglo-Spanish friendship of the past had had its root in English commercial interests in the Low Countries, and that, if they passed under the control of Alençon, English friendship would pass with them. Then he went on to show that if Catherine distrusted Elizabeth, Elizabeth had excellent reasons for distrusting Catherine, alluding briefly to the papal efforts to form a holy league and to the machinations of the Guises at the French court. In matters of deceit and double-dealing there was indeed little to choose between these two remarkable women. But Walsingham was more concerned with winning Catherine's support to the English alliance than with making odious comparisons. He urged upon

MSS., ii. 408). There is an admirable discussion of Catherine's attitude towards Alençon's projects at this time in Mariéjol, *Catherine de Médicis*, chap. x, *passim*.

her the necessity of taking immediate advantage of the two occasions which offered to 'abridge the King of Spain's greatness', namely in Portugal and in Flanders. Both of these opportunities must be seized at once. Neither could attend upon tedious negotiations for an uncertain marriage; neither could be exploited without an Anglo-French alliance. Without it the ships which Elizabeth had made ready for Portugal could not sail. Without it the Dutch rebels would be discouraged. Without it, Walsingham intimated finally, Elizabeth would have to look about elsewhere for friends.

Catherine replied that she had no commission to treat for a league. She promised to do what she could to further it, but it is very likely that she intended nothing of the sort.[1]

Walsingham set out for Paris at once and reached it on the 8th of August. He found there luxurious provision for his lodging. His rooms were richly furnished and his 'diet' large and honourable.[2] La Mothe Fénélon, sometime Ambassador to England, was appointed to entertain him. After three days' delay he had audience with the King. Walsingham, in accordance with his instructions, pressed for a league offensive and defensive without respect to the marriage and for a secret treaty with regard to the Low Countries. Henry III proved gracious. He argued strongly for the marriage but expressed his willingness to enter into 'a straiter amity with England'.[3] Walsingham was extremely pleased with the outcome of his audience. He wrote to Elizabeth:

'The continuance of God's goodness towards your Highness hath not the least appeared in this resolution that the King has taken to join with you in straiter amity, being as your Majesty knoweth . . . a matter thought altogether impossible to be brought to pass. And so much the greater is this benefit to be esteemed in that they seem to be resolved to continue the prosecution of the marriage, whereby your Majesty of necessity (if your state hereafter shall induce you hereunto) are left at your own choice to proceed therein or to relinquish the same. As I doubt not but your Majesty will be thankful to God for this so great benefit, so I hope your Highness (for that this league cannot be accompanied without charges) will prefer safety before treasure, assuring your Majesty that there shall want no care in

[1] Digges, 369 ff.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 287.
[3] Digges, 376.

me or my associates to reduce the same charges to as tolerate a proportion as may be. I hope also your Majesty will have both gracious consideration and speedy resolution touching the Viscount of Turenne's advice, for an offer to be made unto his Highness of present support of a hundred thousand ducats. Upon such resolution as your Majesty shall take therein we are to attend here either good or evil success of this treaty.' [1]

It is evident that Walsingham thought the league without marriage in a fair way to being accomplished. What he feared was that Elizabeth would balk the negotiations by her usual cheese-paring tactics. He was particularly anxious for her to follow Turenne's suggestion; in fact he considered it vital for the success of the treaty. 'I beseech you', he wrote to Burghley, 'to procure her Majesty's speedy resolution to the Viscount of Turenne's proposition for the hundred thousand crowns, without which I fear we shall find some stay in the treaty. I should be very sorry that so small a sum employed to so good purpose should be stuck at. . . . It will stand the Duke in so great stead that he will think himself greatly bound to her if she is pleased to offer it unrequired. Besides I know it will greatly advance the treaty and remove divers impediments that may hinder its course and good success. The hope I have put (*sic*) some of our friends here of this support has made them deal the more effectually in disposing the King's and Queen Mother's minds to the league. If therefore it fall out otherwise, I shall greatly doubt, or rather be afraid, that I shall not have any credit to do her Majesty service. For my own part,' he concluded, 'though my state be very poor and my debts great, yet rather than the yielding of support should not take place I would be content to sell anything I have to contribute one thousand pounds to it, so greatly do I see it imports her Majesty's service or rather safety.' [2]

But events which had looked so prosperous on Thursday took a sudden change for the worse on Friday. Five of the King's ministers came to Walsingham in the afternoon to declare that the King 'did not see how there could be any sound or perfect amity without marriage'. Walsingham was amazed. He protested that this new attitude was entirely contrary to what the King had said the day before and wanted to know the reason

[1] Digges, 375.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 289.

for the sudden change. De Vray, one of Alençon's gentlemen, who was present, answered that his master had petitioned the King not to proceed with the treaty until the marriage was assured of. Walsingham declared that this was contrary in turn to Alençon's promises not to hinder the treaty. Then Pinart, one of the royal secretaries, spoke. The King, he said, believed that the chief obstacle to the marriage was the enterprise in the Low Countries. He therefore had sent an envoy to Parma to readjust the differences over Cambray and to treat for an armistice until a treaty might be signed. As soon as that was accomplished, Alençon himself would go to England and finish what he had so happily begun.[1]

It is interesting to see the ingenious way in which Pinart took advantage of the occasion to explain away Bellièvre's mission to Parma. A few days before Pinart himself had been present at the conference with Alençon at La Fère, in which Bellièvre's mission was represented as preliminary to a Spanish marriage. How much Walsingham knew about the real purposes of the French at this juncture is uncertain. At all events he said frankly that he thought Bellièvre's mission a mere waste of time. He expressed his disapproval of any attempt to temporize with Spain, and he added that such a course would be calculated rather to hinder the marriage than advance it.

The matter was bandied to and fro in this fashion for two hours or more until finally Walsingham and his colleagues declared that they wished either to proceed to the negotiation of the treaty or else to hear from the King's own lips why he denied to-day what he had agreed to yesterday. Meanwhile they would advise their mistress to suspend her preparations for Portugal.

The next day came word from the King that Alençon himself had been responsible for the stay of the treaty, and that nothing further could be done until the King heard further from him. Walsingham and his colleagues expressed surprise at this answer, and intimated to the French councillors that they did not altogether believe it. Walsingham said that he began to fear, in view of Bellièvre's mission, that the French still clung to Spanish

[1] On Bellièvre's mission to Parma cf. Muller and Diegerick, iv, 155 ff.; Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, vi. 166.

friends and begged to be more precisely informed upon the point. The French councillors hastened to reassure him. Pinart was particularly insistent upon the King's zeal for England, but it was clear that nothing could be done until Alençon was heard from again, so Walsingham dispatched Somers to him with a view to finding out what he was about, and awaited developments.

Walsingham was inclined to attribute the strange vacillations of the French at this juncture partly to their distrust of the Queen and partly to encouragement which the French received from England that if they held out firmly for the marriage she would yield. He took occasion to deliver to her a rather lengthy sermon on the subject, which is so characteristic of the man that it is worth citing in full.[1]

'It may please your most excellent Majesty, I know you cannot but find the King's alteration of his former resolution very strange, and therefore would be glad to know the true cause of the change, wherein I would to God I could satisfy your Majesty of, with truth. To think that the same proceeded of two causes alleged by the King, whereof we have in our general letter unto the Lord Treasurer made mention, I have many reasons to lead me to be of contrary opinion and have rather just cause to think that the ground of the change grew upon advertisements received from thence, being put in hope that either your Majesty (they insisting still upon the league with marriage) will yield thereto, or else in respect of the doubts they are put in, that the marriage not taking place, your Majesty will not go so resolutely forward in the prosecution of the war against Spain (in case it should be found so expedient) to enter into a public and open war. If your Majesty have conquered the difficulty in your own nature, as also other difficulties of Estate touching the marriage, and shall be disposed to proceed to the effectuating thereof, then we your poor ministers here do hope that we shall not receive that disgrace as that your resolution therein shall rather be delivered by others than by us. On the other side, if that your Majesty shall not be disposed to enter into an open action against Spain with this Crown, in respect of the charges, then were it good that any further proceeding therein were forborn; to give them occasion by the entertaining thereof to think that your Majesty dallieth with them (both in marriage and league) cannot but greatly exasperate them against you. How your Majesty shall be able alone to bear the malice of Spain, France and Scotland (for such a concurrency against you is to

[1] Digges, 387–8; cf. also *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 412.

be looked for), I do not see otherwise than to depend upon God's goodness.

'The consideration of this matter doth minister necessary questions in state;—the one, whether it were not better for your Majesty to join with France against Spain, or to have them both with Scotland against you, the other, whether it were not better to convey the wars out of your own realm by the intended association with this Crown, or to have this Crown, with the rest of the evil affected neighbours, to assail you within your own realm. The solution is very easy; for as in cure of a natural body, being diseased, it were evil advice to counsel the application of inward medicines when outward will serve; so were it no less dangerous to attend a war at home, the inward corruption being thoroughly looked into, when that the same (by some provident course by your Majesty taken) may be put off. The only difficulty resteth upon charges which, if the likelihood were, would grow greater than your Estate or Crown might bear, then were it reason for your Majesty to forbear the same, for that ultra posse non est esse, and to stand upon your own defence. But if the charges may be reduced into such a convenient proportion as the Crown may bear, then were it very hard that treasure should be preferred before safety. I beseech your Majesty that (without offence) I may tell you, that your loathness to spend even then, when it concerneth your safety, is publicly delivered out here. We find also the doubt thereof by the Commissioners' particular and private speeches with us, to be a principal impediment why the King here is loath to join in association with your Highness. For the love of God, good Madam, look into your own estate and think that there can grow no peril so great as to have a war break out in your own realm, considering what number of evil subjects you have; and therefore your Majesty cannot redeem the peril that is like to grow thereby at too dear a price. I hope your Majesty will bear with my boldness and interpret the same to proceed of a care I have of your Highness preservation in that happy estate you have lived in these three and twenty last years, which I pray God to continue your Majesty in, double those years.'

To Burghley he wrote more precisely:

'Spain and the Pope make great and large offers which are not lightly hearkened unto. Now if we shall not in our treating be able to countervail them with as good, or with some certainty as may be to their liking, our conference will be to small purpose; and in my simple opinion it were much better that it were revoked than that further employment of time and charges should be fruitlessly expended. And therefore I beseech your

Lordship to be a mean to her Majesty that we may have some certainty set down to us which in our conference with them we may deliver to them, and that we may particularly know to what sum and for what time her Highness can be pleased to extend her aid, and whether in case it be demanded of us, and they will have it so concluded, she can be content to enter into open war against the King of Spain, or not; for in these two points chiefly will all their treating consist, wherein if we shall not be able to resolve them your Lordship can easily conceive what end our negotiations will have.'[1]

A day or two later Walsingham received letters from England which led him to look at the matter in a somewhat different light. Marchemont, Alençon's agent at the English court, wrote that the Queen was angry with Walsingham for not urging the marriage more vigorously.[2] Burghley, by the same post, indicated that Elizabeth was beginning to waver from the policy which she had held when Walsingham's instructions had been prepared. She would consent to a defensive league. She would agree to assist in the Low Countries and in Portugal underhand. But she had no mind for an open war, and if open war were not to be avoided then she had rather be at the charges of a war with the marriage than without the marriage.[3] It was clear enough to Walsingham that all his labours for a league without marriage had been thwarted at home and that he himself had not escaped the royal censure for adhering rigidly to his instructions.

'I hope', he wrote to Elizabeth, 'when your Majesty shall be thoroughly informed of my proceedings you shall find that I swerved not from your instructions I received, nor yet had cause that in discretion might lead me to another course. The principal cause why I was sent over, as I conceive it, and as I trust your Majesty can call it to remembrance, was to procure a straighter degree of amity between the King and you, without marriage, and yet to carry myself in the procuring thereof, as might not altogether break off the matter of marriage. And though these two points were very hard, considering the determination they had put on here not to yield to a league without marrying, yet the success of my travail fell out so, through God's goodness, as I did assuredly, not without good ground, make account that the amity would have taken place, had it not been crossed by some practice . . . not yet discovered. . . . I cannot but let your Majesty understand, as I declared to you before my

[1] Digges, 386. [2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 410. [3] Digges, 374.

departure, that if your Majesty shall be content to yield to marriage, I am fully persuaded that the King here will be induced to covenant with you that you shall be discharged of such burden as the war may cast upon you, which is the only matter that we have presently to deal in, considering that now your Majesty hath so far opened yourself to Monsieur Marchemont as to let him understand that if the impediment of the charges that the war may cast upon you be removed, your Highness seeth no cause why the marriage should not proceed. For this thing being known to their Majesties, all hope to procure the league without marriage is excluded.'[1]

Walsingham, in fact, came to the conclusion that the only way to do now was to treat for a league on the basis of marriage. 'Now', he wrote to Burghley, 'there resteth nothing for us to do here but to persuade the King to take upon him the burden of the war as the only impediment in the marriage, and therefore we are to pray your Lordship to procure her Majesty's warrant under her own hand, in plain clear terms to proceed therein . . . for until such time as we shall hear from her Majesty, we have nothing to do here, the league without marriage being utterly broken off.'[2]

The next day, however, De Vray returned to Paris, after a visit to his master Alençon, with rather more encouraging news. He told Walsingham that his master 'was contented that the treaty should go forward, as a thing found necessary by her Majesty, so that it might be no prejudice to the marriage'.[3] But the English commissioners were not willing to act upon this information until the return of John Somers, who had been dispatched to Alençon some days before. Somers returned the next day. His report on the whole confirmed what De Vray had said.[4] Alençon was eager for the marriage, but not insistent upon it; disposed neither to check the negotiations for the league nor to further them; desirous above all things, at the moment, of ready money. He had asked Somers what the Queen was willing to do for him in that direction. Somers had replied that he

[1] Digges, 391, corrected by *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 415.

[2] Digges, 392, corrected from original in S. P. France, vi, f. 38. Digges omits two postscripts which appear in the original.

[3] Digges, 395, dated August 21; the original letter in Galba E vi, f. 86 is dated August 20.

[4] Somers's report, dated 17 and 18 August 1581, is in Cotton MSS., Galba E vi, f. 91.

understood the King and the Estates General were supplying money. Alençon swore that his brother gave him cold comfort and the Estates not a penny, and added that unless he got help at once he would have to abandon his expedition. Walsingham had instructed Somers privately if he found the Duke without means to promise him aid from England.[1] But Somers, knowing well the danger of committing his mistress to charges of any sort,[2] had replied to Alençon that he would report his needs to his colleagues.

While Somers was with Alençon, Bellièvre returned from his mission to Parma. The most which Parma had offered was that he would allow Alençon to revictual Cambray without molesting him, provided that he would withdraw from further interference in Low Country affairs. Alençon rejected the offer forthwith,[3] and so it seemed Catherine de Médicis' alternate plan, for the time at least, fell through.

With Alençon's positive objection to the league without marriage removed, Walsingham and his colleagues could go forward once more with the treaty, but they were uncertain which course to take. Did Elizabeth wish the league with marriage without charges, or the league without marriage with charges? If with marriage, upon what terms? If with charges, how much? Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 21st of August: 'I should repute it a greater favour to be committed unto the Tower, unless her Majesty may grow more certain in her resolutions there. Instead of amity I fear her Highness shall receive enmity, and we her ministers here be greatly discomforted, having no certain direction what to follow. The King's charges here are great for my diet, amounting to one hundred pounds per diem, and the charges of his ambassadors that he last sent over, stood him in well near sixty thousand crowns. Now in the end if it prove neither marriage nor honourable amity, he may, besides the dishonour, think his charges hardly employed. To think that the amity (such as may bring surety) will be compassed, we see no reason so to conceive. Now her Majesty, finding it more for her surety to have the charges accompanied

[1] Digges, 385; original in Galba E vi, f. 90, dated August 14.
[2] Cf. Somers to Burghley, 28 Aug. 1581, Cotton MSS., Galba E vi, f. 110.
[3] At least this was what Alençon told Somers; cf. p. 72, n. 4.

with marriage than without, I pray your Lordship that we may have warrant to proceed accordingly, and then by experience her Highness shall not find that any particular passion beareth that sway with me as I find she conceiveth it doth.' [1]

But for all his urging Walsingham could not get definite instructions of any sort from home. Burghley did his best to induce the Queen to commit herself to some definite policy. He tried, or at least pretended that he tried, to banish from her mind the suspicion undoubtedly lurking there that Walsingham was allowing his personal opposition to the marriage to shape his course in France. But in any event he accomplished little in that direction.[2] She would not commit herself definitely to the marriage, although he found her more inclined to it than she had been at Walsingham's departure.[3] He could not get her to state how much she would spend in the support of an offensive league against Spain. She complained again and again that Walsingham was mishandling the affair, yet the instructions which she sent him were so ambiguous and contradictory that he was forced to follow his own devices. 'In what sort', Burghley wrote to him, 'you shall deal to remedy this inconvenience, neither by her Majesty can I direct you, nor of myself can I inform you, but I know you will do your best as the time and place shall serve and more cannot be required.' [4]

For the moment, while Elizabeth wavered, the one thing for Walsingham and his colleagues to do was to follow their original instructions and to take advantage of Alençon's favourable disposition to negotiate for a league. The French King seemed to acquiesce in this opinion. On the 21st of August he sent several of his councillors to initiate negotiations; on the 23rd he appointed commissioners and so a beginning was made.[5] But the business had hardly got under way before it was once more interrupted by the old question of marriage. On the 25th the French commissioners announced to Walsingham and his colleagues that the King had received letters from his ambassador in England which put him in such good hope of the marriage that he had decided to go no further with the league. Walsingham retorted that he believed the King to be misinformed, and

[1] Digges, 396. [2] Ibid. 389. [3] Ibid. 390.
[4] Ibid. 378. [5] Ibid. 399, 403 ff.

urged that the negotiations be continued until further news came from England. But the French would not hear of it. Walsingham was now at his wit's end. He could give no answer on the marriage, and the King would hear of nothing else. As far as Walsingham could see there were only two courses to choose between: either the Queen should commit herself definitely to the marriage or he should return home and acknowledge his mission fruitless. 'Surely my Lord,' he wrote to Sussex, 'if her Majesty be not already resolved touching her marriage it will behoove her to grow to some speedy resolution therein, for the entertaining of it doth breed her greater dishonour than I dare commit to paper, besides the danger she daily incurreth for not settling of her state which dependeth altogether on the marriage.'[1] Of course it does not necessarily follow from these words that Walsingham had been won over to favour the marriage. The probabilities are that he was simply sick and tired of the Queen's dalliance and wanted to have the thing finished some way or other. By writing in such terms to Sussex, an ardent supporter of the French match, he frankly admitted the failure of his own policy and invited the opposing party in the Council to put through theirs if they could. How bitterly he felt over the whole affair at this juncture may be judged from his letter to Burghley:

'I would to God', he wrote, 'her Highness would resolve one way or the other touching the matter of her marriage. The uncertain course that is now held in that behalf, besides that it doth offend the prince here, and discredit her servants that deal therein (especially being persuaded, as they are, that I have more authority than I have) doth minister unto the secretaries of foreign princes matters of discourse greatly to her Majesty's dishonour and extreme grief of us here that are acquainted withal; as that when her Majesty is pressed to marry, then she seemeth to affect a league, and when a league is yielded to, then she liketh better of a marriage. And when thereupon she is moved to assent to marriage, then she hath recourse to the league, when the motion for the league or any request is made for money, then her Majesty returneth to marriage. As these things are delivered out here in discourse among the said secretaries, so are they all conveyed and distributed into other courts through Europe, whereof her enemies will make their profit to throw her into the hatred of all the world. It shall be therefore

[1] Cotton MSS., Titus B ii, f. 229.

most necessary for your Lordship and the rest of the Council, whose advice she doth use in this cause, to move her Majesty earnestly to grow to some earnest resolution in that behalf, as a thing that doth import her greatly, both in honour and safety.'[1]

But Walsingham stormed in vain. Elizabeth preferred to follow her own devious ways and probably in the long run she was right. It would have been extremely indiscreet in her to have committed herself to an offensive league against Spain at this juncture. The English Catholics, under the stimulus of the Jesuits, were becoming dangerously discontented at home. Ireland was in revolt. Scotland, in view of Morton's fall and d'Aubigny's ascendancy, was very insecure at best. It was no time to undertake foreign wars, especially with such an uncertain ally as Catherine de Médicis. Yet Walsingham might well have asked why, in view of these circumstances, Elizabeth had dispatched him to France at all.

The main object of her policy seems to have been to keep Alençon true to his purpose in the Low Countries as the safest, the nearest, and probably the cheapest way of restraining the hostile purposes of Spain towards her. To the accomplishment of this policy three courses offered—to marry the Duke out of hand, to support him secretly with money, or to induce the King of France to support him. Of these the third course was the most attractive. If Henry III could be induced to assist his brother war between Spain and France would be the inevitable outcome, and she might sit and smile and save while her two formidable neighbours weakened each other. This was probably the reason which induced Elizabeth to send Walsingham to Paris, with vague promises of a league but with no power to commit her to the expenses and the dangers of a war. But Walsingham, not precisely informed of her ultimate purposes, discovered that there was no hope of a league of the one-sided nature which she desired. The French might fight, but only upon condition that she would definitely commit herself to fight as well. This was not at all to her fancy. Walsingham also discovered that the Queen Mother was doing her best to induce Alençon to give up his Low Countries' ambitions altogether, to

[1] Digges, 408, dated August 20; the original in Galba E vi, f. 100 is dated August 25.

abandon his hopes of England and to take a Spanish wife. How near she came to the accomplishment of her purposes the account of her interview with Alençon of 5th August has shown. If they had actually been accomplished, Elizabeth would have been faced by a league of her two neighbours. How much she knew of Catherine's plans is not quite clear. That she knew something is certain. Walsingham knew something of them too, and he favoured a frank alliance with France as the best preventative of a French alliance with Spain. But Elizabeth realized what Walsingham apparently did not, that Catherine was not at all anxious to go to war against Spain even if she could have been sure of Elizabeth's support. And Elizabeth felt that the best way to check a Franco-Spanish *rapprochement* was not through Catherine but through her son Alençon. Catherine had offered him a Spanish bride. Elizabeth promptly offset this by stimulating once more his hopes of a match with her. This seems to be the explanation of her encouraging words to Marchemont early in August, which cut right athwart Walsingham's negotiations for the league at Paris. She achieved her purpose so far when Alençon marched against Cambray, but it is not probable that she ever contemplated a consummation of the match at this juncture. Other objections aside, it would have gone far to make Alençon and his quarrels English. She vastly preferred that he should play his part as heir presumptive of the French throne rather than as Prince Regent in England, so that France would have to shoulder the responsibility for his enterprises while she reaped the profit. Turenne's offer to Walsingham provided another way out of the difficulty. Alençon was poor; he could get little money from his brother and none at all from the Low Countries. Unless he got funds immediately he would have to abandon his enterprises. This course was the one which Elizabeth eventually decided to follow. The reason why she did not seize upon it as soon as it was offered was because at that time she still had hope of engaging the King of France. When it came a second time through Somers she acted upon it with a promptitude which was amazing in one of her thrifty instincts.

Burghley wrote to Walsingham on the 24th of August:

'Her Majesty hath willed me with all haste to send this pacquet to you, to will you without any delay to give Monsieur

knowledge that her Majesty hath regard to his cause, and hath at this present instant hour . . . given order that as soon as money can be told and how that by the advice of Marchemont it may be safely sent, he shall have a support from her Majesty to continue his action . . . now so fortunately entered by his entry into Cambray . . ., and so I assure you Sir, for your satisfaction, I am commanded by her Majesty to cause a support to be ready for this purpose to the value of *thirty* thousand pounds.' [1]

Not only was the money quickly promised, but it was quickly sent. Half of it was dispatched at once by Lord Seymour and was in Alençon's hands in the shortest possible time. The other half was sent over piecemeal a little later, all of it in hardly more than a month.[2] So it was that she bound Alençon to her, and while Catherine was discussing Spanish marriages for him,[3] he was offering the standards of Cambray to his Elizabeth, swearing that she might command him in anything and attributing all his victories to the magical potency of one of her garters.

Once Elizabeth had definitely committed herself to this policy she grew more and more indifferent to the course of the treaty in France. Walsingham and his colleagues laboured manfully to get some sort of a bargain struck, but the French King insisted upon the marriage as preliminary to any treaty and for the time being at least Elizabeth had given up any thought of the marriage. She had got what she wanted without it. There is very little else worth noticing upon this point during the rest of Walsingham's stay in France. He thrashed the whole matter over again with Catherine de Médicis on the 30th of August in the garden of the Tuileries, but though he once more urged upon her the immediate necessity of a league he found her still resolute to hear of none without marriage. ' It seemeth ', he remarked, ' that the proceedings in this case may be compared to a physician that, being moved to yield some present remedy to a dangerous disease that can abide no delay of time, deferreth the same until he may receive drugs out of India.' [4]

[1] Digges, 397; word in italics in cipher.

[2] Seymour arrived in France 29th August and went straight to Mons (*Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 305, 331). On the conveying of the second half cf. Digges, 412, and *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 307, 313, 331.

[3] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vii, pp. 398 ff.

[4] Digges, p. 429.

Towards the end of his conference with the Queen Mother, Walsingham let drop a suggestion or two which seem to have impressed her more than anything else he said. He told her that the ill feeling which existed between the French King and his brother was an open secret, and that so long as Alençon remained in France there was little hope of keeping the peace between them. He urged her on that account to assist Alençon in his enterprises in the Low Countries if only to prevent civil war in France. A little later, in discussing the same point with La Mothe Fénélon, Walsingham gathered that it was this very jealousy between the brothers which made Catherine so eager to marry Alençon in England. Looked at from this angle, it seemed as though Catherine must choose between foreign war, foreign marriage, and civil war. 'I see it a general opinion among the wisest sort here,' Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 3rd of September, 'considering the general evil satisfaction that the people have of the present government, that it will be very hard to maintain good concord between the two brethren in case the Duke should reside here within the realm. And it is most assured that the affection that the nobility here do bear to Monsieur (which hath appeared by his late army, compounded of voluntaries, the same consisting principally of noblemen and gentlemen) hath greatly increased the King's jealousy towards him and hath not been the least hindrance of that support that otherwise the said King might have been drawn to have given.'[1] No wonder if the marriage seemed to Catherine essential.

Hand in hand with the questions of marriage and league went the question of Portugal. The preparations for Drake's expedition to the Azores were still going forward when Walsingham left for France, but Elizabeth had insisted that the ships should not depart until she was assured of the co-operation of France. Cobham and Somers had already broached the subject to the French King early in June, but had found him insistent upon a marriage treaty as a preliminary to any co-operation with England against Spain either in Portugal or the Low Countries. When Walsingham left for France late in July he was instructed to use his own discretion in bringing forward the question of Portugal. He spoke of it first in his interview with the Queen Mother on the 5th of August.

[1] Digges, 428.

There can be no doubt that Catherine de Médicis was very much interested in the Portuguese question. It has already been pointed out that she cherished a claim to the Portuguese throne herself. Late in February 1580 she had sent a secret agent, Abadie, to Portugal, to look after her interests and scatter Portuguese translations of her claims throughout the country.[1] The French ambassador at Madrid, St. Gouard, was at the same time conferring with an agent of the Duke of Braganza and suggesting that the rival claims of Don Antonio and Braganza be compromised by French intervention and that in recompense France should receive trading rights to the East Indies, Guinea, and Brazil.[2] It seems probable that Catherine's energetic interest in her Portuguese claims was stimulated rather by her desire to use them as a *quid pro quo* in negotiation with Spain than by any serious ambition to exploit them on their own account.[3] In any case she did make some effort to get a French foothold in the Azores and she hinted at extensive plans of conquest in the Portuguese colonies, particularly in Brazil. In April she had been largely instrumental in the dispatch of an expedition under Antony Scalin to the Azores.[4] In July she reinforced Scalin with four companies of Gascons under Carlas. When Walsingham arrived in France she was seriously contemplating the dispatch of a very considerable force under her cousin, Philip Strozzi.[5] Catherine kept her connexion with these expeditions strictly secret, using Don Antonio's claims as her stalking-horse. Both Scalin and Carlas sailed under commission from him. But it was not for Don Antonio that she was exerting herself. She had her own fish to fry

It is not surprising to discover that she was prepared to listen with interest to anything that Walsingham had to say with regard to Portugal. In his interview of 5th August he urged upon her the necessity of co-operation between England and France

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 180, 220–5, 273 ; cf. also on Abadie's mission Brémond d'Ars, *Jeane de Vivonne, Seigneur de St. Gouard*, pp. 121 ff.

[2] Brémond d'Ars, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[3] Cf. on this point Mariéjol, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 348 ff. A different view of the matter is presented by Ch. de la Roncière in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, xxii (1908), pp. 481 ff.

[4] La Roncière, *Hist. de la Marine française*, iv. 171. Scalin's name is given as Scarlin in *Cal. Foreign*, 1580–1, p. 94, but Catherine herself called him Scalin (*Lettres*, vii. 383).

[5] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, vii. 383.

for giving assistance to Don Antonio.[1] She gave him no answer at the time, but the very next day the French King sent a message to Cobham summoning him to an audience upon the same point.[2] Henry told Cobham that he had already dispatched two expeditions to the Azores and requested that Elizabeth send her promised help to co-operate. Cobham inquired how the joint fleet was to be commanded and the King promised to give that point his consideration. When Walsingham had his audience with Henry on the 10th of August he pressed the King for his speedy resolution in regard to Don Antonio, and Henry promised to give it to him. The next day again, although negotiations for the league had been temporarily interrupted by fresh hopes of the marriage, Catherine urged that in no case should Elizabeth's preparations for the Azores be delayed.

But the fact is that the French refused to commit themselves upon the matter of Portugal in such a way as to make their co-operation of much value to Elizabeth. She wanted some sort of definite written statement from the King that he would stand by her in case her intervention in behalf of Don Antonio should bring her to war with Spain.[3] Henry III and Catherine would not agree to do so. They wished the whole matter to be done underhand and without any agreement between the two countries. Unless Elizabeth would consent to marry Alençon they would bind themselves to nothing.

So it was that Walsingham made no more headway in the Portuguese question than he did in that of Flanders. Lacking assurance from France, the preparations for the expedition under Drake against the Azores languished in England.[4] The ships swung idly at anchor; the crews ate up the supplies.[5] Presently more money was needed and a demand was made upon the Queen for twenty-five hundred pounds more. She refused to give it. Drake and Hawkins both got sick of the delay and threatened to withdraw. The other captains began to make excuse.[6] The season was getting late; already the Plate fleet

[1] Digges, 370.
[2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 408.
[3] Digges, 393; cf. B.M. Lansdowne MSS., xxxi, f. 197.
[4] It appears from a letter of Cobham's (*Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 336) that Walsingham conferred with Strozzi when in France, but no other record of the conference appears to have survived.
[5] The expense of maintenance was reckoned at £20 a day. B.M. Lansdowne MSS., xxxi, f. 197.
[6] Digges, 379.

from the West Indies was reported to have got safe to Spanish harbours.[1] Yet the Queen still hesitated, waiting for better assurance from France. On the 24th of August she decided to send four ships only under Hawkins, accompanied by Captain John Norris, to command any landing expeditions.[2] This plan appealed to both Drake and Hawkins, but Don Antonio refused to endorse it.[3] The consequence was that Elizabeth finally decided to abandon the whole affair. On the 29th of August orders were given for the discharge of the mariners and the sale of the munitions. Even the Portuguese flags were to be sold, these to Don Antonio himself.[4]

From a commercial, as well as a political, point of view the enterprise failed. Burghley estimated the total loss at about thirty-six hundred pounds. Don Antonio demanded back the diamond which he had given as security to Walsingham, or else wished it to be applied to cover all his losses.[5] Walsingham had left the diamond with his wife; an attempt was made to get it from her, but Burghley advised her to hold on to it until she had received instructions from her husband, and she did.[6]

There seems to have been some suspicion thrown upon Walsingham, particularly by the Queen herself, that he had been largely responsible for the rather excessive overcharges involved in the preparations, and when the smaller expedition under Hawkins was under consideration there was a disposition to charge him with a thousand pounds towards its equipment.[7] In a letter of 28th August to Burghley he dealt with both of these questions.

'I most humbly thank your Lordship', he wrote, 'for the advice given my wife to stay the ring in her hands (as so directed by me) until I may receive so much satisfaction for such money as I have disbursed, and am become surety for. And whereas I perceive by a letter sent me from my servant Mills that towards the preparation of the four ships intended to be employed in the former voyage, I am taxed at a thousand pound charges, I desire your Lordship's honourable favour therein and to provide that it may be otherwise borne, for that neither my state can bear it

[1] Digges, 389.
[2] Ibid. 394.
[3] B.M. Lansdowne MSS., xxxi, f. 197.
[4] Ibid., f. 203.
[5] Digges, 422.
[6] Ibid. 394; cf. also *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 166.
[7] Digges, 394; Murdin, *Burghley Papers*, 355.

nor, if it could, the hope of the success of that voyage doth not carry any such probability as may allure me thereunto.

'I hear that her Majesty is offended for that the charge doth exceed the first proportion which was the sum of eight thousand pounds. It may please your Lordship to understand that the cause thereof grew upon earnest request made by the King [Don Antonio] that the number of ships might be increased . . . and for the defraying of the charges . . . there was hope given there would come both money out of the isle of Terceira as also out of the Low Countries upon such jewels as were sent thither to be either mortgaged or sold. . . . The only thing that moved me to be so forward in the voyage was in respect of her Majesty's safety, but finding now that the time is overslipped and that the employment of those ships will be, as I conceive it, to no great purpose, I hope . . . the charges thereof will be otherwise supplied.'[1]

It has appeared already that the expedition of four ships was abandoned, and so Walsingham's alarm for his thousand pounds was premature.

In spite of the efforts made to keep Don Antonio's presence in England secret, Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, was very well informed of his presence there and of the negotiations in which he was taking part and of the preparations being made in his behalf. Mendoza laboured to prevent the preparations, and by his persuasion Philip himself wrote a letter to Elizabeth demanding Don Antonio's surrender and threatening if she gave him assistance to regard the same as a *casus belli*. For this reason Elizabeth became anxious to be rid of him and Don Antonio himself was eager to be off. Burghley announced his present departure to Walsingham on the 2nd of September, but he did not get away finally until past the middle of the month. At Dover he met Walsingham on his way back from France. According to Mendoza, Walsingham tried to dissuade the Pretender from going to France, but failed. He landed in France about the first of October.[2]

Walsingham expressed one view of the whole affair in a letter to Burghley written just before his departure from France:

'He [Don Antonio] cannot in reason be offended either with her

[1] Cotton MSS., Galba E vi, f. 114.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 146, 156–8, 161–2, 178; *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 302; Digges, 422. Wm. Herle wrote on 28th September that Don Antonio was still detained at Dover by contrary winds (S. P. Domestic, cl, no. 15).

Majesty nor with any of those that have been dealers in the same. Notwithstanding, it were a very princely part (considering into what a perplexed estate the poor Prince is thrown) for her Majesty to take upon her the discharge of the loss that is sustained in the said preparations, whose estate I do not think yet so desperate, but that God will one day raise him up again to pluck down the pride of him who is the sworn enemy both to God and her Majesty. I do utterly mislike of his repair hither [to France] seeing no reason that should move him to attempt the same, considering how he hath been dealt withal, especially upon the King's denial to write his letters to her Majesty. If my first advice touching his repair into the Low Countries had been followed, both the isles of the Azores had been preserved and also the East and West Indian fleet defeated. . . . I am glad that the poor Prince resteth so well satisfied of my dealing towards him, for I was in doubt that the Count Vimioso, who is a very vain man, has sought to cause him to conceive otherwise of me than I deserved. Notwithstanding that it is apparent to all the world that the stay of the preparations for the islands hath grown from hence [France] . . . yet doth he blame her Majesty, being carried away by the vain hope that the King here is greatly disposed to assist his Majesty [Don Antonio] when he shall repair thither, which in the end will prove but an abuse, and I pray God it will be not with the peril of his person.'[1]

Although Walsingham insisted in this letter that the French were to blame for Don Antonio's failure to secure help in England, he expressed somewhat different views in a letter written a few days before to his brother-in-law, Robert Beale. 'For the matter of Portugal,' he wrote, 'sorry I am that a cause importing her Majesty so greatly as it doth should be overthrown; wherein surely the French King is greatly to be blamed and I would to God that some there [in England] also were not faulty. Seeing the preparations were so forward the enterprise was not to have been given over. For the injury will be reputed as great as if the same had taken place. The course of all our doing tendeth to offend without regard had so to proceed therein as the persons offended may not have ability to prosecute their revenge. It is strange to see what friendship Spain has won throughout all the courts of Europe by corruption and therefore it will behoove all princes to have a special care to make choice of honest men that will esteem more of honour and conscience than of profit. I have

[1] Digges, 434; cf. also *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 178.

great cause to think that the King of France his not assenting to concur with her Majesty in the said action of Portugal grew by practice from thence [England], for they are as bold to speak liberally here of such as are affected unto Spain as we are bold to speak of them there, whom we conceive to be so inclined. Though there be some here that seek to lay the fault of the not proceeding in the enterprise upon her Majesty, yet have I so used the matter as her Majesty is excused and the blame lighteth upon those that have deserved it. And whereas there hath been great fault laid upon me for that the charges have grown so great, I hope I shall be with more honesty able to answer the same than they that have been the impeachers of this voyage; and if the mischief that is like to ensue thereby might only light upon the same impeachers, the harm were the less; but I fear that her Majesty and her realm shall feel of it when it shall be too late to remedy it.' [1]

It is not clear whom Walsingham considered the 'impeachers' to have been. Probably he was levelling the charge generally against Burghley and the Conservatives in the Council. The hint at bribery may refer to Sir James Crofts who was plainly receiving bribes from Spain at this juncture.[2] How just Walsingham's accusations against the Conservatives were it is difficult to say with certainty, but the probabilities are that Burghley looked askance at the whole project just as he had looked askance at Drake's earlier adventures. His was too orderly and cautious a mind for such hairbreadth exploits, and to him Drake's warfare savoured too much of piracy, and played too much havoc with trade. Still it seems that, if the French had stood by, the expedition would have set forth.

There was one other project which Walsingham had under consideration while he was in France for 'abating the greatness of Spain'. He discussed it with Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, the agent of Henry of Navarre in Paris. The proposition seems indeed to have emanated from Navarre. Briefly, he undertook to stir up trouble in Spain, or as Mornay put it, 'to keep Hannibal amused at Carthage in such sort that he will be glad to leave his

[1] Murdin, *op. cit.* 355.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 128, 150. Mendoza maintained that Hatton, Leicester, and Walsingham were those chiefly interested in the project, ibid., pp. 140, 144–5.

neighbours at peace'. Exactly what Navarre intended is not clear. He spoke of a surprise expedition and it seems likely that he cherished some notion of recovering that part of Navarre which had passed to Spain some seventy years before. He undertook to bear half the expenses himself if Elizabeth would bear the other half and would lend some 'great ships'. He thought about twelve thousand crowns a month would cover the Queen's share and would serve to 'light a fire in Spain which all their waters will not be able to put out'. There is no evidence that Walsingham even communicated the proposal to his mistress and none that it was ever entertained by Elizabeth. Still, it is worth noting as one of the many irons which Walsingham at this juncture had in the fire.[1]

There is very little to be added with regard to Walsingham's embassy to France. He and his two colleagues had their last audience with the King on the 10th of September, and they found him still resolute not to enter into an offensive league with England except with the marriage.[2] Two days later, in an exchange of 'ordinary compliments', Walsingham took his formal leave of the French court. From Paris he went to Pont-Dormi to confer with Alençon and apparently made a very favourable impression upon the young Duke in their conversation together. Alençon wrote at once to Elizabeth that he had found her Secretary 'the most honest of men and worthy of the favour of the greatest princess in the world'. Exactly what passed between them is not recorded, but Alençon remarked that Walsingham's views entirely coincided with his own.[3] This probably indicates that the conversation turned rather upon Alençon's projects in the Low Countries, which Walsingham favoured, than upon the marriage, which he opposed. On the 19th of the month Walsingham was at Abbeville and two days later at the court.[4]

Looked at as a whole, his mission seems to have accomplished nothing. He had gone over to negotiate for a league without marriage and he had failed. The best that he could say of his achievements was that he had made matters with France no worse than they were.[5] He attributed his failure to Elizabeth's

[1] *Cal.Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 314; ibid., 1583, p. 715. [2] Digges, 439.
[3] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 428. [4] *Walsingham's Diary*, p. 43.
[5] Wm. Herle wrote to R. Huddleston on 28th September 1581, 'And as

cheese-paring policy. Just before he left France he read her a long lecture on the subject.

'I cannot deny', he wrote, 'but I have been infinitely grieved to see the desire I have had to do your Majesty some acceptable service (in the present charge committed unto me) so greatly crossed. But I will leave to touch my particular though I have as great cause as any man that ever served in the place I now unworthily supply, being at home subject to sundry strange jealousies and in foreign service to displeasure, though I dare make the greatest enemy I have the censurer of mine actions and proceedings in such foreign actions as have been committed unto me. If either ambition or riches were the end of my strife my grief would be the less. But now to the public, wherein if any thing shall escape my pen that may breed offence, I most heartily beseech your Majesty to ascribe it to love, which can never bring forth evil effects, though sometimes it may be subject to sharp censures. And first, for your Majesty's marriage. If your Majesty mean it, remember that by the delay your Highness useth therein, you lose the benefit of time, which (if years be considered) is not the least to be weighed. If you mean it not, then assure yourself it is one of the worst remedies you can use (howsoever your Majesty conceiveth it, that it may serve your turn). And as for the league we were in hand withal, if the King would have assented that the same should have proceeded in general terms, according to such direction as we have lately received from your Majesty, I am for sundry causes led to think that it would have proved unprofitable, as generally I know that there is a precedent to confirm the same. But if in that time a king of Scots, pretending a title to the crown of England, was like, by matching with Spain, to have wrought that peril to your Majesty's father as he is towards you, he would not then have stood upon generality as your Majesty doth now. For in diseased bodies there is not always like use of medicines. Sometimes when your Majesty doth behold in what doubtful terms you stand with foreign princes, then you do wish with great affection that opportunities offered had not been overslipped. But when they are offered to you (if they be accompanied with charges) they are altogether neglected. Common experience teacheth that it is as hard in a politique body to prevent any mischief without charges as in a natural body diseased, to cure the same without pain. Remember, I humbly beseech your

Mr. Walsingham sayeth to his friends, things be not better than they were by his going over, yet are they not in worse terms than they were' (S. P. Domestic, cl, no. 15). Mendoza wrote that Elizabeth received Walsingham ungraciously because of his failure (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 180).

Majesty, the respect of charges hath lost Scotland and I would to God I had no cause to think that it might put your Highness in peril of the loss of England. I see it, and they stick not to say it, that the only cause that moveth them here not to weigh your Majesty's friendship, is for that they see your Majesty doth fly charges otherwise than by doing somewhat underhand. It is strange, considering in what state your Majesty standeth, that in all the directions that we have now received, we have special charge not to yield to anything that may be accompanied with charges. The general league must be without any certain charges, the particular league with a voluntary and no certain charge; as also, that that is to be attempted in favour of Don Antonio. . . . Heretofore your Majesty's predecessors, in matters of peril, did never look into the charges, when their treasure was neither so great as your Majesty's is, nor subjects so wealthy nor so willing to contribute. . . . If this sparing and unprovident course be held still, the mischiefs approaching being so apparent as they are, I conclude therefore, having spoken in heat of duty, without offence to your Majesty, that no one that serveth in place of a Councillor, that either weigheth his own credit, or carryeth that sound affection to your Majesty as he ought to do, that would not wish himself in the farthest part of Ethiopia rather than enjoy the fairest palace in England.' [1]

To Burghley he wrote by the same post:

'I see she [her Majesty] is not disposed to redeem her peril otherwise than necessity shall lead her (who is one of the most dangerous pilots that can take the helm in hand, for where necessity ruleth, election and counsel can take no place). And though dealing underhand heretofore hath accidentally (in respect of the weakness of the princes her neighbours) continued her Majesty in a peaceable kind of government, yet now that Scotland is aliened from her Highness and the King well near of years fit to match with the daughter of some prince that may stand with him for his pretended title, her Majesty is to look for another kind of reckoning.' [2]

This last sentence marks the essential difference between Walsingham's policy and that of his mistress. She awaited dangers; he went forth to meet them. She was an opportunist; he essentially an idealist. The reason why his mission in France failed was not because Elizabeth was sparing (she had sent thirty thousand pounds to Alençon) but because she had changed her course of action. Walsingham failed because she wanted him

[1] Printed in Digges, 424, but wrongly dated there. The date should be 12 September 1581; cf. *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 427. [2] Digges, 435.

to fail. So far he was a victim to a policy which she did not altogether confide to him any more than she did to other councillors. His failure practically marked the abandonment of an attempt to form a league with France. Elizabeth chose to follow instead the policy of binding her fortunes with those of Alençon, and keeping him in train now by dangling the prospect of marriage before his eyes, and now by lending him badly needed money.

When Walsingham had his last interview with Alençon in France, the Duke had clearly intimated his intention of coming to England. According to Alençon himself, Walsingham had rather encouraged the idea ; according to Mendoza, Walsingham had tried to discourage his coming.[1] At all events it was rumoured about the court before the end of September that he would come,[2] and both the French ambassador and Marchemont said as much publicly.[3] It was not, however, until the end of October that he actually arrived. Apparently he entertained the notion of stopping for a day or two with Walsingham before he went to court, but Walsingham contrived to escape the expensive honour by pointing out that the plague was bad in his neighbourhood.[4]

The object of his coming was plain. He needed assistance for his Low Countries enterprises. Neither the King of France nor the Estates General of the Low Countries were giving him any material assistance. He counted upon inducing Elizabeth to marry him or to lend him more money. At the outset he seems to have entertained small hope of the marriage.[5] At any rate, the matter in which he was more immediately interested was in securing financial support. This fitted in with Walsingham's policy exactly and probably accounts for the friendly attitude which both he and Leicester took towards the visit. Walsingham, indeed, even ventured to praise Alençon's good parts to the Queen

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 428 ; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 180.

[2] S. P. Domestic, cl, no. 15. [3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 180.

[4] For preparations for his coming cf. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 202 ; *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 450–1. He landed, 31st October, at Rye, *Walsingham's Diary*, p. 44.

[5] Cf. St. Aldegonde's letter of 22 November 1581 in Diegerick, 'Quelques lettres de Marnix de St. Aldegonde' in *Codex diplomaticus van het historisch Genootschap*, 2nd series, vol. iv, pt. 2, p. 221. Cf. also Mendoza to Philip II, 29 Oct. 1581 (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 202) : 'The principal object of his visit is to ask for money.'

herself, and provoked the angry retort, 'Well, you knave, why have you so often spoken ill of him? You veer round like a weathercock.' [1]

After Alençon's first interview with Elizabeth he was more encouraged at the prospects of bringing off the marriage after all. At least so Mendoza thought.[2] Certainly the relations between the Queen and her suitor at this juncture partook much more of the nature of courtship than of diplomacy. Whether or not the Queen actually carried bouillon to Alençon while he was still in bed and did the other scandalous things with which the diplomatic correspondence of the time is full,[3] she certainly convinced many observers that she was madly in love with the ugly little frog prince. Exactly what she was about was not clear. Possibly she let the rather vulgar woman in her run away with her dignity for the moment. It seems more likely, however, that she was playing a game as usual. The French thought the marriage was practically an accomplished fact. Walsingham and Leicester both gave out that it was the only way out of the difficulty. But Mendoza, who was singularly well informed, regarded this simply as a pose and told his master that the English in general were scoffing at the match, and were saying that Alençon was simply trying to borrow money.[4]

Such small traces as there are of serious business afoot between

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 206. It is striking to observe that Alençon seems to have provoked a great deal of praise at this juncture, among others from St. Aldegonde who expected great things of him. Cf. Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, vi. 223.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 206.

[3] Cf. Hume, *Courtships of Queen Elizabeth*, p. 265; Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Les Huguenots et les Gueux*, vi. 231. There is a good instance of the kind of gossip which was afloat at the time in a letter from De Sousa to Diego Botelli, of which there is a copy in S. P. France, vii, f. 21, as witness the following extract:

'The Earl of Leicester knows well enough that if the Duke should be married in England he cannot be sure for to live there; because after that the same marriage was in talk he did procure some place in Germany for to dwell there if the marriage should take place. And therefore he speaks as much as he can against the marriage. And there be those that do speak against it, that it shall not take place. Some others say that the lady is not barren and that by God's grace she hath two girls and that the marriage shall be concluded with one of them. And let it be as it will there goes much babbling, in so much that there is no talk of any weighty matter of the realm, and the Queen doth not attend unto other matters but only to be together with the Duke in one chamber from morning to noon and afterwards till ii or iii hours after sunset. I cannot tell what a devil they do.'

[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 211–12.

the Queen and her suitor at this juncture tend to support this view of the situation. Political friendship with no hint of marriage is the tenor of an agreement between them of the 14th of November.[1] A long memorial from Walsingham's pen, written about the same time, is concerned not with the alternatives of marriage or no marriage, but with those of assisting or not assisting Alençon in his Low Countries enterprises. This memorial is worth considering at length.[2] Walsingham developed his subject with rather more elaboration than was his wont. In the first place he admitted that tradition favoured hostility towards France and alliance with the ruling house in Burgundy. He maintained, however, that the bases upon which that policy had rested were changed. French antagonism had proceeded from the fact that England in the past had held territory which France had claimed. With the loss of Calais that bone of contention had been for ever removed. He admitted also that the French King was ' transported by the advice of that house that is the enemy of this crown ', but he pointed out that the personal malice of Henry III was effectually curbed by the power of Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots in France. ' It will then appear that the said King shall hardly be able to attempt anything against the Crown, howsoever he be affected, but that upon so just occasion he may be bridled and set a work within his own realm.'

As for the traditional alliance with Burgundy, Walsingham pointed out that so long as Burgundy remained under its own rulers and ' depended of the amity of England, for that always the stronger giveth law to the weaker ', England had done well to cherish its goodwill, but with Burgundy under Spain the case was different. It simply served to strengthen the power of Philip II, of whose malice towards England Elizabeth needed no further proof.

In such wise Walsingham brushed away tradition. He then proceeded to develop his argument more in detail. Three

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 369.

[2] Harleian MSS., 1582, f. 38. The paper is headed ' Whether it be good for her Majesty to assist the Duke of Anjou in his enterprises in the Low Countries, November 1581. Sir F. W.' It is written in a clerkly hand. The ' Sir F. W.' in the heading is the only direct evidence of Walsingham's authorship.

general propositions might be stated, he insisted, without fear of contradiction: (1) that the Low Countries could not hold out against Spain without assistance; (2) that England could not hope to make a sound peace with Philip II, 'being so passioned in religion as he is and otherwise ill-affected as by effects hath appeared'; (3) 'that it will be a very hard matter for her Majesty having no friends abroad; the realm so corrupted at home; Ireland, as it were, altogether aliened in devotion, and the gate of Scotland laid open to the malice of her enemies; to be able to defend herself.'

Under these circumstances, Walsingham inquired, what policy should England follow in regard to Alençon's enterprises in the Low Countries? Was it better that these countries should be in the hands of a friend or of an enemy; of a despot or of a limited monarch; of an enemy to religion, or a prince 'that yieldeth to a toleration of religion';—in brief, of Philip of Spain, or of Francis, Duke of Alençon? The answer was obvious, but Walsingham acknowledged difficulties and undertook to meet them. In the first place, it might be alleged that the friendship of France was not likely to be more stable than that of Spain, and that to assist France to gain Burgundy was simply to weaken one enemy in order to strengthen another. Walsingham's retort to this was that 'whiles there is doubt made of the future greatness of France, Spain presently groweth to that power and strength as if he be not presently met withal he is like to overrule France, England, and all Europe'. 'Present griefs', as he put it, 'being dangerous are to be preferred before conjectural doubts of future diseases.' 'Furthermore,' he added, 'this quarrel for the Low Countries between Spain and France will not so speedily be ended, Spain enjoying, as she doth, a great portion of the country and having good means to maintain the wars, whereby he may be kept from annoying us.' Furthermore, 'if France grow too great, her Majesty, in the ordinary course of policy amongst other princes in the like cases used, may change the balance.' Finally, Walsingham suggested the poor expedient that Alençon might be bound by treaty to relinquish the sovereignty of the Low Countries in the event of his becoming King of France.

In discussing the practicability of keeping Alençon within the

bounds of a ' limited government ' in the Low Countries, Walsingham made some interesting observations upon political conditions there. He had no faith, of course, in the power of promises to keep France in bounds. ' Experience teacheth that when France getteth once a footing he can hardly be contained within limits.' But he did have considerable confidence in the ability of the Dutch to look after themselves. The country was strong, he said, by nature, the towns were well fortified, the burghers jealous of their liberties ' making no difference between a French and a Spanish tyrant '. The nobility, ' who could by gifts be corrupted ', were few and without power. If corruption were practised, it would have to be with a multitude and could not be kept secret. ' It will then appear most manifestly that upon any such attempt they will revolt and so thereby the mischiefs doubted to follow will be avoided.'

Walsingham then went on to consider ' the inconveniences to follow if the Duke be not continued and encouraged by some convenient maintenance to be yielded unto him '.

' When he shall see no friendship extended towards him but rather an opposition to that which he doth so effectually seek . . . it must needs draw him of a friend to become an enemy.' This, Walsingham argued, would play exactly into Spain's hands. ' Whereby it is likely that both the Pope, France, and Spain will combine themselves against this crown. . . . The ill-affected of this realm, casting their eyes upon such support as may grow from so mighty assistance, will not be contained, as it is to be greatly doubted, within the limits of dutiful subjection within this realm. And what encouragement Ireland, that is already out of joint, will receive thereby, all the world may see.' Walsingham believed that, in such an event, the allied enemies could strike at her through Scotland. ' For that France would be loathe that England should be cast in the balance of Spain, and Spain, on the contrary side, that England should be joined to the crown of France, it is probable that the plot by common consent will be to advance the King of Scots and establish him in the title and right he pretendeth to this crown.'

Finally, Walsingham, having established to his own satisfaction at least, the necessity of assisting Alençon, turned to the question of ways and means.

'If', he wrote, 'such a support should be required as might breed an open war between Spain and this crown, then should it be very necessary to have the matter propounded in Parliament and the realm made acquainted with such reasons as doth induce her Majesty to yield support unto the said Duke . . . lest otherwise, being not acquainted with the reasons, they may enter into some hard conception touching the same. And in case it shall be found expedient to enter into an overt action with Spain for the avoiding the perils and dangers above noted, then may it be propounded unto them, as a thing that will be least burdensome to the subjects, that some portion of the B[ishops] temporalties may by sale be converted into fee farms, with which motion the clergy ought not to be discontented for that the ground of this war groweth in respect of religion, for the maintenance whereof they ought to sacrifice their lives, and therefore not to make difficulty in the parting with their temporalties, especially seeing they shall continually enjoy the rent.

'On the other side, if an overt war may be avoided and that it shall suffice to give some support underhand, then shall it be expedient for avoiding of the grief of the subjects, that her Majesty convert some of her own land into fee farms which, if it should amount to the sum of ten thousand pounds by year, would not prejudice her Majesty during her own time not much above forty thousand pounds, which sum, the perils and dangers being thoroughly weighed, that otherwise may ensue, ought not in reason to be stood at.'

This passage is very illuminating. As a practical financial expedient it will hardly commend itself to the prudent. Walsingham was careless of the national resources in his ardour to carry out his aggressive policies. In this respect he stood in marked contrast to Burghley. Very likely this was one of the subjects upon which they disagreed. But the passage quoted is even more illuminating upon other points. One sees the lurking Puritan behind Walsingham's suggestion to despoil the bishops of their temporalties. Even more striking is his suggestion that important matters of public policy which involve heavy expenses should be explained to Parliament. He saw the value of conciliating and consulting public opinion. Possibly his religious views were beginning to colour somewhat his political ones and shaking a little his faith in the divine right of kings. Possibly he wished to consult Parliament as the surest way to prevent the possibility of the marriage taking place after all.[1] At all events his

[1] On this point cf. Mendoza to Philip II, 20 November 1581: 'Some

sentence on the immediate question was for supporting Alençon vigorously in the Low Countries.

Meantime the love making went on at court. There is reason to believe that the party in the Privy Council which favoured the marriage, particularly Sussex, were urging the necessity of the match upon the Queen on the one hand, and prompting Alençon on the other to press his suit hard.[1] The consequence was that the suitor became more insistent and the virgin more tractable. Nevertheless, during the first three weeks of November, well-informed spectators were generally of the opinion that the match would not come off.

Then, of a sudden, came the dramatic episode of the 22nd of November. The story has been often told, best perhaps by Mendoza, in a letter to Philip II.

'I wrote . . . on the 20th, and on the following day Alençon and all his company displayed, not discontent alone, but entire disillusionment as to the marriage taking place. On the 22nd, however, at eleven in the morning, the Queen and Alençon were walking together in a gallery, Leicester and Walsingham being present, when the French ambassador entered and said that he wished to write to his master, from whom he had received orders to hear from the Queen's own lips her intention with regard to marrying his brother. She replied, "You may write this to the King: that the Duke of Alençon shall be my husband", and at the same moment she turned to Alençon and kissed him on the mouth, drawing a ring from her own hand and giving it to him as a pledge. Alençon gave her a ring of his in return, and shortly afterwards the Queen summoned the ladies and gentlemen from the presence chamber in the gallery, repeating to them in a loud voice in Alençon's presence what she had previously said.'[2]

Alençon and his followers naturally appeared delighted. He informed St. Aldegonde that he was sure the King of France would now commit himself. St. Aldegonde wrote to the Prince of Orange that some celebration had better be made,[3] and

Englishmen judge that the prolongation of Parliament is a pure artifice on the part of the Queen, in the certainty that the King of France will not conclude an alliance with her on the mere word of his brother . . . and that if Alençon thereupon asks her to fulfil her pledges she will call Parliament *together which will certainly oppose the marriage*' (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 221).

[1] Cf. Camden, *Annals of Queen Elizabeth* (ed. Hearne), ii. 376. Camden shows himself to have been singularly well informed about these negotiations.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 226.

[3] Cf. p. 89, n. 5.

bells were ringing and bonfires blazing in Antwerp not long afterwards.[1] But Mendoza thought that the display was 'only artful and conditional', and when the news reached France the King refused to give the bearer of it the thousand crowns intended for him until further confirmation. In England the news affected different parties at court differently. 'Some', says Camden, 'leaped for joy, some were seized with admiration, and others dejected with sorrow. Leicester, who had lately plotted and contrived to cross the marriage; Hatton, Vice-Chamberlain, and Walsingham stormed at it, as if the Queen, the realm, and religion were now quite undone. The Queen's gentlewomen, with whom she used to be familiar, lamented and bewailed, and did so terrify and vex her mind that she spent the night in doubts and cares without sleep amongst her weeping and lamenting servants.'[2]

One wonders how much of this play was feigned to deceive the very observers who recorded it and how much was genuine. Mendoza suspected that it was designed to force the hand of the French,[3] who had refused the league without marriage. There is a draft letter from Elizabeth to Cobham, her ambassador in France, written about this time, which tends to confirm this view. In it Elizabeth instructed Cobham to tell the French King definitely that she would marry his brother on condition that he, the King, would give her written assurance that he would hold her free of all charges in the Low Countries' wars, and would declare war on Spain if Spain attacked her.[4] Elizabeth may have hoped, by kissing and ring giving, to convince the King of the sincerity of her intentions.

Shortly after his arrival in England, Alençon had dispatched an agent to his brother urging his co-operation in the match[5] and Henry had dispatched Pinart, one of his secretaries, with instructions to declare that in case the marriage was consummated he would consent to bear half the charges of his brother's enterprise in Flanders and would enter into a league offensive and defensive.[6] But Pinart was long on the way, and while he tarried Elizabeth retraced her steps. There are several

[1] Camden, *op. cit.* ii. 376.
[2] Ibid. ii. 486.
[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 226.
[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 388.
[5] *Cal. Venetian*, 1581–91, p. 22.
[6] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 405.

different versions of her backward course,[1] but the sum and substance of it was that she had been misunderstood, that she had not intended to pledge herself definitely to a marriage, that religion stood in the way, that her people objected, that the King of France would not meet her conditions. She succeeded in convincing the bystanders, at all events, that the match was more than doubtful. But the suitor himself seems to have become more resolute than ever to bring it to pass.

Pinart arrived at last and was received at court on the 29th of November. Subsequently he held several conferences with members of the Privy Council upon the question of the league and the marriage,[2] but no real progress was made, nor any, it appears, by the French at least, expected. Pinart's mission was indeed rather one of observation than of negotiation. He remained in England as long as the Duke of Alençon was there and kept in as close touch as he could with the progress of affairs between the Duke and the Queen.

Elizabeth's problem for the moment was not with Pinart or his master, but with her young suitor. The fact is that she had gone too far in the gallery on the 22nd. Alençon was deceived into believing that after having committed herself so far, she really would marry him after all. Consequently he lost interest in the Low Countries and came near forgetting that it was chiefly to get aid for his enterprises there that he had come to England in the first place. He found life at the English court, where he was magnificently entertained at the Queen's expense, both cheap and comfortable, and he showed no disposition to depart. The situation began to be embarrassing. As time went on the idea of marriage became more and more distasteful to the Queen.[3] Alençon swore that he would not leave England without her promise of marriage. To the Privy Councillors the only alternative seemed to lie in following Walsingham's suggestion and giving Alençon money.[4] Leicester thought he would

[1] Camden (ed. Hearne), ii. 376; *Cal. Venetian*, 1581–91, p. 24; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 229.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 495–6.

[3] She told Sussex late in December that 'she hated the idea of marriage every day more, for reasons which she would not divulge to a twin soul' (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 252).

[4] St. Aldegonde wrote to the Council of State of the Low Countries in December 1581 as follows: 'Et s'il [Alençon] ne tenoit qu'a y aller je croy

be satisfied with two hundred thousand pounds outright, and suggested that the sum be raised by ' privy seals ', the favourite Elizabethan form of the forced loan.[1] Elizabeth at first stormed at the idea, but on the 15th of December she finally agreed to lend Alençon sixty thousand pounds upon his promise to repay her within six months after she called upon him to do so. Half of this sum was to be delivered to the Duke fifteen days after he left England, and the other half within fifty days after that.[2] This loan, the news of Parma's capture of Tournay, which reached England a few days before, and the importunities of the Dutch themselves, at last seemed to persuade Alençon to depart. Elizabeth ordered ships to be got ready at once for his convoy, was profuse with tears and sighs to her suitor, but danced for joy in her bedchamber. But her rejoicing was premature. While Alençon awaited favouring winds for his departure he suddenly changed his mind about going. He swore now that Elizabeth had pledged herself to him by every token. ' If ', he said, ' I cannot get you for my wife by fair means and affection I must do so by force, for I will not leave this country without you.' The Queen was in a predicament.[3] She sent Burghley to Alençon to urge upon him the necessity of his departure, and loosened the purse-strings a little to the same end. On the 31st of December she paid him ten thousand pounds in advance on her promised loan.[4] But though this cheered him a little, he still insisted that the Queen was pledged to him and that if he abandoned his suit now he would become the laughing-stock of the whole world. He threatened, moreover, to give up his projects in the Netherlands altogether. Elizabeth was in despair. His lack of resolution gave very little hope of his accomplishing anything serviceable in the Low Countries even if he went. Already she had lent him large sums of money on

qu'il y seroit longtemps, mais il desireroit bien y aller avec quelques moyens, qui est cause de retardement.' Muller and Diegerick, *op. cit.* iv. 262.

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 229, 232. Mendoza says that Leicester at this time was also arranging for a riot in London as a protest against the marriage and that a plot was afoot to execute all supporters of the marriage.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 409.

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 239, 243.

[4] Cf. Cotton MSS., Galba E vi, f. 113. ' Sums of money paid to the Duke of Anjou . . . 31 December. Paid to the Duke by Palavicino £10,000.'

no security. To lend him more seemed merely to be throwing good money after bad. For the moment she thought of abandoning him altogether and coming to terms with Spain,[1] a suggestion which seems to have emanated from Burghley and to have received the support of the conservative elements in the Council, but which Leicester and Hatton and Walsingham all violently opposed. That project was dropped. Then pressure was brought to bear upon the Duke indirectly through St. Aldegonde, the Dutch envoy in England. Walsingham even induced Orange to send over special commissioners from the Low Countries to the same end. Increased demands were made upon the King of France as the price of marriage. The English Roman Catholic Seminary at Rheims must be closed; Calais and Havre must be delivered to England as pledges of the good faith of the King. According to Mendoza, even Alençon's own followers were bribed to expedite his departure. Finally Alençon woke up to the fact that nothing whatever was to be gained by remaining longer in England. After several false starts, he at last set forth from London on the 1st of February. The Queen herself accompanied him as far as Canterbury.[2] Leicester and a troop of nobles

[1] La Huguerye, that notable liar, maintains that Elizabeth cherished a plan of marrying Alexander of Parma. *Mémoires de La Huguerye*, ii. 148.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 238, 249, 266, 268–9, 280. Mendoza supplies practically the only information about Alençon in England from 22 November 1581 until his departure. Mendoza is not altogether to be trusted, but his story must stand until further evidence is forthcoming. His account of the financial transactions with Alençon (ibid., p. 275) should be compared with the memorandum of money paid to Alençon, in Cotton MSS., Galba E vi, f. 113, which represents that Alençon received the following sums on the dates indicated, the day and month, but not the year being given:

By the L. Henry Seymour at Cambray £15,000 By du Bex at London £15,000	For which there is a bond, 13 October 1581.
31 December. Paid to the Duke by Palavicino	£10,000.
14 April. Paid to the Duke by Palavicino	£15,000.
Paid to the Duke into the hands of du Bex by J. Somers	£15,000.

This shows aggregate payments amounting to £70,000 against which the Duke delivered bonds aggregating £90,000 as follows:

13 October 1581, £30,000.
17 December 1581, £30,000.
19 December 1581, £30,000.

There are among the S. P. France (x, 158, 160, 161, referred to in *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 288, as x, 122, 124, 125) three statements of moneys

were told off to convey him all the way to Antwerp. He embarked on the 7th of February at Sandwich.[1]

While he still had one foot on the shore he sent a note to Burghley requesting that the remaining fifty thousand pounds of the sixty thousand pounds which the Queen had promised him should be paid over to Marchemont. It looks as though he had chosen the psychological moment to make the demand. There was a suggestion implied, perhaps, that if he did not get the money he would not go. At all events the device seems to have failed.[2]

Alençon's departure with some of the Queen's treasure, but without her hand, should be regarded as a triumph for Walsingham and Leicester and their party. They opposed the marriage. The marriage had not taken place. They favoured subsidizing Alençon to fight the cause of the Dutch and Elizabeth had paid

advanced to the Duke of Alençon which were probably made after his death in 1584.

The first paper (no. 158) shows that Elizabeth loaned Alençon in 1581 278,340 li.; 1582, 353,731 li.

W. R. Scott in *The Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720*, i. 90, takes this to be pounds sterling and represents Elizabeth as having paid out the enormous sum of over £600,000 to Alençon in two years. As a matter of fact, these figures are not in pounds sterling but in livres tournois, as Professor Scott would have discovered had he examined no. 160, where the sums are given both in the French coinage and in their English equivalent. The conversion was apparently made by Burghley himself on the basis of 10 sous to the shilling and 20 sous to the livre tournois, which would make the livre tournois 1/10 of the pound sterling. On this basis the payments to Alençon were as follows:

1581 £27,834.
1582 £35,373.

Unfortunately the summary of these documents in the Foreign Calendar does not explain that the abbreviation l. means livres tournois and is therefore misleading. Professor Scott is naturally rather hard put to it to show how Elizabeth managed to make such enormous payments within so short a time.

Burghley has shown in no. 161, written in his own hand, where these sums were disbursed.

1581	At Cambray by Sir Henry Seymour 50,000 crowns at 58 sous	145,000 liv.
	At St. Valery by Du Bex 50,000 pistoles	133,340 „
1582	January by Palavicino	100,000 „
	April by La Forgere 43,000 pistoles	111,700 „
	21 August by Du Bex	142,131 „
		632,171 „

[1] There is a full account of the ceremonies attending his departure from England and his arrival at Antwerp in Holinshed, *Chronicles* (ed. 1586), iii, pp. 1329 ff. Some interesting details of the embarkment are given in a letter of Alençon to Des Pruneaux in Muller and Diegerick, iv. 284.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 484, 507.

over to him ten thousand pounds since his arrival in England and had promised him fifty thousand pounds more. It is true that Elizabeth said tearfully that her suitor would be back in six weeks to marry her, and swore she would give a million to have her frog swimming in the Thames, but this was generally set down by the wise heads as mere histrionics. Underhand, through Leicester, she was bidding the Prince of Orange keep her suitor fast in the Flemish marshes.[1]

Burghley and Sussex and their supporters believed that Elizabeth had a choice of two courses, either to marry Alençon or to come to terms with Spain. Now that the marriage seemed to have failed, they accordingly began to advocate the alternate course. They opposed vigorously the policy of sending Alençon money. Mendoza wrote to his master on the 26th of March 1582:

'Marchemont had seen the Queen in private audience, solely for the purpose of begging money for Alençon. She was very dissatisfied and referred the answer to some members of the Council who have not yet resolved upon it. Cecil, Sussex, the Admiral and others are of the opinion that nothing whatever should be given to him unless he marry the Queen; whilst the rest say that the rebels must be supported. Each one gives his own reasons privately to the Queen and between them they have made her so perplexed and ill-tempered that it is noticed by every one, as she rudely scolds all the ladies and others in the Chamber. Walsingham, after this Council, told a friend of his, with great anger, that he had no idea that the Queen had so many Spanish Councillors as were in the Council the day before.'[2]

It seems that Leicester's absence in the Netherlands had so far weakened his party at court that his opponents had temporarily at least got the upper hand. Upon his return he declared lightly that he had left 'Alençon like an old hulk run ashore, high and dry . . . unable to get off the sand bank'. The words got to the Queen's ears and she was extremely angry. She swore he was a traitor, like all of his stock, and that he and Orange together had planned to make a mere figure-head of the Duke. Walsingham came in for his share as well. She called him a rogue for

[1] Cf. Elizabeth's letter to the States General commending Alençon to them, in *Archives de la maison Orange-Nassau*, 1st Series, viii. 61; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 295, 299.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 311.

having incited Alençon to go to the Netherlands where he could reap nothing but infamy.[1]

But events in the Netherlands soon put her into a more sober mood. On the 18th of March, as the Prince of Orange was leaving the dinner-table, he was shot in the neck by Jean Jaureguy. The news reached England a few days later. For over a month Orange hovered between life and death. The general conviction was that he could not live. Under these circumstances it behooved Elizabeth to consider what would happen in case he died. She knew well enough that Orange was the real master of the Dutch rebels, and Alençon a mere figure-head. But what if Orange were taken away? Would Alençon then grasp the substance as well as the forms of power? It is not unlikely that those in Elizabeth's Council who opposed his progress in the Low Countries suggested this to Elizabeth. At any rate she became possessed about this time of her old fear of French domination. Her first impulse was to call the Duke back to England, and Walsingham had a good deal of difficulty in persuading her not to do it.[2] Her next was to renew the negotiations for marriage, not with any serious intent, probably, but with a view to keeping Alençon still in leading strings. Walsingham and Leicester and Hatton, who worked hand in glove during this whole business, were all convinced that she had no thought of marrying and considered it very unwise in her to run the risk of irritating the French by a resumption of her old tactics. They tried to induce her to take the Netherlands openly under her protection, but Burghley and Sussex both opposed this course and Elizabeth herself preferred to play her favourite game of courtship. During the debates on the subject she complained that the prospect of Orange's death made all her councillors tremble and her subjects lose their courage,[3] a remark which goes to prove how completely, in English eyes, the cause of the Dutch was identified with the person of the great Prince.

The fear of French domination in the Netherlands was the impelling force behind Elizabeth's foreign relations for the next month or so. Once more Leicester and his partisans had to face her wrath. It was due to them, she swore, that Alençon had

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, pp. 310–12. [2] Ibid., pp. 326–7. [3] Ibid., p. 346.

MICHEL DE CASTELNAV SEIGNEVR DE MAVVISSIERE
L'obiect de ce portraict, fera veoir au Lecteur
du visage les traicts bien formez de Lauteur
mais son esprit diuin cogneu en son histoire
Luy fera beaucoup plus estimer sa memoire
Jaspar Isac fecit

MICHEL DE CASTELNAU, SEIGNEUR DE MAUVISSIÈRE, French Ambassador to England, 1575–85 ; from the engraving by Jaspar Isac published in *Les Mémoires de Messire de Castelnau*, Paris, 1621

gone to the Low Countries at all. When Walsingham went one day to consult her on business, she turned upon him savagely. 'You knave,' she screamed, 'you ought to have your head off your shoulders for having urged the going of Alençon to Antwerp, where he is now trying to get hold of the seaports; but they shall see whether I will coolly put up with that.' [1]

She pressed the marriage hard late in April and early in May. She told the French ambassador that she would certainly marry as soon as the King complied with her conditions.[2] She wrote affectionate letters to the Duke himself, and, what was still more to the point, she sent him fifteen thousand pounds.[3] She bade her ambassador in Paris give encouraging replies to approaches in that quarter.[4] If only to make the illusion complete, she even quarrelled with Walsingham, attributing to him the coolness between her and her suitor. But no one seems to have been very much deceived by these time-worn devices. Her purpose came out more clearly when she told Mauvissière plainly that she would spend every penny she had and every Englishman she could muster sooner than let France gain a footing in the Netherlands.[5]

At the French court, Cobham, the English ambassador, found small disposition to resume the marriage negotiations. Elizabeth indicated to him rather coyly that it would not be becoming for her to reopen the matter herself. He should hint to the French that she was prepared to listen as soon as they were prepared to talk. They were disappointingly silent. 'For mine own part,' Walsingham wrote to Cobham, 'I do think that the King's mistrusting her Majesty's meaning is the matter that maketh him also keep off—and it may be that he findeth her Majesty's years so far spent that he doth not perhaps think it convenient the match should now go forward. . . . Such is the common course

[1] Ibid., p. 347.

[2] Ibid., p. 353; *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, viii. 31. Catherine was eager as always for the marriage, but past experience had made her sceptical; cf. her letter to Bellièvre of 16 May 1582, in *Lettres*, viii. 29; cf. also *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 47.

[3] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 502; on the sending of money cf. p. 99, n. 2.

[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 22.

[5] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 355. Philip II himself gave a pretty good summary of Elizabeth's position at this juncture in a letter to Mendoza of 20 May 1582 (ibid., p. 374). He sent Mendoza at the same time credit for 40,000 crowns to be employed in bribes among the English councillors.

of all our proceedings here that when we want the friendship and amity of the great princes our neighbours we do then lament that we have not sought it, but when it is offered unto us we make little account of it.'[1]

In July the prospect of the marriage brightened a little. Cobham found the French King more disposed to treat and Mauvissière in England declared stoutly that his master would yield anything to bring about the marriage.[2] Elizabeth thereupon instructed Cobham to demand as a condition to the marriage that the King should relieve her of all charges in the Low Countries. At that Henry III backed off again and Catherine de Médicis wrote to Mauvissière that keen as she was for the match she despaired of its being brought to pass.[3]

Meantime in France the Queen Mother had been preparing to assert vigorously her claim to at least some portion of the Portuguese Empire. Whether or not her ultimate aim was at Brazil, her immediate intention was to seize the Azores as a base of operations. In June a strong expedition under Philippo Strozzi was dispatched to the islands. On the 26th of July the Spanish Admiral Santa Cruz with an inferior force completely defeated Strozzi's fleet, scattered it to the four winds, and captured its commander. Not long afterwards the island of Terceira, which had so far withstood Spanish attempts to occupy it, yielded. So far as European politics were concerned, the net result was to increase greatly the prestige of Philip II and to incline the balance of power towards Spain. England and France were of necessity drawn nearer together.[4]

Elizabeth's response to the news from the Azores was to send Alençon fifteen thousand pounds.[5] Even Burghley agreed that under the circumstances it was a wise step to take rather ' than that Spain should crow over us in the Low Countries ', although a fortnight before he had been opposed to it.[6]

On the French side of the Channel the same reasons were driving the King into a similar line of policy. Walsingham learned through the bankers that money was being conveyed to

[1] 20 June 1582, S. P. France, vii, f. 219. [2] Ibid., ff. 250, 279.
[3] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, viii, p. 48, 6 August 1582.
[4] Mariéjol, *Catherine de Médicis*, pp. 348–50.
[5] Cf. p. 99, n. 2; also Walsingham to Burghley, 8 Aug. 1582, in S. P. Domestic, clv, no. 6. [6] *Cal. Domestic*, 1581–90, p. 66.

Anjou in the Low Countries from France, and soldiers as well.[1] A little later Cobham wrote that Biron, one of the ablest of the French marshals, was sent to command Anjou's forces.[2] Henry of Navarre's project against the Spanish frontier was revived.[3] And so necessary did the marriage seem to the King that he at last yielded to Elizabeth's demands and sent a letter under the great seal discharging her of all expenses in the Low Countries in the event of the marriage.[4] It appeared, however, that the document was not so ample a discharge as the Queen had demanded. Walsingham wrote to Cobham early in November that the French ambassador was offering no more than he had offered 'these twelve months back'. 'By the which manner of proceeding,' Walsingham added, 'it appeareth that the King is but coldly affected in the cause, wherein those that weigh the matter indifferently, considering her Majesty's years and their necessities in France to be provided of a successor either by the King or Monsieur, do judge that they have good reason for themselves not to be too hasty in the matter. And yet, notwithstanding all this, it is meant that the negotiations shall be still entertained, whereof we have hitherto taken more hurt than good.'[5]

This passage makes it clear how Walsingham stood in the matter. Elizabeth herself seems to have been entertaining the match simply for the purpose of keeping in close relations with France, and had no intention of carrying it through. When Hatton asked her what she meant to do in case the French acceded to her demands, she said she would give them words, 'which were the best current coin amongst Frenchmen'. Hatton told one of his friends that he had never had any fear of the marriage but once, when the Queen had given Alençon the ring. Yet in public Elizabeth was still swearing that she would marry Alençon as soon as his brother acceded to her terms.[6]

But such was Elizabeth's diplomacy. It is hard to resist the conclusion that since Alençon's visit to England the whole course of the marriage negotiations was nothing more than a mere

[1] Walsingham to Burghley, 19 Aug. 1582, S. P. Domestic, clv, no. 24.
[2] 26 Sept. 1582, S. P. France, viii, f. 117. [3] Ibid., f. 43.
[4] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, viii. 60; S. P. France, viii, f. 84; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 411.
[5] S. P. France, viii, f. 219. [6] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 408–9, 416.

rattling of dry bones in the ears of the King of Spain. Perhaps in France some hope of the match was still cherished. Catherine de Médicis, at any rate, professed to believe that it would all come out right in the end, and her son went so far as to request passports for ministers whom he intended to send to England.[1] But although La Mothe Fénélon did come over late in November, it appeared that his business was primarily with Scotland. It may be, as Mendoza thought, that Henry III was dangling the prospect of a Franco-Scottish alliance before Elizabeth's eyes at this juncture in order to force her hand.[2] At any rate he failed, and by the end of the year the match was to all appearances dead,[3] although the *coup de grâce* was actually administered early in the following year in the Netherlands by Alençon himself.

While the match still hung in the balance Elizabeth left her suitor to fight his own way in the Netherlands. As soon as she was convinced that the King of France was assisting his brother,[4] she sent him no more money and would send him none for all his urging.[5] Towards the Dutch themselves she held an unfriendly course. Her dealings with the Estates General directly took the form of reiterated demands for the repayment of her loans.[6] Although she recognized the necessity of maintaining them, especially in view of Parma's continued successes, she limited her own efforts to that end to such assistance as she gave Alençon, and she scolded them roundly for not co-operating with the Duke more effectively than they were doing. She even threatened

[1] *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, viii. 73. Walsingham wrote to Burghley, 16 Nov. 1582: 'Her Majesty, according unto the king's request, hath sent a passport for such ministers as he meaneth to send hither, of whose coming I assure your Lordship I take little comfort for the doubt I have they shall be returned home with little satisfaction, which may breed an unrecoverable alienation' (Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 72).

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 425.

[3] Walsingham wrote to Cobham, 4 Jan. 1582/3: 'Her Majesty, seeing by your last letters that the King of France will not discharge her of the cost of the war in the Low Countries seems no longer disposed to entertain the marriage, being pleased that Marchemont shall accordingly depart to the Duke his master with such resolutions as she shall now take in the said cause, upon the king's answer now received' (S. P. France, ix, f. 3).

[4] Alençon, by the way, denied this in his letters to her. *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 508.

[5] Cf. Walsingham to Cobham, 8 Nov. 1582, S. P. France, viii, f. 219.

[6] Cf. Gilpin's correspondence in *Cals. Foreign*, 1581 and 1582, *passim*; also Elizabeth to Orange, 9 Aug. 1582, in *Archives de la Maison Orange-Nassau*, 1st Series, viii. 120.

on one occasion to abandon them altogether and to induce her suitor to make terms with Spain.

But wise heads were coming to see more and more that Alençon was a broken reed to lean upon. His soldiers were badly paid and mutinous. He himself was playing tennis in Antwerp and not daring to venture beyond the gates.[1] The whole world must have been convinced by this time that he was no man to measure swords with Parma. Walsingham, who had thought well of him in the past, must have been completely disillusioned. But there was this merit in the policy of supporting him, that it might in time set France and Spain together by the ears. This contingency gave to his silly demonstrations real military significance.

Alençon himself, if he had nothing else, had a consuming ambition. He did not intend to serve simply as the tool of the Prince of Orange and the Queen of England. In January 1583 he designed a plan for getting into his own hands a number of the chief cities in the Low Countries, with a view to making himself complete master of the country. To what extent his brother co-operated in his arrangements is not at all clear. At all events the plan failed. The French did seize a few minor places, but they failed in the large cities. In Antwerp itself the burghers, alarmed in time, slew half the surprising force of the French, including many noblemen. Alençon himself escaped, and finding the country too hot to hold him took refuge across the French frontier, whence, during the rest of his life, he negotiated with the Estates with a view to recovering his position. Just before his death some sort of terms were reached, but his effectiveness in Low Country affairs terminated with the Folly of Antwerp. The rebels would trust neither him nor his French followers. It was only by sheer hard fighting that William of Orange, who, in view of Elizabeth's attitude, felt that France must be conciliated at all costs, saved him from being altogether repudiated.

Walsingham first heard rumours of the 'Antwerp folly' on the 11th of January, but without any details. He wrote to Cobham at once and instructed him to look into the matter.

[1] Cf. Farnham to Manners, 5 April 1582: 'The Prince of Parma sweareth by the bread and eateth it that if they come abroad he will make one [of their party].' *Cal. Belvoir MSS.*, i. 134.

'Whether', he added, 'the practice have been executed by Monsieur's privity or no, it cannot but breed some dangerous alteration in that country and elsewhere.'[1] When more detailed news reached England the general suspicion was that there was collusion between Alençon and Parma. Walsingham wrote to Cobham on the 17th of January that there was no positive evidence of collusion, but that he greatly feared the French, in view of their failure, would now join the Spaniards 'for the utter subversion of the states and generally against the cause of religion; which', he added, 'I am the rather induced to think for that of late I have been secretly given to understand that there had been a treaty in hand of a match to be arranged between Monsieur and the King of Spain's daughter, wherein, if there shall be discovered any further dealing, then are we to look for no other effects than hath been always doubted such practices would, in the end, bring forth. I cannot but think that those of the Religion there [in France] will now be thoroughly awakened and accordingly provided for the preventing of any danger threatened them by so hot an alarm.'[2] Once more Walsingham scented a general league against Protestantism and once more his thoughts turned to the arousing of Protestants throughout Europe to a common sense of their danger.

The 'folly of Antwerp' killed the project of marriage, but it did not in any other essentials change the course of Elizabeth's policy towards the Duke and the Low Countries. Alençon's treachery was undoubted and he deserved no countenance in it, but as soon as Elizabeth had satisfied herself that he had not worked in collusion with the Spaniards she took the attitude that the Dutch had wronged him and she stood out valiantly in his defence. She needed him still to fight her battles, and though he was a sorry champion he was at any rate a cheap one. So her efforts during the spring and summer of 1583 were chiefly directed towards patching up an understanding between him and the Dutch.[3] In this she had the assistance of William of Orange,

[1] S. P. France, ix, f. 10; for Elizabeth's reaction cf. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 441.

[2] S. P. France, ix, f. 25.

[3] There is a long paper corrected in Walsingham's hand in the Harleian MSS., 1582, f. 188 ff., entitled 'What course were fit for her Majesty to hold in mediating the accord between the Duke and the States', which is undated,

who himself saw that Alençon was still too valuable to be cast off. Thanks mainly to his efforts, some progress was made in that direction. The provinces of the south and west, which lay nearest

but which indubitably has to do with these negotiations. The following is a brief extract of its contents :

In mediating an accord it is to be considered

1. How far her Majesty may deal, considering her treaties with Spain.

2. What are the differences between the State and the Duke and how much shall her Majesty ask each one of them to yield.

3. How able the Duke is to maintain the necessary forces and how willing the King his brother is to assist him.

4. How the Duke is to be advised to conduct himself that the people may forget their diffidence and jealousy.

5. How her Majesty's ministers in this service are to proceed.

I. If her Majesty mediate to the end of establishing the Duke in that country, she shall directly oppose the King of Spain, a matter carefully to be thought of, considering the doubtful ability of the Duke to make head against Spain unless better assisted by both his brother and the States.

II. The differences rest chiefly on two points, (*a*) the one touching the removing of French garrisons out of certain towns, (*b*) second, what guard he shall have about him, (*c*) thirdly, of what number his court and train shall consist. Touching (*a*) her Majesty must move the Duke to yield, for unless he do he shall either have to continue in his present miserable state, or else go over to the Prince of Parma to his great dishonour, for so he shall be forced to do if he receive not great assistance from his brother and the States ; moreover he lacketh not about him bad instruments to advise such a course.

Touching (*b*), the greater his guard, the more will he be mistrusted, and since the States have already allowed a large guard, he ought to be content with that to avoid mistrust.

Touching (*c*), in his first treaty he promised to be served by those of the country, so he shall do well to be served by as few French as he may.

III. He is to be conferred with as to what forces he needs, what the States will do, how far they have performed former contributions, and if not far, what likelihood there is of better performance in the future. What he has received from the King, his brother, what he is likely to receive, and what assurances he has. If it appear that he is not likely to receive any better assistance from either source than heretofore he has had, or not so much, then the Duke is to be advised to give over the enterprise and some way is to be found to make accord between the States and the King of Spain.

IV. He is to be advised to remove from himself all suspected to have been authors of the last enterprise, and to call men of wisdom and integrity about him, for the most part natives of that country ; to be served by martial men, rather strangers than Frenchmen, because of the aroused jealousy.

V. Touching this the following are to be considered :

a. To whom shall they repair first, the State or the Duke.

b. What speech they shall deliver to the Duke.

c. How they are to proceed with the States.

a. Because the Duke has desired mediation they shall go first to him.

b. To him they shall (1) charge him with his strange dealings in not acquainting her Majesty with his proceedings in that country nor with his passages with his brother ; (2) advise him to punish such as were authors of the late enterprise ; (3) advise him, before he come to accord with the States, to consider well how he shall go through with the matter ; (4) ask him, that in case he cannot go on with the action for lack of means, what other course he

the French border and were most exposed to Spanish attacks, were still willing to accept Alençon notwithstanding his treachery. But the northern provinces, Holland and Zealand particularly, were more obdurate. They were rather disposed to appeal directly to Elizabeth for aid. The Estates of Holland did in fact send Joachim Ortell to England in August 1583 with some such purpose in mind.[1]

It is not certain just what Ortell asked for, but he certainly found Elizabeth in no mood to give. Her purposes were directed rather to the collecting of money, long overdue, which the Dutch owed her. The £65,000 which she had loaned them four years before, they had contracted to repay in six months. It was still unpaid and the £28,000 odd which they had borrowed on her credit from the Genoese bankers was unpaid also. She had succeeded in inducing the bankers to grant the Dutch an extension of time. Even with that they had failed to meet their engagements. They had even defaulted on the interest. It began to look as though she would not only be saddled with their debt to her but would even have to satisfy the bankers.[2] At

thinks meet and whether he cannot like that an accord should be made between Spain and the States by the King of France and her Majesty.

c. The States. (1) They are to be put in mind of the indignity offered the Duke and to show how necessary it is for them to come to accord with him considering that the late accident proceeded from their ill treatment of him. (2) That they must look to it how they shall contribute to the maintenance of such forces as are to be supplied against the enemy, and that they beware they abuse not the Duke by promising more than they can do. (3) That they provide against long delays in resolution. (4) That the contempt of the Duke and the Prince and other magistrates be punished. (5) If they cannot supply requisite funds to maintain the Duke they are to be asked whether they think a treaty may not be made with Spain with the preservation of religion and liberties. (6) That if the Prince object he is to be reminded of his daily danger by reason of secret practices against his person, which can only be avoided by an accord with Spain, as also how that the people, being warned, may be led privately to make a peace dangerous to him.

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 43.

[2] The best statement of the financial obligations of the Dutch to Elizabeth at this time will be found in S. P. Holland and Flanders, xiv, no. 142, entitled: 'A note of the debts drawn out of the original bonds, which the States General of the Low Countries are owing to her Majesty':

This records the following:	19 Jan. 1577/8	£20,000.
	17 Mar. 1577/8	£20,000.
	20 April 1578	£5,000.
	11 July 1578	£20,000.
From Horatio Palavicino:	3 Nov. 1578	£16,636 7*s*. 3*d*.
From Spinola:	3 Nov. 1578	£12,121 4*s*.

Also a power from the Estates General to Elizabeth, dated December 1579.

just about the time that Ortell arrived in England she had made up her mind that if she could not get her money by persuasion she would take it by force. In August she gave orders to intercept one of the Dutch fleets trading in Spain, her intention being to levy upon it to the extent of £35,000, which represented the principal, interest, and cost of collecting the money due to the bankers.[1] The plan seems to have been abandoned after all, but the fact that it was considered boded ill for Ortell's mission.

It is hard to deny the justice of Elizabeth's attitude. The Dutch were no doubt hard put to it for funds, but their resources were very considerable at this juncture and their penurious estate proceeded rather from a desire to save their private purses than from any real economic exhaustion. Too much has been made of them as ragged patriots fighting like grim death on a strip of sand for liberty and faith. As a matter of fact, they were growing rich on the war. Their blockade of Antwerp and Ghent had diverted a large part of the commerce of those cities to Amsterdam and the ports of Zealand. Notwithstanding their rebellion, they drove a thriving trade with Spain. Already their ships had appeared in the Mediterranean and they had begun to contemplate direct trade with the Far East. The decade following

to contract with Palavicino and Spinola for prolongation of time of payment upon such interest as she can agree for.

Bond, dated 8 July 1583, for £4,616 13*s.* 1*d.* for interest upon debts of P. and S. at 10 per cent.

Total debt in July 1583, £98,374 4*s.* 4*d.*

Mendoza said that Walsingham and Leicester urged the Queen to charge the Low Countries interest upon the money she had loaned them directly. This, according to his note, she refused to do on her own account, but authorized Walsingham and Leicester to collect 8 per cent. if they could get it and pocket the money themselves (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 459). Here again his story lacks confirmation from other sources, and it is pretty clear that no thought was entertained at this time of trying to collect interest on the £65,000 loaned directly (cf. on this *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, pp. 73, 120–2) either by the Queen or by Walsingham.

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, pp. 73, 120–2. Capt. Bingham was ordered to the seas to seize Dutch vessels to the amount of £35,000. Froude, xi. 577, by misprinting Bingham's instructions represents that the interest amounted to £35,000, whereas in the original document (S. P. Holland and Flanders, xx, no. 39) this sum is named to cover principal, interest, and cost of collection. It is expressly stated that the ships are to be stayed in satisfaction of the debt of the States General to Palavicino and Spinola (*Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 121). Lawrence Tomson wrote to Dr. Hammond that the Queen had no intention of collecting by force the loans due to her personally (ibid., p. 73). In this light the purpose of the arrest seems quite justifiable.

the year 1580 marks the beginning of that commercial expansion which enabled them in the course of the next fifty years to monopolize most of the carrying trade of northern Europe. The English had not yet come to recognize in them their great maritime rivals, but Elizabeth was well aware that she had to do with a lot of shrewd burghers who would charge as large a part of their expenses to her as they could possibly induce her to pay.

Unfortunately she was so much concerned about her pounds, shillings, and pence that she lost sight of the larger issues at stake. Walsingham was hardly less irritated than she was at the cheese-paring tactics of the Dutch, but he was a long way from thinking that on that account she ought to abandon them. Quite the contrary, he never tired of pointing out to her that in the long run their interests and hers were identical. He supported her policy of subsidizing the Duke of Alençon to fight for the Dutch not because he thought it the wisest course to pursue, but because he found it the only practicable way of engaging her interest and support in their cause. He would have preferred to have her intervene directly in their behalf, and he strongly urged her to do so when Ortell made his appeal. According to Mendoza, he and Leicester fought hard during the summer of 1583 to induce Elizabeth to accept the sovereignty of the Low Countries, or at the least to send the Dutch five or six thousand troops. It may be that Mendoza was misinformed as to the facts, but he did not mistake his man. He cannot have been far wrong either when he singled out Burghley as the chief opponent of such bold courses.[1]

It will not be forgotten that in the autumn of 1583 Walsingham, by the arrest and confession of Francis Throgmorton, at last gathered into his hands the last threads of the Guisan-Spanish plot against England. The details of this plot are considered at length elsewhere. Its effect upon English foreign relations was considerable. It revealed the fact that, although the French King himself was not conspiring against England, there was a strong party in France that was. It proved to Elizabeth's satisfaction that Philip II of Spain continued to cherish the same hostile purposes towards her which she had

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 498.

discovered twelve years before, when the various ramifications of the second Norfolk Plot had been laid bare. Incidentally it demonstrated that Walsingham was no mere calamity howler in his reiterated warnings against Spanish devices. Its immediate result was to strengthen considerably the position of his party in the Privy Council. Even Burghley was compelled to admit that Mendoza could no longer be tolerated in England. He was dismissed with little ceremony, after some warm words from Walsingham, whose knowledge of Italian made him the spokesman of the occasion.[1] This in itself was a long step forward in his policy of open hostility to Spain, and it served to call once more into question the wisdom of pursuing further Burghley's policy of masterly inactivity.

Late in November Walsingham induced Elizabeth to permit him to send Edward Burnham, one of his servants, to the Netherlands with the idea apparently of sounding out the situation there. His instructions were briefly to assure the Dutch leaders of the Queen's goodwill and to dissuade them from putting too much faith in the hope of assistance from France. Probably his mission ought to be interpreted as a tentative informal invitation to the Dutch to reopen negotiations with Elizabeth. But Burnham went with empty hands and with no very definite promises.[2] The net result of his mission was to reveal the fact that the Dutch leaders had lost faith in England and were disposed to look for aid to France.

Walsingham himself came to the conclusion that since his mistress was disinclined to act alone and since she was strongly opposed to allowing the French to act alone, the most promising policy to pursue was one of joint action by both countries in behalf of the Dutch. In February 1584 he wrote a letter to Marchemont in which he argued strongly for Anglo-French co-operation.

'If', he wrote, 'the same be well weighed, it will be found that those that heretofore were his [Spain's] competitors will grow now over weak to match with him. The branches of the house of Austria have, as it were, overshadowed all Germany. Italy, what for love and what for fear, is altogether at his devotion. His treasure groweth infinite, which commandeth most in these days, yea, and which is most perilous of all others to make the

[1] *Cal. Belvoir MSS.*, i. 158. [2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 233.

way of his greatness the more easy, what prince is there in Europe (England only excepted) that hath not some Spanish factor in the same. Men of judgement that look into the course and see how little this mischief is weighed by those whom it principally toucheth, can grow to no other resolution but that it is fatal. And if it were subject to any remedy, then were it fit that those that are of greatest puissance should by their example provoke others to concur in the action, before which time I can hope of no remedy other than that which patience and prayer bringeth.' [1]

Some informal advances towards an alliance with England were made in France in the spring of 1584 to Sir Edward Stafford, who succeeded Cobham as English ambassador in Paris in the late autumn of 1583. They seem to have been aimed at joint co-operation in behalf of Don Antonio against Portugal. Walsingham was of the opinion that they ought to be taken advantage of at once. 'For mine own private opinion,' he wrote to Stafford, 'knowing right well that the King of Spain wanteth not good friends in France that will use all the means and persuasion they can to stop this course . . . I could wish that her Majesty, to take away all occasion of this jealousy and suspicion that may hinder the course of so good and necessary a purpose, would once again offer herself and make the motion anew to the King for a mutual association and concurrency between them against Spain.' [2] Unfortunately, however, Walsingham was too sick at the time to get to court and urge the matter to the Queen himself. He sent John Somers to do it in his stead, but Elizabeth did not take kindly to the suggestion. On the 27th of March Walsingham wrote to Stafford: 'As you may perceive by her Majesty's letters that we are not very warm in the motion for the concurrency between the two princes, so can I assure you that in very deed we are but cold therein, whereof I have thought good

[1] S. P. France, xi, no. 23, ascribed in *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 346, to Elizabeth, but evidently from its contents from Walsingham.

[2] S. P. France, xi, f. 103, calendared in *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 388. It is to be noted that the unfortunate practice of renumbering documents in the Public Record Office often results in serious difficulties in the verification of references. When I made my transcript of this paper it was numbered f. 103. In the Foreign Calendar it is referred to as no. 49. On the distressing poverty of Don Antonio in France at this time cf. Prim Corea to Walsingham, 28 Feb. 1584, in Harleian MSS. 286, no. 62. Corea wrote that Don Antonio, sometimes for two or three days together, was obliged to live upon bread and water, and that his servants were sometimes four days together without bread.

particularly to give you knowledge that you may deal the more circumspectly and warily in the matter, for though the King would yield to make the motion first and that her Majesty might be well assured of his concurrency in the action, yet if she should thereby be thrown into a war I fear she would not like or accept of the matter.'[1]

During the spring of 1584 Elizabeth seems indeed to have done nothing more than to hint indirectly to the French King that it would be better if all efforts in the behalf of the Low Countries were directed simply to the 'defence of the people in their ancient privileges and liberties'. It is evident that this policy was dictated by the fear that France would attempt to conquer the Low Countries for itself.[2] This fear increased as time went on. Walsingham heard from the Prince of Orange in June that a treaty was already 'in hand' between the Dutch and the French King. At that time Alençon was practically on his death-bed and Elizabeth at last saw the necessity of coming to terms with France. It was decided to conciliate Henry III by sending him the Garter. The Earl of Derby was named for the mission. In sending news of the proposal to his friend Davison in Scotland Walsingham wrote: 'Some motion hath been made that a man of state might be sent over to be conferred withal about the said motion of the Low Countries, but we are so slow in these actions as I think the purpose of the sending of My Lord of Derby shall go forward, and that her Majesty will wade no further into the action than to forbear to take advantage of the going together by the ears of the two monarchs by making her peace with Spain; with the assurance whereof I think the French King must in the end content himself, being all that he is likely to have of us.'[3] Derby, in fact, did not go until almost a year later.

Early in June came the long-expected news of the death of Alençon.[4] Elizabeth professed the deepest grief at his passing. She wrote to the Queen Mother that not even she herself could feel the loss more deeply. For three weeks on end she wept daily for her lover.[5] 'Now', wrote Walsingham to Davison,

[1] S. P. France, xi, ff. 111, 139.
[2] S. P. Scotland, xxxv, f. 2.
[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, pp. 377, 432–6.
[4] Walsingham to Orange, 7 June 1584, *Correspondance de Guillaume le Taciturne*, iv. 243.
[5] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 579.

'melancholy doth so possess us as both public and private causes are at a stay for a season.' [1]

So far as Elizabeth's policy towards the Dutch was concerned, Alençon's term of usefulness had passed long before his demise and it had ceased to be a matter of any moment what became of him. His death was, however, fraught with tremendous consequences for France. Since his brother the King had no male children and gave promise of none, Alençon was next in line to the French throne. With his death the right of succession passed out of the house of Valois to the head of the house of Bourbon, the Huguenot Henry of Navarre. In every way except in his religion he was well qualified to reign, but the Catholic leaders in France swore that they would never submit to the rule of a heretic. So it was that Alençon's death opened the door to the renewal of the religious wars in France, more engrossing and more bloody than any in the past, because the fate of the crown itself hung upon the issue.

This, of course, profoundly affected Elizabeth's relations with the French King and gave her opportunity once more to neutralize his attitude towards her by encouraging civil dissensions in his realm. So in place of an alliance with the French crown, Alençon's death threw Elizabeth back upon her older policy of alliance with the French Huguenots. But all this was to come. Walsingham foresaw it perhaps in part and urged Elizabeth to prepare for it.[2] She preferred as usual to wait and see.

Before the royal tears for the royal lover were dry came news of a far more serious nature. On the 30th of June William of Orange was assassinated. Walsingham heard of it on the 6th of July. 'With what grief I write', he said in a letter of the same date to Davison, 'upon knowledge I received this day of the death of the Prince of Orange, being killed by a Burgundian with a pistol, I refer to your judgement, knowing how greatly it importeth both the common cause and the Queen's safety. You can guess into what toil this alteration hath thrown me.' [3]

The death of Orange was a tremendous fact. Every one knew

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxv, no. 14.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 579.
[3] S. P. Scotland, xxxv, no. 48.

that his supreme statescraft had been the most potent factor in preventing the reconquest of the Netherlands by Spain. Now that he was gone there was no one to take his place and it seemed inevitable that the dogged patience of Philip and the consummate ability of Parma together would sweep the Dutch rebels into the sea. Even Elizabeth realized how disastrous that would be for England. For nearly twenty years the Dutch rebels had been her chief bulwark against the wrath of Philip II. Once that bulwark was down she would be face to face with the triumphant power of Spain. She might treat or she might fight; one or the other she must do. There was no longer any convenient suitor at hand to shoulder her responsibilities, nor any second Prince of Orange to fight her battles. So it was that the death of Orange, and to a lesser degree that of Alençon as well, of necessity forced her to revise completely the policy which for five years she had followed in her relations both with the French and the Dutch.

The middle of the year 1584 marks the end of her quiet days. For five-and-twenty years, in spite of Drake and Hawkins on the high seas and Leicester and Walsingham in the Council chamber, she had kept England at peace. With peace had come prosperity and contentment and, out of them both, loyalty. England in 1558 was poor and weak and discontented. England in 1584 was strong and rich and loyal. Therein lay Elizabeth's greatest achievement, which must never be lost sight of in the petty details of her opportunist policy. The glorious days to come came, it is true, against her will, but she made them possible by making her subjects ready and able to achieve them.

IX

SCOTTISH AFFAIRS, 1570–85

The most decisive period in the relation between Scotland and England under Elizabeth was the first ten years of her reign before Walsingham entered her service. During that decade the various forces, secular and religious, which go by the name of the Scottish Reformation accomplished for her what the force and guile of her predecessors on the English throne had failed to do. It broke the back of the old Franco-Scottish alliance, it converted the Scottish nation from a defiant enemy to a necessitous friend, and it established a community of interest, in matters of religion and foreign politics at least, between the two parts of Britain which made their union, under her successor, possible.

Elizabeth herself played some part, as has been pointed out already, in bringing these results to pass, although the benefits she received were far in excess of the efforts she expended. It will not be necessary to rehearse here the course of the struggle. The issue was practically assured when Mary Stuart fled into England in 1568. After that Elizabeth's problem was simply to maintain the *status quo* in the north.

This task would have been easier had it been possible to treat the Scottish question as an isolated phenomenon. Unfortunately there were other powers in Europe besides herself which were not only profoundly interested in Scotland, but were diametrically opposed to her interests. The Pope of Rome wished to restore Mary Stuart because she represented, in Scotland as in England, the cause of Roman Catholicism. The King of France wished to restore her because she stood for the Franco-Scottish alliance and the predominance of French influence in Scottish foreign politics. How much either or both of them were prepared to do in Mary's behalf was problematical. They had done little enough for her in the past. Still, they were forces to be reckoned with, and Elizabeth realized that she would have to reckon with them if she was the least trifle too vigorous in the support of her

friends in the north. Of the two she saw in France the more immediate danger. The Pope in theory would command the forces of Roman Catholicism at large, but ten years of experience had taught her that Roman Catholicism at large was by way of being a colossus of clouts.

The problem was still further complicated by the conditions within the northern kingdom itself. Scotland was only a kingdom by courtesy. Such revenues as the crown could command from its lands, from the customs, and from what taxes it could collect, were quite inadequate to meet its requirements. The middle class, which was the bulwark of monarchy in England, was small and poor. Parliament met at intervals, but it commanded scant respect and it exercised little influence.[1] The dominating element in Scottish politics was the greater nobility, who were as a class turbulent and rapacious. In their double capacity of feudal lords and clan chieftains they could command large followings to maintain their private quarrels. Almost all of the country-side was ranged under one or another of their banners and many of the towns were subservient to them.[2] They controlled local government almost entirely and respected the central government only in so far as it accorded with their interests. Along the borders and in the highlands they practically ignored it altogether.

In pre-Reformation days the nobles had regarded the revenues of the Church as legitimate spoil and had wrangled at court for the disposal of the richer 'prelacies'.[3] With some notable exceptions their support of the Reformation proceeded from similar motives. For the Reformation bade fair to deliver into their hands not now and then, as in the past, a golden feather, but the whole golden bird. Once the bird was plucked bare, it was to be anticipated that their zeal for the 'purer gospel' would sensibly diminish. This fact made them precarious allies to the new Church at best. They could be calculated to lend it support just so long as it served their interests, and no longer. Alluring prospects in other quarters might readily entice them away.

Even under the most favourable circumstances the power of the crown in Scotland had always been rigorously limited by the

[1] F. W. Maitland, in *Cambridge Mod. Hist.*, ii. 551 ff.; Rait, *The Scottish Parliament*, passim.

[2] Stählin, *Der Kampf um Schottland*, 136.

[3] Mathieson, *Politics and Religion in Scotland*, i. 27 ff.

power of the nobles. After Mary's flight into England they dominated the situation. For nearly twenty years to follow Scotland was controlled by some one or the other of the many coalitions of nobles who succeeded in getting hold of the machinery of administration and the person of the young King. Such coalitions were bound to be unstable. The men who went into the making of them were not capable of protracted co-operation. They had small respect for the King in whose name they professed to rule. When they acknowledged a regent they were impatient of his authority. They were jealous of each other, constantly quarrelling over the spoils, and if they held together and somehow or other kept the machinery of government in motion it was due rather to the fact that they feared a common enemy than that they cherished a common ideal. As it was, their corporate weakness invited resolute attacks from their numerous opponents in Scotland at large, and their individual susceptibility to particular inducements made them easy prey to foreign intrigue. Their periods of power were consequently short. Between 1573 and 1583 no less than four different coalitions rose and fell.

From the point of view of Elizabeth the peculiar weaknesses of the Scottish Government complicated considerably the problem of dealing with it. Its hydra-headed character necessitated an individual reckoning with its component parts. Its instability and unreliability gave to its contracts a tentative and unsubstantial character at best. Elizabeth could never be sure that the Government with which she treated to-day would be in power to-morrow, or that it would abide by its engagements if it were in. So, too, the self-seeking attitude of the Scottish governors and their relative indifference to the national well-being, gave to the ordinary arguments of diplomacy little weight with them. It was no use arguing that such and such a course would benefit Scotland; Elizabeth had to show that it would benefit the particular men with whom she dealt. Greedy and indigent as they were, the shortest way with them was usually through their purses. 'Money', as Walsingham observed on one occasion, 'would do anything with that nation.'[1]

The situation created in Scotland by the flight of Mary Stuart

[1] B.M. Additional MSS. 32091, f. 262.

in 1568 was distinctly favourable to Elizabeth. The Earl of Murray, Regent for the young King, was definitely committed to the Protestant cause and the English alliance, and so long as he lived he proved strong enough to resist the efforts of the Hamiltons, the Huntlys, the Argylls and others of the Marian faction to overthrow him. But his assassination in January of 1570 somewhat changed the complexion of affairs. The Marians raised their heads again, and with secret encouragement from France seemed for a time likely to triumph. It was only by the direct intervention of Elizabeth and with the strong support of English troops that the party opposed to Mary, generally known as the King's party, was able to establish its position and to seat the Earl of Lennox, Elizabeth's own candidate, as regent. Even then the position of Lennox was a precarious one, to say the least. The Marians still kept the field in force and offered a strong foothold for the recovery of French influence in the north.

This was the situation in Scotland during the first year of Walsingham's term as Ambassador to France, and it will be recalled how constantly he was troubled at that time by the efforts of the Guises to provoke the French crown to active intervention in Mary's behalf there. But it will be recalled also how these efforts failed and how the Anglo-French *rapprochement* developed in spite of them and eventually found expression in 1572 in the Treaty of Blois. The problem of Scotland had been one of the principal difficulties which had faced the negotiators of that treaty, but it had finally been agreed that a joint commission of English and French should undertake to re-establish peace in that turbulent country. By the time this decision was reached Lennox was dead and the Earl of Mar was regent in his place, the English party had won most of the country and nothing remained of the Marians but a desperate band who had shut themselves up in Edinburgh Castle and defied all efforts to dislodge them. In accordance with the terms of the treaty the King dispatched M. du Croc to Scotland, and Walsingham seems to have cherished the hope that du Croc would be of material assistance in bringing the Castelians, as they were called, to terms. He wrote to Thomas Randolph, his uncle, on the 19th of April 1572:

'I hope when they shall understand du Croc's commission, which tendeth to union and not to maintenance of any party, they of the Castle will wax better advised. . . . If by your good means and travail they of the country may be induced generally to agree to the present government of the King [James VI], I think you shall have du Croc give his consent thereto, though his commission seem not to be absolute in that behalf. The King [of France] only sticketh upon this point, that it is not fit, neither for him nor for her Majesty, to give law unto Scotland, but it is their parts only to maintain that government that amongst themselves shall be agreed on. Besides, I think that du Croc shall have commission to persuade them, that seeing the Queen of Scots is absent and that there is no hope of her deliverance, that therefore in reason the government pertaineth to the King [James VI]. Which thing, if they that be passionate will wilfully withstand, then to show them that both their Majesties, for the preservation of that realm from utter ruin, shall be constrained by force to cause them to yield thereto. To this effect I know he hath commission, which is somewhat nicely made because the King would be loathe to seem to confirm the present government in Scotland, otherwise than drawn thereto by their own choice and election, lest it may seem he did allow of the Queen's [Mary's] deprivation, which for his honour's sake . . . he must in no case make any show to agree to.'[1]

Walsingham was, of course, a strong supporter of the King's party at this juncture, but he believed that an agreement between the two parties was by no means impossible, and in the occasional letters which he wrote to the Regent Mar he urged this course upon him.[2] The only real obstacle in the way, as Walsingham saw it, was Mary Stuart herself. 'I fear', he wrote to Burghley in June, 'that so long as that woman liveth there will never grow good accord in Scotland.'[3]

Du Croc and William Davison, the English commissioner associated with him, failed to make a permanent peace between the two warring factions in Scotland, but after two months' work induced them to agree to an 'abstinence', which was originally designed for two months, but which was subsequently extended to the end of the year.[4] Du Croc lingered in Scotland until early

[1] B.M. Additional MSS. 33531, f. 107.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, pp. 703, 706.
[3] Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 97 b.
[4] Du Croc was not very well received by the King's party in Scotland. Since he refused to recognize James as King and Mar as Regent he was treated as a private person. He was refused permission to deal with the Castelians,

in October, but to no further purpose. So Walsingham's hopes of the success of this joint commission were disappointed. He thought the 'abstinence' worse than useless, and he wrote to Sir Thomas Smith early in August that he could see no point in it unless the Scotch meant to re-establish Mary Stuart. He complained that Elizabeth's leniency in dealing with Mary was the cause of the protracting of the Scottish troubles. 'But', he added, 'we use to build with one hand and overthrow with another. I can rather lament it than hope after any remedy.'[1]

The Massacre of St. Bartholomew's had a quickening effect upon Elizabeth's relations with Scotland. It revealed, or seemed to reveal, a sudden *volte-face* in French policy from the counsels of England's friends to those of her enemies. The Guises had been chiefly instrumental in the massacre. Presumably they were now supreme, and being supreme would take energetic measures in Scotland on Mary Stuart's behalf. More than that, there was the larger menace, long impending and now, it seemed, at hand, of a general conspiracy among the Roman Catholic powers 'to eradicate and utterly destroy all such as make profession of the true religion'. Elizabeth sent an envoy, Henry Killigrew, at once to Scotland to bid the Scots be on their guard. Such was his public mission. Privately he was instructed to deal with the Regent and others for the delivery of Mary Stuart into their hands, upon condition that she be promptly executed, but in such manner as to relieve Elizabeth of all responsibility. The extremity of this measure is a good index to the Queen's alarm, but it was not very practicable, and not particularly well received by the leaders of the King's party in Scotland. They were disposed to stand upon rather stiff conditions, and before differences could be adjusted the Regent himself died and the project, for the time at least, was abandoned. Killigrew's efforts to bring the warring parties to terms were equally futile.[2]

Walsingham's reaction upon the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's has already been discussed at length elsewhere. He lost all faith in the French, felt confident that a general destruction of

a watch was kept upon him and his back door was blocked up, *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, pp. 314, 329. The form of 'abstinence' is printed in *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, p. 363.

[1] Digges, *Compleat Ambassador*, p. 232.

[2] Tytler, *History of Scotland* (ed. Alison), iii, pp. 79–84, with documents in Appendix.

Protestantism was intended by the Catholic powers, and so far as Scotland was concerned, was more than ever insistent upon the necessity of establishing peace there. 'Some of the wisest sort of them here', he wrote to Smith from Paris on the 14th of September, '. . . do wish that her Majesty sought to make some reconciliation between the Earl of Morton and the Lord Lethington, and that her Majesty by some pensions did make both him and others assured to her. They think that her Majesty in so doing, by disbursing of two or three thousand pounds a year, may save the disbursing of many thousands, besides the avoiding of many dangerous practices that are like to grow that way.'[1]

Walsingham kept harping on this string for a month, and his own opinion plainly accorded with 'the wisest of them here'. In October he wrote at length to Leicester on the subject, in a letter which practically defines his policy towards Scotland for some years to come.

'If', he said, 'that footing place were taken away from our foreign enemies, our danger would be the less. Money will do anything with that nation, as your Lordship knoweth, which if her Majesty stick to disburse, she shall find neither profit nor surety in it. The tempest that hangeth over our head is to man's judgement apparent so great, as if she overslip any remedy that may be used, she must not look long to keep the state that she now enjoyeth. . . . If England and Scotland be united, and such unsound members be cut off as have been the cause of inward corruption, both her enemies shall have less will to attempt anything against her safety and she remain in less peril of such mischiefs as otherwise are like to fall upon her. Violent diseases must have violent remedies. . . . I beseech your Lordship to pardon my passion in this behalf; the suspicion I have of the evil meaning here [in France] towards her Majesty maketh me to be thus carried away as I am.'[2]

Walsingham also took occasion to deliver a long homily on the subject to the Earl of Morton who had just succeeded Mar as regent of Scotland.

'As I was sorry', he wrote, 'to hear that the accord so long in treaty is grown to no better issue, so am I not a little

[1] Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 169.

[2] B.M. Additional MSS. 32091, f. 262. Walsingham's original draft of this letter will be found in Vespasian F vi, f. 179.

aggrieved by other letters to understand, that notwithstanding the late miserable accident happened here in France is known to you there, yet you remain as far from agreement as you did before. If there were that regard had to the maintenance of the Gospel there amongst you that ought to be, private grudges and interests would give place, whereas they may be lets to God's glory. Or if there were that love had to your country and to your own general safety, that reason and policy requireth, though religious zeal took no place, the evident danger that else is like to ensue would cause you to hasten a friendly union amongst yourselves. Can we think that the fire kindled here in France will extend itself no further? That which was concluded at the late Council of Trent, as also that which was agreed on at Bayonne (things not unknown) for the rooting out of the professors of the Gospel, may in reason induce us to think the contrary. Let us not deceive ourselves, but assuredly think that the two great monarchs of Europe, together with the rest of the Papists, do mean shortly to put in execution that which in the foresaid assemblies was concluded.

'It is seen that when two brothers are at discord, yet when a stranger or a third person shall offer them any injury, nature teacheth them to agree, to withstand the stranger. Methinks that Christian alliance and the natural love of your own country should be of no less force with you, to bring you to an agreement. If the zeal we ought to bear to God's glory, if the love we ought to bear . . . to ourselves, our wives, children and kinsfolks cannot move us, I know not what can move us. Let him that is drawn through some particular grudge or quarrel to mislike of agreement, lay before his eyes the danger that he and his adversary is like to fall in through foreign invasion, by the which neither they themselves, nor their wives nor children, can be free from most evident danger. Let them that are drawn by particular profit, who enjoy some part of that which others think belongeth to them, remember that they, in seeking to retain the same, do not only lose it but also that that they have and enjoy of their own. In a ship's dissension, when the mariners through quarrels upon regard of honour or for partition of booty, do grow to division, yet in the time of tempest and storm they forbear not, each man to set his hand to the tackling, leaving private grudges aside in respect of a common danger. I would the mariners of your ship, whereof God hath placed your G. governor under the King, could in this great tempest drawing on, grow to the like union. Besides reason and regard of their own safety, they have Religion to move them thereto, which if it may not so move them, as they may take profit thereof, let them assure themselves that besides the danger of the temporal storm, they shall incur the danger of

eternal destruction; a thing, that if we had that regard and reverence to God's judgement that we ought to have, should chiefly move us. Let him that hath received wrong, and notwithstanding can be content to remit particular quarrels, in respect to avoid the common mischief and danger, think that God will be the avenger of the same, who hath willed us to remit the vengeance thereof unto Him. Let him that enjoyeth some part of that which another man thinketh belongeth unto him and can be content, in respect of the necessity of union and concord, to give over his interest, think that God who enricheth and maketh poor will bless him, seeing that he can be content in respect of His glory and the benefit of his country, to prefer a general good before a private lucre.

'I should trouble your G. over long if I should put down in writing that which the zeal I bear to God's glory and the necessity I see of your union, as well in respect of yourselves, as of us, your neighbours, moveth me to say in this behalf. I hope therefore, though I have been overlong in this matter, your Grace will not interpret it to proceed of a kind of lightness or presumption, to be over curious in another state, but upon those good respects that before I have alleged.'[1]

Throughout the autumn of 1572 Walsingham's fears of French interference in Scottish affairs steadily increased. Early in October, while du Croc was still in Scotland, he wrote to Sir Thomas Smith that he saw no hope of a settlement there so long as du Croc remained, 'seeing that upon this alteration, the end of his staying there is rather to impeach than to further the same. If we think otherwise we do but dream ourselves.'[2] Late in November he reported the dispatch of Vérac to Scotland 'with a good sum of money to entertain a party' there. 'If', he added, 'her Majesty do not compound the matter of Scotland before Vérac his coming, she shall find more difficulty in the matter. It is evident how much money may do with that nation,

[1] B.M. Additional MSS. 33531, f. 111. An abstract of this letter is printed in *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, p. 414. Probably the letter calendared on p. 711 ibid. is another copy of the same misdated.

[2] Walsingham's suspicions of du Croc were not without foundation. Through his son-in-law, l'Espinasse, he managed to procure ready money and promises of pensions for the Castelians. Two days after St. Bartholomew's Charles IX wrote to La Mothe Fénélon, French ambassador at London, that he had sent l'Espinasse to Scotland with 3,000 livres and 1,000 more to Kirkaldy, adding that he had promised Kirkaldy the same amount monthly if he would guard Edinburgh Castle for the Queen of Scots (Fénélon, *Corresp.* vii. 327). Kirkaldy afterwards admitted that he had received 2,000 livres through du Croc's means (*Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, pp. 424, 443).

therefore it were well before his coming her Majesty took advantage of the market, for that many chapmen maketh (*sic*) dearer "wares".'[1] A week later he wrote to Burghley that James Kirkaldy, the brother of him of the Castle, was to carry the money instead of Vérac.[2] Walsingham indeed was so fearful of French intervention that he abandoned his former idea of bribing the Scots as too slow under the circumstances and urged instead that they be coerced.

'They say here', he wrote to Leicester on the 5th of December, 'that the King's side in Scotland is much weakened, and the other side far the stronger. They have therefore despatched of late from hence some to keep the Queen's party in courage until they have settled things at home. . . . It is now to be doubted that without force it cannot be remedied (if it be true that they say) and surely neither force nor any other means must be left unexecuted to withstand all events, if her Majesty like to live in peace and safety. As I wrote unto your Lordship in my last, the time now serveth fit for the purpose, the two great monarchs being entertained as they are. It may be that they here will use some brave speech, which will prove but a French brag, having so many irons in the fire as they have. Her Majesty may well say unto them, if they find fault with the matter, that they have no more cause to mislike of her proceedings there, the same tending to her safety, than, as they say, she hath to mislike of the King's late doings here, who holdeth it for a rule that the jealousy of a kingdom must leave nothing unexecuted that tendeth to surety. The great fear I have that some mischief will one day grow unto us that way, maketh me to trouble your Lordship often with some superfluous speech in that behalf.'[3]

[1] Digges, 299, original draft in Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 214.

[2] These reports were quite true. J. Kirkaldy reached Scotland some time in January 1573 (*Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, 477). He was captured by the King's party before he could do much harm. The money taken with him is variously estimated at 15,000 francs (ibid. 486) and 33,000 (probably a misprint for 3,300) crowns (Digges, 345). Vérac himself departed for Scotland late in January (Digges, 315), but was driven by storms into Scarborough harbour in February (*Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, 492) and was kept from entering Scotland until after the castle fell. Walsingham had a rather interesting conference with Catherine de Médicis on the matter of Vérac's detention late in March 1573, in which he showed her that if Vérac had commission from her she had sent him in contravention of the terms of the Treaty of Blois, and if she had not then he was justly stayed. 'She seemed to be very much entangled with this matter,' Walsingham observed, 'and had not therefore much to say for the staying of him' (Digges, 342).

[3] The original draft of this letter is in Cotton MSS., Vespasian F vi, f. 218. The version printed in Digges, 293, omits most of the passage cited.

Walsingham's reports of designs in France against Scotland became more alarming as time went on. Late in December he informed Burghley that one of the Hamiltons in France was writing to the Castelians that if they could hold out until Whitsuntide they would be assisted by the Pope, Spain and France.[1] In January 1573 he dispatched a special messenger in haste to report an intended expedition of a thousand troops under the Duke of Maine to reinforce Edinburgh Castle, and another under the Duke of Guise himself to land in England and liberate the Queen of Scots.[2] How much of this was true is not certain. That the King of France was disposed to encourage the Castelians with promises and pensions is clear enough, but there is little evidence that he seriously contemplated more vigorous intervention. No doubt the Guisan faction in France was making loud boasts and constructing fine plans, with a view to serving their niece. Walsingham's fears of France at this juncture may have led him to give undue importance to their imaginings, or he may even have wilfully exaggerated the dangers to Scotland from France for the purpose of stimulating Elizabeth to a more vigorous line of policy.

All the evidence which Elizabeth could command at this juncture pointed to the probability that after the King of France had either subdued the Huguenot rebels or made peace with them he would intervene with vigour in the Scottish quarrel. It was becoming increasingly plain that the Castelians had no intention of coming to terms, but were merely entertaining her advances in order to gain time. Her principal advisers urged her to stop dallying and to intervene openly in behalf of the King's party.[3] Burghley told her that her policy of 'prolonging and

[1] Digges, 296.

[2] Ibid. 314. The messenger was promised £6 13*s*. 4*d*. to make the journey.

[3] Burghley's views are admirably set forth in a paper written in his own hand in Cotton MSS., Caligula C iii, f. 449. The paper is entitled 'Certain matters wherein the Queen her Majesty's forbearing and delays hath produced not only inconveniences and increase of expenses, but also dangers'. The passages regarding Scotland are as follows :

'The fourth is the doubtful dealing which Scotland, forbearing to aid directly the King, whose party is wholly for the Q. Majesty, and suffering the contrary party to stand in strength ; and yet no prince abroad nor wise person in England but well understandeth that her Majesty covertly aideth the one and willingly hindereth the other, but yet in such sort as neither the one is the better nor the other the worse. Whereof follow these inconveniences :

'1. Her Majesty cannot be assured of any of the parties, for the one knoweth

mincing ' merely served to strengthen her enemies and alienate her friends, and was more costly and less profitable than ' round and open ' dealing. With Walsingham warning her from France and Killigrew from Scotland, Burghley and Leicester dinning into her ears at home, and Verac's and Kirkaldy's embassy an ocular demonstration of French intentions, Elizabeth was won over gradually to adopt a more vigorous policy.

In January 1573 she dispatched two engineers from Berwick to survey Edinburgh Castle and estimate its strength to resist a resolute siege. They reported that the walls could be battered down in twenty days. Late in February she declared her intention of sending men and ordnance to capture the place, and on the 12th of March Drury received his commission to go in force to the assistance of the King's party.[1] Late in April he entered Edinburgh town with some six hundred troops. His artillery, sent by sea, landed at Leith a few days later. The bombardment of the castle began on the 17th day of May, and eleven days later the Castelians surrendered at discretion. Most of the occupants were spared, but the two chief offenders, Maitland of Lethington and Kirkaldy of the Grange, were condemned to death. Maitland himself died before he could be executed. It was rumoured that he had poisoned himself, but more likely, as the chronicler puts it, ' he departed at the pleasure of God '. Kirkaldy, ' that lusty, stark and well-proportioned personage ', was ' hanged on a gallows against the face of the sun ', even as John Knox had prophesied.

that her benefits are so covertly bestowed as thereof they take not the profit as they should, nor yet do they esteem the same to come of good will but of necessity for herself.

' 2. The cause of Scotland is by this coldness drawn to such length, as truly the calamities thereof, which are many ways bloody, cannot be avoided in the sight of God to be imputed to her Majesty.

' 3. If Scotland shall either be recovered to Spain or to France and the labours and charges of XIII years spent to tie that realm to England in friendship shall be lost, surely to all posterity great shame will be recorded of her Majesty's lack of conduct, in losing such an occasion as these 500 years the Crown of England had not at commandment.

' 4. The charges are greater by prolonging and mincing, and the profit less than if her Majesty would have roundly and openly proceeded.' (Also in *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, p. 273, where the reference to the original is incorrect.)

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, pp. 475–6, 486, 494, 505, 514. Drury's commission was carefully worded with a view clearly to meeting French objections. The warrant to raise money for his expedition is given in *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, p. 520.

The fall of Edinburgh Castle terminated the long warfare, open and covert, which Elizabeth had waged against Mary Stuart in Scotland since 1560. The flight of Mary in 1568 had practically decided the struggle, but it was left to Sir William Drury to administer the *coup de grâce*. After 1573 the cause of Mary in Scotland, although it had been an unconscionable time dying, was dead at last. In large measure the cause of Roman Catholicism was dead also. The Scotland which remained was strongly Protestant and decidedly pro-English. Furthermore the destruction of the Marian party as a fighting force diminished very considerably the danger of foreign intervention in Mary's behalf in the north. So long as there were two factions contending for supremacy in Scotland, foreign powers could take sides according to their sympathies without actually declaring war on the land. France and Spain could justify their action in supporting the Marians by the same arguments that Elizabeth used to justify hers in supporting the Jacobeans. With the Marians finally eliminated, French interference in the north, which Elizabeth chiefly feared, was rendered far more difficult and far less dangerous.

In view of these facts it is somewhat surprising to discover that the French King took the fall of Edinburgh Castle so calmly as he did. La Mothe Fénélon, at the King's command, protested against the sending of Drury to Edinburgh, and complained that the action was a breach of the Treaty of Blois,[1] but nothing more seems to have been made of the matter in France. Charles IX wrote to Fénélon that Elizabeth had pulled wool over their eyes with her shows of mediation, but the only remedy the King proposed at the very moment when Drury's guns were reducing the fortifications of Edinburgh was to encourage the Castelians to hold out till the autumn.[2] When the castle fell the French seem to have accepted the *fait accompli* without further protest. The truth is that the attention of the French King was too much occupied at home to take any active part in affairs abroad. He was much more concerned about preventing Elizabeth from assisting the Huguenots in France than he was about keeping her out of Scotland, so that even Walsingham's sanguine expectations were exceeded and Elizabeth's resort to

[1] Fénélon, *Corresp.* v. 322.

[2] Ibid. vii. 418.

force to solve the Scottish problem did not even provoke a 'French brag'.

During the five years which followed the capture of Edinburgh Castle, the relations between England and Scotland were unusually quiet and uneventful. Morton kept the peace in Scotland even to the border side with a strong hand, and though he plundered a merchant here and there, he gave to Scotland a measure of material prosperity which amazed foreign observers. His disposition towards England was friendly in the extreme, and he posed as being entirely at the Queen's commandment; but he was, as Killigrew observed, a shrewd fellow, with an eye to the main chance, and would adhere to Elizabeth's interests only so long as her opponents did not outbid her.[1]

Ever since Morton became Regent in the autumn of 1572 he had been urging Elizabeth to enter into a defensive league with Scotland, and to secure her party there by a judicious distribution of pensions. Henry Killigrew, Elizabeth's agent in Scotland, urged her very strongly to accede to these demands. He estimated that by the expenditure of twelve hundred pounds yearly she could bind Morton, Huntly and Argyll, with two or three others, to her and 'keep the country at her devotion'. The price was unusually low, Killigrew wrote to Burghley, and the opportunity had therefore better be seized quickly.[2] But Elizabeth was not disposed to consider these suggestions at the time, and she ignored Morton's requests altogether for the better part of a year.[3] The rumours of French practices in Scotland and the course of events in France itself seem to have been chiefly instrumental in awakening her to the importance of having a greater care for her position in the north.[4] On the 22nd of May 1574 she accordingly sent Killigrew back to Scotland with instructions to discover 'whether the Regent continues constant in his affection towards us, how his manner of proceeding in his

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, p. 443. [2] Ibid. 518, 540.

[3] The request was repeated again and again during the winter of 1573–4; cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, pp. 592, 624, 638, 639.

[4] Walsingham wrote to Morton, 22 May 1574: 'For news out of France we have heard nothing since the imprisonment of the two marshals, Montmorency and de Cosse, nor what is like shall become of them. But men of judgement may easily guess. It will now behoove both England and Scotland to awake, seeing the counterpoise of the house of Guise grown to such decay.' S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlv, f. 59. This letter is not calendared in the *Scottish Calendar*.

government is liked, what party the Queen of Scots has there . . . whether there hath not been any lately sent out of France to practice underhand any alteration in that state'.[1] But the answers which Killigrew took with him to Morton's reiterated requests for a defensive league and for pensions were not calculated to stimulate his goodwill. Elizabeth bade Killigrew tell him that she thought a general league among Protestant princes for the defence of their religion desirable and was taking steps to advance it, but that she saw no particular advantage to be gained by a separate league between England and Scotland. As to Morton's request for money and pensions, Killigrew was to have nothing whatever to say.

Killigrew's report upon the situation in Scotland was not particularly reassuring. He found the Regent less frank in his dealings than heretofore, the nobles and clergy discontented because of Elizabeth's attitude towards the league and the pensions, and the traders and commons greatly irritated by reason of the spoils committed by English pirates upon Scottish commerce. Killigrew discovered also that there were French practices at work in the land and that those suspected to be friendly to Mary Stuart were being very gently handled.[2] His own opinion of the situation he expressed tersely in a letter to Walsingham in June: 'If you perceive that her Majesty will give ear to no league or pension, I pray you solicit my revocation, for I shall do her Majesty no service here, but undo myself.'[3]

Killigrew in fact returned to England about the middle of August, with nothing to show for his embassy except an ill conceit of the situation in Scotland. At the time of his return Walsingham had become one of the principal secretaries and

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, p. 663. Besides his public instructions Killigrew was secretly directed to renew the proposal for the surrender of Mary Stuart to Scotland. A brief *résumé* of his efforts in this behalf is given in *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, Introduction, ix ff. Elizabeth apparently abandoned the idea in the spring of 1575 (ibid. 112). Walsingham's reaction upon the project is dealt with in chap. xi.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, p. 679; cf. Catherine de Médicis to la Mothe Fénélon, 23 July 1574, in which she instructed him to nourish a French faction there (*Lettres*, v. 63). In October Catherine wrote letters to Morton and to James VI and to his keeper Erskine (ibid. 93), and it appears intended to dispatch these letters by de Mondreville, whom she planned to send as resident ambassador. (Cf. *Cal. Foreign*, 1572–4, p. 583, and also Hubault, *Ambassade de Castelnau*, p. 33, n. 3.) But Mondreville apparently never went.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 6.

most of the Scottish correspondence was passing through his hands. His own view of the situation was a pessimistic one. 'There is a man of mine,' he wrote to Burghley late in July, 'that I lent to Mr. Killigrew is this day come out of Scotland . . . I perceive by him their affection towards us decayeth as all other things that tend to our good and safety. God be merciful unto us.'[1] He was himself strongly in favour of following the course in Scotland which Killigrew recommended and he regarded Elizabeth's delay in that regard as little short of criminal. It was at this juncture that he wrote that strong remonstrance to Elizabeth which has been already cited in another connexion. 'For the love of God, Madame, let not the cure of your diseased estate hang any longer in deliberation.'[2] Its particular bearing upon the Scottish situation is revealed in its concluding phrases: 'Your Majesty, by one of the enclosed letters I send you, received from the Regent, may well perceive how much he findeth himself aggrieved for that there is so long delay used in sending unto him. It were therefore very convenient that there were one sent unto him out of hand with full satisfaction to his demands, which tend only to your Majesty's safety. Whatsoever account is made of him, there is no man of judgement that loveth your Majesty that can imagine any peril can befall unto you so great as the loss of that gentleman, either by death or alienation. For the love, therefore, of your Majesty's own safety, lose not such a one negligently, whom it behooveth you to keep so necessarily.'

Walsingham's strong language at this juncture was induced partly by fear of 'mischiefs abrewing in France' and partly by the discovery of a secret channel of correspondence with Mary Stuart which involved some two or three great nobles and seemed to reveal a general rottenness at home. He kept harping on the same string during the early spring of 1575. 'I judge', he wrote to Leicester on the 10th of March, 'that Cockburn in his letter to your Lordship did let fall somewhat whereby it might appear how necessary it were for her Majesty to have a minister in Scotland, especially before the arrival of some one that is looked for there out of France. It is strange, the conservation

[1] B.M. Harleian MSS. 6991, f. 47.

[2] S. P. Scotland, xxvi, f. 66, dated 15 Jan. 1574/5 (misdated in *Cal Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 83).

of the amity of that country importing her so much as it doth, that her Majesty dealeth so loosely therein as she doth. I have so often put the Regent in hope of some one to be sent from her Majesty unto him, as I am now ashamed to write unto him, having no colour of excuse to lay before him to make him interpret the longer stay in sending in good part.' [1]

Late in March Elizabeth made up her mind to send Killigrew back to Scotland again. Walsingham learned from Killigrew himself the nature of his instructions, which corresponded almost exactly to those which he had taken with him about a year before. The two salient questions, that of the league and that of the pensions were, as before, the one dismissed as unnecessary, the other ignored. Walsingham's reaction upon these intended instructions he wrote to the Queen at length.

'I thought it my duty', he wrote, 'forasmuch as there are certain requests which the Regent delivered unto him [Killigrew] to be preferred unto your Majesty, whereunto he hath long attended your Majesty's resolution, to send your Highness a note of the same: fearing if he shall not receive some such answers as shall be to his contentment your Majesty's sending thither may rather prove prejudicial than profitable. And whereas your Majesty maketh difficulty to enter into mutual league of defence with that Crown, a thing more necessary for your Majesty than for them, for that it is apparent that none will ever assail Scotland but with intention to have a foot in England; such of your Council as are most careful for your Majesty's safety and look deepliest (*sic*) into your estate, who, seeing on the one side that no amity can be to your Majesty so profitable and necessary as the amity of that Crown, and on the other side that no danger can befall so great unto you as that way, if they shall be aliened from you, do very much lament your Majesty's delay used in the acceptation of their offer, which cannot in the end but breed in them an opinion that your Majesty hath them in contempt, whereby there may follow in them by some like conceit an alienation incurable. And if it shall so fall out, the burden of the error will be only cast on your Majesty, by refusing, contrary to the advice of your Council, that amity offered unto you, that unoffered, in due policy were most necessary to be sought for, a thing your Majesty's predecessors who stood not in like need of their amity would have redeemed with any treasure. The inconvenience that may follow of this error, besides the loss of

[1] S. P. Domestic, ciii, f. 16. There is another copy of this letter in Cotton MSS., Caligula C iv, f. 321; cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 102.

their friendship, may breed an alienation in your Majesty's own subjects, in that you lay them open to so many manifest perils as depend thereon.

'Whereas your Majesty conceiveth, and that by my information, that pensions should be demanded by certain of the Scottish nobility, with pardon be it spoken, your Majesty mistaketh me. For as it appeareth by Mr. Killigrew's last instructions, the advice grew from the Regent, who thought it a necessary mean to continue their devotion towards your Majesty, which advice of his, tending so much to your Majesty's benefit, if he shall be neglected, cannot but for his own safety, upon such offers as he shall receive from the French, make him take another course. The sum, as I can gather by Mr. Killigrew, that may content them is not great; but the benefit that may ensue thereby, if your Majesty make a just and due value of quietness and safety, is invaluable. Whensoever they shall be aliened from you, besides the great mischiefs that may follow thereby, the ordinary charges of the increased garrison upon the borders will amount unto, at the least by the year, ten thousand pounds more than presently your Majesty is at. And whereas your Majesty doubteth the French offers will overweigh yours, if it be considered that the French be of a contrary religion, that their liberality tendeth to put them at division among themselves, and that their large pensions are paid by leisure, your Majesty may be well assured that they will more esteem a mean pension of your Majesty than one of five times the value offered by the French.'[1]

The only effect of this eloquent appeal apparently was that Killigrew's departure was deferred. Possibly if Walsingham had been at the court at this juncture he might have hastened the Queen's resolution, but he was confined to his London house 'under the hands of the physicians'.[2] Howbeit he laboured manfully with his pen, and his confinement, if prejudicial to his cause, has proved profitable to his biographer. Early in April he heard that Morton was leaning towards the Hamiltons, was advancing members of the French party to positions of trust, and was secretly plotting to get possession of the young King, who was in the keeping of Sir Alexander Erskine. Walsingham wrote at once to Burghley.

'Three things', he wrote, 'maketh me to doubt the likelihood

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxvi, f. 70, in *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 112.

[2] Cf. Walsingham's letter to Morton of April 1575 in B.M. Add. MSS. 33531, f. 151.

of his alienation of affection for her Majesty; the first in respect of the little account that her Majesty seemeth to make of him, for that she hath not vouchsafed to answer the request contained in his memorial, nor to give him that countenance that he looketh for, which cannot but breed unto him like peril as hath befallen unto others that have supplied the same room that he now possesseth; the second, for that being a man of judgement and looking abroad into the world, and seeing on the one side that the French King is now altogether devoted to the House of Guise, who is like, when his own estate shall be quieter, to be drawn to enter into any action that may tend to the Queen of Scot's benefit; and on the other side, being not ignorant of the great party that she hath here within this realm, being so loosely looked to as she is, whereby she hath liberty to practice, whereof she maketh no small profit, he cannot in reason, weighing his own peril and danger by consideration of the dangerous estate of such as have supplied his place, but run some other course that may contain in itself some more sound ground of safety. Lastly, the gentleman being noted to be over much inclined to his own gain and profit, it is to be doubted that the large offers of France draw him to revolt.[1] Therefore, unless her Majesty by consideration how much it importeth her to have the amity of that Crown, shall presently give order by the sending of some apt minister thither, either for the continuance of his devotion towards her or for the bridling of him by some such as may be there raised up against him, if he shall be discovered to be aliened in affection from her Majesty. If ever Prince that possessed this crown had cause to desire the amity of Scotland, none can have greater than her Majesty hath; the corruption of her own estate being well weighed, and the malice that the great Princes her neighbours bear towards her, notwithstanding their fair speeches, that the broken state of their kingdoms now forceth them to use. God forbid therefore that a gap that may now so easily be stopped, should lie open to so evident peril as is like to break in if necessary prevention be not used. God forbid that no other thing should teach her Majesty to make value of the friendship of Scotland but only the mischief that be manifest from the lack thereof.'[2]

With this letter to Burghley Walsingham sent a letter which

[1] Cf. Castelnau's estimate of Morton, 'plein d'avarice et d'exactions sur le peuple,' and yet 'un homme de police et de courage', cited by Hubault, *Ambassade de Castelnau*, p. 33.

[2] S. P. Domestic, xlv, f. 27, not signed or dated. It probably belongs to about 10th April, since Walsingham wrote to Elizabeth to the same effect on 12th April. This letter is not included in Boyd's *Scottish Calendar*. Several letters in S. P. Domestic, xlv, important for Scottish affairs, are omitted in the *Scottish Calendar*.

he had received from Morton, which contained an urgent request to be informed of the Queen's intentions towards him.[1] Burghley and Sir Thomas Smith together discussed the matter at length with the Queen, and it is evident that they favoured the course which Walsingham described. 'But I fear', Burghley wrote to Walsingham on the 11th of April, 'there will more smoke arise than fire, and yet I wish you should advertise her Majesty of the things contained in your letter to me.'[2]

Walsingham acted upon Burghley's suggestion and wrote the next day to Elizabeth in very much the same terms that he had addressed to Burghley.[3] The Queen was so far impressed by his letter as to ask him to set down his opinion as to what should be done 'for the stopping of the Scottish gap'. In his reply he set forth in brief his Scottish policy at this juncture.

'I can but put your Majesty in mind', he wrote, 'of such remedies as have been heretofore propounded, namely these: the acceptation of the Scottish league, the bestowing on certain well chosen persons yearly pensions, and the restraining of the Scottish Q. from practice. But presently, in respect of the doubt of the Regent's alienation, in my simple opinion it were very requisite for your Majesty (after the matter had been thoroughly considered of), to despatch one into Scotland with some comfortable message unto the Regent, under the colour thereof to discover whether there be any such alienation as is suspected, and if upon due search made thereof in secret wise, it shall appear that either there is no such alienation or if there be any, it hath chiefly ensued through the delay your Majesty hath used in sending unto him, and that the same is not grown to such an extreme degree but that by some good assurance from your Majesty of your honourable consideration of his requests he may be drawn to continue his former devotion: then were it convenient that the gentleman of whom your Majesty shall make choice to send thither should carry with him your full resolution touching the three points above named. On the other side, if he shall discover upon his arrival there, that the alienation in the Regent is void of all hope of recovery: then were it necessary that he seek by all secret means to procure unto your Majesty a party there, that may make head unto the Regent. Amongst others it will be

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 114.

[2] S. P. Domestic, ciii, f. 26 (not in Boyd's *Scottish Calendar*).

[3] The original draft of this letter is in S. P. Domestic, ciii, f. 28. It is dated 12th April. Mr. Boyd in *Scottish Calendar* has made use of another copy in the Cotton MSS. on which the date is partially destroyed, which accounts for his misdating it 7th April (*Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 115).

most requisite that three persons especially be drawn to your devotion, namely the E. of Argyle in respect of Ireland, Sir Alexander Erskine for the stay of the young k. in that country and the Captain of Dumbarton, whereby that fort may not come into the hands of the French. For the winning of these persons to depend upon your Majesty; the gentleman who hath acquainted me with the doubt conceived of the Regent's alienation (in respect of the credit he hath of the said parties) will be a very apt instrument.[1] But this latter remedy is no way to be put in execution if the Regent be by any means recoverable. For the division amongst them (besides it will be chargeable to your Majesty) cannot breed that quietness unto your state as the keeping of them at union; which union most assuredly can neither continue long there nor here unless your Majesty in time take order for the restraining of the Scottish Q. from practice. And as for the other two points, the league and the pensions, unless they may come jointly accompanied with the third, the putting in execution of any one of them apart in my simple judgement (be it spoken without offence to your Majesty) will prove like seed unprofitably sown in untilled or unmanured ground.'[2]

Over a month later Elizabeth dispatched Henry Killigrew to Scotland, but the message he carried with him was far from conforming to Walsingham's counsels. Once more Elizabeth refused the league. Unfortunately the two copies of Killigrew's instructions which survive are both silent upon the question of the pensions. It is probable that he was privately instructed upon this point. It hardly seems likely, however, that his message was a 'comfortable' one.[3]

Killigrew was on his way to Scotland when he was checked at Berwick by a border affray which threatened serious consequences. At a Warden Court in July, presided over by Sir John Forster for England and Sir John Carmichael for Scotland,

[1] This was a nephew of Sir Alexander Erskine and may have been the young Earl of Mar. Lord Seaton's son was also in England at this time. *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 115, 116.

[2] S. P. Domestic, ciii, f. 30, in *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 118, from another copy in the British Museum.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 152. The instructions take up the question of the pension but break off abruptly without giving any instructions upon the point, as follows: 'Secondarily, to the Regent's motion for support for himself, as also concerning his opinion to have us bestow upon some of the nobility of that realm for our better assurance of their continuing in good devotion towards us, certain pensions, you shall answer (the rest blank). Cf. S. P. Domestic, cxxxiv, f. 267, and the copy in B.M. Lansdowne MSS. 155, f. 402.

a dispute arose between the English and the Scots, which led to blows. At first the English had the better of it, but later the Scots, reinforced, rallied and totally routed the English. Sir John Heron was slain ; Sir John Forster and about three hundred of his followers were taken prisoners.

The affair was really not a very serious one in itself. The English prisoners were very well treated ; Sir John Forster ' behaved with tact and good sense ', and Morton, in a letter to Elizabeth, offered to make suitable redress. Walsingham was of the opinion that the matter might be adjusted easily. ' Considering the good disposition of either party,' he wrote to Morton on the 13th of July, ' in my opinion the true way to bring this to pass is, first to choose apt and fit ministers that may without partiality examine how the disorder grew and who are the offenders, to the end that there may be due punishment executed upon such as shall be found culpable, as well of the one side as the other. For surely without severity used in this behalf it will be a hard matter to quench the quarrels that otherwise are like to follow, which both the realms shall rue.' [1]

But Elizabeth was furious. She insisted that Morton should meet the Earl of Huntingdon, President of the Council of the North, in England, and when he refused she bade Killigrew speak to him in terms which had they been literally repeated might have plunged the two realms into war. To Walsingham, as secretary, fell the burden of drafting this letter. He wrote to Burghley on the subject early in August. ' The letter drawn by your Lordship, directed to Mr. Killigrew, the same being signed by all the councillors here save one, was torn in pieces, as others have been heretofore, misliked only for that it was tempered with too much phlegm, and thereupon I was commanded to draw another of another temper, which was so seasoned with choler, as I think we may take our leave of the amity of Scotland. I never wrote letter with worse will, and if it prove as dangerously for the state as it was by me unwillingly written, I fear we shall then have just cause to mislike of this intemperate course.' [2]

[1] B.M. Additional MSS. 33531, f. 153. (*Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, 167.)

[2] B.M. Harleian MSS. 6992, no. 7, dated 3 Aug. 1575. The letter to Killigrew is probably the one given in *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 184. It is there ascribed to September. In *Cal. Foreign*, 1575–7, p. 93, the same letter is ascribed to July.

Killigrew, upon advice from the Earl of Huntingdon, thought it wise to temper Elizabeth's message to Morton somewhat in transmitting it, and it accomplished its purpose without undue irritation. Morton proved amenable to all reasonable demands. On the 16th of August he met Huntingdon at the Bond Rode,[1] and the matter was adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties.[2] Morton released the prisoners, loaded them with presents, and offered to send Carmichael to England to beg pardon of Elizabeth. Among the presents were some fine falcons, whence a saying arose along the Border, playing upon the death of Sir John Heron, that for once Morton had been beaten at a bargain, for he had given live hawks for dead Herons.[3]

For the next three years the history of the relations between England and Scotland is practically a blank page. Killigrew's mission terminated almost before it began, and seems to have been confined to a few conferences between him and Morton near the English border. After the Warden Court affair was settled he returned to England. The men of Berwick said that he was nothing more than a mere 'letter bearer', and indeed his constant postings to and from Scotland during the few years past almost earned him the title.[4] Walsingham corresponded with the Regent at intervals during this period and sent him from time to time the news from foreign parts. Walsingham also gave Morton some advice as to how he should conduct himself with the Queen. In November 1575 he wrote to Morton urging him to send an agent to the English court. 'I and others of your Grace's friends who wish some sound knot of friendship to be knit between the two realms cannot but encourage you to send him hither; not doubting but that by the good direction he shall receive here from such as are affected to the said friendship, touching the cause of his negotiations, there will fall out such good effects thereof as your Grace, I hope, shall have no cause to repent the sending of him hither. And for sundry respects I should wish that he might be here about Christmas.'[5] Nevertheless it does

[1] The boundary road near Berwick, common to both kingdoms.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 188.
[3] Tytler, *History of Scotland*, iii. 100.
[4] Cf. Cockburn to Burghley in *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 199. Cockburn said that Killigrew was also dubbed 'My Lord Basket Maker', but does not explain why.
[5] B.M. Additional MSS. 33531, f. 155.

not appear that the agent was sent. A little later Walsingham seems to have been advising Morton how to write to the Queen.[1] This manner of prompting foreign princes in their negotiations with Elizabeth, a course of action which Walsingham also followed with the Prince of Orange, hardly commends itself to the modern critic, although it seems to have been a common enough practice in his time.

The principal matter of interest to Morton at this juncture, as previously, was the question of league and pensions. Most of his correspondence with Walsingham centred around this point, and to Walsingham fell the disagreeable task of keeping his hopes alive with vague promises and threadbare excuses. Finally, in July of 1576 he had to admit to Morton that the Queen would do nothing for him. She would not join a particular Protestant league with Scotland for fear of inciting the Catholic princes ' to combine themselves more strongly against us '. She would not accede to Morton's request for a pension because ' she thinketh that in this peaceable time, that realm [Scotland] being in quiet and no great cause of extraordinary charge, that she should not be urged therein, knowing how chargeable the maintenance of the liberty of that country from foreign subjection hath been to the crown of England '. The best that Walsingham could offer Morton was that England would help him without any league ' upon all extremities ' and that ' in case you should be driven to extraordinary charge either by inward dissension or foreign attempts . . . her Majesty will not fail to yield both to that realm generally and to yourself in particular such support and relief as shall be necessary and to your contentation.' [2]

Morton's reply to this was in the nature of a solemn warning to the Queen to be on her guard against the machinations of her enemies. The most interesting fact about this letter is that it was written apparently at Walsingham's prompting. Elizabeth

[1] Walsingham to Morton, 26 Feb. 1576/7, in S. P. Scotland, xxvii, f. 15. ' Your Grace may see by her Majesty's letters unto you in how good part she accepts your letters . . . for the which, as well for the good that is like to come thereof to all, as also to myself particularly I cannot but think myself beholding unto you, *for that it pleased her* [you] *at my request to write as you did unto her*. The passage in italics Walsingham crossed out in the draft of his letter after he had written it. It has been omitted in the version of the letter given in *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 226. The first ' her ' in the passage in italics was doubtless a slip of his pen for ' you ', which is supplied in brackets.

[2] S. P. Domestic, Eliz., xlv, f. 45 (not in Boyd's *Scottish Calendar*).

acknowledged it courteously and Walsingham told Morton that he thought it would have the desired effect. 'Howsoever,' he wrote, 'she hath been slow to answer some of your Grace's demands concerning the King your master or yourself in particular, yet I doubt not but your good and sound advice given her in your said letter, both for the safety of the common cause of religion (chiefly now shot against by the mighty and common enemies thereof) and of herself in particular, will be so regarded as you shall perceive your writing to this end hath been effectual. And I may boldly say unto you that since the receipt of your letter aforesaid, she hath entered into a deeper care and consideration of the defence of her own realms and of her good neighbours than at any time heretofore to my remembrance'[1]

It is to be suspected, however, that Walsingham was writing rather to impress the Regent than from any inward conviction, for none of the steps were taken to cultivate the friendship of Scotland which Morton desired and Walsingham himself thought necessary. So the matter stood during the spring and early summer of 1577. Meanwhile trouble was brewing in Scotland. In the autumn of 1575 Killigrew had detected the growth of a faction against Morton, in which the two principal figures were the powerful northern Earls of Atholl and Argyll.[2] For a time these two were prevented from co-operation by a private quarrel which took the form of armed incursions upon each other's countries. There is some reason to believe that Morton himself fomented this quarrel for his own purposes. Robert Bowes,[3] Treasurer of Berwick, wrote to Burghley in July 1577 that Argyll and Atholl, 'thinking their discord to be fed and continued by a third, whom they thought would have travailed their speedy agreement, do purpose quietly to meet and betwixt themselves and secret friends to end their debates.' In this same letter Bowes spoke of a confederacy of Atholl with Ruthven, Lindsay, and others.[4] Simultaneously came news from France of negotiations for peace between the King and the Huguenots

[1] Cf. p. 141, n. 1. The letter from Morton to Elizabeth referred to has apparently not been preserved. [2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 179.

[3] Bowes was the brother-in-law of John Knox who had married Marjorie Bowes and who later had somewhat informal relations with her (and Robert's) mother. Cf. article Elizabeth Bowes in *D. N. B.*

[4] *Bowes Correspondence* (Surtees Society), p. 1.

there. It looked as though a breach were opening in Scotland at just the moment when the French King would be free to profit by it. Indeed there was some reason to believe that French agents were already at work.[1] Under these circumstances it is not surprising to discover that Elizabeth began to reconsider her course with the Regent. 'I find her Majesty', Walsingham wrote to Burghley on the 29th of August 1577, 'very well inclined to assure Scotland unto her by pension, wherein I fear by the overslipping of the time it will not now be performed so soundly and effectually as before.'[2] About ten days later Robert Bowes was dispatched to Scotland. The ostensible reasons for his going need not detain us. The one most welcome to Morton, no doubt, was the definite promise of a pension.[3] The main object of Bowes's mission was 'to break the purpose of such as seek the overthrow of his [Morton's] government'. If Bowes found that Atholl and the rest had any just grievances, and were disposed to seek French aid in correcting them, he was to offer Elizabeth's services in mediation. If he found them 'carried away with a disposition to have recourse to violent remedies' he was to let them understand plainly that she would come to Morton's assistance in force. He was further instructed to consider what men in Scotland might profitably be pensioned

It is clear that Elizabeth's main fear at the time was that Atholl and his party would seek French assistance to overthrow Morton. That danger brought her at last to Walsingham's policy. It remained to be seen whether 'the overslipping of the time' had rendered it ineffectual.

Bowes went to Scotland and was back again at Berwick early in October. His report on the situation there was not particularly encouraging. 'Your Lordship,' he wrote to Leicester, 'I trust, understandeth by my letters . . . all my doings and success in Scotland; where, albeit these matters are for a season wrapped

[1] Cf. Bowes to Burghley, 2 Aug. 1577 (*Bowes Correspondence*, p. 3), concerning Capt. Molyns. As to what Molyns was doing in Scotland, cf. Lawrence Tomson to Davison, 14 Sept. 1577, in *Cal. Foreign*, 1577–8, p. 153.

[2] S. P. Domestic, xlv, f. 11 (not in Boyd's *Calendar*). Five days before this Henry Killigrew wrote to Davison, 'I hear if the matters in Scotland be not compounded her Majesty will send aid to the Earl of Morton and his side to keep the king safe' (*Cal. Foreign*, 1577–8, p. 91).

[3] The amount of this pension is not stated in Bowes's instructions which are given in *Cal. Foreign*, 1577–8, pp. 144 ff.

up, yet it is not belike that without wise handling, and with some charge to her Majesty, the fire will be readily kindled again. For although the Regent and the best affected in religion, and to the welfare of the King and realm do presently embrace the amity with her Majesty as a thing most profitable to them; yet many malcontents lie in wait to alter this course, casting in such practices as offer great peril to the same.'

Bowes's solution of the problem was to mediate a peace between the factions and to strengthen Morton's position by a substantial pension.[1] Elizabeth, for the time being at any rate, seemed disposed to agree with him. Some time in December she dispatched him once more into Scotland with instructions to mediate for peace between Atholl and Morton,[2] and early in February of the next year she sent Thomas Randolph to join with him. Walsingham informed Randolph of Elizabeth's intention to dispatch him on the 12th of January,[3] and on the same day Randolph explained in a letter to a friend his conception of his mission. 'I assure you,' he wrote, 'it neither agreeth with my years nor any way to my contentment.... If aught can make me willing it is that the errand is good, if it take effect as the plot is laid—a league offensive and defensive between us and them, pensions to be bestowed among the worthiest sort, agreement to be made between the portions now discontented, some with the government, others for particular action. This is the sum of the whole negotiation. God sent it to be well followed here and executed there as the importance of the cause requires.'[4] When Randolph's instructions were drawn up, however, on the 30th of January, there was no word in them either of league or pensions.[5] Elizabeth had to be prodded before she would commit herself upon these matters. The prod was applied early in February in the form of news from the Low Countries announcing the defeat of the Dutch army by Don John of Austria at Gembloux. Walsingham wrote in haste to Randolph: 'This night we have received advertisements of the overthrow of the States' Camp, wherefore among other things it will be

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 4. It is not unlikely that the reports on the hostility of Scotland, dated 1577 and given in *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 252–64, came from Bowes.

[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 5.

[3] Harleian MSS. 6992, no. 45.

[4] S. P. Holland and Flanders, v, no. 16.

[5] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 268.

thought requisite that you use as much diligence in your journey as may be, . . . and now you may make account that her Majesty will not stick at money, considering how much it standeth her upon to assure Scotland unto her.'[1] Three days later, probably in response to the same impulse, a further clause was added to Randolph's instructions authorizing him to open negotiations with the Regent for a defensive league.[2]

Before Randolph had reached Scotland he received a letter from Walsingham which reveals the distrust with which the secretary regarded the Scottish situation, and particularly the Regent himself at this juncture, for there can be little doubt that Morton is the unnamed person to whom the letter refers :

'I fear', Walsingham wrote, 'you shall deal with one whom you are to hold as a wolf by the ear according to the old proverb. Therefore I pray after you have, upon conference with Mr. Bowes, well sounded him, at large and with as much speed and plainness as you can, advertise hither in what good or bad terms you find him, that accordingly deliberation may be had here and direction given from hence to you there. Whether this man, whom you are to hold so hardly and dangerously, do stand upright with her Majesty and her realm or waver, or be clear fallen away, you are thought the most apt and likely man either to continue him in a good course or to reduce him to the right way. And therefore, knowing as you do how necessary this man (held now somewhat doubtful) is, for the preservation of the same, though I wish you to write speedily and largely how you find him disposed, yet would I not that you yourself make any haste to return hither, but rather tarry there until some good and sure league of amity may be concluded on between both realms, wherein, as my desire is great, so is my hope no less, but by your good and discreet dealing it will be brought to pass.'[3]

Randolph arrived in Edinburgh on the 25th of February and, joining with Bowes, began negotiations with Morton at once. But they had scarcely got under way before the intrigues of Atholl and his party against the Regent came to a head. On the 4th of March Argyll appeared at Stirling before the young King, complained bitterly of Morton's insolence and oppression, and requested James to call a convention of the nobles. Others of the same faction, assisted by Erskine, the King's governor, and Buchanan his tutor, urged the same course. Morton protested

[1] B.M. Harleian MSS. 6992, no. 47.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 270.
[3] B.M. Harleian MSS. 6992, no. 48.

and offered his resignation. The convention was called and consisted mainly of Atholl's friends. They resolved unanimously that James should assume the government in his own name, and dispatched messengers at once to Morton to demand his resignation. Morton accepted the situation without remonstrance. As soon as he received the King's letter he wrote to Randolph and Bowes seeking their advice. Their reply was non-committal. They had not, they said, been privy to his intention to resign, nor did they know upon what grounds he had resigned, but they accepted his own judgement of the situation and trusted that he would provide for the preservation of the King's person and the maintenance of the estate before withdrawing from the scene.[1]

The resignation of Morton followed so close upon the arrival of the English envoys that one is tempted to see some direct connexion between the two facts. There is, however, no evidence to prove that Randolph and Bowes had anything whatever to do with the *coup d'état* of 4th March, and every reason to believe that they were, as Elizabeth was, directly opposed to it.

Elizabeth, in fact, when she received the news, was very angry. She bade her envoys protest vigorously to Atholl and his partisans at the overthrow of Morton but, fearing as she did that if she took too hostile an attitude Atholl's party would throw themselves into the arms of France, she tempered her wrath sufficiently to advise them to have a good care for the preservation of the young King, to grow to unity among themselves and to continue in good amity towards England. She still hoped that Morton might be restored to a prominent place in the young King's Council, and so she bade her envoys tell James himself, and she sent a comfortable message to Morton, with assurance of her 'constant good will and favour'.[2]

Walsingham's reaction upon this 'sudden alteration' is set forth in a letter to Randolph on the 16th of March 1578:

'These civil and domestical broils', he wrote, 'come very evil to pass in this common combustion abroad. The time requireth an unity and perfect agreement rather in them that make profession of that truth which is elsewhere impugned and hath so mighty enemies and so cruel wars enkindling against it in these days amongst our fellow members abroad. Our unity might be

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 275. [2] Ibid., pp. 279–80.

a strength to ourselves and an aid unto our neighbours, but if we shall like to fall at division among ourselves, we must needs lie open to the common enemy and by our own fault hasten or rather call upon ourselves our own ruin. Both parts, I know, will and may pretend maintenance of the Gospel and entertainment of good amity with her Majesty and crown. If the same be performed indeed, and their effects be answerable to their outward pretensions, they are like to reap the better fruit of their actions, but yet it cannot be where offended minds are, and displeasures conceived in the one against the other, but there a third faction shall have better entrance to work his own purpose. And they that are entered into jealousy are not so apt to join together as otherwise they would, if they were soundly affected one towards the other. But it is greatly to be doubted that the secrecy of this practice is deeper rooted and hath a further intent in it than the removing of one man from his government, whose carrying of himself in his regiment could not be so evil as the sequel of this action may bring danger. The way is easily opened to division. Gaps and breaches made in state are not easily stopped and salved soundly. But seeing they are fallen into this inconvenient (*sic*), that they are now more subject to those movements which discord and disunion breedeth than before, it shall behoove them specially whom God hath appointed watchmen over that piece of his house, to mediate as much as they can, that unity may be maintained, that the profession of the gospel and the free course thereof be not interrupted, that good regard be had amongst them to continue their good amity with their friends which make the same profession as themselves, that they suffer not themselves to be carried away by sinister practices to any course that may prejudice the good estate thereof, whereupon dependeth the welfare of the cause of religion amongst them, and of the crown and realm. And to this effect you shall do well to persuade with the ministers and others that are best affected to be good instruments that way, and to be very careful thereof seeing they are so nigh to danger.'[1]

As for Randolph, he wrote that 'all the devils in hell are stirring and in great rage in this country', and hearing that the Atholl faction was about to send an ambassador to Elizabeth, hastened back to England to anticipate him.[2] Yet a little later he seems on the whole to have been satisfied with the situation in the north. 'I assure you,' he wrote to Davison on

[1] B.M. Harleian MSS. 6992, 16 March, 1577/8, printed in Wright, *Queen Elizabeth and her Times*, ii. 79. [2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 283.

the 23rd of April, 'they are now in quiet and at her Majesty's devotion if she likes to receive them.'[1] Elizabeth, however, feared France still and took occasion to instruct her ambassador in Paris to hint that if the King intermeddled in Scotch affairs she might find occasion to stir up trouble for him in his own realm.[2]

But before France could take advantage of the situation in the north, or England adjust itself to the new state of things there came a second *coup d'état*. On the 26th of April the young Earl of Mar, prompted by Morton, seized Stirling Castle and with it the person of the young King. In less than a month later Morton had emerged from his lion's den, joined Mar at Stirling, and was once more master of the situation. In June he secured the appointment of a new Council, in which he himself held the foremost place, and by the end of the summer his position seemed to be as strong as ever.[3]

It is difficult to say how large a part Elizabeth played in the restoration of Morton to power. She certainly wrote in his favour to the young King and others.[4] According to Mendoza, the Spanish Ambassador at London, she sent Hunsdon to Berwick and increased her forces along the border for the purpose of assisting him against his rivals. According to Mendoza also she turned back without an interview an ambassador who was dispatched to her by Atholl and his friends.[5] At all events, the course of affairs was very much to her liking.

Morton, once more in control, acting now, of course, not as Regent but as chief councillor to the boy King (James was still only twelve years of age), took steps at once to reopen formal relations with England. Early in July he dispatched an ambassador, the Commendator of Dunfermline, to Elizabeth.[6]

Before Dunfermline reached London Walsingham had departed on his embassy to the Low Countries. Morton, who regarded

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1577–8, p. 630. [2] Ibid., p. 609.

[3] Castelnau to Henry III, 14 Aug. 1578. Teulet, *Relations politiques de la France et l'Éspagne avec l'Escosse*, iii. 32.

[4] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 292.

[5] *Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, pp. 584.

[6] There were three main points to Dunfermline's instructions: he was to reopen negotiations for a league defensive, he was to present once more the old demand for financial support and, in view of the recent death of the Countess of Lennox, he was to advance the claims of James VI to the Lennox estates in England. *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 297.

Walsingham as one of his chief advocates at the English court, learned of his absence with considerable disappointment; but Walsingham had taken care to provide an advocate in his place, and wrote to Bowes to bid Morton address his ambassador to Sir Christopher Hatton.[1] Walsingham wrote twice to Hatton on the subject in June, before he set sail for the Low Countries. 'I nothing doubt', he wrote on the 16th, 'but that you will have a care . . . especially to further a straiter knot of amity between this crown and Scotland. I find her Majesty in that point to rest upon some nice terms, which I hope by your good persuasion will be removed. Surely, sir, if her Majesty let slip this opportunity I fear we shall estrange Scotland from us unrecoverably.'[2] A few days later, finding that Hatton was somewhat in the dark about Scottish matters, and being at Canterbury on the point of departure, Walsingham wrote him again on the same subject:

'I perceive the message I sent you by Mr. Heneage touching the nobleman that is to be sent out of Scotland seemed somewhat dark to you, being not made acquainted with the last letters sent from Mr. Bowes, remaining in Mr. Secretary Wilson's hands. You shall therefore do well to send for them, and upon the view of the same to take that course that to your good judgement shall seem to knit the two crowns in perfect amity. I am the more importunate in this cause for that at my departure I found a strange disposition in her Majesty (things at home and abroad duly considered) touching the entering into any straiter degree of amity with Scotland as a matter dishonourable to join in any treaty with that Crown during the Q's life. If her Majesty would call to mind her former proceedings in the causes of that country since the deposition of the Queen, as the maintenance of such as were disposers of her, the prosecuting of her friends, the disposing of her friends of the castle of Edinburgh, and the retaining of her prisoner, all these actions being grounded on reason and justice, considering the title she pretendeth to this crown, and the actual rebellion she procured within the realm, there is no cause why her Majesty should now make a conscience to strengthen herself with the amity of Scotland. Such scruples of conscience are rather superstitious than religious. Scotland is

[1] Morton to Walsingham, 9 July 1578 (*Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 302). Morton speaks simply of the vice-chamberlain, whom Mr. Boyd, editor of the *Scottish Calendar*, took to have been Sir Thomas Heneage. His mistake is the more pardonable in view of the fact that the *D.N.B.*, art. Hatton, declares that Hatton was not created vice-chamberlain until November 1578. The Acts of Privy Council (New Series, x. 85) leave no doubt that he was created vice-chamberlain, 12 Nov. 1577.

[2] Nicolas, *Life of Hatton*, 60.

the postern gate to any mischief or peril that may befall this realm. It will therefore behoove her Majesty to look well to it. The Scot is a proud nation; if you refuse his friendship when he offereth it, you shall miss it when you would have it. And therefore it greatly importeth her Majesty to look substantially to the matter; for to my judgement it toucheth her as nearly as the conservation of her crown amounteth unto. I am afraid I am too troublesome to you in this matter of Scotland; and though the country be cold, I can neither think nor speak of it but in heat.'[1]

Dunfermline reached the English court about the middle of July. Shortly after his arrival Hatton wrote to Walsingham that the Queen was once more wavering in her Scottish policy. Walsingham replied on the 23rd of July. 'Sorry I am', he wrote, 'to see by your letters her Majesty's indisposition to deal effectually in the Scottish causes. If the party presently repaired thither [Dunfermline] be sent away with evil satisfaction, farewell the quietness and good days of England. If I stood (as I hear I do not) in her Majesty's good grace, . . . I would then discharge my duty plainly unto her, touching the sending away of Dunfermline well satisfied. But my state standing as it doth, I think it wisdom to forbear to offend.'[2]

Dunfermline was in fact rather cavalierly treated. Elizabeth, as Walsingham had surmised, hesitated for some time before she would consent to recognize him as ambassador at all.[3] Burghley wrote to Walsingham on the 29th of July: 'We have had much ado to bring her Majesty to accept such offers from the Scottish King and his nobles to commit themselves to the protection of her Majesty, which all other kings of this realm have sought by all means, both fair and foul, and could never attain the same. A strange thing it is to see God's goodness, so abundantly offered for her Majesty's surety, to be so daintily hearkened unto. Yet I trust her Majesty will not reject such a singular favour of God. I am sorry to write thus uncomfortably to you, but indeed the abundance of grief will not suffer my hand to stay.'[4]

[1] Nicolas, *Life of Hatton*, 66.

[2] Ibid. 65. Misdated by Nicolas 23rd June, it evidently belongs about one month later.

[3] Cf. Tremayne to Walsingham, *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 100.

[4] Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques des Pays Bas et de l'Angleterre*, x. 660.

Secretary Wilson, however, was disposed to be rather more optimistic. 'There is some hope', he wrote to Walsingham on the same day, 'that the Scottish matters will go better than was thought, that the King's government will be acknowledged and an overture given for a league, to be confirmed by parliament in both realms; and that the demand for succession to the Earl of Lennox's lands will be referred to the judges, the revenues being meanwhile sequestered. This morning the Lords are to consider these matters and to know her Majesty's further pleasure in them, for the speedy dispatch of Commendator Dunfermline, who is in haste to return, because of the Parliament and the troubles there; which in my opinion might easily be appeased if Argyle were fully won.'[1]

Elizabeth did in fact, in conference with Dunfermline, acquiesce in his proposal of the league and compromised upon the question of the Lennox estates, as Wilson had surmised she would,[2] but she refused to consider his request for 'aid and relief' for the King his master. 'So far', Wilson wrote to Walsingham, 'was he from getting any relief that he himself went away without any reward . . . Hope is given that the King shall not want aid hereafter. His authority is allowed and a promise made to assist it against all who seek to impugn it.'[3] Walsingham concluded, when he heard that Dunfermline had been dismissed with such 'evil satisfaction', that the Scots, 'though the matter may be patched up for a time,' would now 'take another course for their safety, and not depend upon those whom they think do make little account of them'.[4]

Meanwhile in Scotland, although Morton was chief in the Council and controlled the young King, Atholl's party was preparing to debate his supremacy by force of arms. Morton on his side called out his followers and appealed, through Bowes, to Elizabeth for assistance. Elizabeth for once acted quickly. On the 18th of August she sent orders to Huntingdon and Hunsdon on the borders to be ready to enter Scotland at once with a force of twenty-five hundred men in behalf of Morton's party.[5] Before, however, any such radical step was taken, before

[1] Quoted as given in *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 103.
[2] For these negotiations in detail, cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 306–14.
[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 118. [4] S. P. Holland and Flanders, ix, f. 3k.
[5] *Acts of Privy Council*, x. 306–7; cf. Wilson to Walsingham, 18 Aug. 1578,

indeed it was even decided upon, Bowes himself had interposed between the two armies and had persuaded them to come to terms.[1] Hunsdon, it seems, from Berwick added some cogent arguments of his own to assist in this conclusion. 'By the way as I was coming hitherward,' he wrote to Leicester from Berwick on the 19th of August, 'I received a letter from Mr. Bowes of the great likelihood of their going together by the ears . . . whereupon I wrote presently to him to let the lords of the King's side understand of the Queen's Majesty's good favour towards them, and of her Majesty's intention for the preservation of the King in maintaining all those that took his part, and also that he should declare to the Laird of Cesford, Sir James Hume (wardens of Tweedale and the Merse) and to all the gentlemen in their company . . . most furiously bent against Morton, that if they did not presently retire with all their forces and be content to put their cause to the Queen's Majesty, that I would presently set fire in their houses at their backs; which letter, I perceive by Mr. Bowes, came in good time, for as it did greatly encourage the King's side, coming in the very instant of doing good, so did it make the other side yield sooner than they would have done. So as now the lords that were against the King do seek to depend wholly upon her Majesty, especially the wardens and gentlemen of Tweedale and the Merse, in so much as the King's side doth call them Englishmen.' Hunsdon was indeed of the opinion that Atholl's party were, in show at least, more at Elizabeth's devotion than Morton's was.[2]

The situation in Scotland for the moment looked brighter, but Burghley was doubtful of the future. 'We of the Council', he wrote to Walsingham on the 31st of August, 'are forced greatly to offend her [Elizabeth] in . . . Scotland matters, which do keep a tolerable course, more by our particular fair overtures than by good matter, which without her Majesty's royal consent we cannot deliver to them, and so I fear they will espy our weakness, and for mistrust will take some better anchor hold.'[3]

Cal. Foreign, 1578–9, p. 138. It ought to be noted that the version of this letter printed in Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques des Pays Bas et de l'Angleterre* (x. 742), is like many others, incomplete, the passage referring to Scotland being omitted without any indication of the omission.

[1] Spottiswoode, ii. 228.

[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 11; *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 317.

[3] Kervyn de Lettenhove, *op. cit.* x. 783; cf. also Wilson to Walsingham.

Burghley, like Walsingham, felt the need of dealing promptly and generously with the friends of England in Scotland at this juncture, but Elizabeth was for temporizing. She had no mind to spend the money. She had but just committed herself, very much against her will, to a large loan to the Dutch rebels, and was even more than usually disposed to be thrifty. Besides, the old fear of French interference possessed her. The parties in Scotland were so equally divided that it was not so easy to maintain as it had been in the days of the Castelians, that the English party was the nation and its opponents a mere handful of rebels. If she interfered vigorously in behalf of Morton, the French King with something like equal justice might interfere in behalf of Atholl.[1] She felt that it would not do for her to take a partisan attitude. She must continue if possible to keep the good will of both parties, so she assumed the inexpensive and irresponsible rôle of preacher of peace, and expounded that gospel to the twelve-year-old James, even offering to send English commissioners to assist in bringing the rival factions to terms.[2]

It was indeed partly through her efforts that an appearance at least of harmony was established in Scotland in the late autumn of 1578.[3] But Bowes, her ambassador at Edinburgh, was by no means confident that peace would last. The greedy Scots were crying out loud for pensions, and Bowes informed his mistress that she would have to open her purse strings if she hoped to keep a party among them.[4] Meantime, at Walsingham's

9 Sept. 1578, in *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 190. Burghley of course was thinking of France as the ' better anchor hold '. That the French were making some approaches to Scotland at this time is evident. Mauvissière, the French ambassador in England, was corresponding with those ' qui ont le cœur français ', and in September 1578 dispatched an agent to Scotland to encourage Atholl and his faction. One of the chief difficulties in the way of French intervention was the fact that the French King, out of respect for Mary Stuart's title, would not officially recognize James as king, and Morton refused to receive a French representative in Scotland on any other basis. Cf. Hubault, *Castelnau de la Mauvissière*, pp. 34–5, and particularly on the last point, Henry III to Mauvissière, 17 June 1577, in *Mémoires de Castelnau* (ed. Laboureur), iii. 515.

[1] It is worth noting that Atholl, early in 1579, was soliciting aid from abroad. Teulet, *op. cit.* v. 188.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 321.

[3] Castelnau wrote on 15th November that Atholl, Morton, and the rest were together like brothers, Teulet, iii. 41.

[4] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 12.

advice, he made vague promises of future 'comfort', but he was sceptical of such devices. On the 24th of November he wrote to Walsingham, 'I doubt what liberal offers of other princes may work in their bare estates, overcharged with late expenses, especially when they shall see that they may make a profitable market. And I fear that no great inwardness shall be found in them when they find her Majesty's liberality coming slowly to them, that use not often at the fairest call to stoop to empty lure.' [1]

So the matter rested with little apparent change in the relations between England and Scotland for almost a year. During this period there is only one comment forthcoming from Walsingham on the Scottish problem. In the spring of 1579 he drew up two papers dealing with the general question of English foreign relations. These have been quoted at large elsewhere, but the passages in them which bear on Scotland may be repeated.[2] In the first paper he dealt with the danger which might follow the elimination of Mary Stuart from the English succession by the advancement of her son. 'For the avoiding of which', he wrote, 'by . . . Parliament it is . . . to be provided that if the said King shall either marry without her Majesty's consent, or shall go about to do any act to the disquieting of her Highness estate, he shall also be disabled and cut off from the expectation of this crown.' Walsingham laid his finger here very early upon what proved later to be perhaps the most potent factor in keeping James loyal to the English alliance, that is, his hope of the English crown. In the second paper alluded to, Walsingham added a word or two more on the same question: 'Touching the peril that is like to grow by the Scottish King, if the remedy before mentioned by Parliament be put in execution, the King match either within this realm or in Scotland, and such as are of the best credit there entertained by pensions, carryeth some probability of prevention of the dangers that may enssue [if] expedition be used.'

But Elizabeth was not disposed to take any of these measures, and so she continued in her state of 'false security' until of

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 13–14.

[2] Cf. Chapter viii, p. 18. These papers are in S. P. Domestic, cxxxiii, no. 23, and B.M. Harleian MSS. 1582, f. 46.

a sudden the danger which Burghley and Walsingham both anticipated came from the quarter out of which it had long been expected. On the 8th September 1579, Esmé Stuart, Seigneur d'Aubigny, landed in Scotland. There is some reason to believe that young James had summoned him, but he came really at the instigation of the Guises in France and as their agent. He was in fact conducted by the Duke of Guise to his ship at Dieppe. In his company came M. Montbirneau, a witty young gallant well versed in courtly accomplishments, and Mr. Henry Keir, a man of more silent, subtle, and dangerous character.

D'Aubigny was not so young as he has often been pictured, being nearly forty, but he was handsome, accomplished, and courtly, and was one of the most adroit schemers of the time. His commission from the Guises was to win the affection of the young King and strengthen the French party in Scotland, and his progress in that direction was amazingly rapid. After a youth spent among dour Presbyterian preceptors, James more than welcomed the grace and lightness of his French cousin, and d'Aubigny had hardly been a month in Scotland before he was a factor to be reckoned with in political affairs.

Directly Elizabeth was concerned about the matter. Paulet, her ambassador in France, had written late in August that d'Aubigny was about to take ship for Scotland and that he had conferred with the Archbishop of Glasgow, Mary Stuart's representative in France, before setting out.[1] At the moment Elizabeth was engaged in a futile attempt to mediate with the young King in favour of the Hamiltons who were being vigorously and cruelly persecuted in Scotland, her motive probably being to keep them out of France. She dispatched Captain Errington to Scotland for that purpose, but directed him as well to discover whether d'Aubigny was looked for in the north and what was thought would be the effect of his coming. Errington wrote to Walsingham on the subject on the 10th of October reporting that d'Aubigny was in Scotland, high in favour with the King, and likely to receive the Lennox title in reversion.[2] Errington seemed to think that Henry Keir was d'Aubigny's evil genius,

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 50. Mary herself appears to have distrusted d'Aubigny from the first. *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 248.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 355.

and Robert Bowes, who returned to Berwick about the same time, held the same opinion.[1]

Matters got steadily worse as time went on. Walsingham wrote in December to Henry Cobham, the new English ambassador at Paris that d'Aubigny, who was growing 'over great' with the young King, was practising underhand with the Scottish nobility to draw them towards France and had stopped the mouths of the preachers from inveighing against him by pretending an inclination towards Protestantism.[2] What was quite as bad, Morton was withdrawing from public affairs. Errington wrote from Scotland on the last day of the year that Morton had procured the King's licence to travel over-seas, that he was offended with the Queen for her lack of countenance, and that he absented himself from the Court, and disliked the government. 'His glass were run,' Errington added, 'but that he is rich and the King poor.'[3]

Walsingham was very much concerned about the matter. He was not so fearful of d'Aubigny himself, whose abilities he was rather disposed to under-estimate, but he considered some of his followers, Keir particularly, dangerous instruments, 'men of judgement and great practicers'. Walsingham wrote to Cobham again early in February 1580, 'My Lords of the Council have been earnest with her Majesty to send thither some personage of good quality to look into his doings, and to procure that the Earl of Morton may be called again to the administration of public affairs, from which he seemeth to have altogether withdrawn himself; to the end that by his means things there may be kept in more equal balance and d'Aubigny the easier hindered and prevented in the execution of any dangerous course he may take, which motion of my Lords I hope shall take place that there will some good follow of it.'[4]

But Elizabeth preferred for the moment to follow a less vigorous course. The most she would do was to return Captain

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 16. [2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 111.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 371–2. Castelnau heard that Morton was pretending to go to Spa for his health and was arranging to transport his vast wealth into England, Teulet, iii. 66.

[4] S. P. France, iv, no. 2 (in *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 146). Apropos of the English sympathies of Morton, Castelnau wrote, 14 May 1579, 'Estant ledict prince [James] entre les mains du dict comte de Morton, il est comme estant entre les mains de la Royne d'Angleterre,' Teulet, iii. 45.

Errington to Scotland late in February, primarily in behalf of the Hamiltons and on border matters, but with instructions also to see what d'Aubigny was about and to stir up the preachers against him and his faction, 'whom he may assure them to be a most dangerous practicer against the state of religion and the King's government, under a colour and show he makes of renouncing his Catholic religion'.[1] Errington fulfilled his commission and reported that the preachers were prepared to stand by their faith without respect of persons. But d'Aubigny courted them with hints at conversion and gave them no handle to seize him by. So time passed and matters got no better, or rather worse. D'Aubigny increased daily in favour with the King. He received large grants of lands and the Earldom of Lennox.[2] Many of Morton's old enemies, Argyll and Montrose conspicuously, rallied to his support if only for the purpose of getting rid of Morton. Bowes from Berwick and Errington from Stirling both reported practices to overthrow Morton, and Bowes heard rumours of Spanish intervention in behalf of Mary's title, and of French plots to convey the young King into France.[3] As Walsingham put it in a letter to France in April, the state of Scotland stood 'upon very loose and broken terms'.[4]

Meantime the Privy Council in England and the English agents in the north had all been urging upon Elizabeth the necessity of sending some person of quality to Scotland. In mid-April she finally decided to do so and Bowes, the obvious man for the mission, was dispatched from Berwick to the Scottish Court. The chief objects of Bowes's mission were to 'abate the credit' of d'Aubigny and to advance that of Morton. Bowes was instructed to take counsel with Morton, to act by his advice, and if possible to reconcile Argyll and Montrose and the border

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 383. It is interesting to mark in *Bowes Correspondence* the rather alarming headway which d'Aubigny was making with the preachers. On 22 Oct. 1579, Bowes wrote: 'D'Aubigny and he [Keir] are both suspected and spoken against by the ministers of the church and also by them so narrowly awaited as they cannot open their pack in any corner but their wares will be seen and published in the pulpit (*Correspondence*, pp. 16–17). On the 20th of February 1579/80 he wrote: 'The ministers are much overtaken by his [d'Aubigny's] conceit of his reformation' (ibid., p. 21).

[2] *Register Mag. Sig. Scotland*, nos. 2970, 2972.

[3] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 22; *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 389.

[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 239.

chieftains to him. To this end Elizabeth expressed her willingness to grant pensions to some of the chief nobility and even to consider lending some financial support to the King himself. She was particularly anxious to secure the goodwill of the captains of Edinburgh and Dumbarton, and she gave Bowes five hundred pounds in ready money to distribute to them as earnest of her favour. The most delicate part of Bowes's mission was that which concerned d'Aubigny. Elizabeth did not wish to alienate him before she had to and in view of his protestations of goodwill towards England she bade Bowes convey her goodwill to him, urge him to carry himself warily towards all factions and to endeavour 'to quench rather than kindle' civil fires. But she left much of this to Bowes's discretion, 'for that she can hardly be persuaded,' Walsingham wrote, 'that he can be drawn to run any other course than the French course.' The advances to Morton and the other nobles were to be carefully concealed from him. To the young King himself Elizabeth wrote that she was sending Bowes 'to do all good offices of mediation', and professed to incline to no party, but simply to strive for the safety of his person and the quiet of Scotland.[1]

Bowes received his instructions at Berwick on the 24th of April, and was in Edinburgh three days later. Thence he reported to Walsingham that he found 'matters standing in very doubtful condition', the nobility 'no less in division than the people in fury, and ready to take part diversely with the several parties according to the divers affections of those people'.[2] One of the few letters of Walsingham's on Scottish affairs at this juncture which has been preserved was in reply to the letter of Bowes. 'I cannot but be right sorry', Walsingham wrote, 'thereby to see the confused state of that realm, and specially the common people be so diversely drawn into factions whom I thought (in respect of the common hatred they naturally have against the servitude under any foreign prince, which, no doubt, the French seek to bring them unto) would never have declined so much as they do to d'Aubigny, a man altogether French, and besides, a Papist. This ill disposition in the common sort there maketh me more to doubt that there is some great

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 31–7; *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 398.
[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 38.

and hidden reason not yet discovered.' Walsingham then went on to recite evidence from various quarters which led him to suspect an enterprise in hand to re-establish Catholicism in Scotland. 'Wherefore,' he continued, 'it behooveth them to look carefully to this cause as I hope they will, and the better by such good admonition and advice as may proceed from you. For the unfolding of all these practices I think [blank in MS.] one of the aptest and ablest persons, and therefore to do some good herein with him I wish you spared no cost.

'For answer of your particular letter to myself, for that you have begun to write jointly to my Lord Treasurer and me, and that his Lordship should peradventure think somewhat if hereafter you should not do so, I think good you hold still that course, and withal to write, as you do use, privately to me.'[1]

It is evident that Walsingham had already begun to smell in the air some scent of the Guisan and Spanish plots against England which were already developing in Paris and were to turn about the person of d'Aubigny for the next two years to come. It rested with Bowes to counter-check these designs, but he made little headway. He found Morton surly and disposed to withdraw from Court, although willing to remain if Elizabeth would pay his bills, Argyll and Montrose rich in promises but hardly trustworthy, d'Aubigny and his follower Keir, 'that the other day was stiff Papists . . . now so earnest Protestants as they begin to creep into credit even with the ministers at Edinburgh, that have written in their commendation to the King's ministers.'[2] What was still more alarming, Bowes learned that there had been a plot afoot to turn Morton and his friends out of the Council and to take young James from the keeping of the Earl of Mar, which had been prevented for the moment by the cunning of the young King himself, but which was by no means abandoned. 'These matters', Bowes wrote to Leicester, 'are thus wrapped up with the discontentment of many of both sides, and I fear that they tarry but the next wind to set them in flame again.'[3] Bowes attributed the growth of d'Aubigny's influence largely to the fact that he was constantly in attendance upon Court, while the other nobles came only occasionally, because of the

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 48–9.
[2] Ibid., pp. 55–6.
[3] Ibid., pp. 60, 67, 70.

expense. After taking council with Morton and others, he contrived a plan for re-establishing English credit and the English party beside the King. The first essential, he held, was the repair and abode of Morton, Mar, and others of that party at Court, so that they might by their daily presence countermine d'Aubigny's influence. That, he was assured, would be easy to arrange if those nobles could be sure of Elizabeth's co-operation. He accordingly recommended that James be relieved with a pension, to take the form of a loan upon conditions. Recognizing that the nobles would at once fall to quarrelling over any money Elizabeth advanced, he advised that certain of them, with certain substantial burghers, be bound for its repayment and for the fulfilment of the conditions upon which it was advanced. He also thought it would be wise to maintain two young noblemen 'in whom the king will have pleasure', preferably Mar and Angus, at court; and finally to keep and pay a well chosen and wise councillor beside the king, 'to reduce things to their former course and her Majesty's devotion.'[1]

After the delivery of this advice Bowes, considering his present usefulness in Scotland at an end, returned to Berwick, not, however, before he had contrived to bribe the captains of Dumbarton and Edinburgh, and had pledged them to the Queen's service. The preachers he found he could not bribe.[2]

It was sufficiently evident that Elizabeth must act quickly and without counting the cost if she meant to save her party in Scotland. Bowes kept writing urgent letters to Walsingham from Berwick, in which he emphasized this fact again and again. 'The case is not yet so desperate,' he wrote early in June, 'but that it may be relieved by reasonable medicine, which must agree of necessity with the humour of the nation and of the workmen to be employed. And in that realm few or none will be found that will labour only for the public and for it sustain any great pains, charges and chiefly peril without sight of their surety and some particular profit. On which ground you see the Earl of Morton standeth, and will not be called from it, especially in the dangerous condition and time wherein he is, so as he is to be satisfied and repaid in season, or else for his own safety

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 422–3.
[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 65, 66, 78.

(that indeed is presently in danger) he is like to step in so far as with honour he cannot come back.'[1]

'All things there', he wrote to Leicester on the 15th of June, 'depend on her Majesty's resolution, the delay whereof hath made many to distrust that her highness will leave them to themselves, and by this conceit the dangers increase.'[2]

None realized the force of Bowes's argument more clearly then Walsingham and he laboured with the Queen to bring her to some resolution, but she was so engrossed in pursuing her marriage negotiations with Alençon 'that all other causes, be they of never so great importance, must for the time give place'. The most he could induce her to do was to appoint a committee of three, Burghley, Sussex, and himself, to consider the matter. He told Bowes that the one piece of advice in his letters that had pleased the Queen more than aught else was, 'that there should be a stay made of delivering any relief to the King.' Bowes's proposals involved considerable expense. There, as usual, was where the shoe pinched.[3]

A little later news came from Cobham in France that projects were still afoot there to transport James overseas and that a conspiracy against Morton's person was hatching.[4] Walsingham placed this before the Queen and it had the effect of stirring her to some kind of action. She wrote a letter to Morton at once, asking his advice as to how she should proceed to prevent French practices in Scotland and assuring him that whatever course he advised would be taken. In conveying this to Bowes, Walsingham wrote at first that he dared 'adventure upon his honour' that Elizabeth was sincere, and would carry out her promises, but he apparently thought better of it before he dispatched the letter. In the letter he actually sent he contented himself with saying that 'she seemeth to be very earnestly bent to proceed with all celerity'. He had evidently decided that it was imprudent to stake his honour on such a doubtful risk.[5]

In view of the fact that Bowes had already, by Morton's advice,

[1] Ibid., p. 74.

[2] Ibid., p. 81. In a letter of the same date to Walsingham (ibid., p. 80) he said he thought a pension of £2,000 yearly to the King would solve the whole difficulty.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 440.

[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 295.

[5] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 454–5; *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 83.

outlined a plan for proceeding in Scotland, it can hardly be doubted that Elizabeth's purpose at this juncture was mainly to gain time. Morton had already lost faith in her and he refused to commit himself on paper to any advice. He sent word to Bowes, through Archibald Douglas, that he thought the letter was 'devised by his unfriend to draw him outward . . . which would work his overthrow', and he declared that he had already given his advice through Bowes himself. A pension of two thousand marks to the King and of five hundred pounds to Morton, Bowes added, was the only way out of the difficulty.[1]

But Walsingham could send him no comfort, so it is not surprising to discover that towards the end of July Morton was making advances to d'Aubigny. When Bowes protested, Morton said frankly that he had no choice, but he agreed to wait fourteen days before he actually committed himself. But the only reply which Elizabeth sent, and that came late, was a protest against Morton's suspicious attitude, written by Walsingham no doubt with a heavy heart. It naturally produced no result except to call forth from Morton a note of veiled sarcasm. 'He thought it meet', he said, 'that her Majesty and Council prolong such weighty causes till their own best time,' and he went about to make his peace with d'Aubigny. Bowes declared that the whole state was running headlong to the French course and that the plot to turn the friends of England out of power was about to be executed. He wrote furthermore that d'Aubigny was doing his best to get possession of Dumbarton, 'the gateway of France into Scotland'. The connexion between these two events appeared to him too obvious to need comment. Five days later he wrote again that d'Aubigny had seized the commander of Dumbarton and had forced him to give up the keys.[2]

The effect of this last news upon Elizabeth, Walsingham set forth in a letter to Leicester on the 31st of August:

'This matter', he wrote, 'hath awakened her Majesty who hereupon hath given order for Bowes' present repair into Scotland to deal both with the King and his Council for the stay thereof, as

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 85; not given in *Cal. Scottish*, although original is in Cotton MSS., Caligula C vi, f. 52.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 469, 470, 473, 476, 487; *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 103, 106.

also, in case the same cannot be stayed by persuasion, then to practice how it may be done by force, by giving assurance that the attempters thereof shall receive all assistance that her Majesty can yield. To which purpose the Lord of Hunsdon is commanded presently to repair to his charge, who shall receive before his departure authority and direction from hence to perform the promised assistance. But what will become of the matter, seeing it is reduced to so hard an issue as without violence it is not likely to be cured, I leave it to your Lordship's judgement.'[1]

Thus on the 31st of August; on the 1st of September Elizabeth, after having dispatched these instructions to Bowes, had a change of heart. She thought it better to avoid force and she bade Walsingham instruct Bowes not to resort to force without first consulting her.

'You may perceive', Walsingham added in a postscript, 'by this last resolution, in revoking some part of the former direction, how uncertain we are in the course of our doings. If I do not mistake it, the diseases of that realm would have no delayed remedies. Whilst you advertise hither what were fit to be done, the opportunity of doing it be lost. Besides some other causes, the uncertainty of our proceeding is not the least cause to stay me from assenting to that which the Earl Morton desireth. I am afraid that our unthankfulness towards God (which in . . . justice is to receive some severe punishment) will not suffer us to put off by timely prevention the approaching mischief that hastens towards us, which I fear are to receive their beginning from thence. *Nam ab aquilone nil nisi malum.* Be not hasty to promise much from hence, for we take no care to perform.'[2]

So Bowes was left, with no comfort, to make his bricks if he could without straw. He found remonstrance against d'Aubigny of no avail. Indeed, James would hear nothing against him save in his own presence, where Bowes refused to speak as contrary to his instructions. He still insisted that an open hand with the nobility was the only way out of the situation but Elizabeth was deaf to his appeals. The best she would do was to recommend that he should, 'as of himself', hint to the King that if

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C iii, f. 565; cf. also Walsingham to Bowes of same date in *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 109. Andrew Lang asserts (*History of Scotland*, ii. 268) that the intention was if d'Aubigny could not be kept from Dumbarton by remonstrance 'to try murder'. This is surely a rather extreme interpretation of the phrase 'by laying violent hands on the said Earl of Lennox [the new title of d'Aubigny], and his principal associates' which Lang quotes in support of his assertion.

[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 112.

he inclined too much towards d'Aubigny his rights to the crown of England might be cut off.[1] Walsingham wrote privately to Bowes on the 10th of September that Lord Hunsdon was going about to persuade the Queen that the policy of supporting Morton was a bad one, since Morton was so weak that it would be hard to make him strong enough to do any good. Walsingham himself was clearly not of this opinion, and he urged Bowes to frame his letters to meet Hunsdon's objection.[2]

The difference of opinion between Hunsdon and Walsingham on the Scottish question at this juncture marks the beginning of a division in the Privy Council on the subject, which became more marked as time went on. At the moment it was one of the chief difficulties in the way of any definite decision in regard to Scotland. The best advice that the Privy Council could send to Bowes on the 18th of September was to hold his present course, and so he did, with no results for about a month. Finally, early in October, he was recalled. There seems to have been some notion of sending Lord Hunsdon to Scotland in November to work against d'Aubigny and to strengthen Morton's party with some show of silver, but it was abandoned and Morton left to his fate.[3]

The blow fell on the very last day of the year. Morton was suddenly charged in the Council chamber with complicity in the murder of the King's father, and was committed to prison in Edinburgh Castle. D'Aubigny was of course the instigator, James Stewart (later Earl of Arran) the instrument. Bowes heard of the coup the very next day at Berwick, and at once informed Walsingham.[4] For once in her life Elizabeth acted promptly. On the 6th of January Thomas Randolph was dispatched to Scotland. He was instructed to protest vigorously against the imprisonment of Morton, and to encourage his friends with assurance of her assistance, to denounce d'Aubigny to the King, and to sow dissensions in his party. If these methods did not avail to restore Morton to favour, Randolph

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 497.

[2] Ibid., p. 499. 'Sept. 10, M. to Mr. Bowes.' Mr. Boyd in the *Scottish Calendar* attributed this letter to the Privy Council as a whole, but it is sufficiently evident from the nature of its contents that some one individual in a private capacity, most likely Walsingham, wrote it.

[3] Ibid., pp. 504, 510, 522–4, 541.

[4] Ibid., p. 569.

was then to summon English troops into Scotland to accomplish that end by force. At the same time she ordered the Earl of Huntingdon, President of the Council of the North, to levy twenty-five hundred troops and to lay them along the Scottish border, and she sent Hunsdon north to take command of them. So too she sent ships forth secretly to intercept messages from d'Aubigny to France.[1]

Randolph reached Edinburgh towards the end of January 1581. It is hardly necessary to follow the course of his negotiations there in detail. His attempts to discredit d'Aubigny with the King failed absolutely and his efforts to build up a party in support of Morton were little more successful. He found that Morton's enemies were many and that most of the nobility were glad to be rid of him. All he could be sure of were three, Angus, Mar, and Glencairn, and two of these were over young for leading forlorn hopes. Randolph in fact despaired of creating in Scotland an opposition to d'Aubigny strong enough to be effective. He came to the conclusion that the surest way to save Morton was to make terms with d'Aubigny himself and more than half believed that the man might be won to the side of England.[2] This opinion called down the following sharp remonstrance from Walsingham:

'I have received from my Lord Lieutenant the copy of your letter of the 26th of the last directed unto his Lordship, containing a report of your negotiation with the King and his Council in your second audience, wherewith, having made her Majesty acquainted, she seemed somewhat to *mislike* that you should so long *defer to deal for the enlarging of Morton*, but I made answer in your behalf that I thought you were directed by the advice of the said *Morton's friends* in the soliciting of that cause, who knew what time was fittest for you to take, to deal therein with most effect and best success. With which answer her Majesty did in the end rest very well satisfied touching that point. Your putting of us in hope that *d'Aubigny* might easily be won to be *at her Majesty's devotion* was at first interpreted to have been ironice (*sic*) spoken by you, but since it seemeth you insist upon it, I could wish you

[1] Ibid., pp. 572, 575, 584–6.

[2] Ibid., pp. 631–2. It is worth noticing that Randolph's view of the situation at this time is widely different from Froude's, who maintains that 'all the Protestants in Scotland, peers and commons, were ready to take arms when the first English soldier had stepped out from Berwick upon Scottish soil' (Froude, *History of England*, xi. 310).

were either otherwise persuaded of the man or at least kept that opinion to yourself. For considering the end and purpose of his coming into Scotland, as may be many ways sufficiently proved, was only to advance the Queen's liberty and reception into that government, to overthrow religion and *to procure a foreign match with the King of Scots*, wherein the enclosed copy which you may read to good purpose there shall presently give you some light, there is no man here can be persuaded that he *will change his purpose for so small advantage* as he is likely to find by it, and therefore you shall do well to forbear to harp any more upon that string, as I have already written unto you.'[1]

Yet Walsingham himself confessed that the situation looked little short of desperate.[2]

Randolph presently reached the conclusion that since Walsingham would not hear of an attempt to win d'Aubigny, the best course was to come to some agreement with the Scottish King upon the matter at issue through the medium of commissioners to be appointed ostensibly for border causes. Invasion from England with the forces now gathered under Hunsdon along the border he absolutely opposed. They would find no party to co-operate with them in Scotland. They would not be strong enough to subdue the nation. The best they could accomplish would be to harry the border country, drive the King into Argyll or perhaps to France, and alienate the people.[3]

Lord Hunsdon, however, held a different opinion. He had begun to dabble in Scottish affairs at Berwick, and had conferred many times with the notorious Archibald Douglas, who found Berwick a safer place than Scotland at this juncture. Douglas succeeded in convincing him that the chances of organizing a party in Morton's favour in Scotland were much brighter than Randolph made them out to be.[4] Hunsdon furthermore

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vi, f. 112, passages in italics in cipher in the original. [2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 650. [3] Ibid., pp. 623, 653.

[4] Ibid., pp. 629, 655, 657, 661. Bowes was of Hunsdon's opinion (ibid., p. 643), but Randolph told Walsingham that Bowes also was getting his information from A. Douglas (ibid., p. 655). On 13 March 1580/1 Randolph wrote to the Earl of Huntingdon, 'Hunsdon lieth so in my way that nothing can escape him. All matters are sounded there by Archibald Douglas that no way will serve but open war, against which I am all that I can except the ground were better than I see' (B.M. Harl. MSS. 6999, f. 79). This letter is given in Boyd's *Calendar*, but the passage just quoted is omitted. Randolph wrote several important letters to Walsingham at this time, partly in cipher, which are very imperfectly given in Boyd's *Scottish Calendar*. He wrote, for instance, to Walsingham on 23 February 1580/1, 'I have spoken with *20 since I came that I am sure neither*

considered that the policy of making terms with the Scottish King was dishonourable to the Queen after the stand she had taken, and that a meeting of commissioners would serve no good purpose, but merely give d'Aubigny time to procure assistance from abroad. He accordingly advised armed co-operation with Morton's friends, insisting that they were far stronger and far better organized than Randolph believed.[1]

Between these two opinions, both of which were urged with great assurance, the English government found it rather difficult to define a policy towards Scotland. Elizabeth inevitably preferred the more peaceful and the cheaper course. Randolph's arguments were in consequence very much to her liking, and Hunsdon's efforts to discredit him failed utterly.[2] Some hint came from the north, probably through Douglas, of a project on foot to seize the person of the young King and lay violent hands upon d'Aubigny. How far Randolph was involved in this is not clear. He wrote to Huntingdon in March that he would have no hand in a murder plot, but thought some good might be accomplished if Morton's friends could get hold of the person of young James.[3] Elizabeth bent an indulgent ear to

trusteth me nor I him. I would be loath to all that hath been written to you by some that think *to see far into* this state and yet have been *as far and as oft deceived as* another. Where Stratiotes [Hunsdon] *writeth that* Agesilas, duplum, colens, polaphos *boye* ostraces crestus rupes saxific *will join* with *Angus* I wish it so but I doubt thereof as yet, though I know a great part of their minds, *having dealt with them all.* Crestus *excepted, marry this* I believe that *if her Majesty had a force in the field of six or seven thousand* I think that *many would then take part* which now *make it dainty and dangerous,* not so much as *that I can fasten any of her Majesty's liberality* upon them, which I would be lothe *to cast away without some show of desert.* Of *Angus* duplum, *I have no doubt, yet being both well advised by their friends* cast (?) many dangers in *so doubtful matters* as are *now in hand.* . . . Her Majesty hath good cause *to think well* of *Angus and duplum, both worthy young gentlemen of great* expectation. . . . Your advice of the third, *seeing* Empedocles [Morton's] *danger, to attempt force rather than to temporize* must attend *what this assembly will bring forth.* And whereas you *think so* [King of Scots] *cannot be transported for want of ships* and *season of the year* there are *two* Scots *ships lying at the haven mouth* of phelomicia *that came with wine but stayed I know not why.* And yet I am of your honour's opinion that Millenarius [King of Scots] *transporting shall be the last.* There is already a *cipher between* Stratiotes [Hunsdon] *and me.* Let not my Lords [of the Council] or your honour *muse why Angus* and duplum *are come to the assembly* for it is *not done without good advice and to good purpose* (Harl. MSS. 6999, f. 62). The passages italicized I have deciphered. Some of the proper names I have not been able to decipher. Explanations in square brackets are conjectural.

[1] *Cal. Scottish,* 1574–81, pp. 652, 657, 661, 673.

[2] Bedford wrote to Randolph that this was chiefly due to the efforts of Walsingham and Leicester. *Cal. Scottish,* 1574–81, p. 639.

[3] *Cal. Scottish,* 1574–81, p. 654.

indirect practices of this sort. Walsingham wrote to Huntingdon on the 15th of March: 'She misliketh that any violence should be offered to the King's person, though it be void of any meaning to hurt him. She can be content that d'Aubigny should be surprised, so that it might be executed when he shall be found divided from the King.'[1] Whether this should be interpreted to mean that Elizabeth actually would connive at the murder of d'Aubigny is difficult to say. The word 'surprise' has many meanings.

Walsingham, however, and the Privy Council at large, were in favour of a bolder course, and preferred the councils of Hunsdon before those of Randolph. On the 18th of March 1581 Walsingham wrote to Randolph:

'Her Majesty, finding by your late letters that you do rather incline to a composition by mediation of commissioners than to recur to martial courses by employing of forces (being persuaded as you are that her Majesty shall find no great party there), her pleasure therefore is that you should set down your opinion what good were like to ensue by the conference required both in the King's answers to you and in his letters directed to her Majesty, for it seemeth very unlikely that a conference with Commissioners (especially being chosen by the advice of d'Aubigny) shall be able to prevail more to the effect you were sent for than the persuasion you delivered to the King himself and to his nobility and Council, as well by speech as by writing. And therefore, seeing there is little hope that any such meeting will do good, which cannot be performed without some good charges, it was found expedient to stay resolution therein till your opinion were known (who in respect of your late dealing with them, can best judge what is to be hoped for). By perusing of the answer and the King's letters lately sent, we gather that the chief cause of the meeting should tend to the redressing of the griefs of the borders, a matter of small importance considering in what terms we stand otherwise with them. And therefore, if other fruits were not likely to follow thereof, then were it better it were forborne, for that it cannot but breed both dishonour and charges.

'Such of her Majesty's Council as have been made acquainted with the cause, seeing no likelihood that d'Aubigny should ever be won to be at her Majesty's devotion, especially considering how her Majesty hath of late sought every manner of way to disgrace him, and finding by many probabilities that his intent is to match the King either with Spain or some other of those

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 661.

princes that are not the best affected to this crown, whose assistance, joined with those that are aliened from us in that realm, cannot in time to come but be most perilous to her Majesty, when the quarrel will be not for matters of border but for the right of this crown, are therefore of opinion that it were better for us to deal with them now, being weak, having neither money nor munitions, than to attend the fruit of their malice when they shall be assisted by the arm of both Spain and France, besides a party it is to be doubted will be found here.

'But hereunto it may be objected that her Majesty can take no honorable ground to enter into quarrel with a prince for calling about him a nobleman, his near kinsman, whom by birth and blood he is bound to love. This thing being nakedly looked into, without due consideration of circumstances, may seem very hard, but if the King's years be considered, the dangerous course that d'Aubigny hath led him into by causing him to proceed in such a dishonourable sort with a person of the Earl of Morton's quality and desert towards him, and the contempt that is had of her Majesty's great benefits bestowed upon him and his realm (a matter proceeding from d'Aubigny's advice), it will then appear (the intent of her Majesty's using of forces tending nothing to the King's prejudice but to remove from his person so dangerous an instrument) to those that are not carried away by passion, that her Majesty doth deal both honourably and providently.

'It may be farther objected that the King, in case the realm should be invaded, would either retire himself into Argyll, or else repair into France or Spain. For his repairing into Argyll, it is perhaps so that if her Majesty's forces were entered into the country with those only that are partly lying on the borders; but five or six thousand more, and the intent of their coming being made known to tend to no other end but for the good of the King, as was above noted, it is not to be doubted but the greatest part of the realm would join and concur with her Majesty in so honourable and necessary an action, whereby d'Aubigny shall be reduced to that extremity as he shall be forced by way of composition to yield to his return into France.

'And as touching the King's passing over the seas, it is thought that, d'Aubigny only excepted, few of the rest of the nobility that are of that party will ever assent thereunto, and if they did, yet considering the manifest danger that her Majesty were like to throw herself into, for the considerations above mentioned, it is thought more expedient that the same should be hazarded than to suffer him still to continue about him. This much of our disposition I thought good to acquaint you withal, to the end you may the better know how to frame the advice you are to yield therein, which I wish to be contained in your own letters to her

Majesty, who hath willed me to assure you that she doth very well allow of your service.'[1]

But Elizabeth was not convinced. She wanted to hear more of Randolph's alluring alternative. While she lingered, the conspiracy of Angus and his party was discovered, and the opportunity of effective intervention in their support was lost. Randolph wrote to Hunsdon on the 20th of March: 'Whatsoever we intended by my Lord of Angus is discovered through the voluntary confession of the Laird of Whittingham . . . The enterprise should have been (as they say) to have taken the house where the King lieth by forced keys and intelligence of some within, to have slain the Earl of Lennox [d'Aubigny], Montrose, and Argyll, and to have possessed themselves of the King, to have sent him into England . . . He [Whittingham] has also confessed that he was here with the Earl of Angus at my lodgings, and what passed between us.'[2] It is not clear from Randolph's letter whether or not he was a party to such a plot as Whittingham described. At all events when the news was out, Scotland soon became too hot to hold him. His house was watched, his servants followed. Placards were posted on his door and shots were fired through his study window. He thought it prudent to retire to Berwick.[3]

Elizabeth's course was even more fluctuating than usual at this juncture. Walsingham wrote to Hunsdon on the 31st of March: 'The state of Scotland, as appeareth by your last letters, may well be resembled to a diseased body, that one day yieldeth hope of life, and another utter despair of recovery. Sometimes it seemeth to stand upon indifferent terms, which minister comfort of redress, though the inward disease have much weakened it, at other times it appeareth most desperate and not to be cured without desperate remedies. And the state of that so sore diseased body is not so perplexed by breeding doubtful cogitations as we are here irresolute which way to take.'[4] On the 26th of March Elizabeth instructed Randolph to arrange with the Scottish King for the appointment of commissioners to settle the matters in dispute.[5] Five days later

[1] Harl. MSS. 6999, f. 87.
[2] Ibid., f. 100.
[3] Calderwood, iii. 507. Calderwood gives the placard in full.
[4] Harl. MSS. 6999, f. 140 b.
[5] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 681.

she drew up orders for Hunsdon and Huntingdon to cross the border in force.[1] Four days after that she instructed Hunsdon to discharge all her forces except five hundred men.[2] This last step was taken despite the advice of Walsingham and the rest of the Privy Council. Walsingham wrote to Hunsdon on the 10th of April :

'Their Lordships [of the Council], finding it very dangerous to have d'Aubigny suffered to run on his intent course without stay or impeachment and being led to think that he would not have entered into so extraordinary a kind of dealing unless he stood in some expectation and hope of timely maintenance from foreign parts, which were better prevented than let come on, found it in counsel best for her Majesty to have nine or ten thousand men put in readiness to be entered into that realm for the removing of the said d'Aubigny from thence, upon the first occasion offered. Which resolution, being reported to her Majesty, she liked not of it by reason of the charges that of necessity must needs ensue. Her Highness disposition standing thus, your Lordship may conceive what may follow of these actions intended there.'[3]

Later on the same day Walsingham wrote again to Hunsdon : 'Since the closing up of my former, I received order from her Majesty, in the presence of my Lords of the Council, to be given your Lordship for the discharge of the five hundred also (which before you were appointed to be reserved), unless your Lordship see great reason for the stay of them. And thus, giving your Lordship a view of our good husbandry, I humbly take my leave.'[4]

[1] Ibid., p. 689. This is a draft of instructions. It is not certain that they were sent.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 3.

[3] Harl. MSS. 6999, f. 165.

[4] Ibid., f. 166. The correspondence of Castelnau de la Mauvissière, French ambassador at London, contains some interesting notes on the English attitude towards Scotland at this juncture. He wrote on the 10th February 1581 that he had just protested to Burghley against the armed intervention of England in Scottish affairs, who had declared to him that England had no desire to intervene, that d'Aubigny was entirely devoted to Spain, and that a project had been discovered to transport the young King of Scotland to Spain. Later Castelnau had an interview with Elizabeth in which she said that she was very well content with the bearing of the French towards Scotland and emphasized the Spanish danger (Teulet, *op. cit.* iii. 87–98). Castelnau wrote again, 28th February, that he had heard of a project on foot to marry James VI to one of the daughters of Lord Hunsdon, or at any rate to find him a bride in England (ibid. iii, p. 100). On the 9th of April he wrote again that he thought he had gained the point that Elizabeth would let justice take its course against Morton and would make no further attempts to have d'Aubigny driven

To put the matter plainly, Elizabeth decided to leave the Scots to their own evil devices. She discovered that she could not achieve her ends by practice, and she flatly refused to fight.

D'Aubigny and his clever coadjutor, Captain James Stewart, having successfully defied her, proceeded at once to dispose of her accomplice. On the 1st of June Morton was brought to trial, charged with complicity in the murder of the King's father. He was convicted, probably justly, though he was booked to die in any case. As Froude remarks, he had an edifying end. Possibly, had Elizabeth acted in time, she might have saved him. It is, however, absurd to make him out, as Froude virtually does, a martyr to her interests. He had never been popular among the nobles, and he alienated the clergy by his rapacity and the precocious young James by his forbidding ways. Consequently he fell an easy victim to the more ingratiating methods of his clever French rival. Even Randolph, the ablest of all English intriguers in Scotland, could not, by hook or crook, find him enough supporters to give him a fighting chance. Elizabeth might have consented to join forces with any respectable number of his adherents. She was not prepared to fight the whole Scottish nation on his behalf. Yet by his death she lost a strong and useful friend. Never again was Scotland so completely at her beck and call as it had been during Morton's tenure of power.

For almost a year after Morton's death, diplomatic relations between England and Scotland were practically broken. D'Aubigny dominated Scottish politics, and, as Walsingham put it, England's postern gate stood wide open to the malice of her enemies. In view of the fact that the Jesuits were invading England in force, and that every post from the Continent brought fresh evidence of the hostile intentions of the Roman Catholic powers, it became more and more imperative for Elizabeth to re-establish her influence in the north. This task was rendered more difficult by the closing of the ordinary channels of intercourse. After what had passed, and since she refused a passport to James's envoy, Lord Seaton, she could scarcely venture to send an accredited representative to Scotland, and unofficial agents

from Scotland (Teulet, *op. cit.* iii, p. 102). It is quite certain that Spain was interesting herself in Scotland at this juncture, and that Mary Stuart herself was conspiring to have her son carried to Spain (ibid. v, *passim*, particularly p. 222).

received scant courtesy. One whom Lord Scrope, Warden of the West Marshes, sent at Walsingham's suggestion was shot at twice and imprisoned in the bargain.[1]

In the early summer of 1581, if Mendoza, the Spanish Ambassador in London, is to be believed, Elizabeth played with the notion of building up a party in Scotland around the Hamiltons. She approached Lord Claude Hamilton, who was still in England, on the subject early in May; but nothing appears to have come of it, although both Lord Claude and his brother, Lord Arbroath, in Paris, became her pensioners.[2]

A more promising opening appeared to be offered by the increasing power of Captain James Stewart, now Earl of Arran. From being the right-hand man of d'Aubigny, Arran bade fair to become d'Aubigny's rival. This promised well for England, and Elizabeth at once sought occasion to widen the breach between her enemies. The Earl of Leicester supplied her with one. He had been, no doubt with her connivance, corresponding unofficially with d'Aubigny during the summer. It is possible that Roger Ashton or Aston, a member of the King's household, carried the letters between them. At all events, under some cover or other, Aston managed to travel pretty freely between England and Scotland during the summer months.[3] He was clearly acting in Leicester's employ. He seems to have been something better than a spy. If Mendoza is to be believed, he was working underhand among the Scottish lords to build up an English party.[4] From his reports Elizabeth gathered that Arran was determined to oppose Lennox's efforts in favour of Mary Stuart and Roman Catholicism, and to that end had begun to organize a party among the Protestant nobility.[5] This encouraged the Queen to go forward a step farther in the matter. Late in October she dispatched Captain Errington to Scotland,

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 34.

[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 108; *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 162.

[3] Sir John Selby seems to have been his furtherer at Berwick, *Cal. Border Papers*, i, pp. 72–3, 78.

[4] Mendoza says that Ashton was a confidential servant of King James, who had been sent to him by his grandmother, the Countess of Lennox, that he was arrested in June 1581 for sending letters to Lord Hunsdon at Berwick (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 124). This must have been the same Ashton who was supplying Leicester with news, for Burghley speaks of him as 'my Lady of Lennox's servant' (Digges, p. 412), cf. also *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 216.

[5] Digges, pp. 359, 412.

ostensibly to protest against the King's dealings with his mother and with France, actually to widen the breach between Lennox and Arran, and to win the latter to the support of England.[1] This device, however, failed for the simple reason that Errington was refused his passport by the Scots.

Walsingham himself took no part in these intrigues. He spent the summer in France trying in vain to negotiate an Anglo-French alliance. The failure of these negotiations naturally increased somewhat the chances of a rapprochement between France and Scotland. Walsingham himself saw evidences of grave danger from that quarter. On the 3rd of September he wrote to Burghley from Paris :

'The Duke of Guise is of late crept into very inward credit with the King, which ought to move her Majesty to be more careful of the matters of Scotland, for that there are daily consultations in the Duke's house, especially since advertisements are come hither out of Scotland that the King doth submit himself to any such direction as his mother shall give him, even so far forth as the yielding up of the government to her if she shall think it meet. . . . I find confirmed by divers that a general hope is conceived of alteration of religion in that realm ere a year come about, in furtherance whereof they promise to themselves great support, both from the Pope and Spain. And yet have we neither power to provide Scotland, nor to prevent that the greatness of Spain may no way hurt us. Yea, rather such as have been persuaders both in the one and the other have reaped, instead of thanks, displeasure.'[2]

During Walsingham's sojourn in France he conferred with Lord Arbroath, the head of the house of Hamilton, for whom he had already been instrumental in securing a pension from the Queen.[3] The purpose of this conference was to make sure that Hamilton was not playing against English interests. The result of it was that Hamilton got Walsingham's promise that the pension should be increased.[4]

Of even greater significance were Walsingham's dealings in

[1] Capt. Errington's public instructions have not been preserved. Mendoza gives an outline of them in *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 207. His private instructions are in *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 60.

[2] Digges, p. 428; cf. also *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 299. A correspondent in Scotland thought that Walsingham's presence in France had the effect of checking communications between France and Scotland (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 55).

[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 205–6.

[4] Ibid., p. 661.

Paris with Archibald Douglas. It is not quite clear what brought Douglas to Paris. He told Mary Stuart's agents that he had come to seek the French King's intervention in behalf of the exiled Earl of Angus,[1] but it was probably at Walsingham's instigation that he undertook to spy upon the doings of his relative, George Douglas, dispatched by the King of Scotland to France in the late summer to negotiate for a revival of the Franco-Scottish alliance.[2] Some way or other Archibald succeeded in getting sight of George's dispatches. Late in September he sent a report of them to Walsingham, which gave him a pretty clear idea as to what James and his favourite and his mother were all about.[3] These dispatches made it manifest that James was seeking his mother's intervention to secure the recognition of his title by the King of France, that Mary was proposing instead a deed of association which should acknowledge James's title as proceeding from herself, and that d'Aubigny was opposed to such a plan because it would involve acknowledging that the King had been unlawfully crowned, and would call in question the validity of his acts.

This information, which came into Walsingham's hands not long after his return from France, suggested to him that he might by adroit management get from Mary herself further information as to the dealings between Scotland and France. To his mistress the evidence of a disagreement between Mary and d'Aubigny, which was confirmed by intercepted letters,[4] revealed the possibility of playing the King's mother against his favourite. A request from Mary in October for permission to send a messenger to Scotland to confer with her son with

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 50. Upon Douglas's departure from Paris Cobham wrote to Walsingham that the reason for his going was his desire 'to confer with the Earl of Anguysshe' (*Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 336). But this is not to be taken too seriously. It may have been thought prudent for him in his letters to Walsingham to maintain that idea. For Mary Stuart's attitude towards Douglas, cf. Labanoff, *Lettres de Marie Stuart*, v. 261.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, pp. 323, 328. Douglas left Paris 8 October (ibid., p. 336) and returned to England. Cobham was much impressed by his ability (ibid.).

[3] The letter from Paris in *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 47, is obviously from Douglas and pretty clearly to Walsingham. It must be misdated. Although it is endorsed 9 September 1580, it refers to events in Paris of 17 September 1581. It probably belongs near the end of September 1581.

[4] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 97. Perhaps the letter referred to as having been intercepted is that printed in Labanoff, v. 258–9.

respect to his title, furnished a convenient opening.[1] So it was that early in November Robert Beale, Walsingham's brother-in-law, was dispatched to the royal prisoner at Sheffield. It appears that his business there was twofold: first, to get all the information from Mary that he could; second, to discuss with her the possibility of an agreement between the two queens for arranging matters in Scotland to their mutual satisfaction. Mary herself said afterwards that Beale had proposed that she should co-operate with the English to overthrow d'Aubigny through the instrumentality of Angus and the Hamiltons, in return for which she was to have her liberty.[2] Beale's account of his mission rather hints that this suggestion emanated from her.[3] At all events Mary offered to do anything and promise anything in return for even a moderate amount of freedom. It is clear that she was not deceived as to Elizabeth's motives in befriending her, and meant to over-reach her rival if she could, but she played her game skilfully and succeeded in persuading Beale at least that she might be of service.[4] Upon his return to court he found his mistress deep in love play with Alençon, so the matter was dropped for the time, to be revived again for a little while the following spring. Walsingham himself was clearly not deceived by Mary's fair speeches. The burden of his advice was that Mary should be more closely confined.[5] He was indeed urging her removal from Shrewsbury's care for greater security, but Elizabeth, although very wary, was encouraged to persist. Possibly her desire to conciliate France at this juncture had something to do with shaping her course. The net result was that although Mary conceded nothing of any value she gained somewhat larger liberty and was enabled to conspire with rather greater ease.

After the failure of Captain Errington's mission in October 1581, Elizabeth left Scotland to its own devices, and there is very little evidence of any intermeddling there on her part for over half a year. Her enemies were more alert. In the autumn

[1] Labanoff, v. 266.
[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 257.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 86.
[4] Ibid., p. 88.
[5] There is a paper in the Public Record Office (S. P. Mary Q. of Scots, xi, no. 74) in which Walsingham argues for a resumption of negotiations with Mary. It ought to be noted that this paper in the original is undated. Mr. Boyd (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 106) confidently ascribes it to 1581 without even intimating that the date he places on it is a conjectural one.

of 1581 the Jesuits, already in force in England, determined to invade Scotland. Probably some time in September, through the instrumentality of Father Parsons and with the knowledge and assent of Mendoza and some of the prominent English Catholics, William Watts, an English (or perhaps Welsh) Jesuit, was dispatched into Scotland. After conference with Lord Seaton and other Scottish Catholic noblemen and an interview with the young King, Watts reported that the prospects of winning Scotland to the old faith were fair. Whereupon a second Jesuit, Father Holt, was sent to co-operate with him, and early in the following year two Scottish Jesuits, Creighton and Hay. Whatever these priests did as missionaries is quite overshadowed by their political intrigues. They became in fact active promoters of a plot to invade England with foreign armies from the north, to depose Elizabeth and to put Mary Stuart in her place.[1] Walsingham did not apparently get wind of this plot until the middle of the next year, but the presence of the Jesuits in Scotland was in itself sufficiently disquieting.[2]

Other news which he had from Scotland during the latter part of the year 1581 was no more reassuring. He learned that Lennox and Arran had patched up their quarrel and were as thick as thieves, and that the King was so in love with Lennox 'that he can hardly suffer him out of his presence'.[3] In the spring there was much talk, too, of the King's falling off in religion, and of projects to convey him to France. And there was no doubt that gunpowder in large quantities was being imported from abroad and stored at Dumbarton.[4]

Walsingham himself was acutely sensible of the dangerous instability of the situation in Scotland, but he failed signally in his attempts to impress it upon the Queen. One of the most important considerations, to his reckoning, was the disposal of the young King's hand in marriage. If James married in France, as his mother had done before him, all the benefits of twenty

[1] Kretschmar, *Invasionsprojeckte*, &c., pp. 61 ff.; cf. also *Edinburgh Review*, clxxxvii. 319–42; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 349 ff.

[2] *Cal. Border Papers*, i, pp. 28, 85; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 42; *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 464; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 351.

[3] *Cal. Border Papers*, i, p. 82.

[4] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 126–8; *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 440.

years' intrigue and fighting might be lost at a blow. In March the English party in Scotland sent a special envoy to Elizabeth to urge her to promote a match between young James and a royal Danish princess. Walsingham lent this project his warm support and argued strongly in its favour to his mistress, but he could get no further satisfaction than to be told not to bother her about the wedding of the boy 'before he was out of his shell'.[1] He also urged Elizabeth to deal with the Scottish nobles liberally as the surest way to countercheck French intrigue. She was still in no mood for spending. 'All remedies are rejected', Walsingham wrote to Cobham early in June, 'and found unpleasant that bring any charge with them, providence is esteemed but prodigality and necessity is here President of the Council.'[2] And yet Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador at London, kept writing to his master through the spring of 1582 that Walsingham and Leicester had great plots afoot in Scotland to get possession of the young King, and that they were sending money over the border to that end.[3] Probably Walsingham contrived to do something to encourage the English party in the north, but it is not likely that much English gold went over the border.

There were two groups among the Scots accessible to Elizabeth at this juncture, the House of Douglas and the preachers. The Earl of Angus, a refugee in England, was doing his best to stir up the former; Lennox contrived, by his behaviour, to arouse the fighting spirit of the latter. John Durie, minister at Edinburgh, learned in January of the traffic between James, his mother and the Duke of Guise, and denounced it in the open pulpit.[4] This was the beginning of an open attack by the preachers upon Lennox and his devices, which grew hotter as the year proceeded. Upon the question of excommunicating his tulchan Bishop of Glasgow, Robert Montgomery, they defied the favourite to his teeth. Early in July they presented to the King a list of complaints against his attitude towards the Church and his 'hand shakings' with the 'bloody murtherers and persecutors of the people of God'. When Arran asked 'with a thrown counte-

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 320.
[2] S. P. France, vii, f. 193.
[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 320, 352, 388, 395–7, 400.
[4] Calderwood, iii. 594.

nance' who dared subscribe the treasonable articles, Andrew Melville answered at once, 'We dare, and will subscribe them and render our lives in the cause.' Whereupon he seized the pen from the clerk and put down his name, and those who attended him did the like. Calderwood says that this speech frightened both Arran and Lennox. Montgomery, Lennox's protégé, having shown himself in Edinburgh, was hounded out of the town by the populace.[1] It was clear enough that the preachers had the burghers behind them.

All this was distinctly favourable to Elizabeth. Roger Aston, Leicester's agent in Scotland, wrote early in July that matters there were in very encouraging shape. Angus, he found, had more friends than ever; the ministers 'never prayed faster' for England.[2] A little later Walsingham heard from Sir Henry Woodryngton, his correspondent at Berwick, that the opponents of Lennox had begun to organize.[3] Late in July Angus decided that the time had come to strike. He went to Elizabeth with a concrete offer to overthrow Lennox upon condition that she would pledge herself to give four thousand crowns to every earl and two thousand crowns to every baron that took up arms against him. There can be little doubt that Angus was acting at Walsingham's instigation, or at least with his approval. Walsingham certainly befriended him, even loaned him money.[4] Elizabeth apparently was unwilling to pledge herself, but she made some verbal promises which encouraged Angus to proceed.[5]

[1] Ibid., pp. 630, 631.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 138.

[3] Mendoza was of the opinion that this was being accomplished with English gold. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 396.

[4] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 246, 316.

[5] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 387–8. Mauvissière wrote on 26 July (the day after Mendoza's letter, just cited) giving a somewhat different account of the transaction between Angus and Elizabeth. He wrote that Angus had promised to enter Scotland and stir up civil war there if Elizabeth would assist him, and that he demanded in case of failure that she would receive him and his partisans into England and give £10,000 to be distributed among the ten earls who were to support him. Mauvissière wrote further that Elizabeth had given Angus general promises of friendship and had granted him £1,000 in pension and £4,000 to go to the frontier and prepare his enterprise. Finally Mauvissière said that he had found means to warn Lennox (Teulet, *op. cit.* iii, p. 127; cf. on the last point the confession of George Douglas in *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 167). Since one must choose between the accounts of Mendoza and Mauvissière, it seems likely that Mendoza was the better informed. He usually was.

The outcome was the raid of Ruthven. Walsingham himself seems to have given the signal for the enterprise. He heard from Paris early in August that Lennox had discovered the conspiracy against him and was preparing to thwart it by bringing the leaders to judgement.[1] On the 7th of August Walsingham sent news of this discovery to Bowes and bade him warn the conspirators.[2] Bowes did so. They thought it expedient to act quickly. Accordingly they descended upon the young King suddenly at Perth, when both Lennox and Arran were absent from him, and led him either by persuasion or force to the neighbouring castle of Ruthven. Gowrie, Mar, and Lindsay were the most conspicuous actors in the conspiracy, although Bowes said later that 'the chief device and execution had come from meaner persons well affected to her Majesty and the cause'.[3]

After the conspirators got James in their hands, their problem was to secure Lennox and Arran from doing further harm. Arran they got easily. Lennox made some show of fight, went to Edinburgh, and began to gather his adherents about him. Had he been bold and ready, he might have recovered his position by a sudden counter-stroke. As it was, he lingered in the town, venting his wrath upon his beard, while the citizens marched under his windows, singing the 124th Psalm, 'in four parts', to lead back again the ministers whom he had driven forth.[4]

Walsingham was at first disposed to believe that the Ruthven raid had successfully accomplished its purpose and that Lennox

[1] Cobham to Walsingham, August, 1582. *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 209. Cobham heard the news from Lord Abroath.

[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 176–8. Walsingham wrote to Cobham, 31 August 1582: 'The discovery of some meaning that there should be to seize certain of the nobility there, whereof you have been advertised by a nobleman, I judge was the cause of the hastening of the execution of this enterprise.' S. P. France, viii, f. 78.

[3] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 199. The statement which Mendoza made (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 400) and Andrew Lang has accepted that there was an English plot brewing at this time to murder James and his mother and to establish the claims of the Earl of Huntingdon to the succession rests upon a very flimsy foundation. Gowrie's confirmation of it (Spottiswood, ii. 312, cited by Lang) is not at all obvious, and Mary Stuart's belief in it, probably derived from the same sources as Mendoza's or from Mendoza himself, is neither surprising nor convincing. Huntingdon himself expressed his opposition to any scheme of assassination in unmistakable terms. (*Cal. Scottish* 1574–81, p. 672.)

[4] Calderwood, iii. 646–7; cf. also *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 183.

and his coadjutor were past the doing of further harm. He wrote on the 31st of August to Cobham at Paris: 'Archibald Douglas, whom you know as a man of good judgement, telleth me that the Duke [Lennox] is not likely to find any great party in this action for that both he and Arran are generally so hated in Scotland that few will adventure themselves to take their part. So that we have now, I hope, little cause to fear any danger or inconvenience to grow from thence.' [1]

In any case it was obvious that Elizabeth must take some action in the matter. She accordingly dispatched two ambassadors to Scotland at once, Sir George Carey, eldest son of Lord Hunsdon, and Sir Robert Bowes.[2] They were instructed to express to the young King her constant care for his welfare. They were to convey to Ruthven and his fellows her approval of their action, decently veiled in some formal disapproval of their methods.[3] Above all, they were to urge that both Lennox and Arran should be vigorously dealt with, her intention being that they should be promptly tried, convicted, and dispatched as high traitors.[4] But upon the one essential point in all traffic with Scotland Elizabeth gave no definite instructions. She said nothing of money or pensions. Even Carey, inexpert as he was in Scottish diplomacy, declared that he thought 'a few bare words often promised before' would avail little. Bowes declared that all the benefits of the raid would be lost unless the Queen loosened her purse-strings.[5]

After the ambassadors had reached Scotland and had had time to consider the situation there with some care, they came to the conclusion that Lennox was still much stronger and his opponents a good deal weaker than Walsingham had been led to suppose.[6] Bowes confessed that he was in grave doubt about the outcome. He found the King still constant in his affections toward his favourite, Lennox himself free, and his friends ready and eager to strike in his behalf. On the other hand, Ruthven's party was not compact, his supporters found

[1] S. P. France, viii, f. 78.
[2] Thomas Randolph was anxious to go, but was not sent. *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 155.
[3] Ibid., p. 154.
[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 354; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 160.
[5] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 158; *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 187–8.
[6] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 158.

constant service at court expensive, and many of them were beginning to fall away. Bowes thought the situation might be saved by prompt liberality, but his experience with Elizabeth in the past put him out of hope of that remedy.[1]

Carey returned from Scotland at the end of September, leaving Bowes behind him to face the problem of keeping the Ruthven raiders together and getting rid of Lennox. He found Ruthven and his fellows careless in the extreme, and he more than half suspected that some of them were planning treachery. Of them all he thought Mar and Glamis alone were to be trusted. The rest could only be made reasonably sure of by purchase. Again and again he urged Elizabeth to be generous in time. 'I lament much', he wrote to Walsingham on the 17th of October, 'to behold such untimely sparing in causes, and when most bounty ought to be employed, to purchase the fruit that might yield best surety for her Majesty's quiet estate, and avoid excess of expenses in times coming. I am inwardly afraid that God's determinate judgement will not suffer us to repair the ruins in our house before it fall upon our heads, and that this present husbandry shall at length be found like the houswifery of Calais.'[2] For the rest of the year Bowes kept harping on this string.

No doubt Walsingham, whose letters to Bowes at this juncture are unfortunately wanting, re-echoed his own sentiments into the ears of the Queen. He was quite desperate about the matter and wrote to Burghley that he took little comfort from the promised envoys from Scotland, 'for the doubt I have they shall be returned home with little satisfaction which may breed an unrecoverable alienation.'[3] He agreed with Bowes that the situation in Scotland was too unstable to endure, and he remarked to one of his colleagues in the Council that the Ruthven raiders would either poison the young King or he would escape and bring them all to the block. Mendoza wrote to his Spanish master from London that the conspirators in Scotland were largely outnumbered by their opponents, and that the only reason why Lennox's friends did not strike was for fear that Ruthven's party would kill the King in desperation.[4]

To add to the dangers of the situation, the King of France

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 186.
[2] Ibid., p. 209.
[3] Cotton MSS., Caligula C, vii, f. 72.
[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 408.

decided late in October to send an ambassador to Scotland. Cobham reported on the 27th of October that the Guises had about decided to send the Marquis de Mayneville, an earnest Papist, but that the King had opposed the plan. Towards the end of the month, however, Henry III did decide to send over La Mothe Fénélon, a milder man, and a far more astute one.[1]

Fénélon left Paris on the 15th of November and arrived in London on the 18th.[2] Elizabeth, when she first heard of his coming, had decided not to allow him to go to Scotland,[3] but she changed her tactics somewhat after his arrival. She sought to dissuade him from going, but did not forbid him to go. Her main object apparently was to prevent him from arriving in Scotland before the Duke of Lennox had left. Various pretexts were devised to that end. She made use of the eternal marriage negotiations with Alençon to detain him, and sent Walsingham to him to declare that she meant to marry and that he might remain until the match was concluded.[4] So she contrived to retard him for over a fortnight. Finally he told her flatly that if she did not give him a passport for Scotland, he would leave at once for France. She thereupon conceded the passport and told off William Davison to accompany him north; but Walsingham instructed Davison to impede his progress in every possible way, and the consequence was that he did not get on the road until late in December.[5]

Meanwhile Bowes was working equally hard in Scotland to hasten Lennox's departure. Elizabeth sent a passport for him to leave through England, and Bowes gave it to the King on the last day of November. Three days later he was instrumental in preventing a plot arranged by some of the friends of Lennox for the seizing of the King, and a few days after that, induced James to refuse Lennox's petition for twenty days more of grace. On the 14th of December, however, Lennox was still in Scotland, and Bowes was not at all sure that he could be got out in time. Thereupon Bowes changed his tactics and began to work upon

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, pp. 403, 416.
[2] Ibid., p. 452; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 421.
[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 439. [4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 425.
[5] Ibid., p. 428; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 221–2. Mendoza says that he was delayed at the very last in waiting for a letter from Mary Stuart (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, 431.)

the young King to stop Fénélon at the border. He wrote to Walsingham on the 22nd of December that James had sent orders to stop Fénélon at Berwick. A week later he wrote that Lennox had finally left. Towards the end it had become a race to see whether Bowes could get Lennox out before Davison was forced to bring Fénélon in, and Bowes won out by a very slight margin. In point of fact, by a curious chance, Fénélon and Lennox did actually meet on the high road not far from Northallerton, and some words passed between them, which Davison craned his neck to hear, but mostly missed in the blustering weather.[1]

At the time Fénélon arrived in Scotland, Ruthven's party so completely dominated the situation that even young James thought it the part of prudence to co-operate with them and acquiesce in their policy. When Fénélon, therefore, said that he had been sent by his master to secure the liberty of his Scottish brother, James thanked him, but pointed out that he was already perfectly free. When Fénélon urged that Lennox be restored to favour, James replied that Lennox had left Scotland in full favour. When Fénélon hinted that it would be well to call a convention of all the nobility to ratify the government, James answered that that had been done a few months before. In a word, the young King himself, whom Fénélon had come to free from his bonds, undertook to demonstrate that he had no bonds. So far his mission, as he had been forewarned at Berwick, was absolutely futile.

But the question which interested both Bowes and Davison, who were keeping very close watch upon Fénélon's doings, was as to whether he had any secret mission to perform. Walsingham suspected that Fénélon had commission to deal for a marriage between James and a princess of Lorraine, and instructed Bowes and Davison to get what light they could upon the matter.[2] They thought his suspicions were justified. They learned that Fénélon had been talking of marriage with some of Lennox's friends, and had 'spoken somewhat of marriage afar

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 262, 264, 266, 275, 286, 288, 303. Among other devices Bowes encouraged a rumour that Fénélon was addressed to James not as king but as prince. This was not the case, as Bowes knew, but it served his turn. *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 240.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 243.

off' to the King himself,[1] but they got no evidence of any precise proposals, and it seems likely that Fénélon did not make any. Bowes for his part was convinced that Fénélon was working hard underhand 'to make a party here for the French King', by organizing the friends and supporters of Lennox into a 'band', and believed that Fénélon had plenty of French crowns with him to carry the plan through.[2] Davison was of the same opinion. On his way north he had remarked that Fénélon's boxes were rather bulky for a man of his tastes, and one of the porters *en route* had volunteered to him the information that they were over-heavy. Davison smelt French gold in this, but said he would have to try the boxes on Fénélon's return journey before he could make sure.[3] This test apparently was not vouchsafed to him. It seems not unlikely that both Bowes and Davison were deceived in this matter, or at any rate overstated the case. They certainly both felt that Fénélon's presence in Scotland was distinctly dangerous to English interests, and that the safest course for Elizabeth to follow, since Scottish support was always at the disposal of the highest bidder, was to outbid the French. Walsingham of course agreed with them, but he made no headway at all with his thrifty mistress. On the 4th of January he wrote to Cobham in France telling him of the rumours afloat that Fénélon was to arrange a French marriage for the Scottish King. 'Mr. Bowes', he added, 'had once brought things to so good pass and prepared the King's mind so well to depend upon her Majesty's advice and counsel in all his causes of greatest weight and importance, that if it had pleased her to be at some charges to continue him in that good devotion towards her, she might have had the disposing of his marriage, the saving of which charges now will breed both charge and peril.' On the same day he wrote to Bowes 'seeing we are no better disposed to lay hold of the amity of that realm, I see no great cause why either yourself should be continued there or any other appointed to supply your place'.[4]

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 335.

[2] Ibid., p. 337. Cobham wrote to Walsingham, 27 Oct. 1582, that Fénélon had orders to convey money from Calais or London to Scotland (*Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 416).

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 240–1. Mendoza did not believe that Fénélon had scattered much money about in Scotland (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 451).

[4] S. P. France, ix, f. 5; S. P. Scotland, xxxi, no. 6.

In fact, at the very moment when Fénélon's presence in Scotland made it particularly desirable for Elizabeth to take some positive action, Walsingham despaired of her. Three days after he wrote the letters just cited, John Colville arrived at the English court. Bowes had been largely instrumental in his coming. His commission was to deal in border causes, piracies, and such-like. His principal object, however, was to discover how much Elizabeth was willing to do in order to secure the steady allegiance of Scotland. Colville himself, who had proved a good friend of England in the north, was very optimistic as to his mission. He told Walsingham that his master was prepared to follow Elizabeth's leading and to forsake all other counsel, and that he believed, if this happy opportunity 'be not omitted', that honest men would have their 'hartes contentment'. A few days later Colville spoke with the Queen. She said many things about many things, but what was most to the point, she promised to consider definitely and favourably the question of advising and assisting the King, as soon as she learned exactly what advice and what assistance he needed. Like a prudent buyer, she wished James to state his price before she made her offer.[1]

With this answer Colville returned to Scotland. Bowes reported that James was well pleased with the results of his mission and meant to dispatch a second ambassador forthwith to state his terms, but James was inexperienced as yet in Elizabeth's promises.[2] Walsingham himself thought that her course was likely to prove both futile and dangerous. He wrote to Burghley on the 29th of January: 'They [the Scots] have been often fed with fair promises, and therefore it is not likely that words will prevail before deeds. The French bring crowns and we give words. Our success will be thereafter. I hold Scotland for lost unless God be merciful unto this poor island. How unseasonably the same is like to fall out, or rather dangerously, all the world may see, if the state of things at home and abroad be duly looked into. God open her Majesty's eyes to see her peril and not to prefer treasure before safety.'[3]

Before Colville left England, a second French ambassador

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 247, 252, 312.
[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 347. [3] S. P. Domestic, clviii, no. 33.

joined La Mothe Fénélon in Scotland. This new-comer was the Marquis of Mayneville, a Norman, an 'earnest Papist', and a 'Guisard', but rather too abrupt of speech and fiery of temper for the uses of diplomacy. The Guises had urged the French King to send Mayneville to Scotland as early as October 1582,[1] and the fact that La Mothe Fénélon, a man far more friendly to England, had been dispatched instead, may be interpreted as a desire on the part of Henry III to conciliate England. The notion of sending Mayneville, however, had not been abandoned, and Henry III finally decided late in November that both men should go, La Mothe Fénélon through England, and Mayneville by sea. By the King's own statement the instructions given to the two men were identical,[2] but even if this be true, very likely both of them were given considerable latitude, and there can be little doubt that Mayneville's chief purpose was to restore, by hook or crook, the supremacy of the French party in Scotland. It seems to have been intended that both ambassadors should arrive in Scotland at about the same time, but for some reason or other—Cobham said because Mayneville was afraid of Huguenot buccaneers—Mayneville did not reach Scotland until some weeks after his colleague. According to Mendoza, it was the news of his departure from France that induced Elizabeth to allow Fénélon to go to Scotland at all.[3] It is not improbable that the French purposely provided this awkward dilemma for her. If she prevented Fénélon, a mild white-bearded diplomatist, conservative in temper and friendly to England, from going north, French affairs in Scotland would be handled by an impetuous and fiery Guisard. It was Henry III's intention that the two men should work together, but Fénélon was instructed to return quickly, while Mayneville was designed for the post of resident ambassador.[4]

Bowes reported Mayneville's arrival in Scotland on the 29th of January 1583, with a train of some twenty persons, including a 'mass priest'. He had his first audience with James on the 23rd, when he spoke somewhat vehemently in support of Lennox and very insolently demanded the private use of the mass. The

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 416.
[2] Teulet, *op. cit.* iii. 169–70; cf. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 421–6.
[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 430.
[4] Teulet, *op. cit.* iii. 165.

result was that he stirred up the animosity of the young King at the very start, so much so that Fénélon, who was also present, thought it prudent to make excuses for him. His presence, and no doubt additional instructions which he brought with him, prompted Fénélon to speak somewhat earnestly in favour of the association of Mary Stuart with James upon the Scottish throne. He found the matter so coldly 'digested', however, at the Scottish court, that he seems to have abandoned it. Early in February he returned to England. Davison, his fellow traveller on the northward journey, remained behind to keep an eye on Mayneville's doings, Bowes's French being inadequate to the purpose.[1]

Fénélon arrived in London on the 18th of the month and not long afterwards had an interview with the Queen. Elizabeth received him rather harshly and accused him of breaking his promises, made to her before his departure, by his meddlesome behaviour in Scotland. But she later relented and was content to accept his explanations in good faith.[2] Later Walsingham had a long conversation with him in private, and Fénélon urged the secretary, as he had urged the Queen, to consent to the summoning of a general assembly in Scotland, upon the grounds that he thought it the only way to avoid a dangerous alteration in the State. Walsingham answered that the Queen's ministers in Scotland, who, he ventured to affirm, were better skilled in Scottish affairs than was Fénélon, were of a contrary opinion. Fénélon retorted that it was plain enough that the young King was possessed by but four earls, and reasonable enough to expect a protest from the Scottish nobility at large. Walsingham replied that Fénélon would greatly abuse the French King if he conveyed such an impression of Scottish affairs; that the nobles about the King were indeed few, but their supporters included the majority of the barons and 'the most substantial towns and boroughs of the land' and that there was little danger of trouble in Scotland unless the French King lent his assistance to the faction of Lennox, which was far too weak of itself for any enterprise against the State. 'This much', Walsingham concluded in

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 337, 340–42.

[2] Cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, 307, 311; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 450, for three different accounts of this interview.

writing of the interview to Bowes, ' I said unto him rather to discourage him in some sort in the opinion he seems to have conceived of the great party that he hath left behind him than because, in very truth, I think he hath not done great harm thereby by procuring such a party as may prove very dangerous to the state, considering how weakly you are backed from hence.' [1]

Walsingham's opinion as to the fruits of Fénélon's mission was based largely upon information which he received from one of his secret agents, who had the entrée at the house of the French ambassador. This agent reported that Fénélon seemed very well content with the results he had accomplished, that he boasted of having drawn a large number of the Scottish noblemen, notably Argyll, Huntly, Montrose and Arran, to his party and that the young King had assured him that his ' hairt ' was wholly French. ' Though these things ', Walsingham wrote to Bowes and Davison, ' ought in reason to stir us up to provide for the preventing of mischiefs likely to follow, yet do I not see that there is any such care or regard had thereof as were to be wished.' [2] It is not impossible that Fénélon had some suspicion of Walsingham's agent, and with a view to deceiving him had purposely exaggerated his achievements. At all events, there is very little evidence otherwise of his success in Scotland. Mendoza believed that he had done little or nothing.[3] He left for France early in March.

Meanwhile his colleague in Scotland, Mayneville, in spite of the bad impression which he had made at the start, ' fashioned himself ', according to Bowes, ' very aptly to his business '. He had hardly been in the country a week before he began to work for the recall of the friends of France to court, offering them money and promising them armed support from France. And before the end of February he was scattering purses of French crowns and promises of pensions right and left, arguing that the King was prisoner against his will, and urging the absent nobles to liberate him from bondage. His chief efforts were directed, it seems, to this latter end.[4]

Bowes and Davison both kept a close watch upon his doings,

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 307 ff. [2] Ibid., pp. 325, 342, 344.
[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 450.
[4] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 342, 347–8, 366, 378.

and they were both of the opinion that he was not making much headway. Nevertheless they insisted that the only way to prevent him from doing harm was to outbid him in Scotland. This was the message which they sent to Walsingham in practically every letter they wrote. But he could give them little hope of that remedy. On the 6th of February he wrote to Bowes that Elizabeth was willing to have him spend the rest of the thousand pounds he had in his keeping, but would grant him no more. 'I see no disposition in us', Walsingham added in a postscript, 'to deal with Scotland as we ought.'[1] On the same day he instructed Bowes to protest against Mayneville's insolent behaviour, and told him Elizabeth meant to write to the King about it. 'But for mine own part,' he concluded, 'finding that they there will not be satisfied with words, but do look for deeds, which we are slow enough to perform, I do not see that her Majesty shall be greatly able to prevail by writing.'[2]

Bowes continued nevertheless to press for money, and Walsingham continued to lament the Queen's short-sighted thriftiness. Now and then he succeeded in wringing from her a gold chain or a few hundred pounds to send north to the friends of England,[3] but in general he simply got well scolded for his pains.

'I gathered by her Majesty's speeches', he wrote to Bowes on the 27th of February, 'that she entered into some jealous conceipt that the content of your letters tended only to have drawn some treasure from her coffers, being persuaded that the information given to you of the French promises and offers of great pensions, as well to the King as others, be but devices to prepare the way before Colonel Stewart's arrival, whereby he may the better make the market here. Besides her Majesty conceiveth that if the King should marry at the devotion of the French, the same could bring no great peril to her estate, being persuaded that nothing would be attempted during her life for the attaining to the interest that the King pretendeth to this crown. Now if these conceipts of her Majesty be well grounded then hath she reason to make little account of the French proceedings there. But I fear her Majesty shall learn by dangerous effects to see the error of her own judgement. I cannot, notwithstanding, but comfort you to continue your former course of

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 286.
[2] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 100.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 299, 303.

advertisement, and if that profit be not taken thereof that reason and policy commandeth, the fault is not in you who do discharge your duty but in those whom I pray God may be free from the smart thereof.' [1]

A day or two after Walsingham wrote this letter he urged Elizabeth to lay the whole problem of Scotland before the Privy Council, intending no doubt to bring further pressure upon her from that quarter. The Queen would not concede so much as that, but she bade Walsingham submit the Scottish dispatches to Burghley and two other Councillors, the Lord Chancellor Bromley and Sir Walter Mildmay. Burghley being down with gout in London, they gathered at his bedside, and the outcome of these deliberations was that Elizabeth should spend ten thousand pounds at once in Scotland, half upon the King and two-thirds of the remainder upon the nobility; the remaining sixth was to go to maintain her ambassador in Scotland. But Elizabeth would not hear of spending so much. Her own conviction appears to have been that James's hope of the English succession would keep him faithful to her.

In general, her attitude was to spend no money and to keep the Scots in order by promises, threats and an abundance of good advice. The only positive step which she seems to have favoured was the restoration of the Hamiltons [2] with a view to playing them against Arran, who had possessed himself of most of their lands. This idea had the merit of cheapness, but Bowes found the King so strongly opposed to it that he thought it unsafe to push it, not, at any rate, until Mayneville had gone.[3]

So Bowes was left still to build, as he put it, without mortar. That he accomplished so much as he did by mere words established some presumption in favour of Elizabeth's opinion that Mayneville was much more prodigal of promises than of gold. In any case Bowes was able to thwart him at every turn. It is no doubt true also that James's hope of the English succession was a very strong deterrent to keep him from following French ways, yet Bowes's own efforts should not be overlooked. He pulled every possible wire to accomplish Mayneville's discomfiture, now arguing with the King, now stirring up the friends of England,

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 118.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 243.
[3] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 329.

now prompting the preachers to denounce French popery. The outcome was that although Mayneville had intended to remain as resident Ambassador of France in Scotland, he was practically hounded out of the land. He left early in May with the conviction that conditions in Scotland were very unpromising for France. It appears, however, that before he went he succeeded in laying the foundations for the overthrow of the Ruthven Raiders late in the year.[1]

Since Walsingham could not prevail upon Elizabeth to adopt his Scottish policy, his position in the matter was reduced to that of laying the facts before her. It will appear in another chapter how he succeeded in introducing spies into the household of the French ambassador in London and managed to intercept a good deal of the correspondence which came out of Scotland to the French embassy. He learned enough that way to strengthen his conviction that a plot was afoot, but he learned disappointingly little more. The fact appears to be that the French ambassador in London was never taken very much into the confidence of the plotters, who were looking rather to Spain than to France for co-operation.

When Lennox passed through England under safe conduct on his way to France in January 1583, Walsingham set spies upon him at once, but learned nothing of importance.[2] Lennox managed to induce Elizabeth to grant him a secret interview *en route* and apparently succeeded in convincing her that he was not nearly so hostile to her as some of the Council made him out to be. In any case, she agreed to suspend judgement on him, and he left England in hope that he might win his way into her good graces.[3] Not long after his arrival in France John Smollett, one of his servants, visited Cobham, the English ambassador at Paris, and tried to persuade him that Lennox might easily be won to Elizabeth's devotion. Cobham reported the interview at once to Walsingham and asked for instructions. Walsingham directed him to lead Smollett on and see what could be got out

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 479, 488.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 257, 292. The undated letter in *Cal. Foreign*, 1582–3, p. 87, is part of the letter in *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 292.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 241–2, 244. The only detailed account of the interview between Lennox and Elizabeth is from Mendoza's pen. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 437.

of him.[1] The result was that Cobham, in further conferences with Smollett during March, drew from him an acknowledgement that he was acting in Lennox's behalf, and a written statement that the Duke was prepared in the future to submit his actions to the direction of the Queen of England.[2] Walsingham's view of the whole matter he set forth at length in a letter to Bowes of 31st March:

'Her Majesty doth find it meet that the matter should be entertained, not with opinion that there is any sound dealing, but only to play upon the advantage when any apt opportunity shall be offered. The end of this traffic, as I conceive, proceedeth of two respects, the one to keep us at the gaze that we may the more carelessly look into their proceedings, the other to serve their turn with and to discourage those in Scotland that are well affected, upon doubt that Lennox may be reconciled unto her Majesty and thereby returned unto that realm, where, being once restored to the King's favour, he may with better opportunity be revenged of such as have opposed themselves against him. You shall do well, for the prevention of the latter, to acquaint in secret sort some of the wisest sort there with the proceeding between our ambassador and the party and withal to know their advice how he may be best used to our advantage. Our ambassador is directed to persuade him to pass this way into that realm, and as I suppose, in case he does assent thereunto, I look [*sic*] to be appointed to treat with him, I would be glad therefore to know the humour of the man and what course, in their opinion, were fit to be held with him. By such light as you shall send me I hope I shall be the better able to deal with him.'[3]

In his reply to this letter Bowes said that he had thought it wise to say nothing about these negotiations to those about the King. He had learned that Smollett was 'subtle, prone to practice, full of words, neither secret nor trusty and greedy of gear'. He thought, however, the man might be used and recommended that he be shown some favour and promised more.[4] So Walsingham was prepared against his coming.

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, p. 139. It may be pointed out in passing that Walsingham wrote to Bowes about Smollett and that Bowes in reply bade him be wary (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 303, 319). It was of Smollett and not of Archibald Douglas that Bowes was writing in his letter of 7 April 1583. In the light of this fact A. Lang's elaborate scheme for Douglas in *History of Scotland*, ii. 291, turns out to be mostly bosh.

[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, pp. 199, 201.

[3] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 156.

[4] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 404.

Smollett left for England early in May 1583 in company with Cobham's nephew.[1] He conferred there secretly with Walsingham and with the Queen. The only record of these conferences is preserved in the letters of William Fowler, whom Walsingham set to spy upon Smollett during his abode in England. Smollett told Fowler that the Queen demanded of him that any offers should proceed from Lennox and not from her, while Smollett had insisted that she should propose her terms first. He told Fowler also that although he believed the Queen was 'indifferent for' his master, he had found Walsingham prejudiced against him. Fowler was persuaded that Lennox was playing false in the matter. He discovered that Smollett had held several conferences with one of the French ambassador's servants and had spoken with Archibald Douglas.[2] Howbeit he was dispatched back to France again late in May, with a letter from Elizabeth to his master, apparently quite non-committal in character. He arrived in France to find that Lennox, who had been sickly throughout the winter, was dead.[3] Cobham succeeded in recovering from him the letter which Elizabeth had sent by his hand. So the affair ended, without profit and probably with some slight harm. Bowes wrote to Walsingham in mid-May that the report of his secret mission had reached Scotland, and had put the friends of England there in some distrust of the Queen's intentions.[4]

There is only one more matter in the confused relations between England and Scotland during the winter and spring of 1583 which deserves attention, and that is the question of the King's marriage. Naturally, as young James grew towards manhood, the question became one of increasing interest, not only to the Scots themselves, but also to their neighbours. Royal marriages were held to have great political significance in the sixteenth century, and the general feeling was that James's choice of a bride would profoundly affect the whole course of his foreign relations. It was consequently of great importance to the English to look to it that James married in accordance with English interests. Walsingham himself was keenly alive to this fact. There were constant rumours afloat of efforts on the part of the French to

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, p. 319. [2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 464, 473.

[3] 'He died of a dissenterie, or excoriation of the inward parts, engendered of melancholie, wherewith was joined gonorrhea', Calderwood, iii. 715.

[4] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 443.

provide James with a French bride. A princess of Lorraine and a princess of Navarre were both suggested. Mary Stuart, on the other hand, having lost hope of help from the French crown, was doing her best to match her son with a Spanish infanta.[1] The English party in Scotland could not agree upon a candidate. Walsingham, in the spring of 1582, had spoken strongly in favour of matching James with a princess of Denmark, but could not get Elizabeth to interest herself in the matter.[2] This unsettled state of affairs naturally gave birth to a good deal of petty intrigue of one sort or another and a good deal more of idle gossip. Bowes wrote to Walsingham in April that the Lady Argyll had proposed a match between James and Elizabeth herself.[3] Mendoza declared that this matter was under consideration as early as March 1583.[4] In February 1581, and again three years later, there were rumours afloat that Lord Hunsdon was trying to marry one of his daughters to the young Scottish King.[5] So, too, there was considerable talk about efforts on the part of the Earl of Leicester during the spring of 1583 to marry James to Leicester's stepdaughter Dorothy.[6] La Mothe Fénélon declared that William Davison, who was a distant relative of Leicester's, had secretly worked to bring about this match when he was in Scotland. Robert Bowes, at Davison's instigation apparently, wrote in May that there was no foundation, so far as he knew, for such a rumour.[7] But Mendoza spoke of it in the most assured terms, declaring that both Walsingham and Leicester were behind it, and that they had gone so far as to promise young James, if he would consent, that they would have him declared by the judges heir to the English crown. The gossip finally reached Elizabeth's own ears and called forth from her a characteristic burst of temper. She swore she would rather let James have her crown than see him married to the daughter of such a she-wolf, and declared she would denounce her vices throughout Christendom and prove her husband

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 4, 13.
[2] Ibid., pp. 320, 356.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 408. Bowes uses the symbol 32 instead of the Queen's name in reporting this, but there can be no doubt that 32 was his usual cipher symbol for Elizabeth.
[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 449.
[5] Teulet, *op. cit.* iii, 100; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 276. This latter document is misplaced in the *Scottish Calendar*. It evidently belongs to July 1584.
[6] Daughter of Leicester's wife by her first husband, the Earl of Essex.
[7] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 444.

a cuckold. Whereupon, Mendoza said, Leicester thought it expedient to seek a less exalted husband for his stepdaughter.[1]

It is not very easy to determine how much truth there was in such rumours. Walsingham himself was very much involved in the one associated with Leicester, and if all that Mendoza said was true was making large promises to bring it to pass. That Leicester had ambitions in that direction is not improbable, but Mendoza's testimony will hardly be sufficient to involve Walsingham. Certainly the statement that he would get the judges to ratify James's title to the succession rings false on the face of it. Walsingham was far too discreet a man to dabble openly with the succession question, in view of Elizabeth's attitude towards it. Furthermore there is not the slightest shred of evidence from his own correspondence that he gave any countenance whatever to such a project. Probably the story was spread by Fénélon in order to discredit Leicester at the English court, and Mendoza, getting hold of it, naturally associated it with Walsingham as well, since the two councillors worked together in most matters.

Meanwhile in Scotland Bowes was still labouring to thwart the designs of the French party and to advance the interests of England. When Colville returned from London in January he had taken with him the promise of the Queen to lend his master advice and assistance as soon as she was specifically informed of his needs. James had professed himself pleased with the result of the mission and had expressed his intention of sending Colonel Stewart, Captain of the Royal Guard, with a precise statement of his needs. In fact, James wrote a letter to Elizabeth to that effect on the 1st of February 1583.[2] Later it was decided to send both Stewart and Colville, but for one reason and another their departure was postponed. Walsingham wrote to Bowes early in March that their delay made him suspect that the King was not ' so forwardly disposed in heart to embrace the amity of England as he doth outwardly pretend ', and he went on to add that if the envoys did not bring with them such demands as the Queen could satisfy ' I do great fear there will follow thereupon an irreconcilable divorce between the two crowns '.[3] Colville

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 451, 477. The ' she-wolf ' in question was the Countess of Leicester, sometime Countess of Essex, ***née*** Lettice Knollys.

[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 347; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 285.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 321, 324.

wrote to Walsingham on the 16th of March that he and his colleague were ready to depart and Walsingham was expecting them in London early in April. He wrote to Bowes on the 6th of that month to get a copy of their instructions if he could, but ten days later he wrote again that the Queen wished Bowes to prevent their dispatch until Mayneville, the French envoy, had left.[1] Walsingham was not very sanguine of the outcome of the mission at this juncture. He wrote to Bowes that 'the indisposition of some one who can do most gives me just cause to doubt that that answer will not be made that reason and policy require'. This may refer to the Queen's reluctant attitude, but probably it refers to Burghley and points to a breach between the Lord Treasurer and the Principal Secretary upon the question of Scottish policy which widened as time went on.[2]

At all events, Stewart and Colville got away from Scotland at last on the 24th of April, a day or so before Mayneville left. Bowes succeeded in getting an abstract of their instructions from Colville, so Walsingham was forearmed.[3]

They arrived at the English court on the 3rd of May and were received formally by the Queen on the 6th. The next day they conferred with Walsingham and Hunsdon, appointed by the Queen for that purpose, at Somerset House. At Walsingham's request they set down a brief statement of their instructions for the Queen's perusal. Meanwhile they requested Walsingham to have Bowes advance three hundred pounds at once for the payment of the King's body-guard, insisting that otherwise it must be disbanded. Walsingham, in writing to Bowes on this point, said that he had urged the Queen to yield to the demand, 'who, not without some difficulty, did then agree that you should, as of yourself, lend them such a sum upon your own credit, which I pray you to stretch what you may for the performance thereof, weighing the necessity of the cause and how much it concerneth her Majesty's service that the said guard should not as yet be discharged for lack of entertainment. And if her Majesty should happen to leave the burden upon you, I will not fail to see you myself discharged for the same.'[4]

[1] Ibid., pp. 333, 366, 379.
[2] Ibid., p. 378; cf. also *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 473.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 451.
[4] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 189b.

A few days later the ambassadors had conference with the Queen. Their principal demands were for a league offensive and defensive between the two kingdoms, the restoration to James of the Lennox lands in England and the immediate gift of ten thousand pounds, besides a pension of five thousand pounds, to the King. In return for this they offered the devotion of their King to her interests and his willingness to be guided by her advice, both as to his marriage and as to other matters appertaining to his estate. Exactly what answer Elizabeth made to these demands is not certain.[1] She certainly was not disposed to commit herself to any such large expenditure of money as was demanded. She complained to both Walsingham and Burghley of Scottish importunities and swore she would not have it. Burghley applauded her determination. Walsingham, however, at a subsequent interview ventured to urge Stewart's demands upon her.[2] Whereupon she replied 'that her own servants and favourites professed to love her for her good parts, Alençon for her person, and the Scots for her crown, . . . but they all ended in the same thing, namely, asking her for money'.[3]

The Queen then referred the whole matter to a committee of the Privy Council consisting of Leicester, Walsingham, Bedford and Burghley. It was apparently at the instance of the first three that she was finally induced to grant a part of the Scot's demands. She refused to commit herself to an alliance with James until she had weighed and judged his mother's claims to associate with him. She would give no specific advice as to the marriage. In place of the ten thousand pounds demanded immediately and the five thousand pounds pension she was only willing to promise a pension of twenty-five hundred pounds. Further than that she would not go, refusing even to discharge the three hundred pounds which Walsingham had instructed Bowes to advance for the royal guard.[4]

Walsingham commented on the mission in a letter of the 29th of May to Bowes:

[1] Mendoza (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 472) gives the only account, which is not altogether to be relied upon.

[2] The Scottish ambassadors seem to have put their main hopes upon Walsingham and Leicester, cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 451.

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 473.

[4] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 456–9, 472; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 477; Teulet, *op. cit.* iii. 207, 217.

'The Scottish ambassadors departed hence on Monday in some sort contented though not altogether satisfied for that her Majesty would not yield to the redelivery of the Earl Gowrie's bonds though at the first they were put in some hope thereof, nor to the allowance of the four hundred pounds disbursed by you, neither yet to the discharge of the last three hundred pounds you have now laid out of your own money for the payment of the King's guards. Touching which last points I have told her Majesty plainly that I had directed you to lay out the said sum by her own commandment and that in case it would not please her now to allow thereof the burden must needs light upon me to make it good, which I mean to perform accordingly so as you shall for your part receive no prejudice or loss at all by the disbursement of the said sum. Thus you see, notwithstanding it importeth us greatly to yield all contentment to that nation, how we stick at trifles. I pray God we perform the rest of the things promised. I have also furnished Colonel Stewart with two hundred pounds to serve his present turn here which I perceive now by your man Allen he meaneth I shall take up again out of the ten thousand crowns pension that is granted to the King. So that I may perhaps have but a bad reckoning thereof as I have already had of the like. I pray you therefore use what means you can for me to procure the repayment of the said sum there to the end I may thereupon receive it here again out of such payments as shall be due to you for your allowance.'[1]

Some time before the arrival of the Scottish ambassadors in England Elizabeth reopened negotiations with Mary, Queen of Scots. The purpose of these negotiations was apparently to arrange for Mary's release in return for her friendship and her co-operation in establishing stable and friendly relations between England and Scotland. It is not easy to fathom Elizabeth's real intentions in the matter. Quite possibly she really hoped to divert Mary from further plotting. So far as Scotland was concerned, Elizabeth seems to have reached the conclusion that young James was altogether at his mother's devotion and that he might be won over to the English point of view by her intermediation. In any event, every step in the negotiations with Mary was reported to James and his opinion carefully sounded on all points. Walsingham was not at first sympathetic with that

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 200. The Gowrie bond referred to was a bond which Gowrie had given Bowes in security for a loan of 200 marks. The return of it would probably have meant that Gowrie was to be released from the debt (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 461).

course of policy. He feared, as he wrote to Bowes, 'that if the well affected of the nobility in that realm should perceive but the least inkling that some such motion is made of an accord between her Majesty and the said Queen, they would presently, in doubt of the danger that may grow to themselves, seek to make their own peace with the said Queen.'[1]

This much immediately appeared, that James was not nearly so devoted to his mother and not nearly so much interested in her release as was generally assumed. In fact, he seemed to be more fearful of it than eager for it. It may therefore be that the Spanish ambassador was right when he said that Elizabeth's treaty with Mary was merely designed to deceive the French, since it was certain that the Scots would have none of it.[2] Perhaps for that reason Walsingham's own views about the advisability of treating with Mary changed. In any case he later reached the conclusion that Mary could do less harm in Scotland than she was doing in England. His attitude in the matter will be developed more fully in another connexion. Nothing came of the negotiations in the end. The overthrow of the Ruthven party in the north put an end to them for a time and the discovery of the Throgmorton plot later in the year practically disposed of them for good.

Meanwhile the state of things in Scotland was growing more and more 'tickle' as time went on. Bowes's letters were increasingly alarming. Immediately after Mayneville's departure he reported a plot, set afoot, it appeared, by the Earl of Arran, to lay hold of the King and to destroy the power of the Ruthven raiders. Bowes felt it necessary, as he put it, to pull Arran's feathers and induced a group of the nobility to petition the King to bring Arran to trial for abusing his mad ward, the real Earl of Arran. They agreed, but when the moment came they bungled the matter.[3] Furthermore, James showed himself indisposed to proceed against Arran. Late in May Bowes heard that Lennox was about to return to Scotland, and on the very last of the month he learned of a fresh plot to 'welter this course and state'.[4]

[1] 25 April 1583, S. P. Mary Q. of Scots, xii, no. 58.
[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 471.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 463.
[4] Ibid., p. 477; *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 452, gives 'alter' for 'welter', but cf. Tytler, *History of Scotland*, iii. 147.

Walsingham, on his part, had news from France which was no more encouraging. When Mayneville left for France, an agent of Bowes, one Patrick Tompson, alias Patrick Baynebrigge, went with him in disguise.[1] Baynebrigge was in touch with Scottish Catholics in France, and through the medium of the English ambassador at Paris he sent to Walsingham such news as he gathered of their doings.[2] From him Walsingham learned late in May that there was a design afoot to send money into Scotland from France, that Gowrie, Glencairn, Argyll and Ruthven were all of the Lennox party, that the Scottish King was dissembling a friendship for England while secretly favouring her opponents, and that Lennox was about to land in Scotland to set the whole plot in motion.[3] Walsingham, in sending this news to Bowes said that he had no doubt the plot would have taken place already had Lennox lived and that he had cause to fear that some attempt would still be made to alter the course of state.[4]

After all this the overthrow of the Ruthven party followed almost as a matter of course. It was brought about largely through the instrumentality of Colonel William Stewart, Captain of the Royal Guard.[5] Up to the time of Stewart's embassy to England in May Walsingham and Bowes had both regarded him as one of the staunchest friends of England at the Scottish court.[6] There is reason to believe that his appointment to the head of the King's guard was, if not due to English influence, at any rate pretty clearly with English approval.[7] Various attempts were made to discredit his standing with the English, but both Walsingham and Bowes believed these to be devices of the Lennox party to weaken his position. His behaviour in England, however, led Walsingham to suspect that all might not be well. Fowler, whom Walsingham had set to spy upon him, reported that he was entirely bent to follow the course which Walsingham favoured, and was altogether upright, sincere, and faithful; but Colville, Stewart's colleague, thought otherwise, and after his return to Scotland informed Walsingham that while in

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 446.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, p. 362.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 123, where the letter is wrongly ascribed to the year 1582.
[4] Ibid., p. 491.
[5] Calderwood, iii, p. 715; Spottiswood, ii. 300; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 524, 530–1.
[6] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 239, 304, 319.
[7] Ibid., p. 138.

England Stewart had been making advances on behalf of the Duke of Lennox and the Earl of Arran. Walsingham wrote to Bowes early in July that it had been discovered that Stewart 'had made his way' with the Queen of Scots during his mission to England.[1]

Not long after Stewart's return from England he conspired with the King to get him free from the hands of the Ruthven party, and with the assistance of the Earl of March and the Archbishop of St. Andrews the matter was accomplished on the 27th of June. There is good reason to believe that Mayneville had laid the foundations for this court revolution before his departure from Scotland, and had received the young King's promise that it would be accomplished.[2] The result was that Angus, Mar, and Glamis, the staunchest members of the English party, were dismissed the court, and Argyll, Montrose and others of the opposite party took their places. A month later Arran, the ablest of the lot of them, returned to court, and before the end of August was the right-hand man of the King.

Bowes, curiously enough, seems to have been quite taken by surprise. He had expected danger and had warned against it, but not in very specific terms. It is a remarkable tribute to the deceptive powers of the young James that he succeeded, almost to the very moment of his flight to St. Andrews, in persuading Bowes that he was quite devoted to England.[3]

When the affair was over, Bowes naturally went to court to lodge his protest and James undertook to persuade him that no change in policy was intended. But Bowes was not convinced. Neither was his mistress. Walsingham wrote to Bowes on the 10th of July that Elizabeth expected that the change would have the effect of alienating Scotland from England. He announced her intention of sending a 'qualified' person to Scotland, and thought that Lord Hunsdon would be the one chosen. He directed Bowes to take no open stand against the party in power

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 443, 512, 528, 536; *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 474. Calderwood, iii, p. 714, states that Stewart had made advances to Elizabeth herself in favour of Arran and that Elizabeth had asked Colville whether Stewart had any commission to deal in such a matter, which Colville denied and in consequence Stewart was forced to desist. This story, however, is not supported by the documentary evidence cited.

[2] Lang, *History of Scotland*, ii. 292; *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 488; *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 495.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 506.

and 'outwardly make fair weather' with Colonel Stewart. Underhand, however, Bowes was to nourish the friends of England, to warn them to stand on their guard and to assure them of English support. It was intended, Walsingham said, to send them money and to furnish them with supplies from Berwick. As for Stewart, Walsingham said that he was believed in England to be the author of the enterprise, and directed Bowes 'not to omit any occasion that might tend to the abatement of his credit, so that the same be handled in such sort that it may not seem to proceed from her Majesty'.[1]

It was evidently Elizabeth's intention to pretend to accept the situation in Scotland until opportunity offered to bring the friends of England once more into power by another counter-revolution, judiciously and secretly nourished across the Border.

Walsingham himself, like Bowes, took a rather gloomy view of the situation. The dismissal of Angus and Mar from court, the arrest of Colville, the refusal of the King to accept so small a pension as £2,500, all pointed to a policy there hostile to England.[2] He wrote to Bowes on the 22nd of July: 'As things are now taking their course in Scotland, it is to little purpose to talk of any treaty.' In the same letter he remarked that the Queen was uncertain about sending an ambassador, but that he thought if any were sent he would be a Privy Councillor. He confessed that his own name had been mentioned, but declared himself unwilling to the task, 'for that we do not proceed so effectually in our causes of great weight as were fit.'[3] He knew of old the thankless and profitless character of such missions.

A few days later he wrote to Bowes that encouraging news from Scotland had led the Queen to be more hopeful of the situation there. In consequence Walsingham thought that no person of quality would be sent because of the expense involved. 'And yet', he added, 'I am of opinion that the sending of such a person of quality would do much good for the better settling

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C, vii, f. 229 b; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 531, 535. Stählin, *Der Kampf um Schottland*, p. 142, points out that, besides Hunsdon, Hatton, Sir Philip Sidney and Ed. Wotton were also considered for the embassy.

[2] Mendoza declared that Elizabeth told Lady Stafford in July that 'she could never be secure whilst that boy lived'. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 496.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 553.

and establishing of things in some such good sort as might promise a long continuance of the same; though, for my own private respect, I have no cause but to be glad that this resolution of sending is now broken off for that I think the burden of it would have lighted upon me, who, nevertheless, to do good would most willingly have used my travail in the service, if we did here embrace and go through with things as effectually as we should do.' [1]

But the clouds in the north turned rapidly blacker. On the 27th of July Bowes wrote that Fentry, the Papist, had arrived from France with letters from the Duke of Guise to the King and a basket of fruit from Mayneville, in token, as men thought, that the times were ripe for the execution of Mayneville's schemes. Bowes heard that James was greatly guided by the advice of Guise, and observed that he longed greatly for the company of Arran. Four days later the situation showed darker still. Bowes now reported that 'the King's affection to her Majesty is greatly abated', that his trust was chiefly in France, and that Guise had offered to invade England with five thousand men on his behalf. 'You will perceive', Bowes wrote to Walsingham on the last day of July, 'this state to be in such case as it is very necessary to come to speedy resolution.' Bowes was of the opinion that something might be done if immediate advantage were taken of the alarm occasioned by the royal proclamation against the Ruthven 'Rade'.

'The work is very great,' Bowes added, 'it ought to be builded by such as shall be employed and come hither from her Majesty, and the necessity of causes requires immediate resolution, either for their indelate repair, (that will be the best and most sure means to perform the requisite effects,) or else for some other certain and direct course to be prescribed and taken with the King and others. For truly the state, time and vehemency of passions are such that I cannot long hold them in calm terms, but they shall surely burst into some such course as afterwards it shall be too late to seek to turn back. . . .'

'If the lot shall fall upon yourself to come hither, I wish you in any wise to bring with you both such instruments as thereby you may be able to repair the breach made and also perfect resolution for direction of your course to be taken and holden . . . for I think verily that all promises shall be given and made on

[1] 27 July 1583, Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 253b.

the King's behalf that can possibly be asked, but I doubt partly that little better performance shall be found than hath been seen in other things preceding, unless you shall be able to satisfy the King and the council, as well in the liberal gratuity to be granted for the relief of the King's necessities (and of which gifts perhaps some about him will look to get a share) as also in his marriage, that thereon his estate may be stablished and without which it cannot be settled. In which behalfs, if you shall not bring contentment, I suppose your journey hither towards the King shall receive no such success in the end as I wish.'[1]

A week later Elizabeth finally decided to send Walsingham to Scotland. He tried his best to escape the mission. According to Mendoza, he threw himself at the Queen's feet and swore by the soul, body, and blood of God that he would not go to Scotland though she ordered him hanged for it. He told his friends that he saw no good could come of it and he knew he would have to shoulder the blame.[2] But he had no choice. On the 6th of August he wrote to Bowes that the Queen had finally made up her mind to send him. 'I shall be ready to set forward', he added, 'about the 13th or 15th of this present, though it be with as ill a will as ever I undertook any service in my life, finding by the content of your last that things are now grown into so bad terms as I fear me I shall be able to do little good there, and therefore I would most willingly abide the journey if by any means I might do it without her Majesty's extreme displeasure.'[3]

On the same day Walsingham sent the latest dispatches from Scotland to Burghley with the following comment:

'Your Lordship by the enclosed shall perceive how headlong things run in Scotland, and therefore how necessary it were that an embassage, with countenance, should be presently sent into that realm, as also well furnished with means to stop the intended course, wherein there is already such an entry made as I see just cause to think that by my employment alone will not be repaired.

'For that I cannot be there at the time desired, being the xvth of this present,[4] it were to good purpose that her Majesty did write a letter out of hand unto the King and to acquaint him with her intent of sending me and in the meantime to require him, as he tendereth the continuance of friendship, to stay all

[1] *Bowes Correspondence*, pp. 523, 532, 534.
[2] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 499.
[3] S. P. Scotland, xxxiii, no. 5, cited by Stählin, *op. cit.*, p. 57, n. 1.
[4] Cf. Bowes to Walsingham, 31 July, 1583, in *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 532.

further proceeding in his intended alterations. This courage in the King since Fentry's arrival groweth not without good assurance of backing and will not be helped without a rounder and more resolute kind of dealing than hitherto hath been taken for the conservation of the amity of that realm.'[1]

It must have been about this time also that Walsingham prepared a summary of what he conceived to be the scope of his mission, in the form of a draft of instructions for one to be sent to Scotland. Briefly stated, he recommended that the King should be won over if possible, and that the strongest inducements to such a course 'as honourable support' and 'some thorough resolution touching his marriage' should be not only promised to him but also performed. If the King consented, then he was to be induced to follow the course outlined to him by Elizabeth in May, to accept her mediation to re-establish civil peace in Scotland and to confirm the Pacification of Perth, which would have had the effect of re-establishing the exiled Hamiltons in their lands and robbing Arran of most of his ill-gotten gains. Failing this course, Walsingham believed that Elizabeth should proceed at once to organize a fighting opposition to the present government in Scotland, in a word, to convert the King to her ideas by force if he was not to be won by persuasion.[2]

Walsingham's instructions, which Burghley drafted and prepared on the 13th of August, do not differ widely from Walsingham's own conception of what they should have been. The 'promise of honourable support was made', and a hint given that the offer of twenty-five hundred pounds would, if necessary, be raised. No mention whatever was made of the King's marriage. This may have been among the matters committed to Walsingham orally, but it seems likely that had the Queen intended him to deal in a point so important as this she would have given him specific direction. The instructions concluded with a brief direction as to the course Walsingham was to take in case the King did not yield to persuasion. Here his own advice

[1] B.M. Harleian MSS. 6993, f. 54. Burghley seems to have agreed substantially with Walsingham as to the course to be taken. Leicester was, if anything, more distrustful of any good to follow by treaty; cf. documents in Stählin, *op. cit.*, pp. 138–43.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 626. On the date of this document cf. Stählin, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

was practically repeated with the assurance 'that we will not neglect any means, how chargeable soever it be, to further it'.[1]

Walsingham set out for Scotland early in the morning of the 17th of August with a train of some eighty persons.[2] On the way he received further dispatches from Bowes, which gave him very little encouragement for his journey. 'I pray God', Bowes wrote, 'give you might to work some miracle and wonder to alter and assuage this rage, that undoubtedly passeth mine ability and remedy. Neither can I of myself or by the help of any others that hitherto I can meet withal, find out any means that safely may promise surety of any good recovery and continuance in sound estate.'[3]

Walsingham began to think that his mission would be futile after all. 'In truth,' he wrote to Bowes in reply, 'I do not well see how I can go forward either with honour to her Majesty or with hope of any benefit given thereby to the well affected, since the King shows himself so wilfully bent to run that violent course that he is entered into. . . . I am of the opinion that if her Majesty did revoke me and suffered him to run on this course that he takes and to taste of the effects that are likely to ensue thereby to his own harm, it would be the best way to daunt this new courage that he is of late grown to and make him to know himself better.' Walsingham went on to say that he supposed it was James's hope of support from France which made him bear himself so 'stoutly'. 'Her Majesty hath been afore certainly assured that there will be no such matter put in execution, for proof whereof he [the French King] hath given express commandment to the Duke of Guise to stay any preparations that way. For indeed

[1] Printed in full in Stählin, p. 145: calendared in *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 572, but misdated there 3rd August. Mendoza wrote to Philip II on 16th August that Walsingham's instructions were mostly verbal and that he was directed to promise James that if he would not marry out of the island and would bind himself to England, Elizabeth would name him her heir (*Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 499). There is no other evidence in support of this statement. It is worth noting here that at the time of Walsingham's dispatch Elizabeth ordered Hawkins to send out two ships, ostensibly against French pirates, really to intercept 'such as were to pass from France into Scotland'. (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 595).

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 595. Melville (*Memoirs*, p. 310) says he had 8 score horse in train. He took with him a letter from Elizabeth to James which is omitted from Boyd's *Scottish Calendar* (cf. B.M. Additional MSS. 33531, f. 187). Robert Beale became acting secretary during his absence.

[3] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 556.

he doth know right well that her Majesty wanteth not the best means to keep him occupied at home.' [1]

Nevertheless, Walsingham passed on, delayed somewhat by colic and other ills,[2] and reached Newcastle on the 26th of August. On his arrival there he received a packet of letters from Bowes, not at all encouraging except in the one particular that the new party at the Scottish court had fallen to quarrelling over the spoils.[3] Walsingham took some comfort from this fact.

'These last letters from Mr. Bowes', he wrote to Burghley on the 26th, 'do give some hope that the disunion among themselves may minister some better matter to work upon. Mar showeth himself a constant gentleman. I hope that the comfort they will take by my repair thither may make them stand upon the best resolutions. Otherwise if they shall give place, it will be their ruin. If Ruthven [Gowrie] had been as constant as Mar, the King would have been advised before he had proceeded so far. I am of your opinion that if the King shall run on in the violent course that he is of late entered into, that it will be his own ruin, and of such as are his directors.

'Touching the Lord Claude's [Hamilton] hope conceived through Maitland's credit, I am persuaded that as long as the Stewarts shall carry any credit, there will be little done for the Hamiltons. There may be some profit made of Maitland's using him for an instrument to abate the pride of the Stewarts; but if the Hamiltons be restored by his furtherance and mediation, then it is likely that they will become dependers altogether upon the King's mother, Maitland being a most inward servant of hers. By the Earl of Shrewsbury, whom I met by the way, I find that she is so diseased that there is no likelihood that she can hold out above a year, and therefore her malice, I hope, will not long prevail. . . . I hope on Thursday next [29th] to lodge in Edinburgh.' [4]

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxiii, no. 15, dated at Apthorpe.

[2] He had to go because of his ill health in a 'cosche or chariot' (Melville's *Memoirs*, p. 309); cf. also on his health at this time *Cal. Belvoir Papers*, i. 52, and his letter to Hatton (Nicolas, *Life of Hatton*, p. 340), 'I hope I shall enjoy more ease in another world than I do in this.' A letter to Valentine Browne, written 12 August 1583, just before Walsingham's departure for Scotland throws interesting light upon his attitude towards enclosures (*Cal. S. P. Domestic*, Addenda, 1580–1625, p. 94).

[3] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 560.

[4] B.M. Harleian MSS. 6993, f. 56. Walsingham wrote another letter on the same day from Newcastle, probably to Leicester. It is printed in Nicolas, *Life of Hatton*, p. 339, where it is wrongly addressed to Burghley. The letter runs as follows, some words being missing in the printed text: 'My very good lord: The letter you sent me directed unto Colonel Stewart, is written to singular good purpose but I fear he hath made shipwreck both of conscience and honesty. He guideth altogether the king his master (as it is new reported)

Two days later Walsingham was at Berwick. There he received through Bowes a safe-conduct from the King. When he read it he perceived that it restricted his following to sixty persons and was simply extended to him so long as he and his train behaved themselves.[1] Bowes noticed the insertion of this strange and extraordinary condition and more than half suspected that it had been added intentionally with a view to checking Walsingham's arrival. He had heard that wagers were being laid in Scotland that Walsingham would 'not come in this court a long season'.[2] Walsingham returned the safe-conduct forthwith to Bowes and bade him either procure a better one or else to understand 'plainly what this extraordinary kind of course' meant.[3] To Beale, who had taken his place as secretary during his absence, Walsingham wrote:

'My stay will perhaps be found fault withal and imputed to overmuch curiosity, but if it be duly considered how ill affected these that govern the King are to England and that such as were lately imprisoned in that realm have been, as I understand, very straitly examined what intelligence they had with the ministers of England, I hope it will be thought very necessary that I do carry such a safe conduct with me into that realm as may not be subject to the interpretation of those that will be on every occasion more ready to cavil than to construe things according to reason and equity. For all form of justice is quite banished that realm.'[4]

Upon receiving Walsingham's letter Bowes repaired at once to James and readily received a new passport, 'reformed in both parts defective'. 'The King', he wrote to Walsingham on the 29th, 'excuseth the former faults by the oversight of the clerk.'[5]

Walsingham started at once for Scotland. From Berwick to

and therefore there is small hope of his recovery when misrulers become guiders. As I pass through these parts I learn that the ill-affected are altogether inclined to that king, being resolved that his mother cannot live long. They defend his proceedings and wish no good friendship between the two crowns, which I fear will fall out according to their desire. . . . If such ministers as are employed were well backed by her Majesty there might be more good done than I can now hope after. And yet I am persuaded that this dissembling king, both with God and man, will not long stand, though before his ruin, he . . . some trouble unto her Majesty. . . .'

[1] Stählin, p. 149, quoting Cotton MSS., Caligula B viii, no. 108. This important account of Walsingham's mission is omitted from Boyd's *Scottish Calendar*.

[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 567.

[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 594.

[4] S. P. Scotland, xxxiii, no. 26.

[5] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 567. This disposes of the story that a second safe-conduct was granted as unsatisfactory as the first, cf. Stählin, p. 149.

Dunbar he was escorted by Lord Hume with two hundred horsemen; from Dunbar to Edinburgh by Count Bothwell with one hundred and twenty horsemen. Both were stout Marianists. He reached Edinburgh on the first of September and dispatched a request to the King for an immediate audience. He was, however, put off from day to day. Meanwhile he turned his time to advantage, gathering information. Almost the first news which greeted him was of a Border raid by the Armstrongs, Kinmont Willie at the head of them, into the Tyndale on the 30th of August. It was a typical cattle-raising expedition of the old order, not over serious in itself, but significant as illustrating the disordered state of government. Walsingham made much of it. 'If', he wrote to Leicester, 'redress be not yielded when I shall move the King therein, the wrong is not to be put up. And seeing things here stand in so fickle terms, it were convenient that some forces were laid on the borders until it were seen what would become of this weltering state, which may serve many ways to good purpose. . . . The cause of this outrage is imputed to those who manage affairs there.' [1]

At Edinburgh also he gathered other news of the situation at the Scottish court. He observed that the King was generally disliked by the nobility, because of his deceitfulness and his thirst for vengeance; that Arran, Colonel Stewart, and the Laird of Down, 'authors of these violent proceedings', were grown odious; that the government was generally hateful to the people because of its disordered methods; that discords were breaking out between Arran and Stewart; that the towns, grown rich with long peace, were opposed to any breach with England and the clergy likewise. In fact, Walsingham came to the conclusion, or at any rate expressed the opinion, that the present government was too weak and too incompetent long to survive.[2] It is not unlikely that he put the matter more strongly than the facts warranted, with a view to justifying his proposed course of action to his mistress.

[1] 5 Sept. 1583, Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 270. Walsingham wrote the next day to Burghley: 'This kind of proceeding cannot but render those hateful who now manage affairs, for I find the borderers, the loose men only excepted, generally inclined to continue good peace with England' (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 601).

[2] Stählin, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

A good many guesses at the object of his mission came to his ears from one quarter and another while he was in Edinburgh. Some of the Scots said he came to woo them, others that he came to breed troubles, or to bribe them, or to talk large to them, or to give law to the King, or to destroy the amity between Scotland and France. To all of these he gave sharp replies. His mistress, he said, could get on very well without wooing the friendship of Scotland; she had no notion of breeding troubles, and as for distributing bribes, her liberality in the past had encountered so much ingratitude that he, for one, would advise her not to bestow a single 'testern'. He protested that his mistress preferred to live in peace with her neighbours, 'and yet hath she not her sword glued in the scabbard, if any wrong or dishonour be offered unto her'. She would not presume to name the King's councillors, but she would judge from his choice of them what account was to be made of his friendship. Finally, she had no concern in the amity of Scotland with France so long as it did not prejudice the amity with England. Walsingham, in fact, was not over-sugared in his retorts. He took a bold stand from the first.

He met Bowes at Edinburgh and in conference with him defined his plan of action. This he sent to the Queen:

'That forasmuch as there is no good here to be done so long as these violent counsellors do direct the stern, I do resolve, unless the King shall take another course, after I have had audience and received the King's answer, to return immediately.

'That the best way to make them seek her Majesty is to make little account of them.

'That my departure without satisfaction will render the faction now governing the King more odious and hasten their removing and greatly comfort the well affected.'

Walsingham decided that he would, at his audience with the King, request him (1) to call a convention of the Scottish nobility and with their assistance to choose counsellors free from partiality, sound in religion and friendly to England; (2) to release all those imprisoned without due process of law; (3) to take present order for the redress of the Border outrages. If James assented to these demands, Walsingham would linger for further parley; otherwise he meant to go straight back to England.[1]

[1] Stählin, p. 153.

At Edinburgh also Walsingham decided that he would have no commerce either with Arran or with Colonel Stewart, albeit they had made some advances to him,[1] on the grounds that they were the chief enemies of England and the friends of France, that they were 'noted to be void of faith, honesty and religion, and as inconstant as the wind', that they were generally hateful to the state, and finally that dealing with them would discourage the well affected.

It is quite clear that Walsingham had no hopes of any successful outcome of his interview with the King. His final word to his carrier, about to depart to Elizabeth, was advice that she should strengthen her borders, recall Bowes, and look to the Scottish Queen.[2]

On the 6th of September James Melville, by the King's orders, came to salute Walsingham and to apologize for the delay in granting him audience. Melville had been one of Walsingham's companions during his days of exile, and had often been his guest in London, so that they met as familiar friends. The usual courtesies were exchanged and Melville himself represents the meeting as having been a very amicable one, although Walsingham told Burghley that he had spoken sharply to Melville about the King's delay in fixing his time for audience.[3] Together they journeyed north from Edinburgh to Stirling and so to Perth, where the King was. It had been intended that Lord Seaton and Livingston should convey Walsingham over this part of the journey, but Walsingham requested that they should be stayed so that he might have more leisure to chat with Melville. That, at any rate, was the reason Walsingham gave for making the request. Melville suspected that his real motive was to display his 'awen gret company (for he had xiij score horse in train)' to better advantage, which might otherwise have been dimmed by masses of Scottish retainers. They reached Perth without mishap and Walsingham was received by the King on the 9th of September.[4]

The interview followed in the main the course which Walsingham had planned. He and Bowes were received together. They

[1] Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 311.
[2] Stählin, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
[3] Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 309; *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 601.
[4] Stählin, p. 82.

proceeded to scold James for his change of councillors and to read him a long lecture on the errors of his government. James, in reply, after protesting his friendship for Elizabeth and expressing his desire to deal with her directly and 'not with others who did arrogate to themselves to be the principal workers of the amity', let his temper get a little the better of him. He fell, as Walsingham put it, 'into some kind of distemperature and did with a kind of jollity say that he was an absolute king and therefore prayed your Majesty that he might take such order with his subjects as should best like himself, and that your Highness would be no more curious to examine the affection of his councillors than he is of yours'. Whereupon the English ambassadors told him some homely truths about the extent of his power, and added that he was rather too young to pass judgement upon matters of state. On that account, they said, he ought to be happy that a prince so careful of him as their mistress would consent to advise him. But, they concluded, seeing he made so little account of her, she would leave him to his own devices. Walsingham added, on his own account, that he had not come north to seek the King's friendship. England could live well enough without Scotland. His purpose had been to charge the King with his unkind dealings towards England and to demand satisfaction. He called particular attention to the Border outrages and gave warning that unless they were redressed there would be trouble. And so the interview ended, leaving the precocious young King smarting like a whipped schoolboy.[1]

Walsingham sent a report of this interview to Elizabeth at once, and in a private letter to her he set down his own impressions of James's attitude towards her.[2]

'I have sundry times', he wrote, 'since my repair into this country, called to mind the impression I have always found that your Majesty hath had of the disposition of this young King, which I now find to fall out agreeable with the conceit you have ever had of him; for as your Majesty hath always doubted, so I think you shall find him most ingrate and such a one as if his power may agree to his will, will be found ready to make as unthankful a requital as ever any other did that was so greatly beholding unto a prince, as he hath been unto Your Majesty.

[1] Stählin, pp. 156 ff. [2] Ibid., pp. 158–9.

And for that Your Majesty may find it strange how he is grown unto that pride and contempt of your Highness as by the carriage of himself towards you appeareth, Mr. Bowes and I, being careful to discover whereof the same hath risen, we find by good means that it hath grown altogether from the advice of his mother, who putteth him in comfort of a very great party within that realm, and that no one thing is like to add such an increase thereof, as if he shall show himself to be alienated from you and to seek by degrees to alter and change religion within his realm, who besides the increase of his party in England shall thereby not lack any assistance that Spain and the Pope can give him, which course he is bent by degrees to follow, though for a time he meaneth to dissemble the same in respect of the opposition and difficulties he shall find in the execution thereof: wherein if he shall proceed, as it is meant he shall, there will be great cause to think that his mother, who is the layer of the plot, will work his confusion, and though she cannot live many years shall before their [her] end see his overthrow. It shall be most necessary for Your Majesty to continue still at your devotion the two Hamiltons which is a thing greatly desired by the well affected here. . . .

Such here as be affected unto the mother do think it most necessary to restore them to the King's favour, wherein they find great difficulty as yet, for that Arran for his particular doth oppose himself thereto and hath wrought that impression in him against them as the same cannot be performed without some difficulty. This King is so doubtful of the surety of his estate, in respect of the general discontent which is had of his government, as it seemeth he hath some disposition to fly over into France.'

The day after his interview with Walsingham, James appointed four members of his council to treat with him, but Walsingham declined to parley with them on the grounds that he had no commission to treat but only to receive such answers as they would give him. Thereupon they sent him a copy of the demands which he had handed to the King, and required him to sign them. This he did. About the same time the Earl of Arran and Colonel Stewart both tried to persuade him ' to run a course ' with them, but he refused flatly, said he had no instructions to deal with any but the King, and that for his own part he preferred to have nothing to do with men of their stamp. Later he told Melville that ' he esteemed the said Earl [of Arran] a scorner of religion, a sower of discord and a despiser of true and honest men, and therefore he would not speak with him, nor enter in

acquaintance, for he was of a contrary natural, religious, true and a lover of all honest men'. 'These two companions [Arran and Stewart]', Walsingham wrote to Bowes on the 12th, 'do threaten that her Majesty shall be advertised by some such means as they have of my severe dealing, and that things might have been brought to a good course if I would have used their advice and assistance, which I fear not, for that her Majesty is too wise to be anything moved with their reports. For if I had seen any sound way of a recovery of this country, no man would have been more glad than myself, but I would be loathe that her Majesty should spend her treasure to her dishonour upon as thankless a prince as ever was born.'[1]

Notwithstanding which, Walsingham was evidently not at all sure that his tactics would escape censure. He wrote to Burghley: 'Your lordship . . . may perceive in what sort we have dealt with the King, wherein if it fall out that any fault be found withal, for that the greatest blame will be laid upon me, I do assure myself that I shall not lack your Lordship's friendly and careful defence.'[2]

It is hard, nevertheless, to avoid the conclusion that Walsingham was rather unnecessarily brutal in dealing with the King and that Arran's threat to complain of this to Elizabeth was not unprovoked. As a matter of fact, Arran does not appear to have carried out his threat. He did, however, contrive to avenge himself upon Walsingham in a number of petty ways. He had many of the members of the secretary's train debarred from the King's chamber. He hired a common scold, called Kate the witch, at the price of a new plaid and six pounds in money, to sit at the palace door and revile Walsingham and his gentlemen as they came and went; and finally, when the King sent Walsingham upon his departure a diamond ring worth seven hundred crowns, Arran, serving at once his greed and his malice, picked out the diamond and set in its place a common crystal.[3]

Two days after Walsingham's first interview with the King he conferred privately with James again. The substance of this

[1] Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 311; Stählin, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

[2] S. P. Scotland, xxxiii, no. 35.

[3] On the witch story, cf. B.M. Harleian MSS. 291, f. 146 (cited by Stählin, p. 100, n. 1); on the diamond episode, cf. Melville, p. 311, and Thorpe, *Scottish Calendar*, ii. 806.

conference is worth setting down as Walsingham himself reported it.[1]

'That the King, letting the secretary understand what strange conceit it would breed in his subjects heads in case he should be suffered to depart to the Queen his Sovereign without satisfaction or contentment, as though some breach of the amity were likely to ensue, and therefore desired to understand his opinion (as careful to do anything that might be to her Majesty's satisfaction) what were the things that might breed in her contentment and remove the opinion that had seemed she had conceived of him.

'That thereupon the secretary did let him understand that her Majesty desired nothing at his hands, but that tended to his own good and whereof he was to receive the greatest benefit, which was to forbear to proceed in the violent course of government that he was now entered into, which in the end could not but be accompanied with some hard issue.

'That he had now thrown himself into a very perplexed state, being forced to stand upon his guard in his own realm as though he did live amongst his enemies.

'That if he were well counselled he might live in as quiet sort as ever he had done, or as any princes his predecessors.

'That the remedy consisted chiefly to know out of what cause this alienation of his subjects' hearts hath grown and to seek by all good means to remove the said cause.

'That it was apparent that the same proceeded for that he had made ill choice of counsellors, being young men void of experience and full of passion, and such as sought by the ruin of others to advance themselves. That young princes had more need of grave and ancient counsellors that might by their temperance and wisdom bridle such passions as commonly they that were of young years were subject unto.

'That seeing then the remedy did consist in choice of others, the difficulty would rest by whom and whose advice he was especially to use therein.

'That it was often seen that princes reposing their trust in others in their choice have been greatly abused, for that such have been commonly recommended by them as might rather serve their own turns and strengthen their faction than discharge their duties in advising and counselling such things as might stand with honour and justice.

'That forasmuch as his parliament was shortly to be held and that the assembly of state in monarchies did especially serve to consult of such remedies as might best serve to cure the diseases of the same; he should therefore do well, for the avoiding of the partiality in choice, to recommend the same unto their considera-

[1] Stählin, p. 161, no. 13.

tions and to require them to nominate a certain number, such as they should find best experimented in matters of government and were esteemed freest from partialities, out of the which he might make choice of some convenient number to whom he might commit the care of his government.

'That his subjects would be best inclined to yield him due obedience when they should find him guided by the advice and counsel of those whom they themselves should recommend.

'That his state required not many counsellors, neither had he means to maintain many, and if he were, yet an unnecessary number of counsellors would breed but confusion and delay of expedition in causes called in deliberation.

'That his counsellors were to be charged by him to have regard unto two things especially, being the foundation of all states, and that is piety and justice. The one to see religion maintained and the contemners thereof punished; the other to see the meaner sort delivered from the oppression of the greater, and that every one might receive according to their deserts either punishment or reward, being the principal means to encourage the well affected and to bridle the contrary sorts.

'That forasmuch as his realm had continued well near forty years under the government of regents, whereby the reverence of the authority of a king was taken away, so as every great personage within his realm did think himself as it were exempt from the ordinary obedience of common subjects, it should behoove him to follow in the reforming of his estate the manner of proceeding of wise and discreet physicians, that in the cure of long continued diseases do proceed by degrees, for that violent medicines through the desire of speedy remedy do work dangerous effects. And so in like case of a diseased state, a wise prince ought rather to proceed by degrees, for that overmuch severity, especially in an estate where through a long loose government the authority of a king is in a sort had in contempt, is most perilous.

'That he was ill counselled when at the first entrance into his government he seasoned the same with blood, especially of so well deserving a servant as the Earl of Morton was, and that in such partial sort as the same was performed, divers others being let slip undealt withal that were in a more extreme degree to be charged with the fault whereof he was condemned. In the prosecution whereof her Majesty had great wrong done unto her, as well in respect that the said Morton did accept the charge of regency only at her request, as also that she making intercession for the stay of proceeding against him, the same notwithstanding was denied, without regard had of the great benefits bestowed by her Highness upon him and his realm, as he himself has acknowledged in words.

'That for the establishing of his government he had more need of the advice of Morton than of Lennox or Arran, who were the principal procurers thereof.

'That young princes were many times carried into great errors upon an opinion of the absoluteness of their royal authority and do not consider, that when they transgress the bounds and limits of the law, they leave to be kings and become tyrants.

'That therefore divers princes (carried into that error by such counsellors as, to advance their own greatness and ambition, had no other way to bring the same to pass than to make will stand for law, thereby to enrich themselves by the spoil of others, contrary to all form of justice) have been deposed, for that being advised to remove the said counsellors from them rather than to yield to them, have been content to run any hazard or adventure, whereof both the histories of England and Scotland did give sufficient precedents.

'That as subjects are bound to obey dutifully so were princes bound to command justly; which reason and ground of government was set down in the deposition of Edward the Second, as by ancient record thereof doth appear.

'That for the avoiding of the present mischief of his estate, he should do well to forbear the prosecution of those that were authors in the attempt of Ruthven, who were carried into the same with no other intent but for his good, by removing of such from about him as sought the alienation not only of his own subjects' hearts from him, but also of the Queen of England, to whom he was as much obliged and bound as ever one prince might be to another.

'That whereas sundry of his subjects were warded without charge and their goods disposed before trial upon presumptions and surmises of some conspiracies by them contrived, he should do well to commit the consideration of those things, wherewith they were to be charged to his parliament, for that this strange and extraordinary manner of proceeding did manifestly show that rather their goods and offices were offenders than their persons, and that until the time of the parliament he should do well to release them, upon caution for their appearance to answer unto such things as should be objected against them, and to be of good behaviour to the state.

'That for the avoiding of such like strange accusations and appreachments of such his subjects as either were rich or enjoyed any good office, he should do well (the necessity of his state so requiring the same) to reserve the benefit of the forfeiture and confiscations unto himself, and then should he by experience find that such corrupt and wicked dealing, tending to the alteration of his subjects' hearts and the disgracing of his best affected

servants, would of itself fall to the ground, though for the present it carried an outward show of care for his safety.

'That among other errors in his government his seeking to strengthen himself with a party within his realm by advancing the surnames of the Stewarts, did minister just cause of offence unto the rest of his subjects, who think themselves no less faithfully bent to do him service by the common duty of a subject, ingrafted by God's ordinance in every good man's mind and by the ordinary laws and constitutions of all kingdoms, than the best affected of the Stewarts.'

This discourse, as reported by Walsingham himself, presents some points of interest outside the immediate circumstances of its delivery. The political theories which it enunciates were clearly borrowed from the *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos* of Duplessis Mornay. In its recommendation to the King to take council with his people, as represented in parliament, upon matters of government; in its insistence upon his subservience to the law and his obligation to rule justly; in its broad hints at the rights of his subjects to depose him if he did otherwise, the discourse is redolent of the great Huguenot publicist.[1] It would be rash to assume that Walsingham shared Duplessis's political theories. There is more of Bodin than of Duplessis in his few scattered observations upon the subject of princely authority, yet it is a striking fact that he, the greatest exponent of English Puritanism in the diplomatic circles of his time, should have made use of the same arguments, drawn from the same sources to rebuke James in his youth, that other Puritans were to employ against him in his maturity.

But to return to the interview. When Walsingham had finished his discourse the King declared his intention to act in conformity with Elizabeth's wishes. He offered to forbear to persecute any further the Ruthven raiders; to release those

[1] Cf. the excellent discussion of this point in Stählin, *op. cit.*, pp. 91 ff., particularly p. 91, n. 1. It is probable, however, that the edition of the *Vindiciae* which Stählin holds to have been printed in Edinburgh in 1579 was really printed in Geneva. Very likely Walsingham did not come by these ideas of Duplessis at first hand. On that point the following passage from an account of his interview with James is illuminating: 'His Majesty asked Sir Francis of whom learned he all these pretexts and counsels that he delivered in his conference with his Majesty. He reported that Sir Francis [confessed] he could not have leisure to read these books himself but he had them off Mr. Archibald Douglas.' Harleian MSS. 290, f. 84.

already warded until they could stand their trial before parliament, to promulgate a general act of pardon for all capital political crimes saving only those connected with the murder of his father and the two regents; and finally to choose his councillors by advice of parliament and to prefer just men and such as were friendly to England. In return he requested that the treaty for a closer alliance between England and Scotland might be advanced and that he might deal directly with Elizabeth through some person of trust particularly appointed to that purpose. Such as least was Walsingham's conception of the royal offers. He took note of them and after the interview was over he submitted to the King a copy of his notes for confirmation. James kept the copy a whole day and then returned another version of his offers, penned, as Walsingham learned,[1] by Arran himself and couched in very dark and ambiguous terms. Roger Ashton, who brought the paper, brought also from the King his assurance that he would do even better than he had written. Walsingham thereupon wrote the King a brief note in acknowledgement. 'I see plainly,' he wrote, 'for that I find them [the offers] ambiguous, they will neither yield that satisfaction unto her Majesty that I desire, nor remove the jealousies of your subjects conceived herein through an over severe manner of proceeding than may stand with your Majesty and the repose of your realm in safety.'

As Walsingham left the King's presence he met Sir James Melville at the doorway, grasped him by the hand and declared 'he was the best content man that could be; for he had spoken with a notable young prince, ignorant of nothing and of so great expectation that he thought his travail well bestowed'. It is clear, however, that this was merely a bit of clever acting on Walsingham's part. 'I give it out,' he wrote to Bowes on the 15th of September, 'that I go away well satisfied and that I hope her Majesty will like well of the King's answer, thereby to stay him from proceeding further in his course against the well-affected.'[2]

[1] Stählin, p. 165. It seems likely that the copy of the offers printed in Stählin, p. 166, is Walsingham's rendering of them, while the manuscript printed in Calderwood, iii, p. 729, is the King's version, which is certainly ambiguous enough; cf. also *Bannatyne Miscellany*, i, pp. 79 ff.

[2] Stählin, p. 165; Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 310.

James later made in conversation various comments upon Walsingham which, if they were more consistent, might give some conception of the impression which the secretary made upon the King. One anonymous reporter declared that when Walsingham was commended to the King 'for his religion and zeal, his Majesty said, [that] notwithstanding that outward profession, he is a very Machiavelli, and counselled him even to use religion for his people's obedience; and if he had not broken first to his Majesty he would never have spoken of him otherwise than at the first, when he reported to his subjects [that] Sir Francis gave him faithful counsel, which was far otherwise.' One gathers from this, and from other remarks cited by the same interviewer,[1] that James was in rather a peevish humour when he spoke. It certainly requires some distortion to read Machiavellian counsel into Walsingham's discourse to the King. On another occasion, to another interviewer, James declared that he esteemed Walsingham 'the wisest man that ever he spake with and the more he remembers his counsel finds it better [*sic*] and profitable unto him.'[2] Between the two judgements one must choose, having in mind that the latter one was intended to reach Walsingham's ears. It is pretty certain that James was very much irritated by Walsingham's whole bearing. Being not only extremely young but extremely precocious, he resented the schooling he had received at the hands of the secretary.

Walsingham's opinion of James, so far as he expressed it, has been indicated already. It should be set down very much to his credit that he spoke and wrote in such plain terms both to and of the young King, for it must not be forgotten that Elizabeth was getting old and Mary Stuart was very sickly and the prospects that James would soon succeed to the English throne were distinctly bright. Some of the prudent counsellors in England were already beginning to turn towards the rising sun. Walsingham refused to flatter or to curry favour with the heir presumptive. No doubt if James had ascended the English throne while Walsingham was still alive, he would have been called upon to pay the price of his temerity.

After Walsingham's interview with the King he returned at

[1] Harleian MSS. 290, f. 84, undated, but evidently written in the spring of 1584.

[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 649–50, 2 Nov. 1583.

once to Berwick. From there he sent the following dispatch to the Queen:

'It may please your most excellent Majesty, seeing the King cannot be recovered to stand so soundly affected towards your Highness as you may make any account of his friendship, but rather that it is to be doubted that he is so alienated from you in good will (notwithstanding the great and singular benefits he hath received from your Majesty) as that he will be made an instrument of revenge and to trouble your Majesty's states by such princes as stand ill affected towards you, and therefore I have found it expedient before my return to do my best endeavour to lay some such plot as he may be bridled and forced, whether he will or not, to depend upon your Majesty's favour and goodness. And because the same could not be performed during the time of my being within his realm for sundry respects, especially after I had taken my leave of the King, it was resolved betwixt Mr. Bowes and me that the same might be with less suspicion and as sufficiently performed by staying some few days at Durham, to which place there will either be some sent from the well-affected into that realm to treat with me in secret sort, or I shall from Mr. Bowes understand the impediment and what is to be looked for from thence.'[1]

Evidently the plot to which Walsingham refers had not been worked out before he left Scotland. Bowes wrote to him in cipher on the 17th of September: 'The form and substance for the plots . . . ought to be resolved before you pass out of the north, that these, being your work, may be begun before your departure and after be advanced by you to the wished effects.' Bowes himself was of the opinion that the best way to accomplish the matter was by peaceable means at the coming session of parliament, but he contemplated violent measures if this course failed.[2]

On the 22nd of September Walsingham had laid his plans. 'This bearer', he wrote to Leicester, 'I dispatch with all speed with an offer that may work good effect to bridle the young monarch if it please her Majesty to take hold thereof. Two things are desired, speedy answer and secrecy. I pray your Lordship therefore, when her Majesty shall make you privy unto the matter, to put her in mind both of the one and other. If this occasion be neglected, farewell Scotland.'[3]

[1] Stählin, pp. 166–7.
[2] *Bowes Correspondence*, p. 575.
[3] Cotton MSS., Caligula C ix, f. 95, 22 Sept. 1583, omitted in Boyd's *Calendar*.

But whatever the plot was, Elizabeth's co-operation was necessary, and she refused it. Walsingham therefore had to call off his conspirators as best he might.

'According to your Lordship's advice,' he wrote to Leicester from York on the 30th of September, 'I am now resolved to make what haste I can to the court, seeing you are no better affected to embrace those things that tend to safety. I am sorry that the well affected in Scotland shall be left as a prey unto their enemies. The distrust of some such like issue as is now fallen out made them loth to give ear, for that by experience they have found that we do but coldly back our friends. Sorry I am from the bottom of my heart that I have been made an instrument of ambush, which besides the touch of my own poor credit, will make men both there and elsewhere loth to deal with any of her Majesty's ministers. The well affected noblemen have no other way to save themselves but to make work unto Colonel Stewart and Arran, and to promise hereafter to forbear to have any further dealing with England, and to reconcile themselves unto the King's mother. Whether this be good for her Majesty I leave to your Lordship's consideration.'[1]

The principal reason why Elizabeth rejected Walsingham's proposals was because she found at hand an alternate policy which was cheaper and, as she thought, more promising. Walsingham got wind of this just after he left Scotland. 'I hear', he wrote to Leicester on the 22nd of September, 'that there is a by-course in hand with Arran and the Colonel [Stewart] wherein Mr. Rawley is used for an instrument. I hope he is too wise to be used in any such indiscreet dealing. Your Lordship may do well to give him advice to abstain from such by-courses.'[2] Eight days later Walsingham alluded to the same subject in his letter to Bowes of September 30th. 'I learn that the by-course goeth forward, and is well hearkened unto, great assurances are given that the King shall be altogether at her Majesty's devotion more firmly than ever before. I am sorry that Scotland should be able to abuse us with these vain entertainments. The advice groweth altogether from the Melvilles.'[3]

From these letters it is evident that a plan was on foot in the English Privy Council to win over Arran himself to the English interests. Without doubt Lord Hunsdon was the chief promoter of it. There is indeed some reason to believe that the

[1] Stählin, p. 170, no. 21.
[2] Cotton MSS., Caligula C ix, f. 95.
[3] Stählin, p. 169.

foundations for this course of action had been laid by Hunsdon's son, Sir George Carey, when he accompanied Bowes to Scotland in the autumn of 1582.[1] Of Walter Raleigh's part in it, there is no further evidence than that given in Walsingham's letter just cited. How much support it received at this juncture in the English Privy Council at large is not easy to determine. Walsingham wrote to Bowes in October that Burghley was not 'very forward to entertain the by-course',[2] but later held a different opinion. At any rate, its supporters were strong enough to prevent the Queen from endorsing Walsingham's more violent tactics.

Shortly after Walsingham left Scotland, Bowes himself was withdrawn and formal relations between the two countries were interrupted for a season. Walsingham was clearly desperate about the situation, and with good reason. James had begun to correspond not only with the Duke of Guise and with Philip II, but even with the Pope of Rome himself, was seeking assistance from them, and showing himself acquiescent in any project to invade England through Scotland.[3] There is no more reason to trust his sincerity in these approaches to England's enemies than in those to Elizabeth herself, but they show at any rate that he was prepared to seek help from any quarter and was not deterred by religious considerations from leaguing with the powers of Rome. For the moment, no doubt, his release from the trammels of the English party led him to look much more

[1] This would be hard to prove absolutely. In the draft of a letter from James to Elizabeth of September 1583, which was probably never sent, he said: 'How I did reign for the time [after the Ruthven Raid] you might know by your cousin Mr. Carey, in whose ear I rounded familiarly my inward grief, because he said you desired him to require it at me apart, promising that it should be secretly kept from all others. Albeit I used not such freedom to Mr. Bowes.' Stählin, p. 152; Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 298.

Cf. also Fowler to Walsingham [16 January] 1582/3: 'He [Kilsyth] had long conference with Sir Geo. Carey touching that matter whereof you have knowledge' (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 251). Kilsyth was a strong partisan of the Lennox-Arran party at that time.

Cf. also Bowes to Walsingham, 9 March 1582/3, 'That the course to be taken with the king by Sir George Carey shall hinder the other proceedings for the assurance of this realm to her Majesty (as by your last is suspected) I do little doubt' (*Bowes Correspondence*, p. 376).

It may have been for this reason that Walsingham was anxious to associate Sir Walter Mildmay, his brother-in-law, with Lord Hunsdon when Hunsdon was considered for the mission to Scotland in July (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 532).

[2] 16 Oct. 1583, *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 636.

[3] Teulet, *op. cit.* v, pp. 303, 316–22, 325–38.

kindly towards France and Spain for alliance, than over the Border. He was young, thirsty for revenge, and irritated at Elizabeth's obvious efforts to run his kingdom for him.

The English party was pretty well broken, and Elizabeth was in no mood to reconstruct it. She would not even spend enough money to maintain 'intelligencers'.[1] Walsingham, seeing no hope in that quarter, was tempted to revert once more to the policy of playing Mary Stuart against her son. He was plainly angling for her goodwill early in November[2] and regarded with favour a project of joint intervention by England and France to settle all difficulties in regard to Mary and Scotland. He even hinted that he would be willing to join with Mauvissière in an embassy to Scotland which should include a visit to the Scottish Queen.[3] Something might have come of this if the discovery of the Throgmorton Plot had not increased the distrust of Mary to such an extent as to make any such course out of the question.[4]

It seems probable that during the autumn Hunsdon maintained his 'by-course' with Arran by means of a certain Cuthbert Armourer.[5] Very likely it was through this channel that James was encouraged to make informal advances to Elizabeth in November. On the last day of October he dispatched the Archbishop of St. Andrews south. It was given out that St. Andrews was going to take the waters at Plombières for his health, but his main object was to make friendly advances to Elizabeth, and to pave the way for the coming of a formal ambassador. He arrived in London on the 30th of November and had audience with the Queen a few days later. She stormed at his master's inconstancy in public, but privately gave him comforting assurances and held out some hope that she might renew her offer to pension the King. So much for his mission. He did not get to Plombières after all, but spent some two months in England, where, if current gossip in Scotland be true, he contrived to borrow one hundred pounds of the French

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 680, 685.

[2] Cf. Mauvissière to Mary, 15 Nov. 1583, *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 654 ff.

[3] Walsingham conveyed this hint to Mauvissière through Archibald Douglas: Teulet, iii, p. 243.

[4] As it was, the King of France got to the point of preparing instructions for Mauvissière for such a mission: Teulet, iii, p. 245; cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 680.

[5] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 683.

ambassador and a preacher's robe, richly furred, from the Bishop of London, neither of which were ever returned. Indeed, he is even said to have dodged a tailor's bill of seven pounds in York, contracted on his way south, by avoiding the city on his way home.[1]

After St. Andrews's report reached the King, both he and Arran began at once to push the 'by-course' through Hunsdon and even urged him to come to Scotland, or at least to Berwick, where the matter could be more easily treated of.[2]

While Hunsdon laboured to forward this course, Walsingham still advocated the alternate policy of building up a party opposite to Arran in Scotland and by this means to overthrow him. His agents for this purpose were Mr. John Colville, in London, and Sir Robert Bowes at Berwick. Bowes had been quite desperate of any party in December. In January 1584 he heard of a new plot, and the following March he was in communication with Mar and Angus and Gowrie, the ringleaders, and had hopes that something might be accomplished by their means. One great obstacle to its success, he told Walsingham, was the show of favour of the Queen to Arran, who was boasting that he would overshoot the English party with their own bow. Late in March Bowes wrote that the enterprise was about to break forth. Colville told Walsingham that there was good hope of its success. But Arran, who was constantly on the watch for such devices, got wind of the plot in time and easily frustrated it. Gowrie, the ringleader, was taken prisoner at Dundee. The others shut themselves up in Sterling Castle and prayed for reinforcements.[3]

There can be no doubt that Walsingham, like Bowes, had done everything in his power to forward this enterprise. But Elizabeth, although she expressed sympathy, would lend no money and sign no contracts, so she cannot be held responsible

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, pp. 645, 665, 667, 683; Melville, 315. Calderwood, iv, p. 61, gives a very shocking example of the ill manners of St. Andrews when he was at the English court. [2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 683.

[3] Ibid., p. 688; ibid., 1584–5, pp. 17, 36, 41, 43, 53, 57. There is no reason to credit Tytler's insinuation that Walsingham was plotting the murder of some bishop or other. It seems likely that the allusion to the bishop within the gates (ibid., p. 57) on which Tytler bases his statement was to St. Andrews, who was still in England and whom Colville probably thought a menace to his cause and wanted to get out of England. St. Andrews returned to Scotland in May.

either for the plot or for its failure.[1] Nevertheless she went about at once to seize the occasion offered by the semblance of civil war in Scotland and prepared to send ambassadors to James with offers to mediate a peace between him and the party in Sterling, and with threats to intervene in their favour if her mediation were refused.[2] William Davison, one of her most experienced diplomatists, was named for the post and was further given two thousand pounds to employ in the behalf of those at Sterling. But before Davison got under way the King had marched against Sterling in force and the leaders of the rebellion had fled over the Border into England.

Bowes wrote to Walsingham in despair and bewailed the disgrace which was like to fall upon both of them by the evil success of the enterprise. To Walsingham no doubt the bitterest pills to swallow were the sneers of Hunsdon and his partisans, who had steadily condemned this policy and advocated the by-course instead.

The immediate result of the failure in Scotland was the execution of Gowrie and the more complete supremacy of Arran. Elizabeth, who shared Walsingham's distrust of Arran, was not over-hasty to take up the by-course. She decided instead to reopen negotiations with Mary Stuart and to resume a plan of action which she had contemplated the previous autumn. But when approaches were made to Mary she was quick to perceive her advantage and disposed in consequence to stand on terms. Walsingham wrote to Davison on the 20th of May: 'The intended journey of the French ambassador to Scotland accompanied with a minister of the Queen of Scots is now broken off, for that the said Queen stands upon very proud terms, refusing to mediate the restitution of the distressed noblemen [Angus, Mar, and Glamis] unless her Majesty will grant her liberty and ratify the late treaty between the Earl of Shrewsbury, Sir Walter Mildmay, Mr. Beale and her. So that I do not see what means her Majesty can use to procure their relief, but fear greatly they will be left to seek their own peace, which cannot but breed to us a war. This I pray you reserve to yourself for that we may alter our purpose.'[3]

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 63. [2] Ibid., p. 89.
[3] S. P. Scotland, xxxiv, f. 77.

Two days later Walsingham wrote again to Davison: 'I wish there might be some other good way and remedy found to stay the King's violent proceeding against these distressed noblemen and gentlemen. My Lord of Hunsdon hath conceived some good hope that Arran may be won to serve for a fit instrument in that behalf, whereof I have thought good to give you knowledge to the end you may accordingly use yourself towards him and avoid all you can the giving unto him any occasion of offence by opposing yourself against him or otherwise. And yet can I not advise you to seek unto him or enter into any dealing with him in this matter unless you shall receive special direction from hence for that purpose.' [1]

Davison received this letter at Berwick, where he was awaiting instructions. At the end of May he was finally sent forward into Scotland, ostensibly for the purpose of replying to James's demands for the surrender of his rebellious subjects, really, it may be presumed, to watch the course of Scottish affairs and to advise accordingly. At Berwick he had heard that there was some chance of organizing a new rebellion about the commander of Edinburgh Castle, Lord Alexander Erskine.[2] He thought favourably of the plot and convinced Walsingham that something might be made of it with the assistance of Mar and Angus, the leaders of the Sterling Castle fiasco, who were at the time refugees in England. But he could not bring the Queen to his way of thinking. She leaned towards the by-course with Arran and early in June definitely commissioned Hunsdon to deal with him.[3] Walsingham wrote to Davison on the third of June:

'The poor gentlemen that are retired into this realm are like to receive but cold comfort, having fewer favourers here than I looked for and such become their enemies as neither the authority of their place nor the care they ought to have of her Majesty's safety doth make allowable in them. But it agreeth with the course we now hold here in displacing and depriving the best affected ministers. I look for no better fruits from them that use religion for policy and many times abuse it for faction.

'I will procure your revocation as soon as I may, for I am void of all hope of any good to follow of your travail there unless we were here more religious and resolute than we are.' [4]

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxiv, f. 81.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 123.
[3] Ibid., p. 171.
[4] S. P. Scotland, xxxv, no. 4.

While Davison was going about to stir up rebellion in Scotland and Hunsdon was making his advances to Arran, the hope of a third possible course, that of securing Mary Stuart's co-operation in Scotland, was not altogether abandoned. Walsingham wrote to Davison on the 3rd of June: 'The Queen of Scots begins now to grow somewhat calmer, offering to employ her credit for the relief of the distressed noblemen and to do any other thing that may procure her Majesty's favour to her, upon which she protests chiefly to depend.' [1] A fortnight later he wrote to Shrewsbury that he thought the treaty with Mary would be arranged.[2]

Of the three policies which offered at this juncture, Walsingham plainly preferred that of active intervention, but he seems to have thought the one of treating with Mary the most practicable. Like Bowes and Davison, he had come to the conclusion that Mary was entirely dominating her son at this time and that his policy in the north was at her command. Walsingham seems to have thought that if Mary could be sufficiently bound to keep, when free, the promises she had made when a prisoner, she might be given her liberty in exchange for the Scottish alliance. He had, however, ceased to become an open advocate of this policy since the discovery of the Throgmorton plot. His fundamental mistake, of course, was in presuming that Mary had any considerable influence over her son, but he shared that mistake with Robert Bowes, who was probably the best-informed Englishman on Scottish affairs at the time.

Walsingham's opposition to the by-course with Arran was founded on his absolute distrust of the man himself and on what he knew of his policy abroad. Walsingham was well informed of the dealings of Lord Seaton in France. He knew that a plot was under way to use James as an instrument for the invasion of England. He knew that large offers were being made to the Spanish ambassador in Paris. He knew also that Arran's wife, who was even more shrewd and greedy than Arran himself, had been making secret advances to Mary Stuart.[3] He shared at first Davison's opinion that Arran was countenancing the by-course simply to divert Elizabeth from assisting his enemies.

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 172. [2] Ibid., p. 191.
[3] *Cal. Border Papers*, i, p. 165.

Later he found another explanation for Arran's behaviour in France. 'I suppose', he wrote to the English ambassador at Paris, 'the Scottish King's earnest seeking of her Majesty's friendship, upon a sudden, both by speeches delivered to Mr. Davison as also by letters written unto the Lord of Hunsdon, proceedeth of the cold answer they received from thence [France]. It is conceived here that your King there is disposed to live at quiet with his neighbours and had as lief have the amity of England as of Scotland.' [1]

Walsingham's distrust of Arran was well founded, but he lost sight of the fact that Arran had a fine eye for the main chance and was no more wedded to France or Spain or Mary Stuart than he was to England. Arran was for Arran, and particularly for Arran's wife. He was in fact prepared to sell out to the highest bidder, so that the 'by-course' was not quite so hopeless as Walsingham believed it.

Elizabeth at any rate was disposed to give it a trial. Late in June 1584 she prepared to send Lord Hunsdon to Scotland with that end in view. But with characteristic duplicity she did not altogether reject the alternative. When Davison wrote to Walsingham early in July that he found the prospects of a successful rebellion in Edinburgh distinctly good, Walsingham was able to give him some slight encouragement from the Queen herself. On the 12th of July he wrote to Davison:

'Your last of the 5th of July hath so far forth prevailed with *her Majesty* as *she* is now pleased for the *furniture* of the *Castle* that there should be delivered for the *provision* of *victuals* unto *Alexander Erskine* or to any other person that you shall think meet two hundred pounds if a less sum may not serve. She thinketh meet also that you should nourish in the *well affected* hope of *her* favour and *assistance* so as that the yielding thereof may fall out honourable for *her* and profitable for the *cause*, with likelihood of *better success* than hath heretofore accompanied

[1] 2 July 1584, S. P. France, xii, f. 1. Walsingham wrote to Davison, 2 Aug. 1584, 'I learn certainly by espial from *France* that the *French king* is not greatly affected unto the *king of Scots* and so I suppose *Seaton* advertiseth his master. They build altogether upon *Spain* and the evil affected within this realm.' (S. P. Scotland, xxxvi, no. 5, words in italics in cipher.) It is to be observed that Mauvissière, the French ambassador in London, was opposed to Hunsdon's by-course. His reactions on the Scottish situation at this juncture will be found in Teulet, *op. cit.* iii. 295–6, 298 ff., 308–9, 325. On the question of the succession cf. Teulet, iii. 317.



The original draft in Walsingham's hand and the letter as sent to Wm. Davison, 12 July, 1584
From the originals in the P.R.O., S. P. Scotland, xxxv, nos. 55, 54

their former attempts. . . . For that your former letters through lack of a cipher were somewhat dark, her pleasure now is you should, by use of the cipher, set down fully and plainly what you think meet to be imparted unto her touching the present state of things there, and whether there is any *hope of a party* and what ground you have to conceive that the *Castle of Edinburgh*, being held where it is, may serve to so good purpose as your letter doth import. *She* hath no good opinion of any good success of the *by-course* and yet hath seen good to make some trial, in doubt of *redress* any other way.' [1]

In the same letter Walsingham set down some of his own reflections on the by-course which throw considerable light upon the alignment of the privy councillors on the question: 'Touching the *by-course* between *Lord Hunsdon* and the *Earl of Arran* there is nothing to help it but time and trial. You know *Lord Hunsdon's* passion, whose propinquity in blood doth somewhat prevail to enable his credit to more harm than good. And yet herein he should not greatly prevail were he not countenanced by the *Lord Treasurer*, who dealeth strangely in the action of *Scotland*. I find that men begin to look to the sun rising and therefore it will behoove her Majesty to make much of faithful servants.' [2]

Still more illuminating is Walsingham's original draft of this passage which he apparently thought it well to revise before sending: 'Touching the by-course . . . you know D. C. [Hunsdon's] passion, whose propinquity in blood doth somewhat prevail here, especially being countenanced by B [Burghley] who doth use H as a counterpoise to L [Leicester] though, God wot, he be but a weak one. B. hath always liked to entertain by-courses, which groweth from lack of resolution in him, which, I pray God, may not prove the destruction of England.' [3]

It is evident from Walsingham's allusion to the 'sun rising' that the nearness of James to the English succession was beginning to be an important factor in the attitude of the English privy councillors towards him. Burghley had heretofore been

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxv, no. 54, words in italics in cipher.

[2] Ibid., words in italics in cipher.

[3] Ibid., no. 55. Boyd does not give this draft in his calendar, assuming perhaps that it contained no information not given in the letter as sent. The abbreviations in this draft are not explained. The explanations given here in brackets are conjectural.

regarded as a champion of the Suffolk line, but from now on both he and the Cecils after him seem to have come to the conclusion that James was the most probable successor and to have played their cards accordingly. Hunsdon undoubtedly cherished the hope of marrying either his niece or his daughter, it is not quite clear which, to James himself. Davison informed Burghley that this was the 'chief scope of the secret traffic between him and Arran'.[1] Leicester seems to have abandoned his scheme of marrying his stepdaughter to James, and until his son's death in August 1584 appears to have been trying to arrange a match between him and Arabella Stuart, with a view to having her made Elizabeth's successor, and barring James, an intrigue which recalls curiously that of Leicester's father for Lady Jane Grey. It is clear that Leicester was up to some secret practice in Scotland at this time, although, when Walsingham charged him with it, he denied it. Roger Ashton was his instrument.[2]

Where Walsingham stood on this difficult question of the succession it is not easy to state with certainty. He had generally been thought to favour the claims of the Earl of Huntingdon. The probabilities are that the consciousness of his own failing health, together with his lack of sons, made him more or less indifferent to what happened after Elizabeth died. In this vein he wrote to Hunsdon late in the year :

'I am not ignorant what hard bruits have been given out against me, both in Scotland and elsewhere, that I seek to disgrace the present government in Scotland, thereby to render the King's person hateful in respect of some particular favour I should carry to some pretended successor here within this realm; whereof I would to God the authors were as free from malice as I am from any such conceit, wherein I appeal to God and desire that his vengeance may light upon me and my posterity if I do not write as I think. For as I hope never to live to see a successor, so do I not mean by entering into such provident courses as by seeking to provide for future times, to hazard the

[1] 27 July 1584, *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, pp. 238, 318; cf. also Fontenay to Mary Stuart, not dated, but certainly belonging after July 1584 (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 274, where it is wrongly ascribed to January 1582/3).

[2] 13 August 1584, Walsingham to Davison: 'I fear *Leicester* hath some dealing underhand there. I have charged him withal but he denieth it. And if he have *Ashton* is the man, who God wot, is but a weak instrument.' (S. P. Scotland, xxxvi, no. 15, words in italics in cipher.)

loss of the present benefit I now enjoy by her Majesty's singular favour and goodness.'[1]

The whole matter is a good deal in the dark. Elizabeth's mortal antipathy to any suggestion of a successor made the councillors all extremely wary about showing their inclinations.

But to return to Scotland. Early in August Walsingham seems to have been inclining some way towards the by-course himself. He wrote to Davison on the 2nd of August: 'I would he [Arran] might be made an instrument to secure the King's favour towards the poor banished noblemen. Besides his own safety he should thereby do his master good service . . . to his profit in the present and future. But where passion and the desire of revenge reigneth, it is hard to give advice that will profit.'[2] Elizabeth, however, drew back at this juncture and sent orders to Hunsdon not to enter Scotland until Arran had first come, according to his promise, to a conference at the Border.[3] Walsingham, who had to send the order, protested to Hunsdon that it was given contrary both to Lord Burghley's advice and his (Walsingham's) own. To Davison he wrote: 'How coldly her Majesty is affected to *Lord Hunsdon* you may gather by the answer touching his repair into *Scotland*. And yet, for my own opinion, I wish a thorough trial and am sorry his repair thither is delayed.'[4]

One confusing element was removed from the general chaos early in August when Arran, suspecting the practices of Erskine, had him removed from the command of the castle. On the 4th of August Davison had written that Erskine was 'resolved to ride out all storms for five or six months at the least', but when the demand to surrender came he yielded, or rather fled. There was nothing left now, Davison declared, but the by-course.[5]

Elizabeth came to that conclusion, at all events, and she bade Hunsdon urge forward the interview with Arran, with promises that he should 'taste of the fruits of her favour'.[6] Walsingham told Davison that he might as well be home and 'such instruments be employed in that realm as my Lord Hunsdon shall like of'.

[1] 7 Nov. 1584, *Cal. Border Papers*, i, p. 166.
[2] S. P. Scotland, xxxvi, no. 5.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 248.
[4] S. P. Scotland, xxxvi, no. 5.
[5] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, pp. 254, 256.
[6] Ibid., p. 257.

'I am glad', he added in a postcript, 'you dealt so warily touching *Edinburgh Castle*, otherwise *Hunsdon* would have made his profit thereof both to yours and my disgrace. I only made *her Majesty* acquainted with the matter. I do assure you the most part of our *councillors* do incline to both the *K. and Q. of Scots*. I never saw so great discontentment as well in *court* as elsewhere as presently reigneth. *Arran* sendeth the *M. of Gray* to *Hunsdon* to discover unto *him* the *Q. of Scots* practices under the colour of an extraordinary care *Arran* showeth to have of *her Majesty's* safety. The matter is only imported to the *Lord Treasurer*. I know all is but abuse as I will show you at your return which I will procure with all expedition, for *Hunsdon* will work your disgrace if you stay there.

'I fear *Leicester* hath some dealing underhand there. I have charged him withal, but he denieth it. And if he have *Ashton* is the man who, God wot, is but a weak instrument.

'You do well to deal warily with *Fowler*. I suspect he is but for an underminer. The letters he delivered are of no great importance. I do sometimes deliver such baits to my instruments to be delivered unto their entertainers as stolen ware, by corruption of some about me.'[1]

Hunsdon met Arran on the 14th of August at the border-side and held a long conference with him. Arran set about to justify the King's hostility to Mar, Angus and the Ruthven faction by charging them with further conspiracy against the crown. He denied that James had had any dealings with the Pope or with the King of Spain, or had entered into any association with his mother. He insisted that his master was well disposed towards Elizabeth, promised to reveal all he knew about plottings against her and asked for a passport for the Master of Gray whom James meant to dispatch with his full mind to Elizabeth. What passed between the two regarding Hunsdon's marriage project or other matters, Hunsdon did not see fit to write to Walsingham in the letter which is the only record preserved of the interview.[2] Hunsdon was on the whole well

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxvi, no. 15.

[2] 14 Aug. 1584, printed in Calderwood, iv, pp. 171–5, not given in Boyd's *Calendar*. Regarding this interview, Melville in his *Memoirs* (p. 329) wrote as follows: 'There was a meeting . . . at the borders . . . between the Earl of Hunsdon and the Earl of Arran who had long and privy conference together . . . with a secret complot that the Earl of Arran should keep the King unmarried for three years. In so doing there was a young maid of the blood in England that would be about that time ready for marriage, with the which the Queen would declare his Majesty second person,' &c.

satisfied with the interview and wrote to Davison that he hoped it would have better effect ' than many in Scotland and England look for '.[1]

Hunsdon's report reached the Queen's hands just as she was about to take horse from Oatlands ' towards a little progress '. Walsingham was not with her at the moment, so she directed Burghley to make her reply to Hunsdon.

' She could ', Burghley wrote, ' perceive no such ground of matter worth your meeting whereupon to build any certainty with the Scottish King or to give faith to Arran. For she says that his answers to most part of your articles of charge are either so general that they contain no certainty or are so manifestly untrue in divers points that either she has cause to think that Arran cares not what he says to serve his purpose or else is made more ignorant of the King's actions than he would seem to be, and so is abused himself or that he is appointed to abuse her Majesty. . . . And now for the coming of the Master of Gray . . . to discover to her Majesty matters of importance, her Majesty doubts greatly of his good meaning, being, as is certainly known, a professed servitor to the Scottish Queen and by common report either a great papist or worse. But she is content to make proof of him.' [2]

Three days later Walsingham sent Hunsdon Gray's passport.

' It is a hard and strange course ', Walsingham wrote, ' that the Earl Arran should suffer himself to be made an instrument of such slandrous imputations, and seek to deface and make the noblemen odious to the Queen of England and to all the world, thereby to thrust himself into the charge of Edinburgh Castle and to frustrate her Majesty's reasonable request for their relief. She herself, being touched in honour, cannot in reason look for any sincere dealings at his hands who shall devise such false and malicious plots. For mine own part, as one that loves and honours your Lordship, I cannot but wish you may receive better measure at his hands than I fear me you shall.' [3]

Both Burghley's letters and Walsingham's irritated Hunsdon not a little. He attributed the Queen's attitude entirely to the machinations of Leicester, Davison, and Walsingham. It must have been to Walsingham that he referred when he wrote to Burghley : ' Belike he is angry that I made him not acquainted

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 280.

[2] Ibid., p. 286 ; on Arran's answers to Hunsdon, cf. Calderwood, iv, pp. 176 ff.

[3] 23 Aug. 1584, S. P. Scotland, xxxvi, no. 41.

with the letter I wrote to her Majesty, imagining belike that I had written something therein against the earls or else offended that I writ what Arran had told me of them at Foulden. . . . I am sorry to see that some from malice and some from ambition, and thereby offended that they themselves have not the credit of it, . . . do practise to hinder so good a matter by all the policy they can.' Hunsdon went on to say that Davison was offended because he had not been appointed to deal with Arran and that Leicester had sought by Ashton's and Fowler's means to draw the negotiations into his own hands. 'Truly', he added, 'I would any of them had the dealing of it, provided they would deal as they ought to do for her Majesty's honour and the quiet of the state.' He ended by recommending that the Master of Gray be well used.[1]

So the matter stood for about a month, Hunsdon in his correspondence still pleading eloquently for the by-course and still very outspoken in his condemnation of Walsingham and Leicester for their opposition to it. 'I am heartily sorry', he wrote to Burghley on the 11th of September, 'to see two principal councillors have so small care for her Majesty's estate for their private causes to lose her Majesty a King . . . the one for malice that he was not so used as he looked for, which they say was long of himself, the other by ambition because he is not made the instrument in this action, or else there is further matter worse than this.'[1]

Davison was called home late in August and the next step to be expected was obviously the coming of the Master of Gray. But Gray inexplicably did not come. Hunsdon wrote sharply to Arran on the 13th of September urging that Gray be sent at once and Arran sent back an inconclusive excuse.[2] September passed and still no Gray. On the 1st of October Hunsdon wrote to Burghley to excuse the delay and to take another crack at his opponents, who were seeking, he said, to dampen his ardour for the by-course by charging him with the hope of a royal marriage for some of his kin.[3] But Hunsdon, nevertheless, was beginning to be somewhat shaken in his faith in Arran and wrote him on the 13th of October that he saw no sufficient reason for Gray's

[1] 29 August, 1584, S. P. Scotland, xxxvi. no. 72.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 328. [3] Ibid., pp. 332. 345.

delay.[1] This letter was effective, and Gray was dispatched on the 14th of October 1584 with a very wide and vague commission 'to treat, confer, deliberate and conclude in all matters betwixt us and our dearest sister.' The King wrote to Burghley that Gray was given special commission to deal with him. 'I have heard', James wrote, 'how ye have been the man about your sovereign these times bygone who has had the chief and only care of the well-doing of my affairs there.' Arran wrote to Hunsdon that Gray was to be guided entirely by Hunsdon's advice and was to have no more to do with Leicester than Hunsdon should think meet.[2]

Hunsdon saw Gray at Berwick and formed a very good opinion of his religion. It was said he was a Papist. Hunsdon declared he wished 'all ours [our Papists] were such' and went on to relate how they had gone to church together and how Gray had said the service and sung the psalms 'as well as I could do, whereby it seems he had been used to them or else he could not have done it so well or so readily.'[3] We may exonerate Hunsdon of any pride in his psalm-singing.

In a letter of the same date to Burghley, Hunsdon wrote that Gray was expressly commanded to be ruled by Burghley's advice and Hunsdon's. He said that Gray had shown him all his letters, and that the King would neither write nor deal with Mr. Secretary, 'for, said he, "I know him to be my great enemy."'[4]

In view of all these things, perhaps the most remarkable feature of Gray's mission is the way in which he was won over from the party of Hunsdon to that of Walsingham. This was probably due to the fact that Walsingham discovered an opening breach between Gray and Arran and saw in Gray a fit instrument with which to turn Arran out of power. Furthermore, Gray soon convinced Walsingham that he was quite opposed to Mary Stuart and in no wise designed to deal in her behalf. Mary had received permission in November to send Nau, her secretary, to court, for the purpose of treating for her liberty It was her

[1] Ibid., p. 361.
[2] Ibid., pp. 362, 365.
[3] Ibid., p. 366, 19 Oct. 1584.
[4] Ibid., p. 369. It appears that Gray was beginning to pull wool over Hunsdon's eyes at this point, for he had in fact in his wallet a friendly letter from James to Walsingham (ibid., p. 364).

expectation that Gray and Nau would act together, but Gray refused to have anything to do with Nau. In fact their relations were such that Nau declared in the presence of William Waad, clerk of the Privy Council, that his mistress would settle Gray's hash in Scotland, or words to that effect, and Mary wrote to her son to complain of Gray's conduct.[1]

This explains why Walsingham set himself to further Gray's embassy so far as he could. Both Leicester and Sir Philip Sidney, recently married to Walsingham's daughter, co-operated. Gray himself was a singularly handsome man ; ' a proper gentleman ' Melville called him, ' of a trim spirit and fair speech '.[2] So he made good progress with the Queen. His promise to reveal the plots against Elizabeth brewed by the Guises in Scotland he did not fulfil to the Queen's satisfaction. And he was more passionate in his demands for the delivery of the Scottish refugee noblemen than suited her taste. Yet she was on the whole well pleased with his bearing and wrote to Arran late in December that she was glad the King her good brother had so rare and grateful a servant.[3]

The positive results of his mission are not apparent. He did not give the desired information, but the capture of Creighton on the high seas and the miraculous recovery of his papers pretty well satisfied Elizabeth's curiosity on that point. His bearing towards Mary Stuart was well pleasing to her. His covert antagonism to Arran made him a promising instrument, and she accordingly yielded so far to his demands as to order Mar and Angus and Glamis to retire from the Border to Oxford, where Gray said in derision that they were to be put to school, where at any rate they were separated from their followers, who had begun to gather in some numbers at Newcastle. They complained, of course, but without avail. The most Elizabeth would do for them at the moment was to send six hundred pounds to help meet their expenses.[4]

Gray seems to have been successful not only in gaining Walsingham and Leicester's confidence, but to a considerable extent also in changing the attitude of his master towards these

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, pp. 483, 495 ; Labanoff, *Lettres de Marie Stuart*, vi, p. 85.
[2] Melville, *Memoirs*, p. 329.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, pp. 499, 500.
[4] Ibid., pp. 512, 532, 546.

two councillors. Late in November James wrote a very friendly letter to Leicester, and after Gray's return to Scotland he could write to Walsingham, 'I assure you the King his Majesty hath fully forgot his former wrath he did bear towards you'.[1]

One of the most important results of his mission was to persuade Elizabeth that her fears and hopes of Mary's power in Scotland were alike baseless. The negotiations with her were kept up during the spring, but the need for her was gone. Gray returned to Scotland sometime in January. He wrote to Walsingham from Edinburgh on the 24th of January that the King had been very much provoked by his mother's treatment of Gray and that the royal council had voted unanimously that 'the association was a thing very disadvantageous both for the King, his Majesty, and the country and consequently worthy to be annulled for ever'.[2] He said further that Fontaine, Mary's ambassador, had been invited to leave the country; but he told Walsingham, as he told Elizabeth herself, that the King was very wroth against the banished noblemen, and recommended that for the sake of his goodwill they be removed from the Border as quietly as possible. He concluded in a way which shows that factions were still alive in the Council: 'Pray her Majesty to keep it secret that I write to you, for avoiding of jealousy. Remember that my Lord Hunsdon writ, the where you know.'[3]

The one fly in the ointment was James's rooted antagonism to the exiled nobles. Gray urged Elizabeth not only to move them from the Border but to banish them from her kingdom. He made the same plea with regard to the fugitive Scottish preachers, Melville and the rest, pointing out to her that their 'democraticall' designs were hostile to all princes.[4] Here he clearly laid his finger on one of Elizabeth's fundamental objections to Presbyterianism, and forecast James's famous speech on that subject later. Naturally Gray used no such arguments to Walsingham, whose sympathies were well known.

King James was so virulent in his pursuit of the exiled noblemen that not long after Gray's return he dispatched his Justice Clerk, Sir Louis Bellenden, to Elizabeth with an account of

[1] Ibid., pp. 425, 620.
[2] *Papers of the Master of Gray* (ed. Bannatyne Club), p. 42.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 540.
[4] Ibid., p. 541.

a plot, probably fabricated, against her person, in which the exiles were involved, and a renewed demand for their surrender, or at least for their banishment. At the same time Bellenden was to dabble a little in marriage matters, encourage Hunsdon to believe that the King was still favourable to his plans and approach the Queen herself with proposals of a match with her own august person.[1]

How much Bellenden accomplished in these matters is not recorded, although it is pretty clear that he was of Gray's faction and opposed to Arran.[2] Elizabeth sent her answer to his chief demands by the hand of Edward Wotton, a cousin of Walsingham, who was dispatched to Scotland in May with instructions to refuse the King's demands for the noblemen, and to urge him to enter with her into a joint league in defence of the Gospel.[3] She had begun to feel the urgent necessity of such a course in view of the events in France, the League of Joinville particularly. At the same time Wotton was to convey to the King a gift of fine horses and to offer him a present of four thousand pounds with apologies that the Queen's expenses abroad prevented her from offering more.[4]

Wotton did not reach Edinburgh until the very last of May. At Berwick he received a letter from Walsingham, who had been advised by Archibald Douglas that the King would not be satisfied with four thousand pounds. Walsingham wrote that he thought Wotton had better defer the offer of pension as long as possible. ' For it is likely ', he added, ' that ere it be long there will fall out some more necessary occasion to press us to have a greater care of the assuring of Scotland, and then we shall perhaps be better able to prevail in persuading her Majesty to yield to the increasing of the same.' Four days later, however,

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, pp. 560, 563, 569, 570. Bellenden was also directed to countenance Raleigh and not to make Hunsdon jealous by too much dealing with Leicester. It is worth noting that Bellenden was directed not to mention the Hunsdon match to Burghley.

[2] It is not impossible that Bellenden discussed the question of the murder of Arran when he was in England. Wotton wrote to Gray a little later that the murder of Arran had been expected in England before his (Wotton's) arrival in Scotland (*Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 663).

[3] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 643. Wotton was also instructed to organize a party against Arran (*Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 682).

[4] The amount of money sent is left blank in Wotton's instructions, but cf. *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 656.

Walsingham wrote in a less encouraging vein: 'We grow here more secure upon the late advertisements received out of France, which I fear will hinder the increase of the promised support to the King there upon a conceit that the House of Guise is growing to his declination. I pray God our ambassador that sendeth these news be not deceived.' [1]

Two days later Walsingham instructed Wotton, by the Queen's command, to take up the question of the King's marriage with Gray and Bellenden and to suggest the daughter of the King of Denmark as a foreign match or Lady Arabella Stuart as a domestic one. He further told Wotton not to deliver a letter which he bore from the Queen to Arran until he had first consulted Gray and Bellenden. In a postcript in cipher Walsingham added: 'You shall do well so to carry yourself towards *Gray* as *Bellenden* may take no suspicion thereof; but *Gray* is the sound man and that standeth best affected to the *Earl of Angus* and his *associates*, of whom *Maitland* has no great liking as *Gray* will show you, as also how that may be helped. You shall do well to confer with *Gray* whether this *offer of marriage* be to be imparted to Bellenden.' [2]

Wotton had been in Edinburgh only a few days when Gray, Bellenden and Secretary Maitland approached him with a project to cut off the Earl of Arran by violence, desiring to know what support Elizabeth would lend to such a project. Wotton refused to give any advice in the matter except to say that he thought his mistress ought not to hear of it before it was done.[3]

Walsingham, as soon as he heard of the project went at once to Leicester.

'Whereupon', Walsingham wrote to Wotton, 'it was found meet by us both, to confer with *Archibald Douglas*, for that we did not like of the overture made by *Bellenden*, the *Master of Gray* and *Maitland* being over violent, and did thereupon request him to dissuade *Gray* and *Bellenden* from the same, especially during the time of your abode there—for that it would be thought that you were a practicer thereof. We do very well allow of your answer unto them upon their overture, for we cannot think that God will prosper any such *bloody attempts*, whereunto that *nation* is overmuch bent. It is also to be doubted that upon the least show of

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 644–5.
[2] Ibid. ii. 645–6, words in italics in cipher.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, pp. 654–5.

assent thereunto, they would be content to make us here the authors thereof, and therefore it behoveth us to deal warily with them. And for my own part I would rather advise to give place to the *reconciliation*, whereof *Gray* made mention, between him and *Arran*, than to have recourse to so indiscreet a remedy.'[1]

This letter makes it sufficiently evident that Walsingham was no favourer of violent measures. His views prevailed and the violent course was abandoned.

Meanwhile Wotton heard that the King was not yet disposed to marry, and that when he was he would be guided by Leicester's and Walsingham's advice.[2] Both Wotton and Gray urged Walsingham to induce the Queen to increase the amount of her offer to the King to twenty thousand crowns at least, but Elizabeth, in view of her expenses on the Continent, especially of the stay of the English merchantmen in Spain, would not consent, and Walsingham advised Wotton to induce the King to accept that amount.[3]

Wotton found the King keen enough for a League with England, but he still deferred opening up the question of the pensions in the hope that the Queen would increase her offer. Walsingham, however, could give no hope of this and said so.[4] Indeed he got more desperate as time went on. On the 18th of June he wrote to Wotton :

'We are grown here to such an extreme kind of nearness as I see no hope to ge[t] the *Master of Gray* any relief from hence. I have already furnished him with 2,100, delivered unto him notwithstanding as a thing proceeding from her Majesty, for that otherwise he would not have accepted thereof. Sir Philip Sidney hath moved *Leicester* to be content to yield some present support until her Majesty may be wrought to make more account of the matter than presently she doth, but he yieldeth a deaf ear. *The Earl of Arran*, having for her sake given over all other courses with no small hazard to himself, deserveth a more thankful requital than I fear he shall receive.

'I am sorry (seeing our indisposition such as it is) that I have taken so great care, and have been at so great charges, for the preserving of the amity of that crown. And I am no less sorry also that it should be your mishap to be employed there at this present. There is no remedy but that you must put on a good

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 648, words in italics in cipher.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 660.
[3] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 651.
[4] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 673 ; *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 652.

countenance on the matter, for if you should droop, it would breed a great discouragement in the best affected there, and force them to run some other course. And yet I fear *Mr. Douglas* who seeth our coldness, will acquaint them therewith. He hath notwithstanding promised me to forbear to do so for a time; but I doubt it greatly, for that he saith he can not with his credit betray the[m] that trust him. He is greatly perplexed with the matter, for that the *Master of Gray* was only by his persuasion wrought to take the course that he doth. I fear our state is come to that period as that we may say, Salus ipsa non potest servare hanc rempub[licam].' [1]

It is clear that while Walsingham and Leicester were hoping to secure Arran's removal through the instrumentality of Gray, Hunsdon still cherished his by-course with Arran. Walsingham wrote to Wotton on the 23rd of June:

'There are some here that are enemies unto *Gray*, I might say enemies to *her Majesty*, that would have wrought a hard conceit in *her* against him, and therefore that course [of removing Arran by assassination] is no way to be liked of. I marvel, considering the general dislike had of *Arran*, that the lords that are his enemies do not with one assent repair unto the *King* and to press him to *remove* so dangerous an instrument from about him. It is to be thought that the *King* by fear would be driven to yield thereunto. It is also advertised that *Arran* doth mortally hate *Bellenden, the Justice Clerk*, but of *Maitland* the *Secretary* not a word. The said lord [Hunsdon] beareth some in hand that *Arran* hath a great party there, which I know to be untrue and do therefore give less credit unto the rest.' [2]

A little later Walsingham suspected that Burghley also was in favour of the by-course. 'I have some cause to doubt', Walsingham wrote to Wotton on the 28th of July, 'that *Burghley* is affected to *Arran*, and therefore you shall do well to write warily in anything that concerneth *Arran*. I was hardly handled by *Burghley* and *Hunsdon* at my being in *Scotland* who had at that time some inward intelligence with *Arran*, both to my disgrace and the hindrance of her Majesty's service.' [3]

Meantime Wotton proceeded to negotiate for a league. He

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 654, words in italics in cipher.

[2] Ibid. 656–7, words in italics in cipher.

[3] Ibid. 663, words in italics in cipher. The original of this letter is in Walsingham's own hand, and there is not reason to suppose (as the editor of the calendar does) that this was an abstract from another person's letter.

wrote to Walsingham on the 30th of June that he had come to the conclusion, after consultation with Gray and others, that the wisest course was to keep an eye on Arran and complete the league. After that was ratified he would intercede with the King for the exiled lords and Arran would be removed, either by a joint protest of the noblemen to the King, as Walsingham had suggested, or else by force. Wotton was in favour of a moderate course if possible and thought the disposing of Arran had better be left until after he, Wotton, had withdrawn from Scotland.[1]

So the negotiations for the league went forward. Wotton wrote to Walsingham on the 8th of July that he had submitted to the King the Queen's precise proposals for a league and that James had received them with frank approval. He had also gratefully accepted the Queen's proferred pension.[2] The moment seemed favourable for broaching the cause of the exiled lords. They were growing weary of confinement, and had prayed the Queen either to assist them herself or to give them leave to work out their own salvation. Walsingham accordingly wrote to Wotton on the 16th of July instructing him to consult with Gray and other friends and then to urge the cause of the exiled lords to the King.[3] But Wotton argued so strongly against this course that it was left for a more favourable occasion. In the course of the negotiations the Scots requested that James might be made Duke of Cornwall and that Elizabeth should do nothing to the prejudice of his title to the English throne, but Walsingham thought it wise not to submit these suggestions to Elizabeth and advised Wotton to discourage them.[4]

Everything was going, on the whole, favourably, when at a meeting of the Border Wardens of England and Scotland Lord Russell was shot and killed. The affray seems to have been purely accidental, at least such was the idea which the English Warden, Sir John Forster, formed of it.[5] But the suspicion at once arose in Scotland that Arran had been at the bottom of it. Wotton declared it to have been prearranged between Arran and

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–5, p. 682.
[2] Ibid., 1585–6, p. 7.
[3] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 660.
[4] Ibid. 663.
[5] *Cal. Border Papers*, i. 188–9.

Fernehurst and advised that the Queen should make a great to-do about it.[1] Arran, at any rate, was warded and there was some talk of sending him to England for trial.

Walsingham, in writing to Wotton on the 2nd of August, somewhat exaggerated the facts of the case and demanded in the Queen's name adequate satisfaction, and particularly that either the murderer should be delivered or else that Fernehurst, who was held to be at the bottom of the matter, should be straightly dealt with.[2]

The next day he wrote to Wotton that Elizabeth was not disposed to send her promised support to the King until the treaty was concluded, particularly in view of 'the late unhappy accident'. In the same letter Walsingham made some further comment on Burghley's attitude. '*The Lord Treasurer*', he wrote, 'findeth himself very much aggrieved for that it hath been reported unto him that *Gray* and *Bellenden* should be informed that he hath done evil offices against them towards *her Majesty*, and that he should be enemy unto *the King*. He supposeth that this information should grow from *Leicester*. For my own part I can no way accuse him of any wrong done unto the two gentlemen, or that he should be enemy unto the *King* otherwise than, " pour faire le bon valet ", he hath showed himself somewhat straight touching the support. You know that *Leicester* is a shrewd enemy where he taketh.'[3]

On the 5th of August Walsingham wrote again that he had done his best to induce the Queen to demand Arran's delivery for trial, but that his efforts had been thwarted by Arran's friend in the council [Hunsdon].[4] Nevertheless Walsingham charged Wotton to make as much as he could of Arran's share in the offence, with a view to prolonging his imprisonment.

It was suggested at this juncture that the exiled lords should be

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1585–6, p. 47.

[2] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 665; cf. Forster's report in *Border Papers*, i. 188–9. Forster was called upon to make another report more useful in support of an exaggerated view of the affair. Even then Walsingham wrote: 'I utterly mislike Sir John Forster's report, being very phlegmatic. I had thought he would have urged the delivery of the warden' (*Hamilton Papers*, ii. 669).

[3] Ibid. ii. 665, words in italics in cipher.

[4] This must be Hunsdon. It can hardly be Leicester, as the editor suggests. Walsingham wrote on the same day that 'Burghley showeth himself well affected in the causes of Scotland' (ibid. ii. 666, 668).

sent to the Borders, as a kind of menace. Walsingham, however, was opposed to this course. 'I concur with you in opinion', he wrote to Wotton on the 7th of August, 'that the repair of *Mar*, *Angus* and *Glamis* into the *Borders* will rather prejudice than help the cause. This day I mean to confer with Mr. Archibald Douglas about the matter, who shall acquaint *Gray* and the *Justice Clerk* with our resolution and with the course that is held here.'[1]

At all events, the to-do accomplished little so far as Arran was concerned. James released him from the Castle of St. Andrews early in August and sent him to his own home where he was kept under some kind of restraint.[2] The worst of it was that Gray came forward himself as a mediator for Arran at this juncture. Wotton heard that he had even accepted a bribe to secure Arran's release from St. Andrews. But both the Justice Clerk and the Secretary requested that Gray's fault should be overlooked for the present. Two days later Wotton reported that Gray was very penitent, that there was good hope of recovering him and that it would be well to overlook his fault.[3]

When Walsingham heard this news he wrote to Wotton that he was 'greatly amazed . . . to see so sudden a change in *Gray*, especially the same proceeding of so base a cause as profit'.

'I have', he added, 'not without great difficulty persuaded her Majesty to oversee the matter for a season, according to *Bellenden's* and *Maitland's* advice, though I see no great profit like to ensue thereby. For myself I give over all hope of *Scotland* otherwise than by force. I see no reason to think that *Bellenden* and *Maitland's* credit (now that *Arran* and *Gray* are reconciled) shall be able to prevail to keep the *King* in good terms with her Majesty. There are lately arrived in that realm one Hay, general of the Jesuits of the Scottish nation and one Durye that hath written against the ministers in Scotland. . . . They are sent from the Duke of Guise with very large offers unto *the King*. It may be that they have had some dealing underhand with *Gray* which hath wrought the alteration in him; being one not settled in any religion. . . . I see so great treachery in that nation as I have no desire at all to have any extraordinary dealing with them. Though *Bellenden* and *Maitland* profess soundness as *Gray* did yet I know that they both heretofore were well affected unto the

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 669, words in italics in cipher.
[2] *Cal. Scottish*, 1585–6, pp. 60, 61.
[3] Ibid.; cf. Melville's *Memoirs*, p. 344.

Queen of Scots, and yet are they not rashly to be shaken off. My great care now is to work your revocation, which will not be until some order be taken for the redress of the Lord Russell's death. . . . I suppose *Fernehurst* shall not be delivered, which if it shall so fall out, then it is meant that *Angus*, *Mar and Glamis* shall repair to the *Borders*, who are borne in hand by their friends that they shall bring anything to pass in *Scotland* that they desire. The *Queen* meaneth not in any case to use *Arran's* service, as a man full of treachery.' [1]

Francis Milles, one of Walsingham's secretaries, wrote to Wotton by the same post that he had been on the point of leaving for Scotland with ten thousand crowns for the King and two thousand angels to be distributed to Gray, Bellenden, and Maitland, when the news of Gray's treachery had stayed the whole proceeding. He added that Gray's revolt ' hath turned the galls of men here, makes some laugh in their sleeves '. He added that Walsingham was working hard for Wotton's revocation. ' " And then ", quod he, " let them send whom they list, Dr. Dale or some such, for as for me I will trust no more of the nation "—with sundry other passionate speeches.' Milles said further that Archibald Douglas had written to the King on the subject and advised him to recall the exiled noblemen as the only way to allay the Queen's wrath. ' Were you at home,' Milles concluded, ' I believe they would be left to sink or swim.' [2]

A week later Walsingham wrote to Wotton again that Gray had complained in his letter to Douglas of the changed attitude towards him and had attributed this to the practices of Bellenden and Maitland, who were working in the interests of Mary Stuart. ' He voweth to be altogether at *her Majesty's devotion*, whereof he offereth to make a most manifest proof if *Angus* and *Mar* would come down to the Borders to join with the Earl of *Morton* and such other friends as he can procure. . . . This is the substance of his letter to his friend—what to believe or what to advise you I know not. I know that *Bellenden* did greatly waver in his courses while he was here and that *Maitland* was always, until late, devoted unto *Mary Stuart*. The best is to deal warily with them all, for they are all born under one climate '.[3]

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii 673–4, words in italics in cipher.
[2] Ibid. ii. 677–8.
[3] Ibid. 681. Archibald Douglas had written to Gray 2 August, telling

On the 25th of August Wotton wrote to Walsingham that Gray had made some complaint of his hard favour and had proposed a plan to cure all the current ills of Scotland. Arran, he had said, was so strongly intrenched in the King's affection that there was no hope of anything so long as he continued in favour. He therefore proposed that Elizabeth, taking advantage of Lord Russell's death, should 'let slip the lords, who if they may have from her some support of money, will by their friends here and such as they may levy for money, be able to take *Arran* and to seize the *King's* person, whereunto they shall have the best help he can give them by himself and his faction'.[1]

But Walsingham found Elizabeth wary of Gray and in no mood to spend any more good money on perfidious Scotsmen.

'I can by no means persuade *her Majesty* to write to *Gray*, neither will she, in respect of the jealousy had of the *King's* cunning and unsound dealing, yield unto him the *pension* promised. And as for any liberality to be extended unto *Maitland* and *Bellenden* I see no hope to bring the same to pass—so as I conclude that *Scotland* will be lost, for the preserving whereof I have bestowed a great deal of care and cost in vain; and therefore I am now full resolved [not] to have any further dealing therein than as the rest of my colleagues. The poor Earls of *Angus and Mar* receive here little comfort otherwise than from poor *me*; so as our course is to alienate all the world from us.'[2]

Yet the Queen at any rate assented to Walsingham's writing to Gray to assure him that she put no faith in the rumours of his treachery and held him still her friend.[3] Two days later Walsingham sent to Wotton his reaction on the proposed scheme of the Master of Gray:

'The Q[ueen's] Majesty of her own natural disposition, doth not like of violent courses. And although she confesseth the danger to be great that the *Master of Gray* hath laid before you, yet she doubteth greatly that the remedy by him propounded may bring withal greater peril than the disease itself.

'You know that they that are hardly drawn to resolve, can not

him that he was in disgrace at the English court; that Bellenden and Maitland had informed against him; that Elizabeth was disposed to let slip the exiled lords upon Scotland, and bade him urge James to prevent this by calling the lords home. *Papers of the Master of Gray*, pp. 50–3.

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 683. [2] Ibid. 694, words in italics in cipher.

[3] *Papers of the Master of Gray*, pp. 55–6.

easily be induced to attempt anything subject to hazard. And therefore councillors of state must deal like wise physicians, that do apply the remedy agreeable to the nature of the patient, and not that which may seem most proper for the disease. Yet can I not deny but that course in this, and such like cases, is most subject to danger, especially in perilous diseases—for the applying of lenitives when corrosives should serve, though it yieldeth ease for a season, yet in the end it rendereth the disease incurable. I pray God it fall not so out in this present case. Her Majesty would have you let the *Master of Gray* understand how greatly she thinketh herself beholden unto him, having showed himself (as well by acquainting you with the disease, as by propounding a remedy) very careful that the well begun course, profitable for both their Majesties, should not by indirect practices, be intercepted. For my own private opinion, as well for *Gray's* safety and his friends, as also for the good-will I bear to *Angus and Mar*, whose case I find so desperate, as I am well near out of hope of any remedy otherwise than from above—I could have liked that the remedy propounded by *Gray* might have been allowed of. For if *Arran* come to enjoy *James* ear the peril of such as stand well affected to *England* will grow irreparable, and so consequently the interruption of that happy course that by all honest men is desired. But seeing He that ruleth all hath so appointed it, I see no other remedy but patience and prayer.' [1]

Four days later, however, on the 10th of September, Walsingham was more hopeful:

'Your letters of the first of September hath bred some better liking of the plot set down by *Gray* than before. The advice of *Burghley* and *Leicester* is only used therein, who do both allow of it. This day the full resolution will be taken, and I hope such as will fall out to *Gray's* contentment. The Earls of *Angus* and *Mar* will be *let slip* as also *Glamis*, who is of best *judgement* among them. The *Queen* will in no sort neither by *support* or otherwise make *herself* a party. The burden of the charges will light upon *me*. The delay of answer, which you desired with speed, proceeded through *Burghley's* absence from court. . . . I hope . . . you shall receive direction to repair to the Lord Scroope to confer with him . . . so as you shall be *absent* at the *attempt*; but you must leave your *train* at *Sterling* to avoid *suspicion*.' [2]

But two days later again Walsingham found the Queen once

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 695–6, words in italics in cipher.
[2] Ibid. 697, words in italics in cipher.

more wavering. She had promised James that Angus and his associates should be forthcoming and would not allow them to repair to the Borders until she was released of her promise. Burghley and Leicester both did their best to dissuade her, but to no purpose.[1] Walsingham therefore had to devise a scheme for satisfying the royal conscience. He accordingly wrote a formal letter to Wotton, to be shown to James, in which he said that the banished lords were seeking permission to bestow themselves abroad, 'some in the service of the King of Navarre, and some elsewhere in other service'. The Queen would not allow them to depart until James gave his assent.[2] But James perhaps saw through the device. He would not consent to the release of the lords. Wotton was of the opinion that the Queen had better pocket her conscience, and wrote that if the lords were sent down they would be able to work wonders, but Elizabeth still hesitated, in spite of Walsingham's reiterated urgings.[3] He himself was now thoroughly convinced of Gray's fidelity and more than ever suspicious of the King. He wrote to Wotton on the 24th of September:

'The bruits given out by the Papists both here and there touching the *King* I do assure you are not without cause; for he doth but dissemble in point of religion, whatsoever he professeth to the contrary. You did well to refuse to speak with *Arran* who in cunning and double dealing concurreth well in disposition with the *King*; and so doth the *Queen* conceive now of them both who is offended greatly with *Arran's* friend [Hunsdon?] for employing his agent whom you know [C. Armourer?]. He [Hunsdon] is now forbidden to send him [Armourer] any more to him [Arran] or to have any dealings with him. I fear notwithstanding, there will still be some practicing underhand.'[4]

On the 28th of September Walsingham wrote to Wotton again:

'There is now resolution taken in the causes concerning *Scotland* such as will not dislike you, which in sum is this—that *Glamis* is *licensed to go down* to the *Borders* to confer with his *friends* and by them to learn how men stand affected in *Scotland*. It is thought meet that *Angus* and *Mar* should not *go down* until it be seen what *party* they *have*. You know that their *repair*

[1] *Hamilton Papers*, ii. 698–9.
[2] Ibid. 698.
[3] Ibid. 701.
[4] Ibid. 702, words in italics in cipher.

into the *Borders* would, before things shall be in readiness in *Scotland*, put *Arran* in arms and his fautors. There is also a *support* of six hundred *angels* shall be sent by *Milles* for *Gray* to keep *him in strength*. Besides there is *support sent* to the *Earl of Morton* to keep him *afoot* until it be seen what *Glamis* can work.' [1]

Ten days later Wotton was instructed to take advantage of the King's refusal to deliver up Fernehurst at the Queen's request and return to Berwick. He started out quietly from Sterling on the 16th of October.[2] Angus and Mar arrived from the south the day after. In little over a fortnight they had possession of the King and Arran was a proclaimed traitor.[3]

James took the matter philosophically and revealed a prudent aptness to abide by the result. He confiscated Arran's property. He summoned a parliament at Linlithgow and by its means restored the banished lords to their estates and cleared them of their crimes. He made his peace with the ministers. When Elizabeth dispatched William Knollys to him to protest in her name that she had had no hand in the revolution, James declared himself satisfied and protested that his chief desire was to conclude a close league with England. From the English point of view the situation appeared very promising. Burghley wrote to Leicester on the 12th of January 1586: 'In Scotland, to outward appearance, all things proceed well. The King hath kept a parliament at Lythquoo [*sic*] where the lords that were banished are restored to their estates and are by the King cleared of the crimes imputed. He hath sent a gentleman of his chamber named Keith thereof to advertise her Majesty and to offer all friendship that he can to his power yield to her Majesty. He desireth to have the league that was begun to be finished. . . . Mr. Randolph is to go to the Scottish King and so the treaty, as I think, shall go forward.' [4]

Yet Burghley was not altogether certain of the outcome. In the same letter to Leicester he set forth the chief obstacles in the way of the treaty: 'Time', he wrote, 'must try these things, for we find that the French King hath sent, by sea, a baron of France, the son-in-law of Pinart, a man of great living but of

[1] Ibid. 704–5, words in italics in cipher. [2] Calderwood, iv. 380.
[3] *Papers of the Master of Gray*, pp. 58–9; Calderwood, iv. 381–92; Melville, *Memoirs*, 347 ff.
[4] Bruce, *Leicester Correspondence* (Camden Soc.), p. 52.

little understanding, and therefore he hath a shrewd instrument with him, called Courcelles whom your Lordship did, I think, know here with Mauvissière, a notable servitor to the Scottish Queen and the house of Guise; and, adding to this, that we understand how Lethington, the Secretary in Scotland and Robert Melville, who both remain in good credit with the King, are devoted to the King's mother and to France, we may doubt of the events.'[1]

Henry III did, in fact, dispatch an ambassador, the Baron d'Esneval, to Scotland late in December for the express purpose of preventing the league with England.[2] D'Esneval arrived there early in January 1586. It was reported in England that his luggage was unusually large and unusually heavy and it was generally believed that he carried with him large sums of money for the usual purpose.[3] Walsingham himself, who naturally regarded the league as the consummation of all his intrigues in Scotland, was very much afraid that French gold would prove more effectual than English promises. He wrote to Sir Edward Stafford on the 5th of February: 'What effect the said [French] Ambassador's negotiations will take is not yet known, but little good we may in reason look to come of it, for whereas Mr. Randolph is presently dispatched unto that realm to countermine the undermining of the French, we send but words only by him and the other bringeth treasure with him.... We have discovered that the money is delivered by Mendoza out of the King of Spain's purse which doth plainly show that Spain and France run one course against us both in this and in all other actions.'[4]

However, Randolph, who was an old hand at Scottish diplomacy, was able to hold his own against French intrigues. On the 24th of March Walsingham wrote to Leicester: 'By letters of 17th of March out of Scotland we hear that the King there doth yield all satisfaction unto her Majesty's minister Mr. Randolph and contrary measure unto the French King's minister, which he taketh in extreme evil part. I will send your Lordship the copy of such letters as we have received from Mr. Randolph, who receiveth at the King's hands far better

[1] Bruce, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–3.
[2] On this mission cf. Teulet, iv. 1–60.
[3] *Cal. Rutland Papers*, i. 187–8.
[4] S. P. France, xv, f. 41.

usage than he looked for. I pray this opportunity be not lost as others before have been. I find a greater coldness than the state of the present time requireth.'[1]

The coldness to which Walsingham referred lay of course in the Queen's disposition. As soon as Elizabeth discovered that James was really eager for the league she began to tell over her pennies. Five thousand pounds, she concluded, was too much to pay out for the King's pension at a time when she was deeply engaged in the Low Countries and pledged for large loans to Henry of Navarre. In spite of her previous promises, therefore, she would consent to no more than four thousand pounds. Walsingham was urging the necessity of some display of liberality, in the form of pensions, to the more influential Scottish courtiers. Oil of gold, as he put it later, was the best lubricant to make the wheels of the negotiations run smoothly. Elizabeth did not take kindly to the suggestion. 'I find no disposition in her Majesty', Walsingham wrote to Randolph on the 19th of March, 'to be at any charge with particular persons, which in my opinion will hinder the perfect assurance that otherwise we might have of that state by joining with us such as have most interest with the King, as the Secretary and others.'[2] A little later she raised the question of Lord Russell's murder again and protested that she would pay no pension until she had received satisfaction for that misdeed. Indeed she seemed intent to make as much trouble for the promoters of the league as she could contrive.

In view of the fact that the French were leaving no stone unturned to obstruct the negotiations, Walsingham considered her attitude dangerous in the extreme. He already had received intimations of a plot brewing between the Hamiltons in Scotland and the Duke of Guise to re-establish Roman Catholicism in the north and he felt that it was no time for his mistress to stick at trifles.

'My Lord Treasurer and I', he wrote to Randolph on the 2nd of April, 'could have wished that her Majesty had taken some present order for the sending of the money without standing upon any such terms, wherein there would yet so much the greater haste be made for that the Guises do of late carry more

[1] Bruce, *op. cit.*, p. 187. [2] S. P. Scotland, xxxix, no. 31.

credit with the French King than heretofore they have done . . . which giveth us just cause to think that there will be so much the greater means wrought to win the King of Scots to make himself a party against her Majesty; for the timely prevention whereof you shall therefore do well to call often and earnestly upon us to hasten the sending unto him of the promised pension. Your letter to her Majesty's self, laying down the reasons that may move her to take speedy order in it and the inconveniences that otherwise are likely to follow, would do some good in the matter, for we do no more here in such cases than we are urged unto by necessity.'[1]

When this letter reached Randolph he had already induced the King to put his hand to the articles for the league. Francis Milles, one of Walsingham's secretaries, who was in attendance on Randolph, was dispatched at once with the document to the English court. On his way south Milles sent a brief note to the Earl of Rutland which throws a quick flash of light upon the situation. 'The King of Scots', he wrote, 'after many thwarts and delays made by the French ambassador hath signed the articles of the league. I have another copy of the same for her Majesty to subscribe to send in exchange of his, so that her Majesty, if she likes, may have her will. Marry, he looks by my return to receive the pension of twenty thousand crowns she hath promised, else no bargain; for they are as bare as beggars; and if he refuse, the French are prestolando and offer twice as much; but the King saith he had rather have one groat than a French crown.'[2]

Milles omitted to state that James had imposed the further condition that Elizabeth should pledge herself to do nothing to bar his right to the succession of England. The pension then and this pledge were the two concessions which James exacted in return for his alliance. It was plain enough to Walsingham that if Elizabeth would concede these she might 'have her will'; and so he told her. He found her acquiescent enough upon the question of the pledge, though careful not to lend herself to any positive acknowledgement of James's claims. With regard to the pension, however, she proved obdurate. Four thousand pounds was the most she would give, and she would allow nothing at all,

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxix, no. 41. [2] *Rutland Papers*, i. 192.

in spite of all that Walsingham could say, to secure the goodwill of the King's advisers. The consequences were as Walsingham had anticipated. When Randolph laid her offer before the King he found James somewhat less eager for the league than he had been and a decided disposition at the Scottish court, on the part of Secretary Maitland in particular, to make difficulties about the final ratification of the treaty. Walsingham wrote to Leicester late in May: 'How hazardously her Majesty dealeth in causes of Scotland your Lordship may perceive both by Mr. Randolph and the copy of the King's own letter unto her Majesty. The Master of Gray doth assure me that she never had so weak a party in Scotland as she hath now. I find it a very hard matter to conserve the amity of that country in the course now held here, and what danger may grow by the loss thereof a very mean-witted man may see. She greatly presumeth [on] fortune which is but a [very] weak foundation to build upon. I would she did build and depend upon God and then all good men should have less cause to fear any change of her former good hap.' [1]

Walsingham became more alarmed at the situation as he learned from Randolph and through the intercepted correspondence of Mary Stuart further details of Hamilton's plot with the Duke of Guise. On the 3rd of June he set forth his fears at length in a letter to Burghley:

'This manner of proceeding by them of Scotland is no way to be liked and doth confirm that which the Master of Gray did advertise that Scotland generally stood ill affected to the amity with this crown. I would to God both the banished noblemen and the ministers (who were the chief nourishers of the amity) had been better used in the time of their exile and although in respect of the common cause they can be no enemies to the amity yet I fear (in respect they were here had in contempt, and hardly used by my Lords the Bishops) they stand not so well affected as was to be desired. Besides the pension given to the King (which as your Lordship knoweth) was not performed in so large a measure as was promised) this present time requireth some liberality to have been used otherwise. It was also out of course to gall the Secretary, possessing his master's affection as he doth, who I find is the only thwarter of this present action. Good usage with a little liberality would have helped this matter.

[1] 20 May 1586, Bruce, *op. cit.*, pp. 275–6.

The malice and corruption of this time requireth another manner of proceeding than is presently held. I can assure your Lordship that there is a match made between the ill affected of Scotland and of this realm to attempt somewhat, so as they may be backed from foreign parts whereof they are put in good hope, and therefore this treaty is to be wisely handled by winking at and avansing [?] the proud and overthwart manner of proceeding by them of Scotland in the same. There can fall out for the present nothing so dangerous as a break with Scotland, and therefore passion must be laid aside or else all will be ruined. I pray your Lordship that the Earl of Rutland and his colleagues may receive some good advice how to govern themselves in this cause. And so I most humbly take my leave.' [1]

However, thanks to Randolph's skill and the able assistance of the Master of Gray and Archibald Douglas,[2] the stoutest friends of England at the Scottish court, the difficulties were finally smoothed away without further concessions on Elizabeth's part. In June the English and Scottish commissioners met at Berwick for the purpose of ratifying the league and on the 5th of July it was finally concluded. James thereby became a pensioner of Elizabeth and bound himself to give no aid to her enemies and to assist her with armed forces in case she were attacked.

From Walsingham's point of view this league marked the consummation of his Scottish policy. He had always insisted that the only sure way to bind James to the English interests was with chains of gold and he had at last won Elizabeth to his point of view. He would have liked it better had his mistress made her hold upon Scotland more secure by pensioning some of the most influential members of James's court as well, yet he probably recognized that such a course was less essential in James's maturity than in his minority. One of the facts which the whole negotiation had clearly revealed was that James had ceased to be a mere plaything in the hands of his councillors and had himself become the most important factor in the determination of Scottish policy. Probably this was one great reason why Elizabeth was more acquiescent in the matter of Scottish pensions in 1586 than she had been previously. There had been

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C, ix, f. 329.

[2] Douglas apparently received a pension of £200 from the Queen on 30 March 1586 (*Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, iii. 135).

little to gain in pensioning the King in the days when he was powerless, and to pension the various irresponsible noblemen who then divided his power among them was a contract overlarge for her purse and too uncertain in its results to be undertaken. Now that James was responsible, the prospect of keeping him and his country favourable to her interests by a substantial bribe gave great promise. At all events the league was arranged, and so far as ink and parchment could make it so, the postern gate was safe.

X

CATHOLICS AND PURITANS

PERHAPS the most important single factor in shaping the course of history in the sixteenth century was the factor of religion. It has been observed already what a significant part religion played in the relations between England and her neighbours. In England, as in all other countries of Western Europe at the time, it was also of pre-eminent importance in the arrangement of domestic affairs. England in the sixteenth century was mercifully spared the horrors of internal religious warfare which worked such havoc both in France and in the Netherlands; but England had her internal religious difficulties nevertheless, and they were of sufficient dimensions to cause considerable anxiety both to Elizabeth and her councillors.

Under Elizabeth, as is well known, the Protestant religion was the religion by law established. But Protestantism did not stand in England without powerful props supplied by the government. A large proportion of Englishmen, if not the actual majority, were Catholics, and it was never quite certain at what moment they might not rise in strength and demand the toleration for their faith which the laws refused. One of the gravest problems which faced Elizabeth's government was that of keeping the Catholics in check. Francis Walsingham made large contributions to its solution. It becomes necessary therefore to discover just what his contributions were and just what stand he took upon a question which came near dividing England into two hostile camps.

In his private and personal religious convictions Walsingham was no doubt radically Protestant. William Camden, his contemporary, speaks of him as a 'most sharp maintainer of the purer religion'.[1] His early home training, his youthful contacts at King's College, Cambridge, and perhaps most of all his exile abroad during Mary's reign, established his position in matters religious long before he entered public life. From the very

[1] Camden, *Annals* (English Trans., ed. 1635), p. 394.

beginning of his official career he was recognized as an ardent Protestant. There was little or no diversity of opinion upon that point among his contemporaries. The Spanish ambassador referred to him more than once as a damnable heretic. The King of France took occasion on his first diplomatic mission to remonstrate with him because of his pronounced Protestantism. Protestant rebels both in France and in Holland regarded him first to last as their best friend in the English Privy Council. It was largely because of his religious views that he never got on very well with the Queen. She declared more than once that he was a rank Puritan and complained that he was more interested in the welfare of his fellow believers than he was in the welfare of England. So far as the conflict between Protestant and Roman Catholic was concerned Walsingham's position from the first was as clear as the noonday.

But when Elizabeth denounced him as a Puritan she had in mind not so much the issue with Roman Catholicism as the religious controversy which was alive at the time within her own Established Church. It is hardly necessary to recall the matters involved in that controversy. It turned for the most part upon questions of Church ritual and Church government in which one party, already known as Puritans, favoured a simplification of the ritual and a reformation of the government in accordance with the more democratic ideas of the Geneva Church, while the other party upheld the Anglican prayer book and the Anglican hierarchy. At just about the time Walsingham entered the Queen's service the leadership of the Puritan cause had passed into the hands of Thomas Cartwright, a scholar of eminence and a preacher of great power. Cartwright in fact, and his able coadjutor Walter Travers, were the principal advocates of the Puritan gospel during the greater part of Walsingham's public life. These men favoured a reform of the English Church from within; but another group of Puritans, of whom perhaps Browne and Barrow were the most prominent, had already appeared in the late 1570's who supported a more prompt and radical course of reform. They were prepared to go so far as separation from the Established Church altogether.

During Walsingham's lifetime the stoutest opponent of non-conformists and separatists alike was John Whitgift, first as

Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, later as Bishop of Winchester, and finally as Primate of all England. Whitgift fought hard and courageously. He could generally count upon the support of Elizabeth herself, not only because she regarded an attack upon her Church as an attack upon her prerogative, but also perhaps because she saw in the Puritan concept of Church government the germ of an idea fundamentally at variance with her own idea of the place of monarchy in the state.[1] James I put the matter concisely later when he remarked that Presbyterianism and monarchy as well agreed as God and the Devil. The Puritans, however, were not without their friends at court. Burghley's attitude towards them was uncertain. He interceded in their favour more than once, though he was content in the main to endorse the policy of his mistress.[2] But Leicester and his brother the Earl of Warwick openly protected them,[3] and Sir Francis Knollys, the Treasurer of the Household, went so far as publicly to support their attacks upon the bishops.[4] The Puritans also found many supporters in the House of Commons. With powerful friends at court and strong advocates in Parliament they were able to present a formidable resistance to the efforts of Whitgift to silence them, particularly since the danger to be feared from Roman Catholicism made Elizabeth somewhat reluctant to proceed to extremities against the most energetic champions of her break from Rome. It was not indeed until the defeat of the Armada had effectually disposed of the Roman peril that anything like a vigorous effort to stamp out Puritanism received the royal endorsement. Nor was it altogether accidental that the active persecution of the dissenters was deferred until the last decade of Elizabeth's reign, when Leicester and Walsingham had both passed from the scene.

In considering Walsingham's relationship to the Puritan movement a distinction must clearly be drawn between his official and his personal attitude. There is plenty of evidence to prove that

[1] Mauvissière, the French ambassador in England, wrote to the King of France, 16 Oct. 1579, that Elizabeth was very hostile to the Puritans and said she had told him ' aucunes foys qu'a la fin ils voudroient reconnoistre ny Diew ny roy ' (English Record Office, French Transcripts, x, f. 138).

[2] On Burghley's attitude cf. *English Hist. Review*, Jan. 1913, p. 37, n. 14 ; Strype, *Whitgift*, i. 309 ff.

[3] On Leicester's attitude cf. Strype, *Whitgift*, i. 425.

[4] Cf. Life of Knollys in *D. N. B.*

his personal sympathies lay with the reformers. His household, for example, was a perfect hot-bed of Puritanism. Lawrence Tomson, who supported Travers in his controversy with Richard Hooker, was one of his secretaries. Nicholas Faunt, a bitter critic of Whitgift's violent courses against 'the best and zealousest ministers', was another.[1] Robert Beale, who talked and wrote against the inquisitorial methods of the bishops and who had the temerity to defy the Archbishop of Canterbury to his face on one occasion, was Walsingham's brother-in-law, his intimate friend, and more than once his substitute in office.[2] And if one goes beyond Walsingham's immediate household into the wider circle of his familiar friends, it is equally apparent that he herded by choice with the radical reformers. Henry Killigrew, William Davison, and Thomas Randolph, to mention no others, were as near to being Puritans as public officials safely could be. There is evidence also that Walsingham on more than one occasion personally befriended some of the prominent Puritan divines. He gave Cartwright £100 to assist him in his work of answering the Roman Catholic version of the New Testament put forth at Rheims.[3] He provided funds to establish a lectureship at Oxford for John Reynolds, who was later to champion the cause of Puritanism at the Hampton Court conference.[4] Dissenting clergymen turned toward him for comfort;[5] in the dark days of persecution after his death even the Barrowists remembered him as 'a godly disposed personage'.[6] All these things taken together leave little room for doubt that he was, as his contemporary Sir Robert Naunton quaintly put it, 'one of the great allays of the austerian embracement.'[7]

[1] Cf. N. Faunt to A. Bacon, 12 Mar. 1583/4, B.M. Additional MSS. 4109, f. 143.

[2] Cf. Beale's life in *D.N.B.*; on his controversy with Whitgift, cf. Strype, *Whitgift*, iii. 87–98; i. 283 ff. Beale wrote to Walsingham after an interview with the Queen, 7 Sept. 1584: 'I have been very graciously used and hear no further of any pontifical complaints,' S. P. Domestic, clxxiii, 8.

[3] Strype, *op. cit.* i. 482, but cf. *Cal. Dom.* 1581–90, p. 80, in which it appears that the money was paid to Cartwright by the Queen's command.

[4] Fowler, *History of Corpus Christi College*, pp. 137–8, 160.

[5] Cf. Oliver Pigg to Walsingham (S. P. Domestic, clxi, 33), which begins: 'All I can do for your honour's singular care of me from time to time is to pray unto God for you.' On Pigg, consult his life in *D.N.B.*

[6] Quoted from a Barrowist petition to the Queen of 1593, printed in Burrage, *The Early English Dissenters*, ii. 120.

[7] *Fragmenta Regalia*, ed. Arbor, p. 37. Possibly it may be taken as an

And yet any one who reads through the mass of documentary material relating to Walsingham's official career must be struck by the almost complete absence of any evidence revealing a disposition on his part to support the Puritan movement in his conduct of office. On one occasion he intervened with Whitgift in favour of a dissenting preacher, but Burghley himself did that much, and there is no indication that Walsingham pressed the matter in the face of Whitgift's opposition.[1]

Twelve years after his death it was asserted that he had given permission to eight Lancashire preachers to preach without the orthodox vestments of the Established Church, but the statement is altogether unsupported.[2] In fact, the only instance on record in which he definitely applied the force of his authority in promoting Puritanism was his intervention in favour of Walter Travers at Antwerp, and then he went no further than to rebuke the Governor of the Merchant Adventurers there, when he tried to put Travers to silence.[3] The reasons for his reticence

indication of Walsingham's Puritan leanings that in 1589 he drew up a plan for a catechizing of London citizens (S. P. Domestic, ccxxiii, 112, not signed but corrected in Walsingham's hand), and that he joined with the Earl of Derby on one occasion to suggest reforms for 'the enormities of the Sabbath' (*Cal. Kenyon MSS.*, p. 590), though the contents of neither of these papers reveal any obvious Puritan bias.

[1] Strype, *Whitgift*, i. 430. [2] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, xi. 42.

[3] Henry Killigrew wrote to Wm. Davison (8 Jan. 1577/8) that he did not believe Walter Travers could get a licence to take charge of the English Church at Antwerp, and that he thought Travers would have to get over to the Low Countries as one of Davison's train. Killigrew recommended that after Travers had reached Antwerp he should first be introduced to read a letter in the English house there and afterwards be ordained through the intervention of the Prince of Orange. Killigrew pointed out that if objection was later raised to this course Davison might reply that he had been glad enough to get any one to read the gospel in English there without insisting upon too much formality. Killigrew added that Walsingham did not believe Travers could get a licence and that he (Killigrew) believed the best course was to get Travers in possession (*Cal. Dom.*, Add. 1566–79, p. 529). This letter leaves little doubt that Killigrew and Davison between them were responsible for the irregularities of Travers's foreign ordination which created such a stir later, and that they resorted to it as a means of getting Travers a licence to preach, which they realized he could hardly have got in England.

Killigrew represented Walsingham's attitude as a cautious one at this juncture. Later he intervened more actively as appears from the following letter addressed to the Governor of the Merchant Adventurers at Antwerp on 11 Oct. 1578: 'I am given to understand that since my Lord Cobham's and my departure from thence you have put your minister Mr. Travers to silence, notwithstanding that he offered to yield to any conformity that in reason might be desired; which I have cause the rather to believe for that upon information given unto me that he misliked the orders of our church here,

are not far to seek. He knew the Queen's attitude towards the Puritans. He knew that she was well aware of his strong sympathies towards them. And he no doubt realized that she would not have tolerated from him any exploitation of his official position in their behalf. Under these circumstances he

I caused certain articles to be delivered unto him such as by my Lords of the Council were offered unto certain ministers in Norfolk, who, before being put to silence, upon the subscribing of the same were restored to their liberty of preaching; which articles after he had perused, he offered to subscribe. And therefore, considering the offer of conformity, I do greatly marvel that you have put him to silence, especially in so disordered sort as you did, if it be as I am informed. Wherein you have done my Lord Cobham and me a great deal of wrong, in that you will take upon you, being only a minister to a company of merchants, to redress that which by us was not misliked, as though you could better judge what were fit to be done in these causes than we. It had been your duty to have acquainted my Lord and me with your intention and have demanded our advice what might have been best for you to have done in these matters, and so should you have fully understood such direction as we saw best to be liked of, or if that had not liked you, you might have conferred with her Majesty's agent, whose authority and countenance in that place and in those matters is greater than yours and such as you ought to reverence. But you give me just cause (if it be true as I am informed) to suspect that you have other counsellors upon whom you depend more, making known to the world by such actions how smally you are affected both to the religion published here in England and to her Majesty; for had you had any care to have been well thought of and accounted of either for the one or the other, you would not have admitted into your counsel and society such a person as you have, whom for his disloyalty to her Majesty and unsoundness in religion, you had juster cause to renounce from you, than to entertain and receive into your company. If friendly admonition will not serve you authority shall enforce you to put him from you and to use such about you as are better devoted in heart and external obedience towards her Majesty. You know whom I mean, but lest you should pretend ignorance, it is Doctor Pauley you have to be solicitor of your causes. If you remove him not you shall further hear of it, who as he hath (as I doubt) cooled you in religion, so will he draw you in time to be as dangerous an instrument as himself hath been, wherewith I made you acquainted. And as for your exercise, you shall do well upon this admonition, seeing your minister offered unto us and since to yourself and company (as I am informed) to yield to any conformity, that in reason may be required, to permit him to continue his proceedings until there be further order taken in that behalf by my lords' (Cotton MSS., Galba C vi, pt. 2, f. 276). Cf. also Laurence Tomson to Davison, 11 Oct. 1578 (*Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 232); Walsingham to Nicholas Liddington, Governor of Merchant Adventurers at Antwerp, 25 Oct. 1578 (ibid., p. 250); Walsingham to Davison, 26 Oct. 1578 (ibid., p. 251); Davison to Walsingham, 19 Oct. 1578 (ibid., p. 238); Davison to Walsingham, 5 Nov. 1578 (ibid., p. 266); Travers to Davison, 12 Nov. 1578 (ibid., p. 285). All of these make it plain that Walsingham's intervention was instrumental in keeping Travers in his position; but a passage from Walsingham's letter to Davison of 26 Oct., cited above, makes it clear that Walsingham was urging upon Travers the necessity of not splitting hairs upon small points. An interesting side light upon the opposition of Travers to any plan for mutual toleration as between Catholic and Protestant is to be found in his letter to Davison of 12 Nov., cited above.

evidently judged it wise to avoid entanglement in their controversies with the hierarchy. He would merely have jeopardized his own position and with it the opportunity to advance their cause underhand. It was characteristic of him that while his hot-headed colleague Sir Francis Knollys was publicly denouncing episcopal arrogance he was listening to a solemn discourse from the Bishop of Durham on the divine origin of episcopacy and seeming to nod a solemn assent to it.[1] Whitgift himself, who did not hesitate to criticize Leicester and Knollys both for their active support of the Puritans, regarded Walsingham in quite another light. He was in fact so well satisfied of Walsingham's willingness to co-operate with him in maintaining the established religion that he even consented to some mitigation of his inquisitorial practices by Walsingham's advice.

It is easy to assume that all this was mere hypocrisy on Walsingham's part, and that when he promised to assist Whitgift 'against such as should be breakers of the orders of the Church Established' he promised considerably more than he meant to perform.[2] And yet it is pretty certain that Walsingham was not at all in sympathy with the rebellious tactics of the reformers. He was certainly far from believing that individuals should be allowed to deviate at their own pleasure from the form of worship by law established. Upon this point he expressed himself clearly in a letter which he wrote in March 1578 to William Davison who was then Elizabeth's agent in the Low Countries. It had reference to an intended change in the form of service held in the chapel connected with the house of the English Merchant Adventurers in Antwerp:

'The Merchant Adventurers here [in England],' Walsingham wrote, 'have acquainted me with an intended alteration of the exercise of common prayer in the English house there, contrary to, or at least, not agreeable with the received order in the Church of this realm; and have also let me understand that you are a principal furtherer thereof. I have thought good therefore, as one that wishes you well, to let you understand that if it should come to her Majesty's ears it would greatly kindle offence as well against the Company of the said Adventurers for yielding to such a connivance as also against yourself for the furthering

[1] Strype, *Whitgift*, iii. 224 ff.
[2] Cf. Whitgift's letter to Walsingham in Strype, *op. cit.* i. 432.

of the same. I do not write this as one that misliketh of such a form of exercise of prayer ; only I would have all reformations done by public authority. It were very dangerous that every private man's zeal should carry sufficient authority of reforming things amiss. Mr. Travers, your minister there, knoweth my opinion in that matter. If you knew with what difficulty we retain that we have, and that the seeking of more might hazard (according to man's understanding) that which we already have, you would then, Mr. Davison, deal warily in this time when policy carrieth more sway than zeal. And yet have we great cause to thank God for that we presently enjoy, having God's word sincerely preached and the Sacraments truly administered. The rest we lack we are to beg by prayer and attend with patience.'[1]

This extract reveals Walsingham's attitude clearly enough. He was obviously not out of sympathy with the reforms in the English service which Walter Travers, the Puritan, wanted to make, but he altogether disapproved of Travers's manner of making them. When Walsingham said that he would have all reformations done by public authority he did not mean to endorse the current doctrine of *cujus regio ejus religio.* His flight from England during Mary's reign is proof enough of that. What he seems to have had in mind was the desirability of securing further reform rather with royal co-operation than in the teeth of royal opposition. Had Elizabeth decided that England should be Catholic instead of Protestant Walsingham would have been the last man in England to have endorsed her action. Nevertheless since she had decided, however reluctantly, that England should be Protestant, he wished to rally all Protestants to her support. He knew very well that she was half-hearted in her zeal and he was afraid that she might be alienated altogether by the excessive demands of his more ardent brethren. It was his ambition to make England the great champion of Protestantism in Europe, and he saw clearly that the realization of this ambition would depend entirely upon the Queen herself.

Nor was this all. Walsingham was by training and by

[1] S. P. Holland and Flanders, vi, 54. Some of the later developments of this matter are alluded to on p. 262, n. 2, above, in which it appears that Walsingham lent more support to Travers and his tactics in Antwerp than would be presumed from his tone in this letter.

temperament a statesman, and as a statesman he saw that internal dissension was the great danger to which the cause of the Protestants was exposed, and that unity among them, even at the sacrifice of minor matters of faith, was the great end to be sought after.

He laid particular stress upon this point in a letter which he sent in March 1578 to Thomas Randolph and Robert Bowes who were at that time working for Elizabeth's interests in Scotland. Alluding to the internal dissensions among the Scottish Protestants as a grave menace to their strength, he wrote: 'These civil and domestical broils come very evil to pass in this common combustion abroad. The time requireth an unity and perfect agreement rather in them that make profession of that truth, which is elsewhere so impugned and hath so mighty enemies and so cruel wars kindling against it in these days amongst our fellow members abroad. Our unity might be a strength to ourselves and an aid unto our neighbours, but if we shall like to fall to division among ourselves, we must needs lie open to the common enemy and by our own fault hasten or rather call upon ourselves our own ruin.' [1]

Puritan as Walsingham was in his private convictions, he regarded the religious question from a broader point of view. He never let his ideas on the Vestiarian Controversy, the Episcopal Succession, or on any other point of ritual or Church government blind him to the interests of Protestantism as a whole. He wanted his fellow Protestants, whether they were Lutherans or Calvinists or Anglicans to join together and together to present a bold face to the common enemy. To accomplish this he saw the necessity of many compromises upon disputed points. These compromises he was willing to make. It was perhaps this characteristic in his attitude which led James VI to say, when some one commended Walsingham for his zeal in religion that he was, 'notwithstanding his outward profession, a very Machiavel.' [2]

There can be no doubt at all that Walsingham was resolutely hostile to the Roman Catholics in England. From the point of view of their religion they were the great enemies of his faith.

[1] Harl. MSS. 6992, no. 50.

[2] B.M. Harl. MSS. 290, f. 84. Comments of James VI on Walsingham, no date—probably 1583.

From the point of view of their politics they stood opposed to his cherished purpose of making England the great stronghold of Protestantism at home and the great champion of Protestantism abroad. But an attitude of resolute hostility does not necessarily involve a policy of vicious persecution. Walsingham has been criticized severely by Roman Catholic historians. Recent writers of that persuasion have pretty generally singled him out as the particularly malevolent spirit behind the Elizabethan policy.[1] On the whole he had suffered more at their hands than at the hands of his contemporaries. Broadly speaking the anathemas of Elizabethan Romanists were hurled at Burghley and Leicester. Leicester was subject to the most violent attacks, but Burghley was the man whom they usually indicated as chiefly responsible for Elizabeth's attitude towards the old Church. Walsingham, however, did not escape. The Spanish agents of his time in England evidently regarded him as one of the most violent enemies of the old faith,[2] and Robert Parsons the Jesuit denounced him in unmeasured terms on the same score. He is charged also with having gone out of his way more than once to bully and browbeat and even to strike individual Catholics who were brought before him for examination. Generally speaking his contemporaries do not accuse him of having been responsible for the formulation of Elizabeth's religious policy but rather for the particular harshness and cruelty with which he executed it.[3] Those who like Parsons survived him must have observed that after his death in 1590 the policy of active persecution went on with undiminished violence.[4]

[1] Cf. particularly Lingard, J. H. Pollen, and A. O. Meyer, and in fiction, Benson's *With Rack and Rope*.

[2] The French ambassadors in England had surprisingly little to say about the persecution of the Catholics, and virtually nothing at all about Walsingham's attitude towards it.

[3] On this point cf. Richard Hopkins to Walsingham, 21 Aug. 1582. Hopkins wrote to thank Walsingham for his kindness when ambassador at Paris, and sent him a book from which he hoped Walsingham would perceive that 'the professors of the ancient Catholic religion want not the spirit of Christ'. He went on to say: 'And moreover I trust it would then slake that fervency of zeal which your honour hath against our ancient Catholic religion and the professors thereof; and *so should you not be noted among the chiefest of our religion to be one of the most severe persecutors we have in our realm.*' S. P. Domestic, clv, 10 (italics my own). On Hopkins, cf. his life in *D. N. B.*

[4] Generally speaking Roman Catholic pamphleteers reserved their fire for larger game. The only general condemnation of Walsingham's attitude towards the English Catholics which I have been able to discover in contempo-

So many of these charges against Walsingham are of such a general character that it would be hardly profitable to consider them in detail. For the most part they are little more than estimates of the man based often upon facts in his career only remotely connected with his bearing towards the Roman Catholics. The Spanish agents recognized in him a man unswerving in his hostility to Spain, and they were only too willing to believe any story which came to their ears derogatory to his character. Robert Parsons's estimate was no doubt largely

rary Catholic pamphlets is in the so-called 'Response to the Unjust and Bloody Edict of Elizabeth against the Catholics', &c., put forth by Robert Parsons the Jesuit in 1592. This work was originally published in Latin over the name of Andreaus Philopater; a French translation was published at Lyons in 1593. An English pamphlet entitled 'An Advertisement', &c., put forth under the name of Philopatris in 1592, was written by J. Creswell. In this pamphlet Creswell in his remarks on Walsingham simply repeats, almost verbatim, the statements made by Parsons in the work just cited.

The earlier part of Parsons's pamphlet is devoted to a denunciation of Elizabeth's chief councillors. Burghley is singled out as the head and front of the offending and is charged with shifting the blame for the persecution of the Catholics upon Leicester and Walsingham. The characterization of Leicester is apparently based upon the estimate of him circulated a few years before in the notorious pamphlet later known as Leicester's Commonwealth. Of Walsingham, Parsons wrote as follows: 'Walsingham was a man well equipped for his office but violently carried away by the folly of the Calvinists. He assisted Leicester in all things, but chiefly in two; the one when it was in question to proscribe, to kill, to imprison or to ruin the Catholics; the other when he wished to control the affairs of neighbouring states or to sow wars and dissensions among them. For the rest Walsingham maintained the reputation of an honest man, if one can be called such who was cruel and inhuman, who was not content with mocking and bullying and insulting the confessors of the faith of Jesus Christ, but who even went so far as to beat them and kick them, so violently was he moved to the defence of his sect against the truth of our religion. Having as principal secretary the charge to convey to the Queen that which took place in the Council, he took advantage of the occasion to relate to her the advices he had received of what was going on in the monarchies and states of the world. Recognizing the pleasure which she took in such things he maintained an infinite number of spies at foreign courts, who kept him informed not only of what was happening and being talked about, but also of what was planned. He dressed this news, true or false, with such sauce as to please the Queen's taste, more particularly he never told her anything calculated to vex or irritate her, assuring her always of the increase and prosperity of her State. He often employed his credit and that of his friends to arm pirate ships, with the plunder of which he gorged the Queen, and with which he maintained his luxury, his dissoluteness, his magnificence, and his spies. Yet in the end he died burdened with heavy debts after long torment of an incurable ulcer in the private parts in the same manner as Galerius Maximus of which Eusebius relates.'

It has seemed worth while to quote the whole of this passage, rather freely translated, because it may be taken to represent fairly well the estimate of Walsingham current among his most violent enemies among the Roman Catholics.

derived from Spanish sources. Parsons in any case was bound to see Walsingham in the worst possible light because Parsons was the sort of priest whom Walsingham hunted most relentlessly. Indeed it was the work of men like Parsons who combined religious propaganda with political conspiracy that went far to justify Walsingham's hostility to the 'spawn of the seminaries' on political grounds alone. Nevertheless it would not be safe to assume that the opinion of Walsingham entertained by his Roman Catholic contemporaries was altogether without warrant. In any case the only way to arrive at a just estimate of his relations to the persecution of Catholics under Elizabeth is to examine the facts.

During the greater portion of his public life Walsingham occupied at the same time three positions of public importance. He was at once a member of the House of Commons, a Privy Councillor, and the Queen's Principal Secretary. In every one of these positions he had an opportunity in some way or other to influence the attitude of Elizabeth's government towards the English Catholics.

The part which he played as member of Parliament may be dismissed at once. There is little or no mention of him in the Parliamentary journals.[1] Even in the drafting of such statutes as seem in a special sense to have been passed at the Queen's dictation he appears to have had very little to do. It is highly probable that he was too busy elsewhere to find time for any considerable personal exertions in the House of Commons.

First to last it was as Privy Councillor and as Principal Secretary that he did his great work. A distinction has been made between these two offices, and of course there was a sharp distinction between the duties of a Privy Councillor and the duties of a Principal Secretary. But in Walsingham's case it is

[1] D'Ewes, in his *Journals of Parliament* (Elizabeth) gives one instance of activity on Walsingham's part in the House of Commons in matters of religion; see p. 301, 23 Elizabeth, 3 Mar. 1579: 'After sundry motions and arguments touching some reformation in matters of religion, . . . it was at last resolved by the whole House that Mr. Vice Chamberlain [Hatton], both Mr. Secretaries [Walsingham and Thos. Wilson] and Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer shall, by order of the House and in the name of this whole House, move the Lords of the Clergy to continue unto her Majesty the prosecution of the purposes of reformation which they, the said Mr. Vice Chamberlain, Mr. Secretaries, and Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer have before, of themselves, and not as from this House, moved unto their Lordships.'

practically impossible to dissociate the two. He was made Privy Councillor after he had been made Secretary because it was highly desirable for the proper performance of his duties appertaining to that office that he should be present at the deliberations of Council. But the influence which he exerted in Council, and the influence which he exerted upon the Queen herself proceeded naturally from his position as Principal Secretary, and from that point of view it is most convenient and probably most accurate to regard it.

It has been pointed out before, and must be insisted upon again, that Walsingham's duties as Principal Secretary were, essentially, executive in character. His function was primarily to obey, only secondarily to advise. Whatever his personal convictions may have been upon any point, religious or secular, it was his business to execute the Queen's wishes, whether expressed by herself personally or by the decisions of her Privy Council or by the laws passed in her Parliament. In putting into execution the Anti-Catholic measures which proceeded from these various sources, he was acting first of all as an executive officer of the Crown, and not simply as an ardent Protestant, prompted by a personal animus against those of the opposing faith. It may readily be believed that had he been a Catholic sympathizer instead of what he was, he might have mitigated the penalties which he meted out against the Catholics. But it must be admitted as well that he would have neglected his plain duty had he failed to obey to the best of his ability the orders which were imposed upon him by his superiors.

Therefore in order to understand his attitude and his behaviour towards the English Catholics, it will be necessary to state, as briefly as possible, the attitude of Elizabeth towards the religious question and the measures in reference to it taken with her consent in Parliament and in the Privy Council, all of which together formed the basis for Walsingham's action.

In the first place it is clear from the very beginning of Elizabeth's reign that while she meant to have the Pope out of England and a National Church in his place, she was distinctly opposed to radical measures. By her birth alone she was practically committed to the cause of Protestantism. The daughter of Ann Boleyn could hardly have identified herself with the cause of

Rome without casting grave doubts upon the legitimacy of her own birth. There was moreover something imperious in Elizabeth's character, inherited doubtless from her father, which took very kindly to the notion of a National Church. But it would be difficult to prove that she was in any deeper sympathy with the ideas of the reformers. She appears to have possessed little or no religious enthusiasm herself.[1] First to last, she seems to have regarded religion as a matter of policy. From her point of view it was never an end in itself, but rather a factor to be reckoned with in the achievement of what she considered to be a greater end. She sought primarily to keep England at peace without and within and to make her people prosperous and happy. To obtain this she was quite willing to juggle more or less with creeds and dogmas.

Like most of the rulers of her time Elizabeth was a strong believer in the principle of *cujus regio ejus religio*, but she plainly intended to carry it into effect with as much attention as possible to the religious sentiments of her people. She insisted upon uniformity, but she tried to make her Church broad enough to satisfy the moderate elements in all parties. On points of dogma she yielded many ways to the demands of the Protestants, on points of ritual she adhered pretty closely to the old forms. The Church of England as she designed it was essentially a Church of compromise. Moreover she never interfered, or at least never wanted to interfere, with men's consciences. If they paid a formal homage to the religion by law established, she was perfectly willing that they should think as they pleased. The only point upon which she really insisted, and to her way of thinking this was a point rather of politics than of creed, was that there should be no recognition of the Papal supremacy in England. The harsh policy which was gradually developed by her government against the Catholics was a policy directed primarily against Papal intervention, indeed, against any outside intervention in the religious affairs of England. So long as Elizabeth

[1] I am conscious of differing here with no lesser authority than the late Professor F. W. Maitland himself (*Cambridge Modern History*, vol. ii, The Elizabethan Settlement). It would take too long to discuss the point at length, but I can find little or no evidence, after a careful study of the sources, to support his view that Elizabeth was in real sympathy with the religious ideas of the Protestants. A. O. Meyer, *England und die k. Kirche unter Elizabeth* (Eng. Trans., p. 15), holds the same position that I do.

had to deal simply with the Catholics at home, she pursued a course which, for her time, was singularly mild. It was only after the Pope had absolved her subjects from their allegiance; it was only after groups of English Catholics conspiring with foreign potentates had plotted against her life; it was only after Jesuits and seminaries setting out from Rome and elsewhere abroad had undertaken a systematic invasion of her kingdom to preach disobedience to her laws, that she exchanged her mild policy for one of much greater severity.

First to last, it was the salient characteristic of Elizabeth's treatment of the Catholics, that it had a statutory basis. The change of religion in England was made by Act of Parliament, and every step subsequently taken to protect and to foster the Anglican Church was taken in accordance with parliamentary legislation. Elizabeth, like all the Tudor sovereigns before her, liked to have a legal basis for what she did. According also to good Tudor precedent, she generally acted well within the letter of the law. Rarely or never did she go so far as the law allowed. She erred continually upon the side of mildness, and so could always urge, and perhaps with some sincerity, that she checked rather than prompted the Anti-Catholic tendencies of her subjects.

She based her Church upon the Acts of Supremacy and of Uniformity which were passed by Parliament in the first year of her reign. The Act of Supremacy recognized the Queen to be the ultimate authority in matters ecclesiastical as well as civil. It required all royal officers and all beneficed clergymen to acknowledge this fact by oath as a condition antecedent to the retention of their offices. It imposed severe penalties upon all Englishmen who maintained openly by speech or writing the authority of the Pope in England. The Act of Uniformity changed the service in the English Church in accordance with certain measures taken to that end during the reign of Edward VI. It forbade all subjects, lay and clerical, to administer or attend any other form of service than the one by law established. Finally, it enjoined all subjects to attend the Established Church under penalty of one shilling fine for every Sunday's absence.[1]

It will be observed that these acts were largely negative in their scope. So far as they referred to the English layman in

[1] Statutes of the Realm, 1 Eliz. c. ii.

general, they were much more concerned in telling him what he might not do, than what he must do. They set up a new church and a new hierarchy and they condemned the practice of any other form of worship in England. But they did not, in any real sense, impose the new Anglicanism upon the nation at large. The fine of twelve pence a Sunday was merely nominal, so much so in fact, that the churchwardens very often did not take the trouble to collect it.[1] In a word Parliament practically gave Englishmen the choice of going to the Established Church, or of staying away from divine service altogether.

For four years these two acts formed the statutory basis of such measures as were taken by the government against Roman Catholics. The outbreak of the religious wars in France and a feeble plot by the nephews of Cardinal Pole to set Mary Stuart on the English throne called forth in the Parliament of 1563 somewhat harsher measures.[2] It was now decreed that the Oath of Supremacy should be administered to all clergymen whether beneficed or not, and to all laymen who were caught attending mass. The refusal to take the oath involved the penalties attached to the old Statute of Praemunire—that is to say, forfeiture of lands and goods and imprisonment during the Queen's pleasure. To make matters worse it was enacted that to all such persons as refused the oath once, it might be administered a second time. A second refusal involved the severest penalties of the law, that is to say, the penalties of high treason.[3]

This act of course has particular reference to Roman Catholic clergymen and to Catholic laymen who persisted in enjoying the consolations of their old faith. Another act passed in the same parliament had a more general bearing upon the laity at large who merely refused to accept the newly established form of worship, the so-called recusants. This act was entitled an 'Act de Excommunicato Capiendo'. Its purpose was to lend the support

[1] Burghley mentions this fact in a paper which he wrote (without date) urging the execution of the Statutes of 1581 against the recusants. 'The causes that moved the renewing of this law was for that it was seen that the pain being no greater than xii pence, no officer did seek to charge any offender therewith, so that numbers of evil disposed persons increased herein to offend with impunity' (Cotton MSS. Titus B iii, f. 63).

[2] Cf. W. H. Frere, *History of Church of England*, 1558–1625 (London, 1904), p. 93.

[3] Statutes of the Realm, 5 Eliz. c. i.

of the secular arm to the censures of the Church. The Act of Uniformity, when it provided that all recusants should pay 12*d.* a Sunday for refusing to attend church, had made them liable as well to ecclesiastical censure. At the time this meant little. It had long been the custom for the bishop to call down secular punishment upon excommunicated persons by applying to the Court of Chancery. Chancery would thereupon issue to the sheriff of the county a writ *de excommunicato capiendo* which ordered him to arrest the victim of the episcopal censure and to keep him in prison until he conformed to the demands of the Church. But since no provision had been made for the return of the writ, it usually came to nothing.[1] This act of 1563 provided that a regular return of these writs should be made to the court of the Queen's Bench.[2] The consequence was that a very real power of punishment was placed in the hands of the bishops, and the recusant became liable not only to a nominal fine for his nonconformity but also to imprisonment for an indefinite period.

These acts of 1563, with the two acts passed in Elizabeth's first Parliament, embody the legislation passed against the Catholics during the first decade of Elizabeth's reign.

Generally speaking, Parliament left the enforcement of its measures to the Queen's discretion. In the Act of Supremacy it laid down the rule that the Queen, as recognized head of the Church, had the right to exercise 'all such jurisdictions, privileges, superiorities, and pre-eminences, spiritual and ecclesiastical, as by any spiritual or ecclesiastical authority hath heretofore been or may be lawfully exercised'. It was on the basis of this rule that Elizabeth proceeded to develop machinery for the enforcement of the new laws.

The first thing which she did was to appoint six special commissions, composed partly of clergymen and partly of lawyers, to perambulate England and see to it that the acts passed by her first Parliament were enforced.[3] But before these Commissioners had had time to complete their work, she revoked their

[1] Sir R. Phillimore, *Ecclesiastical Law of Church of England* (London, 1895), ii, p. 1189 seq. The introduction to the Statute de Excommunicato Capiendo (cf. n. 2 below) reveals the insufficiency of the writ before a regular return of it to the Queen's Bench was provided.

[2] Statutes of the Realm, 5 Eliz. c. 23.

[3] For the character and scope of the work done by these commissions, cf. Birt, *The Elizabethan Religious Settlement* (London, 1907), p. 209 seq.

commissions and appointed in their stead a central Court of High Commission composed of twenty members, chiefly laymen, and gave to them wide powers to exercise her ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This Court of High Commission, which was renewed from time to time during her reign, became her chief instrument for the maintenance and defence of the new Anglican Church. By increasing the total of its members and by decreasing the number of them necessary for a quorum, she made of it a very efficient body.[1]

The Court of High Commission was of course an extraordinary body organized to cope with an extraordinary situation. Normally, the bishops in their various diocesan visitations would have seen to it that the clergymen under their jurisdiction were properly orthodox and that the services conducted in the parish churches were in accordance with the law. So too, in the enforcement of uniformity among the laity the ordinary courts of justice would, normally, have executed the decrees of Parliament. As time went on the tendency was for more and more business of this sort to pass into the hands of the bishops and the royal justices. But, at first, undoubtedly much supervision and direct interference by the Crown was necessary.

In this work of supervision Elizabeth did not depend entirely upon the Court of High Commission alone. Above that body as a kind of ex officio court of appeal and overseer in general sat the Privy Council itself. Whenever the exigencies of the case seemed to demand it, the Privy Council interfered at any stage of the proceedings against the offenders. The records of Privy Council are full of such instances of interference, and they prove that in spite of all the powers delegated to other bodies, the central government still kept a firm grip upon the administration of the law, and used large powers to alter the normal course of procedure at discretion.

This machinery, from the Privy Council down, appears formidable, and when we consider the work which it had to perform of changing Catholic England as Mary had left it, to Protestant England as Elizabeth desired it, we should expect to find it very busy, and to see the English prisons flooded to the

[1] Cf. the various Letters Patent for the High Commission Courts under Elizabeth, printed in Prothero's *Select Documents*.

doors with Catholic recusants. Yet this was not so. On the contrary it is amazing to see how little real religious persecution there was during the first ten years of Elizabeth's reign. The Anti-Catholic laws, which were severe enough in themselves, appear to have been administered with singular mildness. The Marian bishops, who were the head and front of the offending, and who might easily have been proved high traitors according to the letter of the law, were deprived of course, and some of them were imprisoned and some of them fined, but only in extreme cases like that of Bonner were they very harshly dealt with. And even Bonner's fate seems mild when compared with that of the Protestants whom a little while before he had condemned to the fires at Smithfield.[1] Among the Marian clergy at large, many conformed and the rest seem to have been treated with singular moderation.[2] Of the laity, a few were imprisoned and a few admonished, but the vast majority of them were left, for the time being at least, to their own religious devices.[3]

[1] Cf. on this, A. O. Meyer, *op. cit.* (Eng. Trans.), pp. 26–8; Pollen, *The English Catholics under Elizabeth*, i, p. 33. Pollen regards the treatment of the Marian bishops as very severe, Meyer as mild.

[2] Upon this point there has been considerable controversy. Mr. Gee, *Elizabethan Clergy* (Oxford, 1898, p. 237 seq.), maintains that during the years between 1558 and 1564 only some 200 clergymen were deprived, and he argues from this that the great majority of them conformed. Father Gasquet in his essay on Hampshire Recusancy (*The Old English Bible and Other Essays*, 1897) maintains that these figures prove nothing, pointing out that many clergy who refused to take the Oath of Supremacy were connived at and not deprived. The difficulties of making any definite statement on this subject have been well pointed out by Dom Birt, *op. cit.*, p. 188 seq. It is, however, fairly certain that many of the Marian clergy took the oath. What proportion of them did so is impossible to say. Pollen, *op. cit.* i. 40, estimates that at least 6,000 of the 8,000 clergy accepted the changes; Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 29, agrees that the number deprived for refusing to conform was surprisingly small. Dom Birt estimates them at 700, Pollen at 600.

[3] The Spanish Ambassador wrote in May 1560 (*Cal. Spanish*, 1558–67, p. 156) that a large number of Catholics were imprisoned; but his testimony is not, in itself, altogether trustworthy, and it is certainly not borne out by the other evidence at the time. A list of recusants in prison in the year 1561 (*Cal. Dom.* Add. 1547–65, p. 510) enumerate 22, of whom 10 were in the Tower, 6 in the Fleet, 1 in the Marshalsea, 1 in Sir Richard Sackville's house, and 4 at Colchester in Essex. Another list, probably belonging to the year 1563 (in Gee, *Elizabethan Clergy*, p. 179), enumerates sixty-five, of whom the great majority were clergymen. Under the Act de Excommunicato Capiendo which provided for a return of all excommunicated persons to the Queen's Bench, few seem to have suffered. Up to Hilary Term, 1565, only one clergyman and some fifty laymen were returned (Gee, p. 197). So far as the records show only a few prominent individuals were dealt with. The great mass of Englishmen were not disturbed (cf. Birt, p. 502 seq.).

This in general was the policy pursued by the English government towards the Catholics during the first decade of Elizabeth's reign. It is not a policy which would have commended itself to the zealots of any creed in the sixteenth century, but it accomplished the end which the Queen had in mind. She was aiming above all things else at peace within her kingdom and at peace with her neighbours. At a time when France was torn and racked by intestine religious wars, and when Philip of Spain was spending millions of money and desolating his fairest provinces to put down his rebellious Protestant subjects, England remained at peace. To many Englishmen this fact alone must have served as sufficient justification for the Elizabethan method of settling religious questions. But to those faithful Catholics at home, and especially to those Catholic refugees abroad, who placed the cause of their religion before the peace and prosperity of their country, the situation in England was far from satisfactory. They began to see that they must exert themselves if they did not wish Catholicism to die of mere inertia in the island.[1]

And so they began to arouse themselves for combat. In 1569 they broke out in rebellion in the north. The next year Pope Pius V by the publication of the Bull Regnans in Excelsis, formally declared war upon the Queen, denounced her as a heretic, and absolved her subjects from their allegiance. In 1571 followed the so-called Ridolfi plot, an attempt by a faction of Catholic sympathizers at court to dethrone Elizabeth and seat the Roman Catholic Mary Stuart in her place.

The consequence of these various warlike measures on the part of the Catholics against the Queen was that she assumed at once a harsher attitude towards them. If we may believe the reports of the Spanish ambassador, the recusants were much more severely treated during the years 1568 and 1569 than they had been formerly.[2] Moreover when Parliament assembled early

[1] Cf. Simpson's *Campion*, p. 137 seq. Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 59 ff., has an interesting chapter on the decline of Roman Catholicism in England during these years.

[2] It should be said, here again, that the extravagant statements made by the Spanish ambassador (cf. *Cal. Spanish, Eliz.*, 1568–79, pp. 8 et seq.) are not borne out by other evidence. The French ambassador at London, for instance, has comparatively little to say on the subject (cf. Teulet, *Correspondance de La Mothe Fénélon*, passim). One suspects that the Spanish ambassador, who enjoyed the confidence of the conspiring English nobles both in

in the year 1571 it increased somewhat the statutory penalties against Catholic sympathizers.

The new statutes had special reference to those who introduced Papal Bulls, or any other token of Papal authority into England. These offences were to be very severely punished. Against the recusants in general, however, Parliament took no further action at the time,[1] and the penal laws against the Catholics remained practically unchanged in England until the year 1581.

During the ten years between 1571 and 1581 the Queen employed the same machinery, as during the first ten years of her reign, for maintaining her ecclesiastical authority. The only change which is particularly noticeable is that the Privy Council seems to have been more concerned about the state of religion in England than it had been during the previous decade. From time to time it dispatched letters to the bishops instructing them to send reports of the recusants in their dioceses, and to be more diligent in the enforcement of the laws.[2] It kept closer watch on the proceedings of the Court of High Commission, and on one occasion at least prompted it to get about its business when it was somewhat slow in proceeding.[3] It summoned a much larger number of recusants to appear before it, and in general identified itself much more closely than it had done in the past with the so-called persecution of the Catholics.

This change was probably due in large measure to the more militant attitude which the English Catholics, or at least some of the English Catholics, had revealed towards the State. The Pope had officially declared Elizabeth to be no longer the sovereign of the English Catholics. The Catholics in the north had fought under the Papal banner and with Papal encouragement against her government. Ridolfi and his coadjutors had conspired against her life. Whether or not the English Catholics at large were in sympathy with those various measures against the government is another question.[4] At all events the Queen

1569 and 1571, and who was doing his best to induce Philip II to lend them his assistance, was perhaps purposely overstating the case in order to stimulate the sympathies of his master and to arouse him to action.

[1] Statutes of the Realm, 13 Eliz. c. 2.

[2] Dasent, *Acts of Privy Council*, 1575–7, p. 49 *et al.*

[3] Ibid. 1571–5, p. 235; 1575–7, p. 225 *et al.*

[4] Cf. on this subject Father J. H. Pollen's interesting articles upon the politics of the English Catholics in *The Month*, Feb.–Dec. 1902. Father

and her Council had enough evidence at hand to satisfy themselves that it would be expedient to proceed somewhat more harshly against the upholders of the old faith.

The immigration of a considerable number of Catholic priests from the newly-founded seminaries on the Continent during this decade brought a new element into the problem. Three priests came over in 1574. By 1578 there were over fifty in England, and by 1580, 110.[1] There were young men, practically all of them Englishmen born, many of them eloquent preachers, and they began at once a vigorous campaign for their faith.

It has always been and probably always will be disputed as to how much political significance is to be attached to this systematic invasion of England by Jesuits and seminary priests from abroad. The question here is not of the facts as they were but of the facts as Elizabeth and her Council saw them to be. In the first place these clergymen came from abroad. That was a point against them in the eyes of patriotic Englishmen then as now. In the second place they came, for the most part, from seminaries which drew support from Philip of Spain, the Duke of Guise, and the Pope of Rome, the Queen's chief enemies on the Continent. In the third place they recognized the Papal Supremacy and by inference the Bull Regnans in Excelsis. Finally, they came, in open disobedience to English law, to preach Catholicism and to disseminate illegal and potentially traitorous doctrines among the Queen's subjects.[2] These were the charges which the English government made against the invading priests, and on these grounds it always justified its religious persecution of them. Opinions will differ as to whether these grounds were sufficient in themselves to justify the action of the government. Possibly the Queen's councillors cherished some doubt upon the subject themselves. Whenever they could they tried to convict the

Pollen has presented the Catholic point of view with a fairness as refreshing as it is unusual in controversies about religion.

[1] Frere, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

[2] It is to be observed that the Jesuits who came over in 1580 were instructed not to take part in affairs of state, 'except perhaps with those whose fidelity has been long and steadfast' (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 142). Later this qualification was stricken out and they were ordered in no case to meddle with affairs of state (ibid., p. 143). Of course after Parsons began his pamphlet attack upon Elizabeth in 1582 (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 278), and particularly after Allen published his virulent pamphlet just before the coming of the Armada, the charge against the priests on political grounds was greatly strengthened.

priests of a more direct kind of treason. In some cases they succeeded. In some cases they did injustice this way. But they could always fall back upon the general charge, and it may be taken to be the real explanation of their attitude.

It was just at the time when the first seminaries were beginning to find their way into England that Elizabeth appointed Walsingham to be one of her Principal Secretaries. During the first three years of his service the seminaries did not invade England in sufficient numbers to alarm the government. Consequently there was during this interval very little change in the attitude of the Privy Council towards the recusants in general, or towards the priests in particular. Matters went on very much as they had gone on before, and Walsingham himself was busy for the most part about foreign affairs. Until the middle of the year 1577 he hardly appears at all in connexion with the execution of the Anti-Catholic statutes. In June 1577 the capture of the priest Cuthbert Mayne in Cornwall revealed to the Privy Council a rather alarming amount of religious disaffection in that county. On the 21st of the same month the Bishop of London wrote to Walsingham: 'I have had conference with the Archbishop of Canterbury, and we have received from divers of our brethren, bishops of this realm, news that the Papists marvellously increase both in numbers and in obstinate withdrawing of themselves, from the church and service of God.' [1]

This letter, though directed to Walsingham, was intended, of course, for the Council. Coming as it did directly upon the heels of the news from Cornwall, it aroused the councillors to the necessity of taking some measures to check the spread of disaffection. The immediate consequence was that a conference of councillors and bishops was summoned to discuss the general question of proceeding against the recusants. Walsingham, acting probably under instructions from the Privy Council, or possibly from the Queen herself, was instrumental in calling this conference.[2]

[1] S. P. Domestic, cxiv, 22.

[2] We have knowledge of this conference from a letter of summons which Walsingham sent to the Bishop of Lincoln. A copy of this letter is in Walsingham's Letter Book, S. P. Domestic, xlv, p. 21. It lacks a date and a signature. Its appearance in the Letter Book suggests that it was from Walsingham. It seems likely that it was written some little while before a letter which is referred to in the *Records of Privy Council*, x, p. 4, under the date of 28 July

It was probably held some time in July. Walsingham very likely took part in it. There is in one of his letter books the copy of a series of resolutions which seem to embody the results of it. The copy is entitled: 'How such as are backwards, corrupt in religion may be induced to conformity and others stayed from like corruption.'

It recommends:

1. That order should be taken generally with all recusants to bring them to obey the laws;

2. That Watson, Fecknam and other old Catholic leaders, 'upon whose advice and consciences the said recusants depend', should either be banished or imprisoned;

3. That measures should be taken to remove 'corrupt' schoolmasters.

The paper then goes on to propose certain measures to be taken for dealing with the recusants in general.

'First, it shall be convenient that letters be sent to the bishops and others well affected in each diocese to make inquiries by such means as by them shall be thought meet, after such as refuse to come to church, especially such as are of countenance and quality and do offend in example.

'Secondly, to take order that the said persons so offending may be conferred withal by the space of two months, by men sufficiently learned after a charitable sort;

'Thirdly, that not taking effect, to proceed by degrees with the obstinate:

'First in restraining of them of their liberties and punishing them by way of mulct according to their abilities, providing that during the time of their restraint (as aforesaid) they may be conferred withal;

'And in case by these means they shall not be reduced to conformity after the space of [*blank in MSS.*] to proceed to the offering unto them the oath according to the laws of the realm;

'Lastly, that forasmuch as the number of recusants is so great as the places of restraint are not able to hold them, it may be thought expedient that the recusants of such dioceses as are most corrupt be first dealt withal, and in the said diocese the principal persons such as are by law to be reached unto.'

1577. My reason for assuming this is because in the letter of summons to the Bishop of Lincoln, Walsingham informs him that among the particular matters to be discussed is the dealing with Watson, Fecknam, Harpsfield, and others. In the letter referred to in the Privy Council Records order is given for dealing with these men.

Then follow some passages concerning the disposal of Watson and his colleagues. The paper ends with some recommendations about schoolmasters and servants of notorious recusants abroad.[1]

This conference of bishops and councillors has been neglected by historians. It is worthy of serious consideration because it outlined for the first time, in the measures which it recommended, a plan for dealing with recusants which was, in many respects, subsequently followed.[2] The Privy Council took steps at once

[1] S. P. Domestic, xlv, 10. This paper is not signed or dated. Its connexion with the conference of July 1577 is sufficiently evident from the fact that it deals with the points which Walsingham in his letter of summons to the Bishop of Lincoln (see p. 280, n. 2) said that the conference would deal with. There is another copy of this paper in S. P. Domestic, cxxvii, 6, also undated, which has been assigned in the *Domestic Calendar* to Dec. 1578. This date, which is simply conjectured by the editor of the Calendar, is probably wrong.

[2] Probably we may attribute to this time an undated paper, written partly in Walsingham's hand, with some corrections by Burghley, among the Harleian MSS. in the British Museum (Harl. 360, f. 65). It was certainly written before 20 Feb. 1579, because Sir Nicholas Bacon is mentioned in it who died on that day. The paper is evidently the draft of a plan for the segregation of recusants on the large scale proposed by the conference of July 1577. It consists of a list of ten castles situated in various parts of England. After each castle is placed the name of its keeper, and after him in turn a list of two or three counties is bracketed, suggesting that this particular keeper was to have charge of the recusants from these particular counties. Finally, the superintendants of each castle are named. I cite two entries from the ten to show their general character :

The Castles	*The Keepers*	*The Counties*	*The Superintendants*
Wisbeach—The Isle of Ely	Sir Nich. Bacon	The Capital Doctors and Priests	Mr. Michell Mr. Carleton
Banbury—Oxford	Mr. Fynes	Warwick Oxford Northants	Mr. Fynes Mr. Cooper Mr. R. Corbett

&c. The other castles named are Framlingham (Suffolk), Kimbolton (Hunts), Portchester (Hants), The Vize (Wilts), Melborne (Derby), Hatton (Cheshire), Wigmore (Montgomery), Barney (Yorkshire).

Following this list are the following notes :

' What is lastly to be done for the committing of the recusants to the several castles.

' After preparing the castles and appointing of persons to take charge of the prisoners and oversight of the ordering of them, there must then be letters directed to the bishops to call and commit so many of the better sort of recusants within their diocese as have not appeared before the Lords of Council.

That upon the baser sort there may be a punishment laid by way of mulct for not coming to church on Sundays and holidays at the least.'

This plan of segregation on such a large scale was never carried out, but it is interesting to note that it was seriously enough considered as early as this time to warrant that Walsingham and Burghley should put their heads together in order to draft elaborate plans for it. Simpson (*Life of Campion*, p. 234) evidently had this list in mind. But he assigns it to too late a date, and he is rash in assuming that it represents anything more than a project.

to carry these recommendations into effect. The first step it took was to collect information regarding the recusants. In October 1577 it dispatched a general letter to the bishops ordering them to make a return, within five or six days, of all the recusants within their separate dioceses, with the value of their lands and goods 'as you think they are indeed, and not as they be valued in the subsidy books.'[1]

The bishops made their reports[2] which, although very inaccurate, gave the Council some kind of rough estimate to work upon. Nothing further, however, seems to have been done at the time to carry out the recommendations of the July conference.[3]

The next definite step, indeed, in the Queen's policy towards the recusants was a step in the direction of moderation. Some time in the year 1579 or early in the year 1580, Walsingham dispatched a letter, written ostensibly in his private capacity, to certain men in various shires advising them to mitigate their rigour in dealing with the recusants.

'I thought good,' he wrote, 'not as a Councillor, a place

[1] S. P. Domestic, cxvi, 15.

[2] The returns of the bishops will be found scattered through the S. P. Domestic in Vol. cxvi and following. In all, the bishops sent in some 1,500 names, but the lists were made out much too hurriedly, as many of the bishops themselves admitted, to be relied on in detail.

[3] In the letter which the Bishop of London wrote to Walsingham in June 1577 (cf. p. 280, n. 1), he said that he and his colleagues had decided to proceed against the better sort of recusants by way of fine rather than imprisonment. 'This manner of proceeding with them', he added, 'will procure to the Queen a thousand pounds by the year to her coffers, whatsoever it will do more.' No doubt, to Elizabeth, this was a very strong argument in favour of the plan. Yet the matter was not pushed forward. The government, indeed, seems to have had some doubt as to the legality of the fines which the bishops planned to impose. Some time in November 1578 Walsingham sent a letter to Sir Nicholas Bacon and to Lord Burghley in which he made inquiries upon this point. They handed his letter to Attorney-General Gerrard, who in turn summoned all the judges who were in London to consider the question. They decided that the Queen, by virtue of the Act of Supremacy, had the legal right to punish recusants by fine or otherwise. Not content with this, Gerrard laid the question before Dr. Lewes and others learned in the Canon Law, who reported that the bishop had power, according to the Canon Law, to levy fines upon the recusants (Gerrard to Walsingham, 3 Dec. 1578. S. P. Domestic, cxxvii, 7). Nothing seems to have been done to apply this decision in practice. It is interesting, however, to observe that the policy of imposing heavy fines upon the recusants, which was carried to such great lengths in the Statutes of 1581–2, originated with the bishops, and came near being applied by virtue of the Queen's ecclesiastical authority some years before it was expressly decreed by law.

I unworthily hold, but as one that wisheth well the common cause of religion to signify to you, by these my letters, that though, in due and necessary policy, it were fit that Papists who will not conform themselves to resort to public prayer should receive punishment due to their contempt according to the laws provided in that behalf, yet the time serveth not now to deal therein, and therefore I cannot but advise you and such others of the best affected gentlemen in that shire to forbear to persecute by way of indictment such as lately were presented, whose names you certified up; for that if you shall proceed therein, you shall not prevail to do that good you desire, but shall rather receive fail through some commandment from hence, prohibiting you to surcease in proceeding in that behalf, which would breed no less discredit unto you than encouragement to the papists. And surely, if I had not prevented the same, there had been written unto you a general letter from my Lords of the Council to inhibit you from prosecuting the matter against the parties presented and by you certified, which things assuredly will follow if you shall not take profit of this secret advertisement I give you, which I shall request you that the same may be so used as my name be concealed, for that otherwise some may take occasion to make some curious construction of this my good and sincere meaning to other end than by me is meant.' [1]

Probably this letter was written at the Queen's suggestion or at any rate with the assent of the Privy Council. It is hardly to be supposed that Walsingham would have undertaken on his own responsibility to check the course of law against the Catholics at large. Besides it was never a policy which he personally advocated. The invocation to secrecy, although phrased in personal terms, may very well have been used to keep the matter from spreading abroad. It would have been bad policy to have it known among the Catholics at large that the government was relaxing its pressure, although for the moment it may have seemed advisable to relax it. The distinction is a nice one but it is none the less actual. It was always Elizabeth's policy to maintain the law in theory and to mitigate it in fact.

[1] S. P. Domestic, xlv, 27. A copy not signed or dated. This letter appears in a volume which was pretty clearly one of Walsingham's Letter Books. The presumption is, therefore, that he was the writer of it. The date of the letter is hard to fix, but since there is the testimony of the Spanish ambassador at hand to indicate that Elizabeth in 1579–80 was relaxing a little her severity towards the Catholics, and since the position of the letter in the Letter Book points to the date 1579–80, one cannot be very far wrong in assigning it to that date.

The Spanish ambassador attributed this relaxation of severity to the fact that the Queen was anxious to conciliate the English Catholics so that they would not join in rebellion with their Irish brethren who had risen at the Pope's instigation early in the year 1579.[1] This may have been the cause, though more probably the explanation is to be found in the negotiations for marriage with the French Duke of Alençon.[2] In any case it had only a temporary effect. Three months later the Spanish ambassador wrote: 'For the last three weeks, they have proceeded with much more rigour than formerly against the Catholics, those of them who had been released on bail having been sent back to prison again.'[3] This testimony is amply confirmed by other evidence.[4] The government undoubtedly did increase its pressure

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 22. Mendoza to Philip II, 23 Mar. 1580. 'This has caused her to revoke the commission given to her bishops to ascertain who were Catholics. She told them, with her own mouth, that they were a set of scamps, for they were oppressing the Catholics more than she desired.'

[2] When the prospects for the Alençon match appeared very rosy as they did in the spring of 1579 the French ambassador in London reported to his master that Elizabeth was showing great favour underhand to the Catholics. He even went so far as to say that the French suitor might expect all contentment from her in respect of his religion (R. O. French Transcripts, x, f. 96; Mauvissière to the King, 29 May 1579, cited by Pollen, *op. cit.*, p. 316). It is quite possible that Elizabeth was deceiving Mauvissière, but there is plenty of evidence to prove that Leicester and Walsingham and their Puritan colleagues in the Council were generally alarmed at the religious complications of the match, and that Walsingham at least opposed it on these grounds. (Cf. Chapter viii, pp. 20–21.) It may be worth recalling in this connexion that when France and England negotiated an alliance in 1595 there was a mitigation of the persecution of Catholics in England (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 371).

[3] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 38. Mendoza to Philip II, 28 June 1580.

[4] Upon this point there is no lack of evidence. The Spanish ambassador bears testimony to it again and again, and there are several papers in the R. O., S. P. Domestic, which confirm his testimony; cf. for example, a letter of Wm. Herle to Sir E. Horsey, dated 13 Dec. 1580 (S. P. Domestic, cxliv, 49). 'The Queen's Majesty is sharper bent against the Papists and is resolved that the oath shall be ministered to the recusants of her prewordings, the first denial whereof is a praemunire, and the second . . . is treason to them that persist; which will gall them indeed and is the direct way to meet with their seditions and practices at home and to discourage their putters on abroad.' Father Parsons, the Jesuit, in a letter written at this time (cited by Simpson, *Life of Campion*, p. 244), attempts to discover the reasons for this increased severity. 'It is supposed', Parsons wrote, 'that the reasons of this great persecution are, first, the ill success of the English in Ireland; next, the demonstration made last summer against England by the Spanish fleet; and lastly, the coming of the Jesuits into the island, and the great number of conversions made by them.' In S. P. Domestic, cxli, 3, there is an interesting account of the session of the Commission held at Richmond in Yorkshire on 2 Aug. 1580. The account illustrates well the manner of proceeding of the

upon the recusants. The plan which had been previously discussed for the segregation of them in castles throughout England was brought forward again.[1] It was not acted upon on a large scale, but some prominent recusants living in districts particularly disaffected were restrained at Wisbeach and Framlingham, and a great many more were summoned to appear in person before the Privy Council at London.[2]

This year 1580, which was the year Campion and Parsons landed in England and the year after Dr. Sander, emissary of the Pope, had begun to preach rebellion in Ireland, marks a distinct change in the policy of Elizabeth towards the recusants. Up to this time though she had, it is true, shown considerable severity in dealing with individuals, she had nevertheless been singularly mild in her treatment of the recusants as a whole. Before 1580 she had evidently counted on the possibility of winning them over by a policy of conciliation. After 1580 she proceeded against them on the supposition that they were, potentially at least, enemies to her state and therefore to be disabled, one way or another, from doing harm.

The action taken against the recusants by the Privy Council marks the first step in this change of policy. A second and a long step was taken in the Parliament which assembled in the autumn of 1580. Early in 1581 Parliament passed an ' Act to retain her Majesty's subjects in their Due Allegiance ', which greatly increased the penalties for recusancy. This act was drafted under the eyes of the Privy Council, it was laid before both Houses by royal ministers and, no doubt, it became law at the direct instigation of the Crown.[3]

Commission and incidentally throws much light on how the recusants in the north sought to evade it. The majority of these summoned did not appear. One man sent word he was ill, another that he had business, a third shut his doors against the messenger who brought the summons. ' Thus,' the account ends, ' your Honour may see how little they regard her Highness' officers and authority.'

[1] *Acts of Privy Council*, xii, p. 82 ; p. 124 *et al.*

[2] Ibid. p. 156 seq.

[3] For the passage of this bill through Parliament, cf. D'Ewes, p. 284 seq. Sir Walter Mildmay's speech, which probably reveals with some accuracy the attitude of the government towards the recusants at this time, is printed in full. Mr. Norton, the ' Rackmaster ', spoke after him and at Norton's suggestion a committee, consisting of all the Privy Councillors in the House of Commons and others, chiefly royal officers and sergeants-at-law, was appointed to draft a bill. This bill was presented later and seems to have passed through both Houses without opposition.

It is clear that in the various measures taken against the recusants before the passing of the statute just referred to, Walsingham, so far as the state papers of the time reveal him, played a very formal part. He appears simply as the official correspondent for the Council and as the recorder of its decisions. What part he played in the framing of these decisions, and what at this time were his own particular theories about dealing with the recusants, it is impossible to say.

Concerning his part in the measures taken against 'professed Jesuits, Seminary Priests and other Priests', which commenced with the capture of Cuthbert Mayne and ended with the execution of Edmund Campion and his fellow sufferers in December 1581, the same thing, in general, may be said. It is true that a great deal of information regarding the movements of these priests came into his hands from one source or another. But then, of course, his were the hands into which such information would normally come. There is plenty of evidence to prove that people who had communications to make to the government addressed themselves, sometimes to the Queen, sometimes to the Privy Council as a whole, and sometimes to Walsingham, without making any real discrimination between them. The fact that much secret intelligence came to Walsingham is therefore in itself no proof of the existence of the elaborate spy system which has been fathered upon him. It will appear that in times to come Walsingham did employ several secret agents for the purpose of hunting down the Catholics. Even at this time he had one or two such men at work. But it is pretty clear that before 1581 he had not organized anything like a system of espionage. With the hunting down of Cuthbert Mayne or Nelson or Brian or Campion, or of the other priests who were taken before the end of that year, he does not appear to have had anything to do. Certainly there is no proof whatever that he designed the traps in which they were, one after another, ensnared.

On the 14th of July 1581 Walsingham informed Burghley that he had been set to work by the Queen to examine certain persons charged with having conspired against her person. They turned out, Walsingham wrote, to be 'runnagate' priests from Rome and Douay. It seems likely that these 'runnagates' to whom he referred were Thomas Cottam, Luke Kirby, and some other

priests who were gathered in at the time when a general search was out for Parsons and Campion.[1] There is a paper in the Public Record Office written partly in Walsingham's hand, which is entitled 'Articles to be administered to Thos. Cottam, Luke Kirby and others'. The questions which the paper contains were designed in part to discover with whom the priests had had dealings since their arrival in England, but were more particularly directed to the discovery of their connexion with Mary Stuart, with the Irish rebellion, and with papal plans for an invasion of England.[2] It is improbable that Walsingham conducted the examination in person. In any event he came to the conclusion that there was nothing much to be learned from them.[3]

In March 1580 Walsingham had also drafted questions for the examination of Richard Cregh, the titular Archbishop of Armagh, who was a prisoner in the Tower,[4] and of Dr. Thomas Watson, one of the Marian bishops who was at the time in the custody of the Bishop of Rochester. Both of these Catholic dignitaries were suspected of dealings with a certain Antonio Fogaza, a rather amateurish Portuguese conspirator of no particular importance.[5] Here again it appears improbable that Walsingham conducted the examinations in person. His questions were designed to trace the ramifications of Fogaza's schemes. These two cases, with that of the 'runnagate' priests cited above, are the only ones on record up to this time which reveal Walsingham in direct dealings with Catholic priests. In every one of them he evidently interested himself not because he wanted to bully and browbeat the enemies of his faith but because he was trying to ferret out treasonable practices against his sovereign.[6]

[1] S. P. Domestic, cxlix, 69.

[2] Ibid., cxlvii, 97. This paper is undated. It is assigned in the *Cal. Domestic* to Feb. 1581. Its relation to the orders given by Elizabeth to Walsingham in July (cf. n. 1) seems close enough to justify the assignment of it to that month, especially since the Acts of Privy Council (xiii, p. 172) show that Cottam and his associates were still being examined in Aug. 1581.

[3] Cf. n. 1 above. 'As far as I can gather,' he wrote to Burghley, 'I think it will prove nothing.'

[4] Cf. the articles administered to Richard Craigh, 15 Mar. 1579/80, in which the questions are written in Walsingham's hand (S. P. Domestic, cxxxvi, 54 and 55). The articles administered to Dr. Watson (ibid. 57) are corrected in Walsingham's hand.

[5] On Fogaza and his devices, cf. particularly S. P. Domestic, cxxxvi, 64, 68, 69, 70.

[6] On 13 June 1578, Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador at London wrote:

Though he took no part in the trial of Campion and his colleagues, there can be little doubt that he was quite in sympathy with the hard measure that was meted out to them.[1] He happened to be in Paris on other business at the time when their case was under consideration and he wrote to Burghley: 'I pray her Majesty may take profit of Campion's discovery by severely punishing the offenders, for nothing has done more harm then the overmuch lenity that hath been used in that behalf.'[2] He clearly was convinced that they were guilty of the charges

'I am told that some months ago he [Walsingham] went to examine a Catholic prisoner and asked him if he held the Queen to be excommunicated. The Catholic answered that he did not concern himself with that matter, and did not know whether she was or not, but Walsingham put down that he [the prisoner] held her to be excommunicated. He then asked him if, the Queen being excommunicated, he considered that she ought to be obeyed as sovereign or not, and the prisoner answered the same way as before, but Walsingham put down that he had said that being excommunicated she could not be Queen. He then went to the Queen with the so-called confession and told her that this was a proof of what Catholics in general thought, for which she could see what it was desirable to do with them' (*Cal. Spanish*, 1568–79, pp. 595–6). There is absolutely no way of establishing the truth of this story, but it is evident that Mendoza was simply repeating a tale that had been told him. His animus towards Walsingham was such that he was prepared to accept any outrageous story he heard as gospel truth. As a matter of fact, there is no direct proof that Walsingham ever personally took part in the examination of Catholics, *quâ* Catholics, though on several occasions he did draft questions to be put to them. Sir Fra. Englefield received a letter in 1589 regarding the examination of certain Catholics before the Privy Council, in which Walsingham is alleged to have denounced one as a traitor because he confessed himself to be a seminary priest (*Unpublished Documents relating to the English Martyrs* (Catholic Record Society), i, p. 168). In John Bridgewater's *Concertatio*, a compilation of the acts of Catholic martyrs, Walsingham is charged with having insulted a Catholic on one occasion and as having struck one on another (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 177), but it is impossible to substantiate these charges. Apart from the work of Parsons cited on p. 267, n. 4, there seems to be no other evidence of Walsingham's personal intervention in the examination of the Catholics. What there is appears to be hardly sufficient to justify the following statement by Meyer: 'Walsingham exhibits in his conduct unmistakable marks of brutality and fanaticism. Blinded by religious passion, he honestly believed every Roman priest was deceitful and dangerous to the state and he presided in person at their examinations for the express purpose of putting to them the bloody question' (*op. cit.*, p. 177).

[1] Simpson says that Walsingham was present at an interview held with Campion before his trial by some members of the Privy Council at the house of the Earl of Leicester (cf. *Life of Campion*, p. 338). If Simpson is correct in fixing the date of this conference at 25th July, it was certainly the last possible date on which Walsingham could have attended such a conference. He was on his way to France the day following. Cf. Walsingham to Burghley, 26 July 1581, at Gravesend (*Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 282). Walsingham in his diary (*Camden Miscellany*, vi, p. 43) says that he left the court on the 25th of July. On the whole one feels that Simpson must be mistaken either as to his date or as to his fact.

[2] S. P. France, vi, 8.

brought against them, and thought that they should be given short shrift. Nevertheless there is practically no evidence to prove the charge which has been made against him that he actually fabricated a plot against Elizabeth's life while he was in France in order to induce the Queen to proceed more rigorously against Campion and his fellow priests.[1]

[1] Simpson's *Campion*, p. 388. Simpson writes, 'It is quite clear from documents in the State Paper Office that Walsingham busied himself in Paris searching for plots which might involve the Catholics, and when he could not find any that would suit his purpose, in inventing them and suborning the witnesses to swear to them.' Simpson bases this charge upon two papers in the Record Office. The first is a letter from Walsingham to Burghley dated 20 Aug. 1581 (R. O., S. P. France, vi, 17), in which he writes, 'I am by secret intelligence given most assuredly to understand that about two months past there was a plot sent out of Spain to the Pope showing him upon the alienation of Villiqr [?] what way is to be taken for the alienation of Scotland.'

'Out of this,' Simpson concludes, 'Walsingham probably hoped to get some matter to accuse Campion of.' He was, however, Simpson declares, disappointed, but later came upon another bit of news which he thought 'would serve his turn better and for which he offered his man 20 crowns if he would depose to it in a court of justice'. Simpson constructs this theory out of an anonymous letter in the Record Office (S. P. France, vi, 37), addressed to Walsingham and dated the 19th of September. The address of the letter is in Spanish and it is very obviously from some spy or other in Walsingham's pay. It is very badly written and so obscure that almost any meaning might be wrung from it. The passages in it upon which Simpson bases his charge are as follows: 'For yours of C. D. I can answer by A. B. touching the plot; be out of doubt, I would it were but false and sophistical; and that you marvelled why I sent you not by my man some intelligence, I think if I had, you would have thought me for neither wise nor able person to put a thousand men's lives in one, as my man's hand.

'The last part of your letter you answered not in effect as you did in words. Believe me, it is not twenty crowns that shall make me a bondman, or make me tell a false tale. But to what end these words? But only that you may and I think do, learn them that for less will be content to sell their country and all that is in it.'

Now the first part of this passage may very well refer to the same plot of which Walsingham had written to Burghley in August. The second part is not so easy to explain, but it would have to be stretched very far to bear the interpretation that Simpson lays upon it. The reference to the 20 crowns is certainly obscure, but it does not read at all like the refusal of a bribe. It reads rather like a reply which the spy makes to a charge of bribery lodged against him. He seems to say, I am not the man to sell my country for 20 crowns, but there are plenty, you know, who would. At any rate, whether this is the meaning or not, it is certainly preposterous to argue from these obscure phrases that Walsingham was trying to bribe a man with 20 crowns to give evidence of a plot against Elizabeth before a 'court of Justice'.

As to Simpson's other charge that the 'plot', which Walsingham disclosed to Burghley in his letter of the 20th of August, was fabricated in order to dicredit English Catholics, it is absolutely unproven. One has only to read the letter sent by J. B. de Tassis, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, to Philip II of the 10th of April 1581 (Teulet, *Relations politiques de la France et l'Espagne avec l'Écosse*, v, p. 222 seq.), to see that the situation was certainly ripe for such a plot and that Philip was being urged strongly enough to partake in one.

In general, if we consider as a whole the part which Walsingham played either in the formation or in the execution of the policy of Elizabeth's government towards the Catholics from the time when he was made Principal Secretary in December 1573 until the end of the year 1581, it will appear that this part was a comparatively insignificant one. There is good reason to believe that he was quite in sympathy with the increasingly severe measures which began to be taken against recusants and priests alike, from the year 1577 onwards, but it would be hard to find evidence to prove that he had much positive influence upon the actual situation.

Walsingham, indeed, during his first eight years as Secretary had not yet become the great figure in the Government which he became later. He had not yet fully revealed his extraordinary abilities. Consequently during that time he continued to be regarded as occupying a rather subordinate position in the Government. It was in the last ten years of his life (1580–90) that he established himself as one of the most influential of the councillors who surrounded Elizabeth's throne. During that decade it may almost be said that he was the chief executive officer of the Government. The part he played after 1581 in the policy of the Queen towards the English Catholics was, we may be sure, no longer a subordinate one.

During those years Elizabeth saw herself confronted by enemies on every side. In France she saw her sworn enemies the Guises increase in power, while her friends the Huguenots steadily lost ground. In Spain she saw her other great enemy, Philip II, slowly gather together his forces to crush her. She saw the formation of the Holy League whose proclaimed intention was to destroy heresy wherever it raised its head. She saw William of Orange, her mainstay in the Netherlands, assassinated and his rival, the Prince of Parma, steadily advance towards her gates. In Scotland she saw the triumph of the French party; in Ireland, sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebellion. Domestic dangers she saw threatening her also, the dangers of insurrection, the dangers of assassination. The situation was a perilous one, to say the least, and it is not surprising if loyal Englishmen did whatever they could to ward off the impending catastrophe.

In such a situation the Roman Catholics and their sympathizers

were not unnaturally regarded with increasing suspicion. They were the discontented and the disturbing element within the realm. Members of their faith had been at the bottom of every revealed conspiracy against the Queen. It was well known that many of them were in communication with the French and Spanish ambassadors, and it was vehemently suspected that they would join forces with any Catholic army which invaded the realm.[1] It is therefore not to be wondered at that both Parliament and Privy Council, and perhaps, to a lesser extent, the Queen herself, were strongly in favour of proceeding against them more severely. The outcome of this sentiment was a number of new laws against the Catholics and a greater strictness than formerly in the enforcement of them.

In the laws enacted against the Catholics between the years 1580 and 1590, as during the previous decade, the distinction between the passive Catholic sympathizers, that is to say, the recusants, and those who laboured positively to regain England for the old faith, that is to say, the missionary priests and their followers, was preserved. The penalties against both classes were increased, but the recusants continued to fare much better than the active proselytizers.

Against the recusants two important statutes were passed, one in the Parliament of 1580–1[2] and the other in the Parliament of 1586–7.[3] By the first of these, the fines for non-attendance at the Established Church were increased from one shilling a Sunday to twenty pounds a month ; by the second, it was provided that, in case the recusant failed to pay his fine, the Crown might confiscate all of his personal property and two-thirds of his realty. These two statutes, taken together, obviously mark an enormous advance beyond the statutory penalties for recusancy imposed by the Act of Uniformity. If they had been rigidly enforced, they would, undoubtedly, have reduced practically all the recusants within the kingdom to a state approaching absolute penury.

[1] Parsons himself asserted in 1582 that all Catholics without a single exception regarded 'the invasion with approval' (Meyer, *op. cit.* i. 293). It will not be forgotten that Cardinal Wm. Allen in the anxious spring days of 1588 publicly admonished the English people to rise against their bastard Queen (Meyer, i. 326 n.).

[2] Statutes of the Realm, 23 Eliz. c. i.

[3] Ibid. 27 Eliz. c. i.

Against the active Catholic proselytizers two important statutes were likewise passed in the same Parliaments of 1580–1 and 1586–7. By the statute of 1581, all priests coming from over seas who tried to win Englishmen from the Church of England to the Church of Rome were declared high traitors and their proselytes with them.[1] This law seemed severe enough. But it did not have the effect desired. The priests continued their ministrations. Even when they were captured, it was not always easy to prove that they had actually made converts or had sought to make them. Consequently the Parliament of 1586–7 found it necessary to take further measures. By the Statute 27 Elizabeth, c. ii, it gave all 'Jesuits, Seminary Priests and other Priests', in England, who had come from abroad, forty days to leave the country. Those who did not go within the time prescribed, and those who came into England subsequently, were to be hunted down as high traitors. There was no longer any question of proving that they had made converts. If they confessed themselves to be immigrant priests, it was sufficient to establish their treason. Furthermore, it was provided that all English students in Catholic seminaries abroad should return to England at once or be proceeded against as traitors. Even the harbourers of priests were made liable to capital punishment as felons. Indeed, a Catholic sympathizer who did no more than send money to priests abroad, incurred thereby the harsh penalties of praemunire which entailed the confiscation of lands and goods and imprisonment during the Queen's pleasure.[2]

There can be no doubt that in these laws Parliament aimed at nothing less than the extermination of all Catholic preachers and of all Catholic sympathizers in England. It is interesting to observe, however, that Parliament aimed its blows not against priests in general; that is to say, not against the old Marian priests as well as the new-comers, but particularly against priests who came from the seminaries over seas. Moreover, Parliament professed to attack these missionaries not on religious but on political grounds. This appears in the introduction to the statute 27 Elizabeth, c. ii. 'Whereas', it reads, 'divers persons called or professed Jesuits, seminary priests and other priests . . . have of late years come . . . and daily do come . . . into

[1] Cf. p. 292, n. 1.

[2] Statutes of the Realm, 27 Eliz. c. ii.

this realm of England . . . of purpose (as hath appeared as well by sundry of their own examinations and confessions, as by divers other manifest means and proofs) not only to withdraw her Highness' subjects from their due obedience to her Majesty but also to stir up and move sedition, rebellion and open hostility within her Majesty's dominions . . . wherefore, be it enacted, &c.' These words express the attitude not only of Parliament but also of the English Government in general towards the missionary priests. It was steadily maintained that they were persecuted, not because of their faith, but because they preached disobedience to the laws, and because they sought to stir up rebellion within the realm of England.[1]

These new penal laws against recusants and priests, if they had been efficiently administered, would have resulted in the destruction of every priest in England and in the ruination of every recusant. But it would have been a very difficult matter, with the English police force of the sixteenth century, to have administered these laws efficiently. What was more, the Queen never intended that they should be so administered. As before, she used the penal statutes rather as a club to brandish over the heads of her disobedient subjects than as a sword of execution. Having got the laws passed, she proceeded to enforce them at her pleasure and it was generally her pleasure to mitigate them in the enforcement. The penal laws furnish the necessary background for a consideration of Elizabeth's policy towards the Catholics, but they are very far from expressing the actual pains and penalties to which the average recusant or the average priest was subjected.

This is a point which deserves emphasis in considering the part which Walsingham and his colleagues in Privy Council played in the administration of the penal laws during the decade between 1580 and 1590. It will appear that they advocated from time to time harsh measures against the Catholics and that

[1] Upon this point there is plenty of testimony. Elizabeth expresses this view in her proclamation against the Jesuits of 1 April 1582 (Dyson, Proclamations, f. 219). It constitutes the gist of Burghley's argument in his pamphlet, *The Administration of Justice in England*, in which he explains and defends Elizabeth's attitude towards the Catholics. Walsingham set it forth in a letter to the English ambassador at Paris, 26 April 1582 (R. O., S. P. France, vii, 63), directing him to expound it to the King of France.

in particular cases they punished offenders with great severity. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that these measures, though severe in themselves, were much less severe than the laws enjoined and that the Privy Council, even in its sternest moments, generally acted to mitigate statutory pains and penalties. It has been remarked already that a distinction was always preserved both in the making of the laws and in their execution, between the recusants on the one hand and the priests and their congregations on the other. In discussing the administration of the penal laws by the Council during this decade, it will be convenient to consider these two classes separately.

In the course of twenty years a fairly regular method of procedure had been developed for dealing with the recusants. It was not difficult in the large majority of cases to find out who were recusants. The various parish clergymen with their churchwardens easily became aware of those who did not attend the parish church, and if these men did their duty, they communicated the names of recusants to the bishop of their diocese. It then became the duty of the bishop to administer such ecclesiastical punishment as he saw fit and also to present all cases to the Grand Jury, which in return presented them for trial before the proper courts. This apparently was the normal course of procedure. But it did not always work. The parish clergymen, moved by fear or favour, were not always accurate in making their reports. Sometimes the bishops were lacking in diligence.[1] At least one case is on record of a Grand Jury which refused to present for trial certain notorious recusants who had been brought to their attention by the bishop.[2] But the chief offenders were the Justices of the Peace, who, in the northern counties especially, very often neglected their duty.[3] The consequence was that

[1] There are many instances of this in the *Acts of Privy Council*; cf. *inter alia*, vol. viii, p. 258; vol. xii, p. 59; vol. xiii, pp. 245, 432.

[2] *Acts of Privy Council*, xiii. 271 seq.

[3] This recusancy among the Justices of Peace was a continual cause of trouble to the Privy Council. Several serious attempts at reform were made, particularly in 1582 (cf. *Acts of Privy Council*, xiii. 320, 329, 347) and in 1587 (cf. *Acts of Privy Council*, xiv. 124, and also B.M. Lansdowne MSS. 53 *passim*). In 1587 many of them even lost their offices because of the recusancy of their wives (cf. S. P. Domestic, ccvi, 85). Nevertheless, in spite of every effort made by the Government, the Justices continued to give trouble throughout the reign by conniving at the offences of the local gentry against the penal laws.

the Council was called upon again and again to scrutinize and to reform these weaknesses in the ordinary machinery for enforcing the law. It did this work for the most part through the agency of the various special Commissions for Ecclesiastical Causes which it sent from time to time into disaffected districts.[1] But it often resorted to the device of summoning prominent offenders before itself either at an ordinary council meeting or in its more terrifying aspect of Star Chamber Court.[2]

This phase of the Council's dealings towards the recusants was distinctly a matter of administration rather than of policy. Walsingham of course had his direct share in it like any other Privy Councillor. Perhaps also in his special capacity as Principal Secretary he was able to supply, through the means of his secret service, some little of the information upon the basis of which the Council took its action. There are, however, few traces of this. The Privy Council ordinarily obtained its information through the bishops and other formal channels. Walsingham's spies were engaged chiefly in tracking down priests. Such information as they supplied concerning the flaws in the machinery for the administration of the penal laws was quite by the way.[3]

The Privy Council was a council of administrators. In its administrative capacity it executed the Queen's policy towards the recusants. It was also a council of advisers. As such it contributed largely to the formulation of that policy.

The Government's attitude towards the recusants varied during the decade under consideration. It was on the whole a harsher one than during the previous decade, but it was not uniformly and consistently harsher. As before, it was influenced largely by the general course of events abroad and at home. When the foreign situation, by reason of the triumphs of the Holy League in France, or of Parma in the Netherlands or because of warlike preparations in Spain, looked dark; or when domestic dangers in the shape of plots and conspiracies hovered about the Queen, the recusants fared badly. At other times,

[1] *Acts of Privy Council*, xiii. 25; xiv. 8; xvi. 235 *et al.*

[2] There is ample evidence of this practice throughout the *Acts of Privy Council*.

[3] I base my conclusions here upon an examination of all the reports I have been able to find which Walsingham received from his spies.

when the political sky was fairly clear, they fared comparatively well.[1]

In the spring of 1581, not long after the passing of the new penal laws, when the back of the Irish rebellion had been practically broken, the Council decided to release all recusants upon their bonds for good behaviour.[2] A year later the diligence of the Jesuit preachers induced the Government to resume its harsher policy, and it sent out orders that all prominent recusants should be indicted and brought before the Justices of Assize for trial.[3]

This policy seems in the main to have been continued throughout the years 1583 and 1584, with the result that a large number of recusants were imprisoned and that the courts had more business than they could very well attend to.[4] The difficulty was that only an insignificant minority of the recusants were able to pay the large penalties imposed by law, and those who could not pay were of course liable to imprisonment until they did. The outcome of this policy was that the recusants, instead of being a source of revenue, became in many cases a pecuniary burden. This was an aspect of the case which did not appeal at all to the thrifty instincts of the Queen. Consequently, about the middle of the year 1585, Council began to seek some more practicable method than the statutes afforded for exploiting the recusants to the advantage of the royal exchequer. A first step was taken in this direction in September 1585, by inviting all the

[1] Cf. R. B. Merriman, 'Some Notes on . . . the English Catholics . . . in the Reign of Elizabeth', *A. H. R.*, xiii, pp. 480 ff.

[2] *Acts of Privy Council*, xiii. 41. The conditions of this bond are given in full in the Council Records.

[3] *Acts of Privy Council*, xiii. 451, 20 June 1582.

[4] A paper entitled 'The Trouble and Grievance growing to the Clerk of the Peace in Hampshire by the Recusants', among the Domestic State Papers in the Record Office (S. P. Domestic, clxxxv, no. 83), is illuminating upon this point. I quote an extract from it. 'The number of Recusants which at every Sessions are to be indicted is so great that the Clerk of the Peace is driven to spend not only by himself, or by his deputy . . . a great deal of time before and after every Sessions, but also the most part of the Sessions itself in drawing and engrossing the indictments, judgements, and processes thereupon, and the Justices most occupied about them, whereby the Sessions are continued more days than heretofore they have done and almost all other causes and grievances of the shire omitted, to the great trouble and charges of the justices and freeholders of the shire without any profit hitherto unto her Majesty by the conviction of the recusants, who are not found to have lands or goods to answer their condemnations and also without any reformation of any of the recusants hitherto.'

prominent recusants to make special contributions towards the expense of fitting out horsemen for the Earl of Leicester's army in the Netherlands. It was intimated that if they gave liberally on this occasion, the Queen would deal more leniently with them in the future.[1]

The recusants in the great majority of cases seem to have strained every effort to meet the demands upon them.[2] The Government at any rate appears to have been satisfied with what had been done. In February of the next year it sent out a general letter to special commissioners in each county instructing them to confer with the prominent recusants upon the question of a general composition for their recusancy fines. It was suggested that if they made a liberal offer of a considerable portion of their yearly income to the Queen, she would accept it in lieu of the £240 exacted by law and would allow them to enjoy the remainder of their revenues without ecclesiastical or secular molestation.[3]

[1] Unhappily, the Records of the Privy Council are missing for the year 1585, so that the exact terms of their demands upon the recusants are wanting. It is apparent, however, that each recusant of means was asked to furnish demi-lances or light horsemen in direct proportion to his means. They might apparently pay a kind of scutage instead; £50 in lieu of a demi-lance and £25 in lieu of a light horseman. It appears from the returns that some were asked to contribute a third of a horse or a half. (Cf. these returns in S. P. Domestic, clxxxiii and clxxxiv *passim*).

[2] Some of the letters written by recusants in answer to this demand are pathetic in the extreme. They reveal how hardly, in many cases, the recusancy fines bore on those who had to pay, though, no doubt, the writers took care to emphasize the miseries of their condition. Richard Tremayne, for instance, writes (S. P. Domestic, clxxxiii, no. 23, iv) that he is willing to pay £25 for furnishing a light horse, but he begs for pity since all his lands have been seized in default of recusancy fines, and all his goods wasted by long and chargeable journeys into Cornwall to answer indictments against him. Another, Nicholas Tichborne, writes that he is the younger son of a younger son, that he had had one little farm to support his wife and children upon, and that it had been seized by the royal officers in default of the recusancy fines and he himself made a prisoner for the same reason. He promised that if he might have his liberty he would try to beg and borrow enough money from his friends to pay for a light horseman, and he begged that he might be released from his bond in order to keep his wife and children from starving (S. P. Domestic, clxxxiii, no. 45, ii).

[3] *Acts of Privy Council*, xiv, pp. 8, 15. The original draft of this letter of Privy Council to the Commissioners in the several counties, corrected in Walsingham's hand is in the Record Office (S. P. Domestic, clxxxvi, nos. 81–3). It differs in some respects from the letter which was actually dispatched. The most interesting point of difference is that in the letter, as sent, the Privy Council invited the recusants to make offer of a 'reasonable portion' of their yearly income to the crown, without any precise definition of

Of course this offer represented a distinct mitigation of the fines imposed by statute, but it seems hardly likely that the Government was moved to make it by any altruistic motive. The fact of the matter was that the legal fines could not be collected. Elizabeth needed money to support her armies in the Netherlands and it was hoped that by some sort of compromise the recusants might be induced to pay voluntarily some part of what the law demanded of them. But the hopes of the Government were disappointed. The offers of the recusants did not meet its expectations. And so the plan was temporarily abandoned. It has its significance nevertheless, because it really anticipated the statute made by Parliament towards the end of the same year, by which it was provided that all the goods and two-thirds of the lands of recusants might be confiscated by the Government in default of the fines imposed by the Statute of 1581.

From the year 1586 until the Spanish Armada actually came in the midsummer of 1588 the English Government was in constant fear of attack from Philip of Spain. In consequence, these years were hard years for the recusants. The Spanish

the term 'reasonable portion', whereas in the draft this term is very strictly defined. 'But to the end you may be informed of her Majesty's purpose herein, you shall understand that she doth hold them [the recusants] graciously and favourably dealt withal whose values in living amounting to above £240 by the year, if she accept the one half of the penalty and acquit them of the other, and of the trouble and vexation incident to the ordinary course of the proceeding held by law against them; and of such as are valued under £240 and shall have yearly living between £150 and £250 if she take the third of their valuation. And because there will rest some difficulty in discerning the just values of their several livings, as well by leases and stocks as by other yearly revenues of such as are valued under £150, we think it necessary that you let them understand that in case they shall deal plainly with you in setting down the true state of their livings as they are worth in these days, that then they shall answer but a fourth part thereof. So on the other side, if by some exact survey to be taken after the said offer, it shall be found that they have not dealt well and plainly in opening the true state of their living, that in that case they shall answer the whole penalty inflicted by the Statute in respect of the abuse of her Majesty's favour so graciously offered unto them.'

It is impossible to say why this clause was omitted from the letter, as sent, although a great many plausible reasons might be surmised. Had it been put in force, it would undoubtedly have greatly alleviated the lot of the recusants at large, especially of those of the poorer sort. The arrangement was certainly much more merciful than that one imposed by statute in the next Parliament which provided for a confiscation of all the personalty and two-thirds of the realty of recusants in default of payment of the full fine.

Walsingham certainly had something to do with the formulation of the earlier plan. The original draft of the letter, as has been observed already, was in his hand.

ambassador reported at great length the hardships which they underwent.[1] Towards the end of the year 1587 a wholesale system of restraining them was begun, which continued until after the Armada was disposed of.[2] After 1588 most of those in restraint were released, but in the main the policy of the Government continued severe. When Walsingham died in 1590 the recusants in general were in about as sorry a plight as ever they had been and their condition did not materially improve during the remainder of Elizabeth's reign.[3]

It is not possible to identify with precision the exact part which Walsingham, as an individual, played in the formulation of this policy towards the recusants. He was in a special sense the representative of the Queen in Council and as such it fell to him to prepare the lists of business which the Privy Council discussed from day to day. Some few of these agenda papers survive. One of them will serve to illustrate the method of his procedure. The contents of this paper are relatively unimportant, but the form of it is illuminating. In the first place, there are a series of questions written in the hand of one of Walsingham's

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 576, 602–10, 629–30, 685–6; ibid., 1587–1603, pp. 184–5 *et al.*

[2] Cf. upon this Burghley's notes of the recusants to be restrained in each county, Feb. 1587 (S. P. Domestic, cxcviii, no. 18, 29), and also his memorandum 'For Mr. Secretary', dated 3 Oct. 1587 (S. P. Domestic, cciv, no. 2), 'To have a register of the names of all recusants that are men of possessions in every shire of the realm, that there be some order taken with them as they may do no harm, nor be any comfort to the enemy.' Cf. also *Acts of Privy Council*, 1587–8 *passim*, and the answers made by the Commissioners in the various shires to an order of Council dated 3 Jan. 1588 (missing), for the general restraint of obstinate and dangerous recusants (S. P. Domestic, ccvi *passim*). Cf. also the letter of W. Fleetwood and Thos. Egerton to the Privy Council on the subject of dealing with recusants at the time when the Armada was actually on its way to England, 20 July 1588 (S. P. Domestic, ccxii, no. 70). Upon the release of the recusants after the Armada, cf. *Acts of Privy Council*, 1588–90 *passim*. There is an interesting letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury to the Privy Council on this subject, dated 13 Dec. 1588, in the Lansdowne MSS. (B.M. Lansdowne MSS. 57, no. 76).

[3] It has sometimes been maintained that after the Armada Elizabeth's treatment of the recusants became less severe. The truth seems to be that it merely became more systematic. The recusants from this time forward became a recognized source of public revenue. It was three years after the Armada that the receipts from the recusants were assigned to a separate account in the Treasury, known as the Recusancy Rolls. Indeed, it frequently happened that the Queen granted or sold the right to the fines of one or more recusants, that is to say, she farmed them out as she did many other sources of her revenue. The form of grant of a recusant's fine is preserved among the S. P. Domestic in the Record Office (Vol. ccv, no. 69).

clerks, and set down doubtless for the consideration of the Council. To these Walsingham has added other questions in his own hand. Subsequently, as he received the answer of the Council to each question, he recorded it, either under the question set down, or over it, or wherever there was a blank space on the paper.[1] One can fancy Walsingham, going to the Council chamber with the list of questions drawn up by his clerk in his hand, recalling other matters perhaps on the way, jotting them down; then, in due time, laying the various questions before the Council, explaining them, discussing them, and finally writing down after each one the decision which was reached upon it. In some such wise Walsingham played his part in the affairs of the recusants. An examination of his agenda papers which survive reveal him, at different times proposing different plans for dealing with them. At one time he is suggesting the means by which a general restraint of recusants may be effectuated;[2]

[1] S. P. Domestic, clxviii, no. 14, 12 Feb. 1583/4.

[2] S. P. Domestic, cxxxiii, no. 45. The date of this paper (written in Walsingham's hand) is hard to place, but it was certainly written after the Statute of 1581 had been passed and before the death of Norton, 'the Rackmaster' in 1584, because both Norton and the Statute are referred to in the document. The paper is worth quoting in part because of the light which it throws upon the steps necessary to be taken in order to carry out a plan for restraining the recusants. It is of course in the brief form of a memorandum.

'To provide places of restraint for the Recusants. In the due execution thereof, these things are to be considered:

1. The choice of the place and persons to whose custody they are to be committed;

2. The choice of the Recusants fit to be restrained;

3. The manner of the usage;

4. The means to maintain them.

(1) The choice of the place and the persons to be referred to the High Commissioners of each diocese.

(2) The choice of the persons fit to be restrained to be referred also to them.

(3) In the manner of usage of them, regard is to be had to principally three things; (*a*) for their diet, (*b*) for their instruction, (*c*) in what sort they shall be restrained. The first, the order of the Fleet. For the second and third, the care thereof is to be committed to the commissioners.

(4) For their maintenance, the poorer sort may be relieved out of that portion of the penalties that is allotted out of the forfeitures of the recusants by statute to be employed upon the poor.'

In Walsingham's memorandum book (Harl. MSS. 6035), which covers the period 25 March 1583 to 3 Dec. 1584, to which allusion has been made already (Chapter V, p. 271, n. 1), there are several interesting references to the Recusants:

f. 37—Not dated, but between Nov. 1583 and Jan. 1584: 'To devise some way how that the Q. may be better answered of the Recusants.'

f. 38—Not dated, but between Nov. 1583 and Jan. 1584: 'Council Matters.

(1) The calling out of the principal Recusants out of their counties.

(2) The restraint of such as rail against the religion published.

at another he is indicating the steps to be taken in order to draw the prominent recusants out of the counties to London.[1] But it is not easy to say how far these suggestions represent his own reaction upon the problem and how far they simply record plans formulated by the Queen herself in consultation with her 'most inward' councillors, which Walsingham merely transmitted to the Privy Council. Here again Walsingham the adviser with all his individual opinions is swallowed up in Walsingham the special agent and mouthpiece of his sovereign. This much, however, is certain, that Walsingham was very well informed about the whole situation[2] and that he had a great deal to do with shaping the decisions of the Privy Council.

It may be worth while to set down at length one of these agenda papers which illustrates the Government's policy of exploiting the recusants. In this paper Walsingham exposed the difficulties which faced the Government in getting money out of the recusants and he made suggestions for overcoming these difficulties. First he stated 'the causes why her Majesty receives no greater benefit of the penalty of recusantship'. He enumerated these causes as follows:

1. That upon the sheriff's return upon writs of execution they commonly return nihil (no property).

(3) To see due execution of the orders set down and to consider in how many her Majesty's assent is to be had. . . .

(5) To take order the penalty for not coming to Church may be in some better order executed.'

f. 57—Not dated, but between 9th of January 1584 and 15th of April 1584: 'Public Matters Council.

That in respect of negligence need clergy appoint special commis.

Not to deal but with Recusants.

Not to offer the oath without direction from Council.

To proceed severely against those of ability to pay.

That where they remove to avoid the (illeg.) to bind them to a resiancy.

To disarm them.

To meet with the inferior sort to answer thirds.

To bind meaner sort good behaviour and to be disabled office and disarmed.'

It is not easy to interpret the exact meaning of these notes or to say whether they were proposals laid before the Privy Council by Walsingham or instructions received from the Council by him. The entry quoted from f. 57 apparently contemplates special commissioners to investigate recusancy. One wonders whether the restriction of the commissioners to cases of recusancy proceeds from a desire on Walsingham's part to protect the Puritans.

[1] S. P. Domestic, clvii, no. 51.

[2] Robert Cecil bears testimony to this fact in a letter to Walsingham in behalf of a recusant friend. Cecil protests that he writes to Walsingham because he knows more about the trouble of the recusants than any other man in England (S. P. Domestic, clxviii, no. 28).

2. That lands are undervalued in their returns.

3. That of lands lying in several counties the return is only made of such as are in the counties where the parties are indicted.

4. That divers fraudulent conveyances of land are made.

5. That divers, being bound by orders from the Council to remain within a certain precinct, do thereby excuse themselves touching their appearance for the answering of the indictment.

6. That others, by shifting of residence, not remaining in any place by statute appointed, do hereby avoid the penalty.

Then Walsingham proceeded to state 'the remedies for the evasions of the Recusants' as follows:

1. Fines to be set on the sheriff's heads and commissioners to be appointed to examine the true estate of the parties returned nihil.

2. The lands to be let to such as shall discover their undervaluation.

3. Those appointed to prosecute the undervaluers to inquire also what lands they be seized of in other counties.

4. All conveyances to be sent up with the return of the writ of execution to be examined in the Exchequer.

5. Orders to be taken in Council that the parties may be prosecuted where they remain.

6. That, for those who shift their residence, orders may be taken that they reside in one certain place where they may be proceeded against.

Those of the better sort may be bound to their good behaviour according to the statute.

'Necessary for those who are unable to pay the penalty of the statute, as well for those who can pay part, as those who can pay little or nothing, that commissions be directed to certain especial persons in each county to treat with the said recusants to yield some contribution towards the provision of horse and armour.'[1]

Walsingham has not dated this paper, but it probably belongs to the midsummer of 1585. It seems to mark the beginning of

[1] S. P. Domestic, cli, no. 72. This paper is in Walsingham's hand. It is undated. The *Domestic Calendar* assigns it, with a query, to 1581. It certainly belongs later. The reference to the provision of horse and armour by the recusants which was actually carried out in October 1586, makes it likely that this paper belongs to the midsummer of 1585.

the policy of exploiting the recusants which the Government assumed at that time in consequence of the failure of the statute of 1581 to yield the returns which had been expected of it. The Privy Council acted upon one of its suggestions at least. As has been observed already, it sent out in the autumn of 1585 special commissioners to deal with the prominent recusants for contributions of horse and armour to strengthen the English forces in the Low Countries.

Traces of Walsingham's handiwork may also be seen in the plan of inviting the recusants to compound for their fines, devised by the Privy Council in the following year. There is a draft of the letter, sent out to commissioners in the various shires to this end, corrected in his handwriting among his papers in the Public Record Office.[1] The presumption is that he had a great deal to do with the dispatch of it. One suspects that in this instance again he was acting in his special capacity of Queen's spokesman before the Council. In general Walsingham appears to have concerned himself very little about questions of public finance, but Elizabeth was always seeking to turn a penny. Indeed, the whole plan of exploiting the recusants may very well represent a compromise between the Queen and her Council. They were in the main very much more in favour of harsh measures against the recusants than she was. On the other hand, she was, by nature, inclined to support any plan which meant increase of revenue. One may hazard a guess that some one, possibly Walsingham, hit upon the device by which Elizabeth's desire for money and the Council's desire for severe anti-Catholic measures should at once be satisfied.

The records of the times give no clue to Walsingham's individual share in the treatment of the recusants after the spring of 1586. He continued his practice of drawing up agenda papers for the consideration of Privy Council, and if they were all preserved we could doubtless follow in much greater detail than we can follow at present the development of the Government's policy towards recusancy. And yet it is questionable whether these missing papers would throw much light upon Walsingham's own attitude towards the problem. Upon this point there is a sad lack of sound evidence. There is, however, one memoir from

[1] Cf. p. 298, n. 3.

Walsingham's pen extant which is not to be neglected. He wrote it some time in December 1586. Perhaps the word memoir is a misnomer. The paper is indeed little more than a series of notes. It deals primarily with the problem of preventing increase of recusancy. Nevertheless it throws much light by the way upon Walsingham's attitude towards the recusants in general.

In the first place, Walsingham exposed what he considered to be the principal reasons for the decay and falling away in religion.

'The decay and falling away in religion', he wrote, 'groweth two ways; the one, through lack of instruction for that there has not been that care taken that appertained, to furnish the church with learned and godly ministers, the other, through corruption that hath grown by the evil example of the recusants and subtle persuasions by the seminaries, as well those that are restrained as others dispersed throughout the realm.'

Having stated this general proposition he proceeded to consider it in some detail. In the first place he advocated certain measures for the reform of the Established Church.

'For the redress of the first, these things following would be put in execution:

1. To provide that the churches endued with convenient living may be furnished with learned and godly preachers;
2. To remove such ministers whose scandalous life doth breed offence;
3. To provide that the youth of the realm may be diligently cathecized;
4. That non-residents, who neither feed body or soul, be in some sort reformed.

(1) For the first, a general examination is to be made whether the ministers presented since the thirteenth [year] of her Majesty's reign [be] qualified according to the Statute.

That for the more due proceeding therein, and for the better countenancing of the matter, it shall be convenient the bishops in their general dioceses shall call unto them for their assistance certain grave and well-affected gentlemen within the said dioceses to join with them in the due examination of the said ministers.

That all recusants that are patrons shall, during the time of their recusancy, upon the death of any incumbent be ordered to commit the choice of a new minister unto the bishop of the diocese.

That it shall be requisite to devise some way for the staying of the *quare impeditis* by appointing some grave persons as the two Chief Justices of England and others to join with the Archbishop of Canterbury for the deciding of all controversies between the bishop and his patron ; or else for the ease of all parties, it were not amiss that some grave person were joined with the dean in every diocese for the deciding of the said controversies, if they cannot be by them [the deans] decided.

That although this manner of proceeding may be thought not convenient as tending to the stopping of the ordinary course of the common law, yet considering how greatly religion may be advanced thereby, and her Majesty's state strengthened by the increase of well-affected subjects, it may stand with due course of policy to have the same helped by her Majesty's prerogative.

(2) For the removing of the scandalous ministers, it shall be requisite that the bishops, for as much as the ordinary officers, as chancellors and archdeacons, for the most part do rather seek to cover faults than to remove or reform the corrupted, do appoint some learned and godly ministers to join with the said officers in due examination of the crimes the said parties shall be found charged withal, and to see such as shall be deprivable by the law to be removed out of the ministry, and others not deprivable to be otherwise punished, as may stand with the censure of the Church agreeable with the ancient canons.

(3) For the well instructing and cathecizing of the young, it shall be requisite that the bishop do appoint certain grave and learned preachers to join with the archdeacons in causing the ministers within their several cures to see the youth more carefully instructed than heretofore they have been. And for the better execution thereof, it were convenient that the said archdeacon did appoint the rural deans (so they be men well learned and well affected) to have a particular care thereof ; and for lack of sufficiency in them, to appoint certain grave preachers to have a kind of superintendancy over certain churches as well to see the young carefully instructed, as the ministers to live soberly and to discharge their duties painfully, as appertaineth to their vocation. A general order also would be taken that all schoolmasters by bond or otherwise should be ordered to cathecize their scholars.

(4) For the reforming of the non-residents, they may be ordered by the bishop, either to reside by the space of certain months upon their several cures, or else to appoint such sufficient substitutes in their places, able to instruct the people and cathecize the youth, as by the ordinary shall be allowed of, to whom there would be special charge given to allow or admit none but such as shall be found sufficient.'

Such was Walsingham's plan for the reform of the Church aimed primarily at 'dumb dogs' and indolent curates. One spies traces of the lurking Puritan in some of his suggestions, but for the moment he accepted the English Church as established and wished merely to remove accidental evils. Having discussed the shortcomings of the Church and suggested remedies, he then proceeded to consider in some detail the harm wrought by the recusants.

'It is first to be considered how they be hinderers of the course of religion and how they be principal instruments to draw the well affected, weakly instructed to fall away; which will appear by these things following:

1. They offend in example.
2. They corrupt by persuasion.
3. They retain secretly Jesuits and Seminaries (the poison of this estate) with money, both abroad and at home.
4. They train up their children in erroneous religion.
5. They corrupt their servants attending on them.

The Remedies:

(1) For the first they are to be removed from the places where they may most hurt in example and the penalties of the law to be inflicted upon them (if it shall not be thought meet to yield some qualification therein).

(2) For the second, they are to enter into bonds that they shall not persuade nor deal with any of her Majesty's subjects in point of religion, which if they shall refuse to do, they be committed.

(3) For the third, to enter into like bond not to minister directly or indirectly any relief unto Jesuits or Seminaries neither abroad nor at home, whereof for the better clearing of themselves, they are twice in the year to be put to their oaths.

(4) For the fourth, the bishops of the dioceses are to be directed to provide learned and sound teachers for the training up of their children, and the said recusants to be ordered by my Lords to send their children by a day named by the bishops to such places as by them shall be appointed.

(5) For the last, they are to be limited touching their number [of servants] and some yearly penalty to be set on the heads of such of their servants as shall offend.'

Finally Walsingham proceeded to discuss the question of dealing with the priests, but his remarks upon that subject will come more aptly in another place.[1]

[1] There are two copies of this paper, or at least of the part of it here quoted,

It is clear that Walsingham was no friend of the recusants. He was completely out of sympathy with their religious views. He regarded them moreover as dangerous corrupters of 'well affected' subjects. It is impossible from lack of material to estimate the exact measure of his influence upon the development of the Government's policy towards them, but there can be no doubt that this influence was not exerted upon the side of leniency.[1]

available. One is in the Record Office (S. P. Domestic, clvii, no. 89) and is undated. The other is in the British Museum (Lansdowne MSS. 97, f. 154) and is endorsed December 1586. Neither of these reveals undoubted evidence of Walsingham's authorship. There is, however, among the Lansdowne MSS. (vol. 97, f. 156) a draft of the second part of this paper which relates to the 'subtle persuasion by the seminaries' written in the same hand as the copy of the first part in Lansdowne MSS. (*vide supra*) and corrected in Walsingham's own hand. This, I think, points to the conclusion that he was the author of the whole of it. Strype prints this document in his *Life of Whitgift* (ed. 1822), iii, p. 201. He attributes it to Robert Beale, but upon what evidence does not appear. Quite possibly Beale and Walsingham may have collaborated on it. In any event Walsingham's corrections are sufficient to prove that he knew of it and endorsed it.

[1] There was a project on foot in 1582 to dispose of some of the English recusants by allowing them to migrate to North America. R. B. Merriman has published an interesting article upon this subject in the *American Historical Review*, xiii, pp. 480 ff. Sir George Peckham and Sir Thomas Gerard, two English Catholic sympathizers of some prominence, appear as the authors of the project. Dr. Merriman, however, inclines to the belief that Walsingham himself was ultimately responsible for it. There can be no doubt, from the evidence which Dr. Merriman prints, that Walsingham favoured the scheme and took some steps to further it. It is not quite so easy to prove that Walsingham was actually the author of it. Upon this point the only evidence which Dr. Merriman adduces is a letter from Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in England, to his master, Philip II, dated 11 July 1582. Mendoza, in this letter, explicitly states that Walsingham was the author of the project, but his testimony must be received with caution. He was opposed to the project on the grounds that it would weaken the strength of the Catholic party in England, and was consequently anxious to establish the fact that the English Government had set it afoot with this end in view. What authority he had for his statement does not appear.

As Dr. Merriman himself points out, Sir George Peckham as early as 1574 had shown an interest in American voyages by joining with Sir Humphrey Gilbert and others to petition the Queen for permission to undertake a voyage of discovery in Western waters. It is not, therefore, surprising to find him associated with Sir Humphrey to the same end once more in 1582, nor, when we consider his Catholic sympathies, is it surprising that he should have seen in this project of exploration and settlement an opportunity to provide a place of refuge for his persecuted brethren. In a word, Peckham's action is readily explained without any reference to Walsingham whatever.

Furthermore, it is to be observed that the first evidence of Walsingham's interest in the matter, Mendoza's letter apart, belongs to the year 1583 when the project was well under way.

Nevertheless, Mendoza's letter still remains, and though his statement may

In the execution of penal laws against missionary priests Elizabeth's government was very much more consistent and, as has been pointed out already, very much more severe than in its dealings with the recusants. Parliament in 1581 had declared all Roman Catholic proselytizers to be traitors. In 1586–7 it had gone a step farther and declared all Jesuits, Seminaries, and other priests from abroad traitors whether they were proved proselytizers or not. The Privy Council, directing the whole machinery of justice, administered these laws in something like the spirit in which they were framed. And yet there is no doubt that only a minority of the priests who were apprehended after 1581, and who were by law liable to the extreme penalties of treason, were actually put to death. Here again the laws were mitigated to a considerable extent in their execution.

There were several reasons for this. In the first place, it is clear that while the statutes assumed all priests from abroad to be *ipso facto* traitors, the Queen was very unwilling to allow them to be executed on that legal assumption alone. First to last, in the trials of priests who were apprehended, the Government attorneys sought to establish some overt act of treason against them. In many cases this was not easy to do, and more than one priest was executed upon a very flimsy charge. Still it may be said in general that a priest who kept strictly to his religious ministrations, and whose behaviour revealed no traces of political designs, always stood a good chance of escaping the gallows. This would not hold true in every case. Campion's execution is a notable exception. Still it appears that the Council in the main abided by this principle.

In the second place it was soon found that the execution of priests in large numbers gave the Queen's enemies abroad a very strong argument to use against her. They always maintained that their designs against England were inspired by religious motives, and nothing could give this pose of theirs greater plausibility than overt acts of cruelty and persecution against

be discredited, it cannot be positively rejected. It is not altogether convincing, but it seems to justify Dr. Merriman's conservative statement that the plan to transport some of the English Catholics to North America was 'probably originated by Sir Francis Walsingham'. This question is discussed from another angle in Chapter XVII.

their fellow Catholics in England. The blood of the martyrs, they liked to say, cried to them from the ground.

In the third place, Elizabeth discovered, what every religious persecutor discovers sooner or later, that the execution of Catholics simply made martyrs of them and stimulated rather than dismayed their followers.

For all these reasons the Government found it expedient to deal with much greater leniency towards the priests than the penal laws enjoined.

Notwithstanding this fact, there has scarcely been a decade in the whole history of England since the Reformation in which the executions of Catholics were so numerous as during that decade between the year 1581 and Walsingham's death in 1590.[1] This must not be attributed to any special blood-thirstiness in those who controlled the government during that time. It was unquestionably due to the fact that between the years 1580 and 1590 England was exposed to a greater danger from Roman Catholicism and its adherents than it had ever been or ever was to be. The designs of the Guises and of Philip II against Elizabeth, which culminated in the dispatch of the Spanish Armada, aroused the English Council, and to a lesser extent the Queen herself, to take measures which in ordinary times they would not have ventured to take. The persecution of priests during this decade ought to be regarded as essentially a war measure. The Queen and her Government were fairly pushed to the wall, and they struck savagely at every one who bore the appearance of an enemy.

It has been possible, from the records of the Privy Council and from other sources, to trace the development of a fairly definite policy on the part of Elizabeth and her Government towards the recusants. It is much more difficult to trace any such definite policy towards the priests. The reason for this is plain. The recusants were known, they had a local habitation, and could be dealt with, in theory at least, *en masse*. But the priests had to be considered as individuals. They lived in secret, they worked in secret. They had no property to levy

[1] Cf. T. G. Law, *Catholic Martyrs* (London 1876), p. 17 seq. In a calendar of 342 Catholic martyrs in England since the Reformation, 100 are noted to have suffered during this decade.

upon, no fixed dwellings where they might be looked for, nothing except their lives and souls to call their own. No matter to what religious organization they belonged they had to do their work as individuals. As individuals they were hunted down, and as individuals they had to be dealt with when they were taken. The Government by the very exigencies of the whole situation was forced, in the main, to consider each case, if one may use the phrase in such a connexion, upon its own merits. Yet here again, as in dealing with the recusants, the attitude of the Government was determined, to some extent, by certain general considerations outside the circumstances of the particular case. The state of affairs in Europe had its influence. When dangers from abroad seemed imminent the Government was severe. In calmer times it inclined to be milder. So, too, the neighbourhood in which the priest was taken and tried had a direct bearing upon his fate. In districts where the Roman Catholics were dangerously strong, priests sometimes had to suffer for the sake of example, who in more secure districts might have escaped. A number of other considerations influenced the Government as well. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the long run the factor which counted most in determining the fate of a captured priest was the character of the priest himself. Was he a man of little influence or of great influence, a good preacher or an indifferent one, 'grave and learned' or 'silly and contentious'? Above all, was there any suspicion that he had been dabbling in political affairs? Questions like these were the questions which the Government asked itself in considering the case of the individual priest, and upon the answers to them his fate generally depended.

It is certain that the English Government did everything in its power to rid England of these Catholic preachers. Yet it very clearly preferred other methods of accomplishing its end before the method of the rope and the knife. The priests who were in England it hunted down with ceaseless vigilance. But it did its best to keep priests out of England by watching the ports and landing places,[1] and those priests whom it captured it punished much more often by imprisonment or banishment than by death.

[1] The care which was taken to guard the ports is apparent from two letters in a letter book of Lord Burghley's, neither of them dated, addressed, or signed, which are intended evidently to stimulate the zeal of the watchers at the ports (S. P. Domestic, ccvi, no. 69, f. 162).

Nothing can be farther from the truth than to say that either Elizabeth or her Government delighted in the execution of a priest. There were no *autos da fé* in England or anything like them. Justly or unjustly the priests who suffered, suffered because they were thought to be dangerous enemies to the State and not because they were enemies to the Church of England.

A large burden of responsibility for the measures taken against these priests has been laid upon Francis Walsingham's shoulders. It will be pertinent to consider how much of it he ought, in justice, to bear.

He defined his policy towards the priests pretty clearly in the memoir which he drew up in December 1586. 'Of this kind of people,' he wrote, 'there are two sorts, some restrained and others abroad [at large in England].' He then proceeded to consider 'the mischief wrought by those restrained [in prison]'.

'They are the instruments at hand (by reason of the corruption of their keepers) to draw her Majesty's subjects from their obedience in point of religion.

'They are the receivers of news both from court and city, which they distribute to their partisans both within the realm and without. They are also the setters of plots both for attempts against her Majesty's person and the invasion of the realm.'

Walsingham next considered 'the mischief wrought by them abroad', that is to say, at large in England.

'They run from county to county and house to house and do draw by persuasion numbers of her Majesty's subjects to fall away in religion.

'They hold a kind of correspondence with those restrained and are distributors of such news as they draw from them.

'They put the evil affected of this realm (as they run through the country) in comfort that they shall have foreign support for the change and alteration of religion.'

Having stated the 'mischiefs' wrought by both classes of priests, those in prison and those at large, Walsingham then turned to consider in the same order the remedies for these mischiefs.

'For the restrained, the execution of them, as experience showeth, in respect of their constancy or rather obstinacy,

moveth men to compassion and draweth some to affect their religion, upon conceipt that such an extraordinary contempt of death cannot but proceed from above, whereby many have fallen away; and therefore, it is a thing meet to be considered, whether some other remedy were not meet to be put in execution. And in case the execution of them shall not be thought the best course (saving in a few for example's sake) then it is to be considered what other were fit to be held with them.

There are of these Seminaries two sorts, some learned and politic withal and of great persuasion, others simple, having more zeal than wit or learning.

For the first, they are to be sent to Wisbeach or some such like place where they may be under honest keepers and be restrained from access and intelligence, for that, being banished, they might do a great deal of harm.

For the second, they may be banished as others before, upon penalty to be executed if they return, and for the more terror, such as were banished and are returned, to be presently executed.

For those abroad, admonition is to be given by proclamation that such as shall, after the publication thereof, receive them, shall be proceeded against by the last statute; that such as have received them since the making of the said statute, and shall reveal the same unto the next Justice within twenty days after the proclamation, and shall enter into bond for not receiving of them in time to come, to be freed from the penalty; and, in case they shall not reveal it, then to be subject to the law.

That the said Jesuits shall have a time limited to depart the realm, and to be freed from the penalty so as they depart before the time limited.' [1]

It is to be noticed that Walsingham was on the whole opposed to the execution of priests 'saving in a few for example's sake'. He preferred rather the alternatives of imprisonment and banishment. And here he made a distinction. The learned and influential priests he wished to keep safe in prison where they could do no harm either at home or abroad. The simple fellows 'having more zeal than wit or learning' he wished to banish.[2]

[1] Cf. p. 307, n. 1.

[2] This policy of banishment was at the end of the year 1584 carried out on a rather large scale by the Privy Council in the case of a number of Jesuits who had been taken, cf. S. P. Domestic, clxxv, no. 38, and clxxvi, no. 9, and also *Acts of Privy Council*, xiv, p. 121. This policy of banishment did not meet with approval in all quarters, cf. Henry Caesar to Walsingham, 9 Dec. 1588, 'I never knew a priest that would wish well to his Prince and his country. . . . Banish no more, for that is the way to breed traitors' (*Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 259); cf. also Richard Young to Walsingham, 26 Aug. 1587 (S. P. Domestic, cciii, no. 20).

Taken as a whole his policy, though dictated by motives of expediency, was a policy of mercy. The result of his advice, which in the main was followed, mitigated considerably the lot of the missionary priests.

It will be remembered that in 1581 he strongly advocated the executing of Campion and his fellows. Five years' experience in dealing with the problem had changed his views. Evidently he was looking at the whole question as a statesman, not as a rabid Protestant.

In dealing with the Catholics in his executive capacity, Walsingham was faced by two problems. He had first to catch the priests and afterwards to dispose of them when they were caught.

With the disposition of those caught he seems to have had much less to do than was commonly supposed. It has been remarked that up to the end of the year 1581 there is little or no evidence to prove that Walsingham ever personally interested himself in the examination of a priest unless he was strongly suspected of being concerned in some plot against the Queen or the State. The same may be said in general of the examination of priests in which he concerned himself during the remainder of his life. The instances of his personal interference are few. In March 1584 he drew up articles for the examinations of the priests Alfield and Rowe. The questions which he set were as follows: What do you know of the Duke of Guise's taking of arms? How large a party has he in France? What plans has he against England? Have you any commission to encourage the English Catholics to look for aid from him? And so forth.[1] Again in September 1584 Walsingham was directed by the Queen to examine the Jesuit Creighton, who had been taken on the high seas with papers revealing a conspiracy of the Duke of Guise against England.[2] The political bearing of Creighton's case is apparent, and Walsingham was drawn into it on that account. Again on the 2nd of July 1585 Walsingham directed the Recorder Fleetwood to examine a certain John Herle concerning his knowledge of a project to carry off Mary Stuart into

[1] S. P. Domestic, clxix, no. 42. Printed in *Unpublished Documents*, &c. (Catholic Record Soc.), i. 106. It should be observed that Walsingham was evidently instrumental in bringing about the execution of Alfield later (ibid. i. 120).

[2] S. P. Domestic, clxxiii, no. 8.

France.[1] These are the sorts of cases in which his personal interference appears. One may gather from the prison lists of the reign [2] that he played some formal part in the examination and the commitment of many other priests. It is nevertheless significant to observe that wherever we have any sort of detailed record of his personal interest in the examination of a priest, it seems always to have been for a political reason in the most precise sense of the term. He was clearly interested in the priests because he regarded them as probable sources of information as to the plans and purposes of Elizabeth's enemies.

In the disposal of priests after examination he had considerable influence. It has been pointed out already that the Government decided the fate of the individual priest according to his individual ability to do harm. Now this question of the character of individual priests was not an easy one to answer. Walsingham was usually called upon to answer it because he knew through his secret agents more about individual priests than any other member of the Government. Consequently a great many cases were referred to him for advice. The most

[1] Ibid. clxxx, no. 3. Reverting once again to Walsingham's memorandum book (Harl. MSS. 6035), the following entries may be noted to mark his connexion with the Government policy in dealing with the Jesuits during 1583–4:

F. 12. '23rd of May 1583. Fra. Milles. To examine the Jesuits in the Tower.'

F. 31 r. '28th of October 1583. The names of the Jesuits and Seminaries in prison.'

F. 43. Not dated, but between October 1583 and January 1584: 'To send a messenger to Mr. Topclyffe.'

F. 48. '2nd of January, 1583/4. Indict the Jesuits and Seminaries of high treason.'

F. 56. Not dated, between January and April 1584: 'To indict the traitorous Jesuits. To proceed to the trial of the principal persons [presumably those arrested in connexion with the Throgmorton Plot]. To place the ancient priests. To write to the B. of Canterbury to appoint certain of the principal Jesuits to be conferred withal.'

F. 86 r. Not dated, but between the 6th and 12th of July 1584: 'To appoint examiners of Jesuits. To set down the dangerous Papists in each County.'

F. 105 r. Not dated, but between 20 November and 3 December 1584: 'To take orders for the dispatch of the Jesuits.'

Here again it is not clear whether these notes represent proposals laid before the Privy Council by Walsingham or instructions received by him from that body.

[2] Reports on the prisoners held for religious reasons in the various London prisons were made from time to time by the keepers to the Privy Council. Many of these have been preserved and are among the S. P. Domestic in the Record Office. They have recently been printed by the Catholic Record Society, cf. *Miscellanea* i, ii.

notable instance of this is in connexion with the disposal, late in 1586, of a large number of priests in London prisons. On the 25th of December 1586 Walsingham wrote to his servant Thomas Phelippes, 'My Lords do mean to take order with the seminary priests by banishment of some, executing of others, and by committing the rest to Wisbeach or some such like place under an honest keeper. I have thought good to send you a register of their names, to the end you may confer with the party you wot of, and to desire him to set down their abilities to do harm in their several kinds. I take it there will be very few of them fit to do good.' [1]

The person Phelippes 'wot of' was none other than Thomas Rogers *alias* Nicholas Berden, one of Walsingham's secret agents, who was deep in the confidences of the Catholics and probably knew more about the characters of the individual priests than any other man in the pay of the Government.

Phelippes sent Berden the lists of imprisoned priests, and in course of time Berden returned them to him again with his comments on the margin. 'I return his honour's note,' Berden wrote, 'which I have well perused according to my knowledge and intelligence. Such persons as I have noted to be hanged are of most traitorous minds and dispositions. Such as I have marked for banishment are most meet for the said purpose, for that they are exceedingly poor and contentious. Such as I have marked for Wisbeach are well able to defray their expenses, of the graver sort and best accounted for learning. And it might stand with the pleasure of his honour, it were meet they should all be hanged.' [2]

Walsingham has been severely criticized for employing a man like Berden in a business of this sort and for putting men's lives at the stake of a thorough-going rascal's whim. His critics ought to remember that there is a difference between seeking advice and following it. Berden was Walsingham's special agent among the Catholics. Whatever his character was, it is not surprising that Walsingham consulted him upon matters so intimately related to his field of labour. No doubt Berden took bribes from

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C ix, f. 566.

[2] S. P. Domestic, cxcv, no. 73. The letter is signed by Berden's secret sign. It is written in his hand. The *Domestic Calendar* speaks of it as a copy. It is obviously the original.

the Catholics.[1] Taking bribes was part of the game he played. He posed before them as a man who had friends at court that could buy the release of priests with money. No doubt Walsingham was aware of Berden's corruptibility. He may even have connived at it. One has only to trace the ultimate fate of the priests in question to discover how small a factor Berden's suggestions were in determining it.[2]

This, however, is aside from the main point. The direct bearing of the whole matter is that it reveals a part which Walsingham very often played in the disposing of Catholic priests. The Privy Council sought his advice about priests with whom it was called upon to deal and he, with the assistance of his secret agents, furnished the advice. It would be straining the point very far to argue from this that Walsingham held the fate of the priests in his own hands and disposed of them at his own pleasure. It is impossible to say to what extent the Privy Council was influenced by his advice, but it is certain that the final decision in every case was made by the Council itself as a body and not by Walsingham or any other individual councillor.

Even the Council in most instances simply determined whether the particular priest in question should be indicted or not. In a few cases it tried and condemned him by virtue of its judiciary powers, but ordinarily the actual judgement against him was given in the regular courts. When his case was allowed to proceed as far as the courts, his chance of escape was small, for in the courts he was judged according to law and the law declared that every missionary priest was *ipso facto* a traitor.

Before priests could be tried they had to be caught. If Walsingham had probably comparatively little to do with the disposal of them after capture, he had a great deal to do with catching them. There can be little doubt that it was in large measure due to the so-called spy system which he organized and maintained that so few priests who came into England eluded the clutches of the Government.

[1] Cf. Berden to T. Phelippes—not dated (S. P. Domestic, cxcv, no. 75). 'If you can procure me the liberty of Ralph Bickley at his Honour's hands, it will be worth £20 to me, and the liberty of Sherwood, *alias* Carlile, will be worth £30. . . . The money will do me great pleasure, being now in extreme need thereof, neither do I know how to shift longer without it.'

[2] Berden's detached recommendations are included in his letter quoted on p. 316, n. 2.

The mistake is often made, however, of supposing this spy system to have been much more elaborate than it really was. Spy systems are always surrounded by an air of mystery. In their very nature they are secret. It is hard to find out much about them, and in consequence writers are often apt to erect, upon the basis of a few known facts, an elaborate structure formed for the most part out of their imaginations. It will be well to examine with some care the facts at command regarding Walsingham's secret agents and to adhere to them in drawing conclusions. A great deal about them will probably never be brought to light, but there is little to be gained in speculating about that.

In the first place it will be worth while to consider the various sources of information from which the English Government in general, and Walsingham in particular, drew their knowledge concerning the whereabouts and the movements of the priests. There is plenty of evidence to prove that much was done in the way of hunting out priests by the local authorities. The bishops had their spies and their pursuivants.[1] So in some cases did the lord-lieutenants of the counties.[2] It is not to be imagined that they were organized upon any definite system. Their ordinary method of proceeding was to keep watch upon the houses of the recusants who were suspected to be harbourers of priests, and now and then as occasion offered to make thorough search of these houses. A great many priests were captured in this way.[3] Then also, quite apart from the work of professional spies, a great deal of information came in from accidental sources. If a suspicious stranger was seen on the high roads, some one, perhaps in expectation of a reward, would report his presence to the nearest justice of the peace or bishop. Or perhaps some servant in the house of a recusant would play his master false and betray the secret guest to the authorities. One way and another the majority of the priests were taken by

[1] This is apparent from many of the reports made by the bishops to the Privy Council. Cf., for example, Bishop and City of Winchester to Walsingham, 10 Dec. 1583 (S. P. Domestic, clxiv, no. 14).

[2] Cf., for example, Huntingdon to Walsingham, 2 Nov. 1581 (*Cal. Domestic*, Adda. 1580–1625, p. 45).

[3] Cf. Morris, *Trials of our Catholic Forefathers*, First and Second Series, *passim*; also Foley, *Records of the English Province of the Society of Jesus*, First Series, vol. i, *passim*.

the local authorities. Walsingham rather encouraged their zeal, but he had no direct connexion with it, and these local efforts must be carefully distinguished from the means which he himself devised for gathering information about the priests.

It appears that he worked in several ways. In the first place he learned much about the movements of priests from the ordinary representatives of the Government in France and the Low Countries and in Scotland.[1] When he himself was ambassador to France (1570–3), he found means to get in touch with the English Jesuits in Paris, and with other English Catholic refugees there, and to draw much information from them.[2] His successors in the office followed his example. Sir Henry Cobham, for instance, who was English ambassador at Paris between 1579 and 1583, kept him well posted about the migration of priests into England during these years.[3] These official sources of information abroad were supplemented by the reports which Walsingham received from his semi-official secret agents scattered all over the continent of Europe. These agents, in conference with English Catholic refugees abroad, often obtained valuable information concerning the plans and movements of priests in England.

In England itself, Walsingham first of all kept watch over the ports and sea coasts in order to prevent missionary priests from entering the country. He had searchers stationed at all the places where priests were wont to land, and these searchers not only scrutinized all travellers coming from foreign parts, but also very often stopped the posts carrying letters and examined their packets.[4] But searchers were often corrupt and there were

[1] Cf. S. P. Foreign and S. P. Scottish in the Record Office, *passim*. The S. P. France after 1580 supply the bulk of the information which Walsingham received concerning English Catholics from abroad.

[2] Digges, *Compleat Ambassador*, *passim*; cf. particularly Walsingham's dealings with Darbyshire the Jesuit, p. 172.

[3] Cf. Cobham's Correspondence in the Record Office, S. P. France, 1579–83, *passim*. These have been published practically in full in the *Foreign Calendars*.

[4] Sir Edward Stafford, who succeeded Cobham as English ambassador to France, complained on one occasion that his own private letters had been stopped by the searchers at Rye, and Walsingham thereupon advised him to send his private letters in an official packet in order to prevent such 'inconvenience hereafter' (S. P. France, xi, no. 139). From this it is evident that private letters were always liable to be searched.

Francis Milles, one of Walsingham's secretaries, testifies to the general corruption of the searchers at the ports in a letter to his master of 22 July 1586

plenty of lonely shores in England where a ship's boat might set a priest ashore without discovery. Consequently hundreds of priests got into England in spite of Walsingham's efforts to keep them out, and his big problem was that of hunting these priests down and apprehending them.

Here again a distinction must be made between the casual information which Walsingham received from time to time and the reports of his regular secret agents. Even in his own day Walsingham had the reputation of being insatiable in his thirst for information. What was more to the purpose, it was known that he was willing to pay well for it. The consequence was that any man who got hold of what appeared to be a valuable piece of news was tempted to send it to Walsingham. There are a great many letters of information about Catholics among Walsingham's papers which evidently come from such sources. Here, for instance, is an item of news sent by a man named Barry, who wrote that while he was saying his prayers in church he perceived that a man named Edmonds who was kneeling next to him was reading out of a 'papistical catechism'.[1] Here is another from a Welshman named Griffiths, who declared that he knew of a cave along the sea-shore in Wales 'three fathoms deep' which was a great sheltering place for seminaries;[2] here a third from one Warener, 'a substantial yeoman of Banisterbridge in Westmoreland', who testified to the great increase of Jesuits in that county.[3] Other instances of similar nature might be cited, but these are sufficient to illustrate the point.

Besides these of course Walsingham drew upon the local authorities, particularly upon the bishops and the lord-lieutenants of the counties, for such information as they gathered together. He learned something as well from the examination of prisoners, from Catholics who had been living abroad and had come home,[4] from merchants and other wayfarers, and

(S. P. Mary, Q. of Scots, xviii, no. 66). He is advising Walsingham how to apprehend Ballard, one of those involved in the Babington Plot, and he says that it will be hard to catch him at the ports, 'the searchers and like officers being all, without exception, so corrupt as they are.'

[1] S. P. Domestic, clxiv, no. 59.

[2] Ibid. cc, no. 31. [3] *Cal. S. P. Domestic, Eliz.* 1580–90, p. 633.

[4] Note among others the letters of Robert Barret, Jan. 1581, in S. P. Domestic, cxlvii, nos. 38–41; the report of Samuel Pettingell, ibid. cxlix, no. 84; and the confession of John Baker, ibid. ccxvii, no. 38.

especially from the confession of renegade priests like John Hart and Hugh Hall and Antony Tyrell who turned Queen's evidence, and sometimes even agreed to spy upon their fellows, in order to save their own necks.[1] Finally, in addition to all these sources of information Walsingham employed his own special secret agents and paid them to search out priests.

It is difficult to determine how large this last group of men was, because a great many of the reports made to Walsingham were anonymous and it is not always possible to identify the writer. The probabilities are that the group was much smaller than has commonly been supposed.[2] Certainly those that can be identified are not more than half a dozen. I speak now of those at work in England. The secret agents abroad were much more numerous.

It will be convenient to classify these English spies broadly into two groups. The first group will include those who appear to have been employed on particular business or for a short time. This group will include practically all of Walsingham's agents who cannot be identified. One or two letters perhaps survive from each of them. There was, for instance, a certain anonymous person employed for a time in the jail at Exeter, where he sought to extort information from the Catholic prisoners by posing before them as a fellow sufferer.[3] There was another who sent information about Papists in Essex,[4] and a third who furnished at least one report of priests in the north.[5] And there were some others. But who these men were or how long they served, or indeed whether or not they were actually a part of Walsingham's secret service at all, it is impossible to say.

Probably the first spies whom Walsingham employed ought to be classed with this group. There was, for instance, a certain David Jones who was at work, at Walsingham's direction,

[1] On John Hart cf. his letter to Walsingham, 1 Dec. 1581 (S. P. Domestic, cl, no. 80). On Hugh Hall cf. Froude, xi, p. 641. The story of Antony Tyrell's tergiversations is well known. Some of his letters will be found in B.M. Lansdowne MSS. 50 and 51. His confessions are in the Record Office among the S. P. Mary, Q. of Scots (xix, nos. 67, 68, 81). These three cases are perhaps the most notorious, but many others might be cited. Cf., for instance, S. P. Domestic, clxxii, no. 56; ibid. clxxxii, no. 31; ibid. ccv, no. 49.

[2] I have examined these anonymous reports with great care, and have identified the authors of the great majority of them by a comparison of handwritings.

[3] S. P. Domestic, clxviii, nos. 29, 30.

[4] Ibid. cxx, no. 26.

[5] Ibid. cliii, no. 78.

seeking information about priests in London prisons as early as July 1574. Three letters of Jones survive, the first of them dated the 5th of July 1574 and the last the 13th of August of the same year. His character may be judged from a passage in his last letter. He says that he had been saved from starvation by the charity of a certain Mrs. Cawkin, a 'notorious papist'. In return for this act of mercy he wrote to Francis Milles, one of Walsingham's secretaries: 'I pray you desire my master that I may have the benefit of what she doth lose by statute even if it be but the chain she doth wear.'[1] What became of Jones after he had written this letter does not appear. It seems likely that he did not remain long in Walsingham's service. There may have been others like him employed by Walsingham at this time. His is the only name which survives.

It is perhaps significant that the more notorious of Walsingham's spies all belong to the last decade of his life. There is very little evidence of anything like a regular employment of secret agents by him in England before the year 1581. It is dangerous to argue too much from negative evidence of this sort, but it seems likely that Walsingham did not pay much attention to the hunting down of priests until the amazing progress of Jesuits and Seminaries made it evident that vigorous measures were necessary to root these preachers out of the land.

Between the years 1581 and 1590 it is possible to trace in some detail the careers of four spies employed by Walsingham for the purpose of tracking down priests in England. I use the word spy in its narrow sense. It does not include men like Richard Topcliffe, or Norton, 'the Rackmaster', who were, primarily, examiners of Catholics, and only incidentally spiers upon them. Neither does it include the hosts of pursuivants employed by the local authorities and by the Privy Council to apprehend priests after their whereabouts had been discovered. Neither does it include secret agents engaged in foreign service. These four spies, naming them in the order of their entry into Walsingham's service, were Robert Barnard, Walter Williams, Thomas Rogers *alias* Nicholas Berden, and Maliverny Catlyn.

It must not be assumed for a moment that these four men

[1] S. P. Domestic, xcvii, nos. 27, 39; ibid. xcviii, no. 10.

constituted the whole staff of secret agents regularly employed in England. Men like Short and Mulberry, and Sledd and Munday and Nichols made a very unenviable reputation for themselves among the Catholics. But these four, Barnard, Williams, Berden, and Catlyn, are the only ones who can be definitely connected with Walsingham's special service as distinct from the service of the local authorities or the Privy Council at large.[1] These were in a special sense his men, and an examination of their careers, one after the other, will throw considerable light upon this spy-system mystery.[2]

Robert Barnard, who went by the name of P. H. in his official correspondence, was the first of them to appear in Walsingham's service. The first dated letter which he wrote to Walsingham is of the 5th of January 1582;[3] the last is of the 17th of November 1582.[4] There are other letters of his undated, but they clearly belong to the same year. How Barnard came to enter this disreputable business and what finally became of him is not recorded. It is evident from the general tone of his letters that he was a man of some education. When he first appeared in Walsingham's service he was at work in London. 'I must

[1] The confession of James Welsh, a Scholar of Magdalene College, Cambridge, who undertook to spy upon Catholics for the Bishop of London because he could not get work as a schoolmaster, illustrates how, sometimes, reputable men drifted into the disreputable business (S. P. Domestic, clxx, no. 44). The confession of Roger Almond, *alias* William Vavasour, who served Walsingham for a time on a kind of roving commission and who was finally apprehended for dealing with Catholics without warrant, is also worth noting (ibid., clxxiii, no. 78). Vavasour was instrumental in capturing Holt, the Jesuit, in Scotland (S. P. Scotland, xxxi, no. 50).

Two copies of a very interesting report of an English spy's adventures in Rome, 5 July, 1579—17 May, 1580, are preserved in the Calthorpe MSS. (xxvi, ff. 94–111; xxxiii, ff. 122–141). It appears from internal evidence that it was written by Charles Sledd. Sledd may have been sent by Walsingham. He certainly reported to Walsingham upon his return. Cf. on Sledd, Pollen, *op. cit.* i. 338–9, with references there cited.

[2] These four men rarely signed their letters with their names. Barnard signed his P. H., Berden his with a double flourish, and Catlyn his with this sign, II. I have, however, been able to find in every case at least one letter signed by the writer, and with the handwriting of this identified letter to guide me, I have been able to trace their separate correspondence in the Domestic Papers at the Record Office and elsewhere. In some cases an attempt has been made by the editor of the *Domestic Calendar* to identify those letters, but he is almost always wrong. Many of Catlyn's letters, for instance, have been wrongly attributed to Berden, and Berden has sometimes been confused with one Thomas Barnes.

[3] S. P. Domestic, cxlvii, no. 2.

[4] Ibid., clv, no. 96.

humbly beseech you consider of me', he wrote to Walsingham in an undated letter which probably belongs to the year 1582, 'I owe my host in London above £4 who threatens to have me in prison for the same. I have not received anything from you in three months past. I beseech you to give me order whereby I may, with less trouble to your Honour, receive monthly that which it may seem good to you to bestow upon me. I was never in better credit with the papists, nor of so great acquaintance among them, for I have attained the means to have access to all the prisons in London, the Tower only excepted, whereby there is nothing that shall come over or go over, nor anything be done here within our country but I am assured to hear thereof.'[1]

This letter reveals Barnard's method of work and the pecuniary motives which prompted him to it. The kind of information which he obtained in this way may be gathered from his letter of the 5th of January 1582. I quote a few extracts from it by way of illustration:

'The Earl of Westmoreland hath been at Rome. Pope gave him 500 crowns. He is returned to Flanders.'

'There is departed from Rome since St. Bartholomew's day last of Jesuits and seminary priests twenty-four, and all for England.'

'There is one Mr. Gardiner and his wife who have a house not far from Uxbridge. Sometime they lie in London and sometime at Hogsden, and do not continue in one place. To them is great resort and they have a priest who is called Mr. Gimlet.'

'I have written to the Lady Foljambe as concerning Parsons and Allot, but as yet I have not received any answer.'

Barnard's next letter of the 19th of April 1582 is of the same character. 'Parsons', he wrote, 'is at present in Rouen in France where he is composing a book in answer to the one against Campion. Very few priests in London now. One Mr. Vaine, a priest at the Temple. One other in Gray's Inn named Lyell. Another, a Mr. March, at the Sign of the White Swan in High Holborn.' And so forth.[2] Barnard wrote in May 1582 that he had been asked to find a priest to perform a marriage ceremony for two Catholics in Derbyshire,[3] and in July that he had searched all over the county for a priest and

[1] S. P. Domestic, cli, no. 23.
[2] Ibid. cliii, no. 14.
[3] Ibid., no. 68.

had not been able to find one.[1] On the 17th of November he informed Walsingham that he had seen a letter written by a priest in Staffordshire to the effect that Dr. Henshaw, Father Heywood, and Father Holt had been working wonders in that county and had converted 228 persons in three months. 'If it please your honour', he added, 'that I may go down, I doubt not to meet with them all, for my acquaintance there is such as I shall have access among them all.'[2]

Apparently Walsingham acted upon Barnard's suggestion and sent him down. He seems to have proceeded first into the midland counties. There is an elaborate report in his hand among Walsingham's papers upon recusants and priests in Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire.[3] From the Midlands he passed into the north and from there sent Walsingham a long list of recusants and priests in Cheshire, Lancashire, Westmorland, Northumberland, Cumberland, and Yorkshire.[4] This is the last we hear of him.

Walter Williams, who was a contemporary of Barnard's in Walsingham's service, appears to have been originally a servant of Thomas Copley, one of the English Catholic refugees in France. Probably Walsingham first became acquainted with him in the course of a correspondence which he carried on with Copley early in the year 1582. Williams was somehow or another induced to betray his old master and to enter Walsingham's service.[5] He came over to England and late in August 1582 was imprisoned, doubtless by prearrangement, at Rye, where he set to work to win the confidence of his fellow prisoners and to extort what information from them he could. 'Till I hear from your Honour further,' he wrote to Walsingham late in August, 'I can do nothing but lie in a very bad prison and expect your honour to help me. I shall want money to bring me up, for my prison fellow wants money and I pay as well for him as myself. . . . More than I have gotten out of him I cannot [get] until my release out of prison, and then I shall have both letters and

[1] Ibid. cliv, no. 47.
[2] Ibid. clv, no. 96.
[3] Ibid. clvii, no. 88. This report is not dated, but it would seem to belong to this time.
[4] Ibid. clxxv, no. 110. This report also lacks a date.
[5] Ibid. clv, no. 30. It seems that Williams was apprehended on the ground that he was one of Copley's servants, who by cunning had obtained a passport from Walsingham (cf. ibid., no. 31).

certain notes to his friends in France.'[1] Again, on the 27th of August Williams wrote, 'I have sifted the notorious papist so far as may be and by no means can find any conspiracy towards her Majesty but this: he with the rest, looks for a short chance and Scotland it is that all their hope is on. . . . I pray your honour have a present despatch for here I have been a long time upon bare ground in my clothes and at night lodged among thieves and rovers in a place not fit for men but dogs.'[2] Williams was still in prison at Rye on the 15th of December and still working upon his fellow prisoner there, but could apparently get little satisfaction out of him.[3]

It seems likely that this Papist was one who called himself Pasquinus Romanus. There is a mock letter of recommendation from him to some one in Paris, dated February 1583, which shows that he had taken Williams's measure very much more accurately than Williams imagined. It shows also that this priest had a sense of humour which was almost Falstaffian.

'Having the opportunity', he wrote, 'of this bearer, Mr. Williams, gentleman, who of a long time hath been my fellow prisoner only taken upon suspicion, I could not but, at his special request, write this much of his conversation since his abiding with me, which is that his devotion towards the good ale is very substantial, for every morning he hath great conference with the clerk of the town touching the same. He is a great faster, but he prayeth little, unless it be somewhat before dinner that God may give him a good appetite to the same, which being down, his delight is to be among his white bears with whom he hath by practice gotten great experience, using to wash them often with claret wine and sugar. With this exercise only he contenteth himself till supper, at which time he useth very little meat, keeping an order in his diet for the quinsey in his throat; and for that cause, sack only sufficeth him, by which means his disease often falleth into his legs that he can hardly stand.

'Besides this, he hath a sore megrim in his head and eyes so that hardly he can see. His conscience is very good, for he prayeth only for that he taketh, and when money wanteth, for fear of scruple he will put his clothes to pawn. For his honesty, if it be true as is reported, he never toucheth maid but from the knee upward. His qualities are such as if I should write them, I should be too tedious unto your reverence, whose wisdom is

[1] S. P. Domestic, clv, no. 29.
[2] Ibid., no. 30.
[3] Ibid. clvi, no. 17.

such that you can, by these few, conjecture and judge of the rest. I beseech you therefore, for my sake, to further him in his affairs, which as I can learn is nought else but to seek remedy for these diseases.'[1]

This letter fell into Walsingham's hands and it had the effect of ending Williams's career as a spy on Catholics in England. Walsingham saw that he was no fit man for that kind of work. He appears later as a carrier of official letters between England and France. In that capacity he did some secret service for Walsingham abroad.[2]

Williams was a thorough-going rascal, no doubt of it, a fellow of no morals and of very little religion. Maliverny Catlyn seems to have been a rather different type of man. There was a touch of the Puritan about him[3] and a savour of religious zeal in his

[1] Ibid. clviii, no. 51. The letter is dated 'From Freeman's Hall in Rye'. Apropos of the name Pasquinus Romanus it will be recalled that there was a torso near the Palazzo Braschi in Rome called Pasquino, to which satirical notices were commonly affixed (Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 337, n. 6).

[2] Sir E. Stafford, English ambassador in France, wrote to Burghley, 6 Nov. 1586, that Walsingham had made use of Williams to spy upon some of his [Stafford's] servants. Stafford called Williams a 'drunken knave' (S. P. France, xvi, f. 139).

[3] There is a letter of Catlyn's to Walsingham among the Harleian MSS. in the British Museum (286, f. 102) which throws considerable light upon this side of his character and incidentally reveals the attitude of the Elizabethan Puritan towards the stage. Catlyn wrote: 'I have often times proposed to attempt your Honour's patience in viewing this discourse following, but fearing lest I should be thought too officious, I have let sleep my determination in hope that time would take away the occasion, which I see to my great grief runneth on a *male ad peius*. The thing is this. The daily abuse of stage plays is such an offence to the godly and so great a hindrance to the gospel as the papists do exceedingly rejoice at the blemish thereof. And not without cause, for every day in the week the players' bills are set up in sundry places of the city, some in the names of her Majesty's men, some the Earl of Leicester's, some the Earl of Oxford's, the Lord Admiral's and divers others, so that when the bells toll to the lectors, the trumpets sound to the stages, whereat the wicked faction of Rome laugheth for joy, while the godly weep for sorrow. Woe is me, the play houses are pestered when the churches are naked. At the one it is not possible to get a place, at the other void seats are plenty. The profaning of the Sabbath is redressed, but as bad a custom entertained and yet still our long suffering God forbeareth to punish. It is a woeful sight to see two hundred proud players go in their silks where five hundred poor people starve in the streets. But if needs this mischief must be tolerated, whereat (no doubt) the Highest frowneth, yet for God's sake, sir, let every stage in London pay a weekly pension to the poor, that *ex malo proveniat aliquod bonum*. But it were rather to be wished that players might be used as Apollo did his laughing *semel in anno*. The Lord of Hosts will surely forsake to dwell amongst the tents of Israel if the sins of the people do still provoke him. The spoil and overthrow of Ninevah is feared and daily looked for, therefore is it more time to pray than play. Now methinks I see your Honour smile, and

diligent searching out of priests. Besides the stigma attached to his trade there are no obvious blots upon his character. He was certainly a man of education. There is something positively scholarly both in the character of his handwriting and in his manner of expressing himself. He was not beneath quoting some small Latin on occasions.

Catlyn seems to have been driven to his disreputable trade by force of circumstances. The first letter which he wrote to Walsingham, dated at Rouen, the 22nd of April 1586, furnishes all the information available about his early life. He was the younger son of a younger brother and in consequence had been forced to seek his living *hic et ubique*. He had begun life as a soldier. In 1578 he had gone over to the Low Countries in the company of Col. Thos. Morgan. There he had got into difficulties with his commander, and had fled to France in fear of his life. Possibly he had been an agent of Walsingham's in the Low Countries. At all events he had no sooner arrived in France than he proceeded 'to open the way for a further entrance into matters needful to be discovered for her Majesty's surety'. He got into touch with some of the English Catholic refugees in France and won their confidence by offers of service.[1]

The next news of him came in a letter to Walsingham from Portsmouth. It appears that Catlyn had been cast into the Portsmouth jail as Williams had formerly been cast into the jail at Rye, to obtain information from Catholic prisoners. 'I beseech your honour', he wrote from Portsmouth, 'vouchsafe me knowledge of your pleasure how I shall proceed, for under your honour's correction, I hold it had been better to have spent some part of this time rather at the Marshalsea [prison] than here, as well for the insinuating of myself among those men, whom, I dare assure you, want no advertisements, as also to have given to the world a more apparent view of mine imprisonment, in which course I might so have carried myself as the same would have sorted to great avail, especially if your Honour think good

say to yourself, these things are fitter for the pulpit than a soldier's pen. But God, who searcheth the heart and reins, knoweth that I write not hypocritically, but from the very sorrow of my soul, and the rather because I know your affection and means of redress.'

[1] Catlyn to Walsingham, 22 April 1586, *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 172.

to return me back again [over seas], either by way of banishment or other policy.' [1]

Not long after this Catlyn was released from Portsmouth, brought up to London, and, as he suggested, cast into the Marshalsea. There he made friends with one Jackson, a priest, and a fellow prisoner, who, supposing Catlyn 'to be participant to his estate', revealed to him some information about the designs of Philip II and the Pope against England.

'This', Catlyn concluded, in making his report to Walsingham, 'is the substance of his whole discourse, which he delivered to me in the hearing of my man, whom, because the matter requireth quick and severe looking into, your Honour may forthwith examine, and no doubt being either terrified or gently entreated, he will declare to you the circumstance thereof, by which means this wicked instrument may presently be called in question and the matter avouched before his face, and yet I may still remain without suspicion. I think if your Honour would send for me it were a good course, for I have many things to acquaint you with. . . . Besides the inconvenience of the place is such as I can hardly be suffered to have paper, pen or ink except I will impart to my keeper what I write, who in truth useth me like a prisoner committed for high treason, so that I was forced to charge him, in her Majesty's name, to deliver this to your Honour with speed as matter of confession touching the suspicion had against me.' [2]

It is difficult to say how long Catlyn remained in the Marshalsea, because most of his letters can only be approximately dated. Sometime in August he wrote to Walsingham, 'My liberty about a se'enight hence may do more good than imprisonment, for I have in this place done as much as will be, and have made a strong entrance and safety for my return beyond seas.' [3]

Before the end of August it is clear that Catlyn was on his way north. He had anticipated employment abroad, but Walsingham had sent him instead to see what the Catholics were about in the disaffected northern counties.

On the 30th of August he sent Walsingham a discourse upon the state of affairs in Yorkshire, Durham, and Lancashire.[4] Later he returned to London again and there continued his work among the Catholics. Walsingham apparently made use of him

[1] S. P. Domestic, cxc, no. 51, 25 June 1586.
[2] B.M. Harl. MSS. 286, f. 266.
[3] S. P. Domestic, cxcii, no. 20.
[4] Ibid., no. 57.

upon his return to watch the movements of certain great noblemen whom he suspected of double-dealing. 'Yesterday', Catlyn wrote to Walsingham in November, 'I spied the Earl of Worcester and the Lord Mordaunt go off to an obscure inn and have conference with a third man whom I knew not. I have within these four or five weeks used my best endeavour to pierce into the mind of a very great one of this realm and have been with him within these few hours, not doubting but to find his affections thoroughly and then I will advertise you.'[1] In December he was apparently preparing to go north again. 'I have laid the foundations of the great northern causes,' he wrote to Walsingham on the 29th of that month, 'and tomorrow I mean to fall to building.'[2] But he was still in London late in January.[3] He went north a little after that and returned to London in April 1587.[4] In June 1587 he was still in London and that is the very last we hear of him.[5]

Catlyn was evidently a better man than his colleagues in the profession of secret service. He was a soldier, a scholar, something of a Puritan. His employment about the court and with 'great ones' of the realm suggests that he was something of a gentleman as well. What became of him finally it is impossible to say, but it may be hoped that when the wars came he drew his soldier's blade with better men in the defence of his country and won a place for himself once more among honest folk.

With the exception of Gilbert Gifford, probably the most notorious of Walsingham's spies was Thomas Rogers, more usually known under his *alias* of Nicholas Berden. He first appeared as the servant of Mr. George Gilbert, one of the most active and influential of the English Catholic laymen. When Gilbert fled from England to escape the consequences of his dealings with Campion and Parsons, Berden went with him.[6] Somehow or other he was won over to Walsingham's service. In 1583 he was writing to Walsingham from Rome 'as con-

[1] S. P. Domestic, cxcv, no. 38.
[2] B.M. Harl. MSS. 286, f. 97.
[3] Ibid., f. 104.
[4] S. P. Domestic, cc, no. 44.
[5] Ibid. ccii, no. 1. A warrant granting to Catlyn's widow a lease in reversion, dated 2 June 1589 (*Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, xiii. 414), reveals the fact that he had died before that date.
[6] A good brief statement of Berden's early life was made by Father J. H. Pollen in one of his articles on the Babington Plot printed in *The Month*, September 1907.

cerning the proceedings there touching the Queen of Scotland '.[1] It appears that Berden's double-dealings were discovered at Rome and that in consequence he was imprisoned for a time in the castle of S. Angelo. Upon promise of fidelity he was later released and permitted to return to England.[2] On the 1st of January 1584 he was in London writing a letter to Thomas Phelippes, one of Walsingham's secretaries. ' I profess myself a spy,' he wrote, ' but am not one for gain but to serve my country. . . . Whensoever any occasion shall be offered wherein I may adventure some rare and desperate exploit such as may be for the honour of my country and my own credit, you shall always find me resolute and ready to perform the same.' [3]

Of course Walsingham took advantage of Berden's offer. He was too valuable a man for secret service work to be neglected. His service with George Gilbert had given him unrivalled opportunities for making the acquaintance and winning the confidence of the leading English Catholics. He certainly gave every promise of being a valuable agent, and so indeed he later proved himself to be.

How long Berden remained idle after his return to England is uncertain. The next letter from him which is preserved was written to Walsingham sometime in the early spring of 1585 and reveals him spying upon the Catholics about London. In this letter he wrote that Edmunds *alias* Hunt, a priest, had dined with him. He also set down a list of priests who were in London ' with such places as they resort to '.[4]

In his next letter, dated the 31st of March 1585, he wrote that he had found Richard, Dr. Allen's man, lodging in London and he inquired of Walsingham whether he should have this Richard apprehended or not. He also found out that the prisoners in the Tower had correspondence with their Catholic brethren at large through the medium of a corrupt official.[5]

On the 13th of the next month Berden reported that he had talked with Richard, Dr. Allen's man. ' I asked Richard ', he

[1] S. P. Mary, Q. of Scots, xxi, no. 43, cited by Father Pollen.

[2] Memoirs of Father Parsons in Catholic Record Society, *Miscellanea*, iv, p. 85, cited by Father Pollen.

[3] S. P. Domestic, clxvii, no. 3. Letter not signed, endorsed ' from B.' In Berden's hand.

[4] Ibid. clxxvii, no. 48.

[5] Ibid., no. 47.

wrote, 'what means the papists had to come into England.' He said that 'Dr. Allen gives every priest for his journey six or seven pounds in money and a new suit to wear; that the priests usually come over in French boats, coming to Newcastle for coals. They land either at Newcastle or near by. They choose this place because Robert Higherlife, the Queen's officer at Newcastle, is a papist at heart and his wife also. By his direction the priests with their books pass securely.' Richard told Berden further that Wm. Bray was the principal conveyer of papal books into England, and Berden wrote that he has come upon Bray by chance at the Bell in Aldersgate Street and had obtained his promise to have a copy of any new books he brought over.[1]

In May Berden reported that a regular association had been formed among the prominent Catholic laymen for the relief of Jesuits and Seminaries who came into England.[2] Nine days later he wrote again that a means of communication had been established between the Catholics and the imprisoned Scottish Queen.[3]

Other letters of Berden might be cited, but these are sufficient to indicate the character of the work he was doing. It is apparent that he enjoyed the complete confidence of the priests and recusants alike. Indeed, they were so sure of him that when the Catholic refugees abroad in April 1585 were seeking a trusty man to look after their interests in London, they at once hit upon Berden as the very man for the task.[4]

When Walsingham heard of this he made up his mind to take advantage of it, and in the late summer of 1585 he sent Berden abroad with orders to establish his credit among the English refugees in France.

The story of Berden's adventures in France is told elsewhere.[5] It is sufficient to note here that his mission was altogether successful and that when he returned to England in the early spring of 1586 he did so as the accredited agent of almost all the prominent English Catholics in Paris. He had arranged to correspond with them in cipher, to send them intelligence from time to time, to receive their letters, and to have them delivered according to their directions.

[1] S. P. Domestic, clxxviii, no. 19.
[2] Ibid., no. 39.
[3] Ibid., no. 52.
[4] Ibid., no. 72.
[5] Cf. Chap. XI.

'It is also expected', he wrote to Walsingham in making his report, 'that I shall presently certify my safe arrival, with the hope of continuance of my liberty, whereupon they will proceed according to their determination, and that I shall also send a book of maps of England, which I shall forbear to do until I know your Honour's pleasure, and some means appointed for the convoy. And if it be your Honour's pleasure that I shall give them intelligence, then I hope your Honour will procure to be set down unto me such matters as I shall certify.'[1]

It is characteristic of the secrecy in which Walsingham shrouded his secret service that Berden on his return to London was hunted down by Justice Young, one of the most notorious of the searchers after priests, and was very nearly taken.[2]

After he was settled down once more in London, Berden resumed his task of spying upon the priests in the city. Meantime he maintained a correspondence with the Catholics abroad, and from time to time sent them such news as Walsingham thought fit to acquaint them with. This correspondence continued for something like two years. 'I received your letter by Painter,' Charles Paget wrote to Berden from Paris in January 1588. 'I have never failed to answer all yours and have sent them by the French ambassador, but I hear he has grown to be in hard conceipt against our nation and can scarce tell whom to trust, having been deceived by many. . . . Your advertisements be stale and known to us sometimes a month or more before you send.'[3] No wonder the advertisements were stale when Walsingham himself dictated them.

Attention has already been called to Berden's behaviour in connexion with a number of priests who were in prison late in the year 1586. No doubt he was moved by considerations of private profit as well as of public welfare in advising the liberation of priests. Nevertheless it must not be forgotten that his apparent

[1] S. P. Domestic, clxxxvii, no. 81. The editor of the *Domestic Calendar* says: 'There can be little doubt this important communication was the basis of the secret intelligence which enabled Walsingham to counteract the designs of Spain.' As a matter of fact, Walsingham seems to have obtained little or no accurate information touching the designs of Spain by this channel. Philip II does not seem ever to have taken the refugee English Catholics very far into his confidence (*Cal. Domestic, Eliz.*, 1580–90, p. 317).

[2] S. P. Domestic, clxxxvii, no. 81.

[3] Ibid. ccviii, no. 39. When Walsingham withdrew Berden from this service in March 1588 he supplied his place with Thomas Barnes; cf. Barnes's Report, 31 May 1589, *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 269.

ability to buy priests free added much to his credit among the Catholics. 'I thank you', he wrote to Walsingham in November 1586, 'for sparing Christopher Dryland's life at the last sessions at my request. It has much increased my credit among the papists that by my endeavour his life was saved, for they suppose that some friend at my request moved your Honour therein. I protest I abhor the man in regard to his profession, but he has a great opinion of me, thinking me very apt to serve the papists' turns, and, moreover, [he is] a man of great credit among them of all factions, and so a meet man to be sent over, thereby to avow and maintain my credit to all the practicers.'[1]

Berden evidently posed before the English Catholics as a man who had some influence at Court and who could bribe Walsingham's friends successfully in their behalf. So he turned the money he got from them to a double advantage, to the enriching of his private purse and to the strengthening of his credit among them. Moreover, under the pretence of working upon Walsingham's friends, he adroitly hid the traces of his treachery, appearing to serve the Catholics by the very methods by which he served Walsingham. His success in pulling wool over their eyes is revealed by the testimony of Robert Parsons, the Jesuit who wrote of Berden twenty years later, '*fece bene*', he did well.[2]

In March some suspicions arose against Berden in Paris, and Walsingham therefore instructed him to 'forbear his service' for a time. 'I am resolved', Berden wrote in reply, 'to enter a more public course of life (yet always keeping myself in terms meet to serve your Honour hereafter if you should please to command me). I desire your recommendation to the Earl of Leicester and Mr. Quarles, Clerk of the Kitchen, to be appointed Pourveyor of the Poultry.'[3] He seems to have obtained this appointment.[4]

Berden was undoubtedly one of the most efficient of Walsingham's numerous spies. He was adroit, diligent, and secret. He seems also to have been faithful, a rare virtue among his kind.

It is difficult, from the information at hand, to arrive at

[1] S. P. Domestic, cxcv, no. 21.
[2] Catholic Record Society, *Miscellanea*, iv, p. 83.
[3] S. P. Domestic, ccix, no. 19.
[4] Ibid., no. 107.

a just view of his character. That he was not above a bribe is already apparent, but he turned these bribes to his master's advantage as well as to his own. There is no evidence to prove that he ever betrayed Walsingham's interests for money. He must have been a man of judgement and balance. His letters reveal intelligence and some education.

Berden served Walsingham as a spy for something like five years. It is to be observed that in the cases of the other spies who have been named and briefly considered that their term of service was apparently for a much briefer period. All the information at hand about David Jones belongs within a single month ; all about Robert Barnard in something less than a year. Walter Williams's single adventure in domestic service among Catholics seems to have been confined to four months. Maliverny Catlyn emerged from obscurity in April 1586. He withdrew into obscurity again before the end of the next year. Probably reports are missing from all these men which would, if we had them, show that their periods of service were somewhat longer than the available documents would seem to indicate. Nevertheless, it cannot be accidental that in every case their letters preserved are comprehended within short periods of time. This points to the fact that, as a rule, Walsingham did not use the services of any single secret agent for long. This may have been due to his natural distrust in men of their type. It was probably due in part to the fact, as revealed in Berden's case, that men who systematically betrayed the Catholics, no matter how adroitly they managed it, were bound sooner or later to fall under suspicion. The Catholics learned by grim experience to be careful to whom they gave their confidences and, of course, as soon as one of Walsingham's spies was generally suspected, his opportunity for service was gone.

It must be insisted upon once again that the spies just mentioned and described do not comprehend the whole of Walsingham's system of secret service. In the first place, I have limited my attention to such men as were engaged in spying upon Catholics within the borders of England ; in the second place, I have touched only upon those whose direct connexion with Walsingham himself is undoubted and whose work can be traced through their own reports. Many other names are

mentioned in the Catholic sources, but it will be found in the great majority of cases that the Catholics used the word spy very vaguely, designating as such men who were really pursuivants or examiners, or harrowers of priests in some other capacity. It would be inaccurate to number these men as parts of Walsingham's secret service, although doubtless he obtained from them occasionally very useful information in regard to the movements and plans of the Catholics. Among those who were in a strict sense professional spies on domestic service for Walsingham, it is probable that the men already considered were the important if not the only figures. The number of them was certainly much smaller than has been commonly supposed. What is more, they never were organized in anything like a 'spy system'. They worked as individuals. Sometimes they made their reports to Walsingham directly. More often they reported to Francis Milles or to Thomas Phelippes, his secretaries. Phelippes indeed became in course of time Walsingham's usual medium for dealing with his spies. But this was as near to an organized system of espionage as Walsingham ever got.

Some idea of the methods which the spies used in obtaining information has already been conveyed in describing their individual activities. They seem invariably to have posed as Catholics and in such wise to have wormed their way into the confidence of their victims. Very often they accomplished this by being thrown as Catholics into prisons where there were Catholic prisoners. This was an old game. Burghley had played it years before to ferret out the Ridolfi Plot. The prisons in general were pretty corrupt.[1] Prisoners even in the Tower readily obtained access to one another, and those in the common London jails seem to have enjoyed comparatively free intercourse with their friends outside. Catlyn on one occasion visited the Marshalsea with a company of good Catholics and found the situation there such that he wrote to Walsingham, 'Sir, if you mean to stop the stream, choke the spring, for, believe me, the prisons of England are very nourishers of papists.

[1] Walsingham bears testimony to the corruption of the prisons in a letter to Burghley dated 13 Jan. 1574/5 (Harl. MSS. 6991, no. 55); cf. also Milles to Walsingham, 23 July 1586 (S. P. Mary, Q. of Scots, xviii, no. 70). Speaking of the keepers of the London prisons, Milles wrote, 'I think none of them all worthy to be trusted unless it be Gray of Wisbeach.'

Banish them, for God's sake, or let them remain close prisoners, that they may not daily poison others.' [1] It will be remembered that Barnard boasted of having access to all the prisons in London except the Tower, that Williams served as a spy in the prison of Rye, and that Catlyn worked in the prisons at Portsmouth and at London.

The other method commonly used by the spies to obtain information about priests was by haunting the houses of recusants who were suspected of giving priests shelter. There are several papers in the Record Office which enumerate at length the recusants in different counties who were known to be harbourers of priests. Barnard made good use of his acquaintance with the Lady Foljambe, and Catlyn in his tour through northern England seems to have passed in the disguise of a Catholic from one recusant's house to another, gathering information as he went. Berden's methods have already been described. He was the most adroit of them all.

These spies were for the most part engaged in their trade simply for what they could make out of it. They were one and all incessant in their demands for money. This points to the fact that they were not regularly paid, but that Walsingham recompensed them according to the value of their services. Barnard wrote to him on one occasion, 'I have not received anything from you in three months past. I beseech you to give me order whereby I may, with less trouble to your Honour, receive monthly that which it may seem good to you to bestow upon me.' [2] Catlyn on another occasion wrote that unless he had money 'I and mine are like to keep the coldest Christmastide that hitherto we ever tasted'.[3] Walsingham ordered Phelippes to send Catlyn £5.[4] In rare cases regular pensions appear to have been granted. Gilbert Gifford, for instance, received the large pension of £100 a year for his signal service in revealing the Babington Plot.[5] In other cases minor offices were bestowed upon them. Probably at the beginning Walsingham paid a large part of the expenses for actual service out of his own

[1] Harl. MSS. 286, f. 97.
[2] S. P. Domestic, cli, no. 23.
[3] Harl. MSS. 286, f. 95.
[4] Walsingham to [Phelippes], 23 Dec. 1586, Cotton MSS., Cal. C ix, f. 571.
[5] Cf. T. Phelippes to [G. Gifford], March (?) 1587, S. P. Domestic, cxcix, no. 96.

purse. Later, the Queen granted him a regular allowance for the purpose out of the royal exchequer.[1]

This so-called spy system was a disreputable affair no doubt. But so are all spy systems. They have been discredited and abused from Walsingham's day to our own, and they have been just as steadily employed by statesmen in England and elsewhere to ferret out secrets and track down conspiracies. Walsingham's spies were probably no worse than the average. One cannot expect to find honourable gentlemen in such a kind of trade. There is no reason to assume anything particularly insidious or underhanded in Walsingham's character because he made use of them. The Catholics, even the English Catholics at the time, did not hesitate to employ the same methods. Berden and his fellows succeeded in playing their double game because the Catholics were as anxious to use these men against Walsingham as Walsingham was to use them against the Catholics.

A distinction has been pointed out already, and one should be made between these spies who sought information from Catholics about priests, and the searchers, pursuivants, constables, sheriff's officers and such like who apprehended the priests after their whereabouts had been discovered. This business of apprehending priests was a matter in which Walsingham himself was only indirectly concerned. He supplied the information upon which local officers proceeded. The story of the apprehension of the priests, although a very interesting one in itself with its dark lyings in wait, its ambushes, its secret chambers, its hairbreadth escapes, its betrayals, and its self-sacrifices, hardly concerns this present subject. The lord-lieutenants, the sheriffs, the bishops, flocks of pursuivants and searchers, sometimes, indeed, the hue and cry of a whole neighbourhood, joined in the chase. It was not a nice business hunting down defenceless men, whatever their intentions might be, and it is not surprising to find that the hunted and not the hunters were the heroic figures in it. But it was really outside Walsingham's province. Indeed there is some room for question as to whether he intended his secret service primarily for that end. His spies reported on priests when they found them, and gave notification of dangerous recusants, but one feels that their main business was rather to

[1] On the financing of the secret service, cf. Chapter XI.

find out what dangerous treacheries priests and recusants were about than who they were and where they lodged. This would be a hard point to establish absolutely; but as one reads the letters of the spies, the questions they put to the priests they met with, the efforts they made to establish means of communication with Papists abroad, one begins to feel that it was what the priests were plotting and planning rather than the persons of the priests themselves that Walsingham's spies were after.

This indeed seems to have been the thought that lay at the back of Walsingham's mind first to last in his relations with the English Catholics under Queen Elizabeth. He dealt with the Catholics not so much as enemies to the Established Church but as enemies to the peace of the State. He watched them and hunted them because he considered them dangerous political enemies. A great deal has been written about his strong Protestant bias and it has led to the belief that there was a large element of religious bigotry in his persecution of the priests. But this does not in truth seem to have been so. Protestant as Walsingham was, he was first of all a statesman, and he habitually looked upon religious and political problems alike from a statesman's point of view. Privately, he opposed the Catholics on religious grounds; but publicly as principal secretary he seems to have acted against them in the same spirit in which he would have acted against any other dangerous group of persons in England, whatever their religious convictions might have been. Perhaps he was wrong in regarding the Catholics as potential traitors; but he had plenty of reasons to persuade him to the contrary, and they seem to have been sufficient to justify his error, even if they do not establish the truth of his convictions.[1]

[1] Attention has already been called to the letter which Walsingham, in the name of the Privy Council, wrote to Cobham, 26 Apr. 1582 (S. P. France, vii, no. 63), containing a defence of Elizabeth's policy towards the Catholics which Cobham was to read to the French King. Another letter of like sort has been commonly attributed to Walsingham. It was addressed to one M. Critoy in France. There are numerous copies of this letter extant (cf. for example, Bodleian Library, Tanner MSS. 82, f. 255b). It has been printed by Spedding in his *Life of Bacon*, vol. i, pp. 96–102. Spedding gives evidence to prove that this letter was written, not by Walsingham, but by young Francis Bacon, in Walsingham's name, at the instance of Archbishop Whitgift. I see no reason to question Spedding's conclusions.

XI

PLOTS AND COUNTERPLOTS

Sir Francis Walsingham survives in popular tradition, so far as he does survive, as the master of craft *par excellence* in Elizabeth's Privy Council. Probably the principal reason for this is to be found in the part he played in revealing the Babington Plot and bringing Mary Stuart to the block; but the Babington Plot after all was only one of a number of plots which he was instrumental in exposing during his seventeen odd years of service as principal secretary. As a matter of fact his activity in this direction was nothing more than a continuation of the work of his great predecessor in office, Lord Burghley, and those who recall Burghley's skill in the unravelling of the Ridolfi Plot may well question whether he was not the equal of Walsingham in matters of this sort. But Burghley was fortunate in being able to hand over these difficult and dangerous tasks to Walsingham some time before the problem of plot-breaking assumed its most acute form. It seems to have been a job associated with the office of principal secretary, and as such Walsingham assumed it along with the office in 1574. No one will question that the term of his service coincided with the period in Elizabeth's reign when she was most gravely threatened by conspiracies to depose and to destroy her.

There can be no doubt that he was extraordinarily well fitted for the task. His contemporaries are unanimous on that point. Sir Robert Naunton observed of him: 'They note him to have had certain curiosities and secret ways of intelligence above the rest.' William Camden, who must have known him personally, declared him to be 'a most subtle searcher of hidden secrets'. Indeed it was his special aptitude in matters of 'search and intelligence' which had drawn him into the service of the Government at the very beginning of his career.[1]

Inevitably a man who has to do with ciphers and spies and

[1] *Fragmenta Regalia* (ed. Arber), p. 36; Camden, *Annales* (English trans. 1635), p. 394.

who undertakes to meet plot by counterplot acquires a sinister reputation for himself, particularly among the friends of his victims. The greater his skill in such matters the more certain is his condemnation. Walsingham's character has suffered severely at the hands of Mary Stuart partisans and of Roman Catholic sympathizers. They have not only denounced his methods but also his motives and purposes. It must be confessed that there was much about him which lends colour to this charge. His sharp, swarthy countenance, his pointed Italian beard, his habitually sombre garments in themselves furnish damaging testimony. If we are to judge from Zuccaro's portrait, no man ever looked more satanic than he. How much there was that was crafty and sly about his conversation and general bearing it is impossible to say. David Lloyd drew a convincingly malevolent picture of him about a hundred years after his death. 'He outdid the Jesuits in their own bow and overreached them in their own equivocation.'[1]

But Lloyd is hardly to be relied upon, though he did much to fix the Walsingham tradition. In any case, however, it is in his capacity as a plot breaker that Walsingham has been most severely criticized, and it will therefore be necessary to examine that aspect of his official career with a good deal of care.

The problem of guarding Elizabeth and her kingdom from the machinations of enemies, domestic and foreign, had been rendered more difficult in the year 1568 by the entrance into England of Elizabeth's chief competitor for the throne—Mary Stuart. The reasons which led to her presence in the realm need not be rehearsed here. Once she had crossed the border she was recognized as a dangerous menace to the peace of England, and both Elizabeth and her councillors were agreed that she should be carefully looked to. It will not be too much to say that Mary Stuart was the centre about which all the plots against Elizabeth's person and all the projects of invasion against her kingdom turned for something like twenty years. This does not mean that the Scottish Queen herself was personally involved in or even acquiescent to all these conspiracies. But she was, she could not help being, the competitor, and all those persons, at home or abroad, who contemplated pulling Elizabeth down,

[1] Lloyd's *Worthies* (ed. 1670), p. 514.

contemplated setting Mary in her place. On this account it will be convenient to consider Walsingham's relations to the Scottish Queen together with his relations to these various plots and conspiracies. For his own part, he always believed that the two were inseparable.

Walsingham's relations with Mary Stuart began in the year when she fled across the Scottish border into England. It will be recalled that when he was still a private gentleman doing secret service work for Burghley he offered to furnish proof of her complicity in the murder of her husband. A little later he got wind of a plot to set her on the English throne. Not long after that he served as keeper of Robert Ridolfi when that clever Italian was arrested for complicity in the first Norfolk Plot. These early relations of his with the fortunes of the Scottish Queen impressed him with the fact that Mary's presence in England was a dangerous menace to the peace of that country and doubtless had something to do with the hostile attitude which he assumed towards her from the very beginning.

He expressed this hostility in unmeasured terms during the time of his embassy in France. It was during his first year's residence in France that the second Norfolk Plot—generally known as the Ridolfi Plot—came to light. The revelation of that plot and his indignation at the mild way in which Elizabeth dealt with Mary Stuart for her connexion with it, called forth Walsingham's first bitter denunciation of her. He wrote to Leicester on the 31st of January 1572, 'So long as that devilish woman lives neither her Majesty must make account to continue in quiet possession of her crown, nor her faithful servants assure themselves of safety of their lives.' [1]

In France Walsingham had a chance to study the problem of Mary Stuart from the point of view of her effect upon the relations of England abroad. He encountered there the active efforts of her cousins of the House of Guise to shape French foreign policy in her interests and against those of his mistress. In the teeth of those efforts he succeeded in putting through the Anglo-French alliance at Blois. Before he left France he came to the conclusion that notwithstanding Mary's claim as dowager Queen of France upon the support of the French crown, the

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1572–4, p. 93.

French King was really not very much concerned about her fate.

'The fear of Spain's footing there with you,' he wrote to his cousin, Thomas Randolph, in April 1572, 'maketh the King here more temperate in soliciting the Queen of Scott's cause, and if it were not for the doubt that he is put in by his ambassador there in England that she is like one day to enjoy the Crown of England in respect of her title, the great party she hath there and the Queen our Mistress's irresolutions in doing of justice, he would then yield to anything that might be for the Queen's [1] . . . and though it touched that good lady as near as her life. But the fear of that, whereby she attaining to the crown, there may ensue an uniting of England and Scotland in amity with Spain (a thing that to him might grow very prejudicial), maketh him to use some show of favour towards her, lest otherwise she might think herself quite abandoned of him. When we tell him that the Queen our Mistress meaneth to do justice on her, forced to the same for her own safety, he then telleth us that the Queen our Mistress is too merciful a princess to shed the blood of so near a kinswoman as she is; but that is rather spoken *ironice* than otherwise. And therefore if her Majesty would do what both reason and justice requireth, they would not inwardly be miscontented, what outward show soever they make.' [2]

Walsingham, it is evident, was convinced that the interest of the French crown in Mary's welfare was a perfunctory one at best. This point is worth considering in connexion with his general attitude towards the Scottish Queen. It shows that he believed Elizabeth had little to fear from the side of France if she took that course with Mary which 'wisdom and justice' required. There can be little doubt as to what Walsingham meant when he spoke of the requirements of wisdom and justice. This captive Queen of Scotland, Roman Catholic competitor to the throne of England, who made plots against the life of Elizabeth and against the welfare of Protestant England, this 'bosom serpent', this 'devilish woman', ought to his thinking to be touched as 'near as her life'. His solution of the Mary Stuart problem, and he had already reached it before the year 1572 was half over, was to set her head upon a spike on London Bridge where it could contrive no more plots and might nod a solemn warning to all intending traitors.

[1] Torn away in the original.

[2] B.M. Additional MSS., 33531, f. 107.

This was Walsingham's attitude, and from this attitude he hardly deviated until he saw his wishes accomplished fifteen years later. A great many in England shared his views, but few, especially among Elizabeth's councillors, were willing to state such views with anything like Walsingham's frankness. The Queen herself was very chary about taking extreme measures. Even when she had once or twice come to the conclusion that England would be better for Mary's room than for her company, Elizabeth was in no wise disposed to agree with Walsingham that the public tribunal and the executioner's axe was the quickest and safest way of doing the business.

An interesting view of her ideas upon this subject as contrasted with Walsingham's may be got from an incident connected with Henry Killigrew's mission to Scotland in the autumn of 1572. The Duke of Norfolk had been executed in June of 1572, and many of Elizabeth's councillors had not hesitated to cry out with Walsingham that Mary, who was his chief accomplice in treason, should suffer the same fate. To strengthen their appeals came news from Paris late in August of the St. Bartholomew's massacre. Elizabeth began to think that Mary ought to be got rid of, but she had no mind for a public execution. Instead she instructed Killigrew to negotiate with the Regent of Scotland for the transfer of Mary Stuart into his hands.[1] Killigrew was to arrange that Mar should demand Mary's person; upon her delivery he was to execute her forthwith; all this on condition that Elizabeth's name should not appear in the transaction. Killigrew went and delivered his message, with the natural result that Mar refused to enter upon any such one-sided agreement. He was willing to execute Mary, but he insisted that Elizabeth should share the responsibility if he did. This was exactly what Elizabeth wished to avoid. While the negotiations were pending, Mar died and the matter rested for a time.

It was, however, revived again in 1574 with Morton, the new Regent. Once more it broke down because the parties interested could not come to terms. Walsingham expressed his own opinion regarding it in a letter to Killigrew on the 30th of July 1574. 'This matter,' he wrote, 'her Majesty would have you

[1] On this subject, cf. Leader, *Mary Stuart in Captivity*, p. 278.

thoroughly break with him [the Regent] before your return . . . to the end she may be assured whether he will yield to the acceptance thereof, a matter in my opinion no less dangerous for him to accept if he mean honourably than for us to offer if we have regard to our surety.'[1] Walsingham indeed wanted to take no such risks. The Regent might mean honourably or he might not. Mary's friends might be all dead in Scotland or they might not be. At all events he knew a safer place for her than Scotland, and he did not hesitate to say so.

That was the way Walsingham looked at the problem of Mary Stuart when he took up the duties of principal secretary at the beginning of the year 1574. Mary herself was well aware of it. She spoke of him as her mortal enemy, and regarded him as such.[2] Perhaps in a way she admired his unequivocating position.[3] But she saw on her side as he saw on his that it was to be war between them to the death. Among Walsingham's colleagues were those who played a different game, pretending a kind of friendship for the imprisoned Queen in order to provide against the time when she might possibly rule in England. But Walsingham never took that attitude. He was Mary's declared enemy first to last, and there can be little doubt that had she succeeded to the throne he would have found very short shrift at her hands.

As principal secretary Walsingham became in a special sense the guardian of the Scottish Queen. The Earl of Shrewsbury of course had the direct charge of her, but Shrewsbury received his orders from Walsingham. In this capacity he was acting as the Queen's secretary in the strict sense of the term, for Elizabeth, who handed over much of the ordinary business of state to her officers, regarded the Scottish Queen as her own special charge, as some one midway between her royal guest and her royal

[1] Cotton MSS. Caligula C iv, f. 237.

[2] Mary to Archbp. of Glasgow, 4 Aug. 1574, Labanoff, *Lettres de Marie Stuart*, iv. 196.

[3] Cf. Mildmay to Walsingham, 17 June 1583: 'At my parting from the Queen (of Scots) she fell in talk with me of you, the rather for that she understood that I had married your sister. She told me that she found in you a plain and round nature, for when you said you would be against her you were so indeed; but now, she saith, having better found by experience her disposition and that she is also of a round and direct nature, you will in respect of that sympathy, as she termed it, between your nature and hers, be the rather inclined to favour her in all her reasonable suits' (S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xii, no. 83).

prisoner. Walsingham acted according to her instructions, but naturally a great many minor matters must have been left to his individual judgement, and his advice must have been a potent factor in determining Elizabeth's general policy towards her captive.

In this capacity Walsingham naturally had oversight of all such matters as the Queen of Scots' diet, her furniture, her lodgings, the numbers of her servants, and all the details of her domestic house-keeping. These were troublesome matters enough, and they were made more troublesome by the cheese-paring policy of the Queen, who in her charge of Mary Stuart, as in all else, tried to save a penny wherever she could. She commenced by allowing Shrewsbury £52 a week for the maintenance of his prisoner and her household, but later she cut this allowance down to £30. Walsingham remonstrated with the Queen upon this point more than once. 'Pray God,' he wrote to her in 1581, 'the abatement of the charges towards that noble man that hath the custody of the bosom serpent hath not lessened his care in keeping her.'[1] But these remonstrances were of no effect, and Walsingham could only advise Shrewsbury 'to devise some good suit either in fee farm or otherwise', for his better allowance.[2]

The matter which interested Walsingham most in his oversight of Mary Stuart was her communication with the world outside her prison walls. He was very anxious to prevent her from hatching any more Ridolfi Plots, and so he used every means at his command to keep watch over her correspondence. It would appear that in the earlier years of her captivity Mary was allowed comparative freedom in this matter, making use of the French ambassador at London as her forwarding and distributing agent. Such letters as she sent this way she delivered to Shrewsbury under seal, who sent them up to London with his own letters. But this method of correspondence was unsatisfactory to Mary, because she suspected, not without good cause, that her letters which were sent this way were often tampered with before they reached the Ambassador's hands.[3] In consequence she was

[1] Walsingham to Elizabeth, 12 Sept. 1581, *Cal. Salisbury MSS.*, ii. 427.

[2] Thos. Wilson to Shrewsbury, 31 Jan. 1580/1, Lodge, *Illustrations*, &c., ii. 193.

[3] Shrewsbury to Walsingham, 12 July 1574, S.P. Mary Queen of Scots, ix, 48.

constantly looking about for some secret channel of correspondence which would escape Walsingham's vigilance. He on his part was well aware of her efforts in this direction, and was constantly seeking to thwart them.

He had not been long in office before he came to the conclusion that Mary had some means or other of secret intelligence, and he set himself to find out what it was. At first he thought of using the services of a certain William Wharton, a disreputable fellow whom Burghley had been using to spy upon Catholics in the north. Wharton came to London early in the year 1574 and had a talk with Walsingham upon the subject. In February he returned north with letters from Walsingham to Sir John Forster, the Warden of the Middle Marches. In conference with Forster he arranged a plan by which he was to be introduced into the household of the Queen of Scots and by degrees to ingratiate himself into her confidence. The plan was submitted to Walsingham, but apparently Walsingham did not approve of it. At all events it came to nothing.[1]

But light did come from Scotland somewhat later in the year. On the 23rd of May 1574 Morton the Regent wrote to Killigrew that a boy named Steward had been taken prisoner, who confessed that he was a carrier of letters between Mary Stuart and her friends in Scotland. The boy said that he had received his packets at Doncaster from a Scotsman named Alexander Hamilton, who was tutor to the children of the Earl of Shrewsbury.[2]

As soon as Walsingham received this letter he ordered Shrewsbury to send Hamilton up to London.[3] When Hamilton reached London Walsingham had him examined upon the points with which Steward, the boy, had charged him. Hamilton straightway denied any knowledge of the boy or any secret dealing with the Scottish Queen.[4] Thereupon Walsingham

[1] The details of this episode may be traced in *Cal. Scottish*, 1571–4, pp. 655, 675. Leader, in his book on Mary Stuart in captivity, declares that Walsingham was the father of Wharton's scheme, but the facts in the case hardly point to that interpretation. If Walsingham had designed it, he would probably have tried it. It is more likely that the plan was Wharton's own and that it fell through simply because Walsingham did not approve of it. His intention seems to have been to use Wharton in the north, in order to find out whether Mary was having any dealings with the Catholics there.

[2] Ibid., 1571–4, p. 665.

[3] S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, ix, 17.

[4] Ibid. 18, 19.

directed Killigrew to have Steward examined again in his presence. This was done, and Steward reaffirmed all that he had said before, adding some new details and charging several other of Shrewsbury's servants. On the basis of this, Hamilton was examined a second time, but he persisted in his denials. Then Walsingham directed Killigrew to see if he could not get Steward into England. But the boy could not be induced to go, in spite of Killigrew's efforts, nor could the Regent Morton be induced to send him.[1]

On the 1st of August Walsingham sent a copy of Steward's confession to Burghley 'to the end it may please your lordship to give order for the apprehension and examination of certain persons suspected to be dealers in the Queen of Scotts' causes'.[2] But no such orders were given. The evidence was on the whole, as Walsingham himself probably realized, much too slight. It would have been impossible to convict any one upon the testimony of an eighteen-year-old Scottish boy who could not even be produced. Consequently Hamilton was released and allowed to return to Shrewsbury's service.

Walsingham's suspicions were nevertheless aroused, and he kept steadily at work upon the clues with which Steward's confession had furnished him. Other information came from the Regent of Scotland when Killigrew returned to London in August, although just what the character of this information was does not appear. Finally, in January 1575, Walsingham received from Morton a copy of instructions given by the Bishop of Ross, one of Mary's agents, to Leslie one of his servants, which threw considerable light upon the situation. He felt that he was now in a position to take certain definite steps, so he bundled up these papers and sent them to Elizabeth. He advised her to use them with secrecy and to appoint certain members of her Council to look further into the matter.[3]

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, pp. 23, 31. [2] Harleian MSS. 6991, no. 50.

[3] Walsingham to Elizabeth, 15 Jan. 1574/5: 'It may please your Majesty to understand that having lately received certain letters from the Regent, as also the copy of certain instructions delivered by the Bishop of Ross unto one Leslie his servant, sent by him into Scotland, containing matters of good consequence that touch your Majesty's state and government and are to be used with secrecy, I thought it most fit to send the same unto your Majesty's self, to the end, after perusing thereof, you may make choice of such of your Council as you shall think fit to have the consideration thereof committed unto' (S. P. Scotland, xxvi, 66).

The first thing the Queen did apparently was to consult Burghley, and this led in turn to the apprehension of one Henry Cockyn, a stationer in London. So much may be gathered from a memorandum in Burghley's hand dated the 16th of January, 1575, for the examination of Cockyn.[1] From this memorandum may be gathered also that Cockyn was charged with having received letters through Shrewsbury's servants from the Scottish Queen on the one hand and from the Bishop of Ross and other agents on the other.

But this was not all—nor was it the worst. He was thought to have had dealings in the interest of the Scottish Queen with certain prominent men in England, notably with Dr. Atslow and Dr. Good, two prominent London physicians, with Thomas Morgan, sometime servant to the Earl of Shrewsbury, long suspected of underhand dealings in Mary's cause, and above all with Lord Henry Howard, the brother of the late executed traitor, Thomas Howard, Duke of Norfolk. It was for this last reason doubtless that Walsingham had advised Elizabeth to keep the matter secret and to choose the councillors who were to deal in it with care.

Cockyn's first examination revealed little or nothing. He admitted an acquaintance with many of the people about whom he was questioned, but maintained that he had met them merely as customers in his book shop. The case was then turned over to a committee of three composed of Thomas Bromley, the Solicitor-General, Thomas Randolph, and Walsingham himself to see if anything further could be got out of Cockyn.[2]

Walsingham was not very hopeful of the outcome. He wrote to Burghley, 'Without torture I know we shall not prevail.'[3] Three days later, on the 5th of February, he wrote to Burghley again. 'This day, according to your Lordship's order, we examined Henry Cockyn, from whom we can draw nothing. He hath been thrice imprisoned before and always so mildly dealt withal as he maketh no great account of threatenings. I think the show of torture (the fellow being so resolute as he is) will little prevail, but rather make him more obstinate, seeing

[1] S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, x, no. 1.
[2] 6 Feb. 1574/5, *Acts of Privy Council*, viii. 336.
[3] 2 Feb. 1574/5, Harleian MSS. 6991, no. 57.

himself but dallied withal. The best is that certain Scottishmen lately come over, and having letters to convey, do find great miss of him.'[1]

After this failure Walsingham decided to change his tactics. What he did and how he prospered may be gathered from his letter to the Queen dated the 22nd of February.

'It may please your most excellent Majesty to understand that neither by examination nor threatening of torture we could get the party (whose confession I send unto your Majesty) to discover anything, so that I was almost void of all hope to do any good. In the end, having great cause to suspect that he received some secret pension at the Queen of Scots hands (which he was loathe to lose), I thought good therefore to run another course with him, assuring him by my letters if that he would discover what he knew (accusing no man wrongfully) in the causes he was examined of, I would not only procure your Majesty's pardon for his former offences, but also send such further consideration as both he and his should be the better for it, and besides that the matter should be handled with such secrecy as he should not be discovered to be an accuser of others, no further forth than he himself should assent unto; which offer if he should refuse I assured him by torture he should be made to confess the bottom of the matter. This course being both faithfully and substantially executed by the Lieutenant of the Tower (who therefore deserveth at Your Majesty's hands great thanks) the party was drawn to set down in writing the said confession. I hope your Majesty will see that performed unto him that by me was promised.

'If now upon his discovery, the matter may be thoroughly handled by faithful and well-chosen ministers, I do not doubt but that your Majesty shall be able to discover a great number of the corrupt members of this your estate, especially such as remain most dangerously about your person. On the other side if it shall be loosely handled (as I do not doubt but that there will be all the devices that may be to qualify the matter), your Majesty shall utterly discourage all honest ministers for dealing effectually in like services whereon dependeth so much your Majesty's safety. I shall most humbly desire of your Majesty,

[1] Harleian MSS. 6991, no. 58.

that at such time as you shall communicate this matter to such of your council as to your Majesty shall seem fit, you will let them understand, that at my departure from the court, you gave me especial commandment in the time of my absence to send unto your Majesty's self all such matters of consequence as should come into my hands, without communicating them to any other, for that otherwise I doubt that this my secret dealing apart with your Majesty will be interpreted to proceed either of a certain distrust of their loyalty, or of a kind of ambition in myself, which two scruples (being innocent as I am), as I would be glad were removed from them, so would I have them also to think that in fulfilling your Majesty's commandment I carry no respect to persons, as one that dependeth only upon God and your Majesty, and yet do bear towards them that reverent respect that their calling and places requireth.'[1]

In the confession which Walsingham sent with this letter Cockyn admitted that in December 1573, at the instigation of the Bishop of Ross, he had agreed to undertake the delivery of the bishop's letters for the Scottish Queen to Alexander Hamilton and to receive in return all such letters from the Scottish Queen as Hamilton brought to him. He admitted that he had done this and had further supplied Mary with information concerning the state of things in England. He confessed that he had had dealings with Atslow, Good, and Morgan, and that he had borne certain messages between the Scottish Queen and Lord Henry Howard which implicated the latter as well as his nephew Philip, afterwards Earl of Arundel, in Mary's cause. Finally he charged several of Shrewsbury's servants and one of the servants of the French ambassador with the conveyance of letters to and from the captive Queen.

This confession of Cockyn's revealed clearly to Walsingham's eyes a whole system of secret correspondence, which Mary, with the assistance of her faithful servant, the Bishop of Ross, had built up. It revealed to him further the necessity of keeping much closer watch upon the servants of the Earl of Shrewsbury. Probably it sowed in his mind some seeds of a suspicion as to the integrity of the earl himself, which he later revealed. But all these things were insignificant in comparison with the revelation

[1] S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, x, no. 12.

which Cockyn made about Lord Henry Howard and his nephew. Lord Henry was the brother of the Duke of Norfolk who had been executed three years before for high treason. Philip Howard was his son. And yet both of these men were holding communication with Mary Stuart. It looked as though the embers of the Ridolfi Plot were not yet stamped out. The Howards were one of the most powerful families in England. Was it possible that they still had designs against Elizabeth? Did they still cherish hopes of setting Mary Stuart on the throne? And if so, to what extent had these hopes developed into plans? It was impossible to say how far the matter extended. Cockyn's confession had involved Lady Cobham, one of the Queen's ladies-in-waiting. How many more might not be involved? No wonder Walsingham advised the Queen to choose with care the councillors whom she appointed to investigate it.

Elizabeth herself, when she read Cockyn's confession, awoke to the seriousness of the situation. She took council with Walsingham upon the subject—asked him what he thought should be done, and whose services he advised her to employ. But Walsingham was too wary to make any discriminating distinctions.

'It may please your Majesty to understand,' he wrote on the 26th of February, 'that whereas you require to know my opinion whether the whole or part of the confession I sent your Majesty is to be communicated to such of your Council as you shall choose out for that purpose, as also who they be whom I think fit; for the first, if your Majesty make choice of those that be loyal and secret, then may you without any difficulty impart the whole unto them; for the second, whom I think fit, I must refer that to your Majesty's own choice, whose long experience and trial had of them can best judge of them. It becometh me to think honourably of them all. Touching the matter itself, your Majesty's delay used in resolving doth not only make me void of all good hope to do any good therein (the opportunity being lost), but also doth quite discourage me to deal in like causes, seeing mine and other your poor faithful servants' care for your safety fruitless.'[1]

This letter, especially the last part of it, appears to have had a good effect. Three days after it was written Walsingham,

[1] S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, x, 13.

writing doubtless at the Queen's command, ordered Shrewsbury to send up to London under guard four of his servants whom Cockyn had accused.[1] On the same day he advised the Queen that Atslow, Good, and Morgan be apprehended at the same time and cast into the Tower, although he confessed that he was afraid the matter had been deferred too long to do any good.[2]

Yet still the Queen delayed. It was not until the 9th of March that she finally appointed Thomas Bromley, Solicitor-General, Mildmay, and Walsingham to investigate the whole matter, giving them commission to examine every one who was in any way 'touched'. Walsingham wrote to Leicester the same day: 'I fear the only good that will grow thereof, the matter having been so long delayed, will be that such evil ministers being committed shall be cut off from practice, and others learn by their example to be more wary.'[3] Two days later, in sending a copy of Cockyn's confession to the Earl of Sussex, Walsingham wrote:

'Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Solicitor, and myself are appointed by her Majesty to consider (upon perusing the said confession) whether it be fit that certain chief dealers named in the same be committed, for that her Majesty is persuaded that the matters they are charged withal are of no great consequence, which I take to be a kind of watchword that all our travail therein will be to no great purpose. At the first I did look for a qualification of the matter and therefore do digest it with more patience. So that her Majesty might be in safety in this loose kind of dealing, wherein faults are judged no faults, I should be the less grieved. I protest before God I malice none of the parties detected, but rather lament them as one that taketh no delight in another's trouble. But when I consider that the trouble of a few may avoid a general trouble, I prefer general respects before particular.'[4]

The outcome of it all was very much as Walsingham had anticipated. Morgan made good his escape, but the other parties charged by Cockyn were cast into the Tower and examined. Some confessed, some denied the charges made against them, but nothing important was found out from any of them to add

[1] Walsingham to Shrewsbury, 29 (*sic*) Feb. 1574/5, S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, x, no. 14.
[2] Ibid., no. 16.
[3] S. P. Domestic, ciii, 15, 16.
[4] Cotton MSS., Titus B ii, f. 364.

to the information already in Walsingham's possession. As for Lord Henry Howard and his nephew, it was long before Elizabeth made up her mind to deal with them. On the 1st of May Leicester finally instructed Walsingham to join with Burghley for the examination of Howard.[1] Howard was examined but revealed practically nothing. Probably Elizabeth was nearer right than Walsingham in inclining to regard the whole affair rather lightly. She was ever indulgent to her nobility, and certainly the Howards could not be charged with a graver offence than exchanging with the Scottish Queen a letter or two containing general expressions of goodwill. It proved more than once that Elizabeth's indolence was better policy than Walsingham's zeal. But Walsingham was plainly disgusted with the insignificant outcome of the whole episode, which he attributed entirely to the Queen's indifference. 'Surely my Lord', he wrote to Leicester, 'her Majesty's strange dealings in this case will discourage all honest ministers that are careful for her safety to deal in the discovery of the sores of this diseased state, seeing her Majesty bent rather to cover them than to cure them.'[2]

Nevertheless the Cockyn episode was not without its results. It accomplished what Walsingham had hoped to accomplish when he began to unravel it, that is to say, it broke up one of the Scottish Queen's channels of secret correspondence. Moreover it revealed to Walsingham himself, who, it must be remembered, was just beginning his career as principal secretary, several points of interest in the whole situation. In the first place he learned a great deal about Elizabeth's attitude towards the Scottish Queen. In the second place it gave him a chance to feel the pulse of the discontented recusant nobility. In the third place it made some startling revelations about Shrewsbury's household. Without counting Thomas Morgan, no less than four of Shrewsbury's servants had been found guilty of dealings with the Queen of Scots. It was no wonder that he was strongly in favour of removing Mary from Shrewsbury's charge at Sheffield to some place 'where she might be more narrowly

[1] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 134.

[2] Walsingham to Leicester, 9 Mar. 1574/5, S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, x, 18.

looked into and more safely kept'. From the Cockyn episode dates Walsingham's growing distrust of Shrewsbury's efficiency as keeper of the 'bosom serpent', which finally led ten years later to her transference to the care of Sir Amias Paulet.

The history of Walsingham's relations with Mary Stuart from this time onward is the history of the searching out of plots, foreign and domestic, against England and Elizabeth which had for their purpose the seating of the Scottish Queen on the English throne. It is not easy to enumerate these various plots and to differentiate them. The Pope, the Duke of Guise, and the King of Spain during the last twelve years of Mary's life were continually turning over in their minds plans for her release. In some of these plans Mary had a direct part; in others she did not. Some of them got so far as the devising of ways and means; some never proceeded beyond the expression of good intentions. It is not the purpose of this chapter to trace out these various plots in detail,[1] but rather to show how Walsingham found out about them and how he worked to thwart them.

The first considerable plot of this kind, after Norfolk had paid the penalty of his treason in 1572, centres around the figure of Don John of Austria.[2] It will be recalled that after the death of Don Luis de Requesens, one of the mildest of Philip II's governors in the Low Countries, Don John was sent, in the late autumn of 1576, to fill his place. No doubt Philip's chief purpose in sending his popular half-brother into the Low Countries was to restore peace to those turbulent provinces and to lead them back to their obedience. There cannot be much doubt, however, that Don John himself, still flushed with the victory of Lepanto, had more startling projects in mind for himself than negotiating treaties with 'drunken Flemings' as he called them. He was dreaming of crossing the Channel into England, dethroning Elizabeth, releasing the picturesque Scottish Queen, marrying her and sharing the throne of England with her. Philip had so far acquiesced in Don John's ambitions as to give him secret

[1] Cf. on this subject in general, Kretzschmar, *Die Invasionsprojekte*, &c., and Pollen, 'The Politics of the English Catholics under Queen Elizabeth', published in *The Month*, 1902.

[2] For the details of this plot, cf. Stirling-Maxwell, *Don John of Austria*, ii, *passim*; cf. also Pollen's work just cited and Pollen, 'The Irish Expedition of 1579', in *The Month*, Jan. 1903.

instructions for the invasion of England as soon as he had restored peace in the Netherlands.[1] Philip even gave his consent to the marriage of Don John and Mary Stuart. He suggested that the best time for the invasion was the departure of the Spanish troops from the provinces. Consequently when Don John reached the Low Countries he set about at once to arrange a peace, and to provide for the deportation of his Spanish veterans by sea, so that he might easily throw them upon the English coast. In order to further his plans he sent an ambassador to Elizabeth early in December 1576, declaring his peaceable purposes, announcing his intention to dismiss his Spanish forces by sea, and craving shelter for them in an English port in case they were driven upon the shores of England *by storms*. This in brief was the plot, as yet concealed from the eyes of Elizabeth and her ministers. It looked as though it had a good chance of success, provided of course that Don John succeeded in making a firm peace with the rebels.

There can be no doubt that Walsingham was on the alert from the first moment he learned of the intentions of Philip to send his half-brother to the Low Countries. On the face of it the matter looked suspicious. If Philip intended peace, as he said, why was he sending the first warrior in Christendom on a business which was essentially diplomatic? It is clear that Doctor Wilson, Elizabeth's agent in the Low Countries, was on the alert as well. He wrote to Walsingham on the 2nd of January 1577 that De Gastel had told him that he was going to England with a letter from Don John 'in favour of the Spaniards to pass the seas upon their retiring homeward'. 'I understand', Wilson added, 'that this letter of Don John's is but to make compliments and a cloak for another matter. It were good that great heed were taken to him, and a watch laid who did talk with him, and Guaras [the Spanish agent in London] to be straightly examined to tell the very cause of his coming. Surely there is no good meaning, and would God the secret of this matter were found out.'[2]

The first definite expression of the Queen's fears as to the intentions of Don John towards England is set forth in a speech

[1] Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Relations politiques des Pays-Bas et de l'Angleterre*, ix. 15.

[2] Ibid. ix. 131.

which Edward Horsey made to Don John late in January. Horsey had been dispatched to Don John by Elizabeth to urge him to come to terms with the rebellious Netherlanders. In the course of his interview Horsey declared that rumours were spread abroad in England to the effect that the Spaniards, in quitting the Low Countries, would try to disembark in England for the purpose of liberating Mary Stuart. Don John had smiled at the notion and had declared that he had no such hostile purposes in mind.[1]

Don John wrote to Philip that Horsey appeared to be quite satisfied with his explanation, but it is certain that Dr. Wilson was far from satisfied. He wrote to Walsingham on the 24th of January that he was afraid the Duke of Guise would match Mary Stuart with Don John as part of a general Catholic plot against the Protestant powers.[2] Wilson's suspicions were further confirmed by M. de Famars, an envoy whom William of Orange sent over to Elizabeth early in February. Famars brought word from the Prince of a plot to poison Elizabeth and to marry Mary Stuart to Don John.[3] This news in turn was substantiated by letters from an English secret agent at Haye who wrote that Sir Francis Englefield and other Catholic refugees were negotiating with Don John for the release of the captive Scottish Queen. Two months later Sir Amias Paulet, the English ambassador at Paris, wrote to Walsingham in cipher that he had succeeded in sounding the secretary of the Duke of Guise and had learned that a marriage was arranged between Don John and Mary Stuart.[4]

In such wise the information accumulated. Walsingham does not appear to have employed special agents upon the case as he usually did in matters of this sort, but he certainly got enough warning from the ordinary sources of information to set Elizabeth on her guard. In consequence ten thousand troops were mustered in England, and care was taken that rumours of these warlike preparations, with judicious exaggeration, should reach Don John's ears.[5] Furthermore the Scottish Queen

[1] Gachard, *Correspondance de Philippe II*, v, 134.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1575–7, p. 490.
[3] Cf. instructions of de Famars, 10 Feb. 1576/7, ibid., p. 516.
[4] 28 April 1577, ibid., p. 565.
[5] Wilson to Walsingham, 1 Mar. 1576/7, Kervyn de Lettenhove, *op. cit.* ix. 229.

was more 'narrowly looked to', and her liberty somewhat restricted.[1]

The plot leaked out little by little and finally was entirely exposed by the interception of some of Don John's letters by La Noue in France. These letters were sent to Orange, who had them deciphered and showed them to Dr. Rogers, one of Elizabeth's agents in the Low Countries. Rogers sent a report of their contents to Walsingham on the 20th of July, 1577.[2]

Meanwhile the danger of invasion had been sensibly diminished by the departure of the Spanish troops overland for Italy late in May 1577. Without doubt Elizabeth's agents in the Low Countries had contributed their share in bringing this to pass, but it is an exaggeration to say that it was done primarily at their instigation. There is plenty of evidence to prove that the Dutch rebels were as anxious to keep the Spanish soldiers off their sea front as the English were, and the man who lodged the first protest against their departure by sea was William of Orange himself.

As long as Don John lived England was in danger from his ambitious projects, although the danger decreased day by day as his difficulties in coming to a settlement with the Netherlanders increased. One motive which led Elizabeth at this time to lend her well-hoarded money to the Spanish rebels was unquestionably her fear of Don John's intentions against England. She breathed more freely when that gallant cavalier, worn out by interminable petty negotiations with the 'drunken Flemings', was gathered to his fathers in the late autumn of 1578.

Very little credit can be given to Walsingham personally for discovering the designs of Don John against England. Wilson in the Low Countries and Paulet in France were the men who did the real work. The actual discovery of the plot was due to the interception of Don John's letters in France by La Noue. St. Aldegonde, William of Orange's right-hand man, deciphered these letters, and the contents of them were revealed to the Queen

[1] Mary Stuart to Archbp. of Glasgow, 18 Mar. 1576/7, Labanoff, *op. cit.* iv. 363; Shrewsbury to Walsingham, 26 Apr. 1577, Cotton MSS., Caligula C v, f. 73. Mary herself does not seem to have been consulted as to the projected match with Don John, nor was she, apparently, in any way directly responsible for his designs against England.

[2] Kervyn de Lettenhove, *op. cit.* ix. 405.

by Orange as an additional argument to persuade her to come to his assistance. The plot of course came to nothing, not because of any great effort on the part of Walsingham or his colleagues to thwart it, but because Don John failed to fulfil the condition antecedent to invasion—that of making peace with the Dutch. Walsingham, it is evident, played a very minor part in the whole affair, but it is nevertheless interesting in this connexion because it illustrates some of the various instruments which he had at his command for the discovery of plots against the Queen and her state.

With the death of Don John the hopes of those who wished evil to the Protestant régime in England fell, but their energies did not flag. Don John was gone, but others were quite ready to take his place as the leader of the crusade against the heretic Queen and as the deliverer of her fair prisoner. The Pope, the House of Guise, and Philip of Spain still cherished their hostile intentions and looked only for an occasion to carry them into execution.

For the moment their eyes were bent towards Ireland, which for years had been presenting to Elizabeth's government something like the same problem that faced Philip in the Low Countries. Ireland, in fact, was in revolt. The reasons for the revolt extend far into the history of the land, being based fundamentally upon differences of race and above all upon differences of creed, which fixed a great gulf between the Irish and their English governors. Upon these differences, and particularly upon the differences of creed, Elizabeth's enemies proposed to play. They had a fine opportunity to talk about freeing their Catholic Irish brethren from the yoke of the heretic oppressor, and they made the most of it. Moreover, the Pope himself laid a kind of claim upon the sovereignty of Ireland, and he was conscious of a certain temporal right to interfere there which was distinct from his asserted spiritual supremacy over Christendom.

There was in Europe at this time a picturesque adventurer who had a great deal to do with turning the attention of the Pope and his adherents towards Ireland. This man was Thomas Stewkley, a Devonshire man by birth, who had been a soldier, a pirate, an Irish adventurer, and several other things, and who wound up by being a rebel. In 1570, being suddenly summoned

by Elizabeth to return from Ireland to England, he changed the course of his ship in mid-Channel, turned southward, and finally dropped anchor in a Spanish harbour.[1] There is no need to describe his behaviour in Spain in detail. He won great favour from Philip II, and was granted a considerable pension. As early as the year 1571 he was turning over in his mind plans for the invasion of England. Somehow or other he won the confidence of Pope Pius V, and after him of his successor Gregory XIII, and he seems to have had something to do with the formation of Don John's project against England. It is pretty certain that he went to Flanders in 1577 with papal letters of recommendation, in the hope of getting employment in Don John's invading army. His return to Rome in April of the same year heralded Don John's failure. It was then, apparently, that the Cardinal of Como, the papal secretary, fell in with his plans for the invasion of Ireland. After some fifteen months in Italy he actually set out in January 1578 with a small fleet for that purpose. Passing through the Mediterranean, he put in at Lisbon, where Sebastian, the young King of Portugal, induced him to join in his expedition against Africa. Stewkley won the papal consent to this change of plans and set out with the ill-fated Portuguese expedition. At Alcazar both his legs were shot off by a cannon ball, and so he died, and that was the end of his Irish projects.

Stewkley was an annoyance but never a real menace to England. He was a vain, swashbuckling fellow who made no effort to conceal his plans. Consequently Walsingham had very little difficulty through his ordinary sources of information in keeping track of all his movements. As early as January 1577 Walsingham learned of Stewkley's dealings with the Pope from Henry Gilpin, a merchant at Naples. Later, when Stewkley was in Flanders, one of his letters from the Pope strayed by mistake into the hands of Dr. Wilson, Elizabeth's agent there.[2] From this letter, Wilson informed Walsingham, the Pope's intentions against England appeared quite clearly. On the 14th of December 1577 Christopher Hoddesdon, English agent at Hamburg, got news from Rome that Stewkley was preparing an expedition against Ireland at Civita Vecchia.[3] Sir Amias

[1] Pollen, 'The Irish Expedition of 1579', *The Month*, Jan. 1903.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1575–7, p. 547. [3] Ibid., 1577–8, p. 484.

Paulet from Paris confirmed this report in a letter to Walsingham of the 24th of January 1578.[1] After this Hoddesdon's Roman agent had no difficulty in keeping track of Stewkley's movements, following him to and fro between Civita Vecchia and Rome until finally he reported his departure from Civita Vecchia for the west in March.[2]

The next news of Stewkley came from France. On the 23rd of June Sir Amias Paulet wrote to the Queen that an Irish friar named Thomas Bowser, who had just arrived from Spain, had visited him and reported that Stewkley was at Lisbon and that he would not get to Ireland that year because he was planning to go to Africa. Dr. Wilson, writing from the Low Countries three days later, sent similar news. He told Walsingham that he had sent a 'choice man' into Portugal to follow Stewkley's movements more closely.[3] And so the matter went. Towards the end of May the Privy Council thought well to appoint some ships to lie in wait for Stewkley, to make ready two thousand men to throw into Ireland on short notice, and to warn Sir Henry Sydney, the Lord Deputy, to keep watch along the Irish coast. Sydney himself urged that the reinforcements be sent at once, but by the 13th of July the Privy Council was evidently satisfied that Stewkley's expedition had been diverted from Ireland, and consequently the reinforcements were stayed.[4]

Once again fate stepped in to save England, if not from disaster at least from menace. But the cannon ball at Alcazar, while it removed a picturesque figure from the scene, by no means cut off the hopes of the Pope against Ireland. Stewkley was gone, but other Irishmen remained, one other Irishman in particular, James Fitzmaurice, or to give him his family name, Fitzgerald. This man had been mixed up in various uprisings against the English government in Ireland, and in the late spring of 1575 had found it advisable to flee into France. He landed at St. Malo in Brittany, and immediately set to work upon the Pope, the King of Spain, and the King of France, to win their assistance in organizing an expedition against the English in Ireland. For the most part he remained in France, and the English ambassadors

[1] Ibid., p. 521.
[2] Kervyn de Lettenhove, x. 583.
[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 23; Kervyn de Lettenhove, x. 543.
[4] *Cal. Irish*, 1574–85, pp. 134, 135, 138.

at Paris, Dr. Dale and after him Sir Amias Paulet, kept close watch on his movements. They protested steadily to the King against his entertainment in France, and from time to time they sent spies to explore the Breton coast in order to ascertain whether any preparations for an expedition were being made.[1]

Through the diligence of the ambassadors Walsingham was able to follow Fitzmaurice's movements on the continent pretty closely. The reports he got from France were supplemented by other reports from Ireland. It was from Drury, President of Munster, that Walsingham learned of Fitzmaurice's journey to Rome in the latter part of the year 1576, when he had got the Pope's benediction upon his enterprise and letters of commendation from his Holiness to the monarchs of Spain and Portugal.[2]

Fitzmaurice was not, of course, a formidable personage in himself, but the relations between England and France were considerably strained during the years of his sojourn in Brittany, and Elizabeth was afraid that the French King might take advantage of his presence to deal her a covert blow upon her exposed Irish flank. Furthermore, it must not be forgotten that while Fitzmaurice was in France, Stewkley was in Spain and Don John was in the Low Countries. News of projected expeditions against England and Ireland reached Walsingham simultaneously from all three quarters, and it is not surprising if he gathered them all together in his mind and pictured to himself an imposing league of the Catholic Powers against England. He confessed to Burghley that he was even ' jealous of the King of Portugal's preparations, though it be given out that they be for Barbary '. The conference which took place in 1577 between the Kings of Spain and Portugal, though it had in reality nothing to do with England, alarmed him not a little.[3]

As a matter of fact the King of France seems never to have seriously contemplated giving countenance to Fitzmaurice's schemes. Paulet probably came very near the truth when he

[1] Dale made good use of a certain Capt. Thomas, an Irishman, whom Walsingham had formerly found of service when he was in France. Thomas, under the guise of an Irish Catholic refugee, gained Fitzmaurice's confidence and revealed his plans to Dale. Thomas was later caught in his tricks by Catherine de Médicis and thrown into prison, and Dale had considerable difficulty in getting him released again (*Cal. Foreign*, 1575–7, pp. 100, 258).

[2] *Cal. Irish*, 1574–85, pp. 112–13.

[3] 29 Aug. 1577, S. P. Domestic, xlv, no. 11.

wrote to Walsingham late in January 1578 that he believed all the friendship displayed towards the Irishman to be merely a device for preventing Elizabeth from lending assistance to the Huguenots.[1] Notwithstanding, Paulet never for a moment relinquished his vigilance, and from his reports, pieced together with reports from Ireland, Walsingham was able to keep close watch upon Fitzmaurice's movements. In February an English agent in Brittany reported that Fitzmaurice had been to Spain. In March, from Ireland, Walsingham learned that Fitzmaurice had fitted out a ship in Spain and, cruising up the French coast, had captured an English ship. In May Paulet sent word that the Irishman was back again in France, gathering supplies together in Brittany ; in June that he was in Paris ; in July that he was living with a large establishment at Dinan ; in September that he had once again departed for Spain.[2]

The next news of him came in December from Botolphe Holder, an English merchant at Lisbon. Holder wrote to Burghley that Fitzmaurice had been several times at Court, that he had freighted a vessel of eighty tons, taken up a hundred tinkers and other rascals for soldiers, bought two hundred culverins, borrowed fourteen pieces of ordnance from the King's officers, and set forth once more.[3] In January 1579 Walsingham learned that Fitzmaurice was back in Portugal again negotiating the purchase of another ship.[4] In March news came from Ireland that an Irish barque, homeward bound, had encountered him on the high seas in a small Spanish vessel with a crew of fifty Spaniards. Later in March further news came from Ireland that Dr. Sander, one of the most famous of the English Jesuits, had joined with the Irishman at the instance of the Pope. In April Fitzmaurice was reported once more off the Spanish coast on his way to join a ship which the Pope had sent him. In the face of all this information Walsingham could not have been greatly surprised when he received news from Ireland, late in the summer of 1579, that Fitzmaurice had made a landing, on the 18th of July, at Dingle Bay.[5]

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1577–8, p. 470.
[2] Ibid., pp. 493, 657; *Cal. Irish*, 1574–85, p. 130; *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, pp. 5, 53, 183.
[3] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1566–79, p. 521.
[4] *Cal. Foreign*, 1578–9, p. 400.
[5] *Cal. Irish*, 1574–85, pp. 162–3, 168, 174.

It is not necessary to follow the course of Fitzmaurice's ill-fated campaign in Ireland. His forces were far too small to accomplish anything even in such a disordered land. The interesting point to observe is that Walsingham, through ordinary channels of information, had been able to give ample warning of Fitzmaurice's plans and his purposes and to calculate pretty exactly the magnitude of his preparations. The sources at command fail to reveal any special efforts on Walsingham's part to discover Fitzmaurice's movements. As a matter of fact, the elaborate diplomatic spy system for which he afterwards became famous does not appear to have been developed at this time. Possibly Walsingham had not yet quite realized its importance. Possibly, realizing it himself, he had not been able to impress its importance upon the Queen with sufficient emphasis to obtain from her the financial support necessary to set it in order.

One thing Walsingham felt pretty sure of, and that was that Fitzmaurice's expedition did not represent the supreme effort of either the Pope or the King of Spain against Ireland. In January 1580 he wrote to Henry Cobham, who succeeded Paulet as English ambassador at Paris, that he was pretty sure the King of Spain meant to send further succour to the Irish rebels.[1] It was this conviction which led Walsingham to take some special steps for getting information as to Philip's exact intentions. To this end he arranged with certain English merchants trading with Spain to send him news of the state of things in that country. Early in the year 1580 he began to receive reports from three different towns in the Spanish peninsula. Botolphe Holder, whom we have met with already, wrote from Lisbon, Roger Bodenham from San Lucar in the south, and John Dunne from Corunna, more commonly known in England at that time as the Groyne, in the extreme north-east. All of these men reported elaborate naval preparations under way. Without doubt much which they saw and heard had no direct reference to England at all, but was connected with Philip's campaign against Portugal. This was especially true of Holder's and Bodenham's reports from Lisbon and the south. John Dunne, however, picked up at Bayonne some news which touched England more nearly. Under pretence of being a Catholic and by some judicious

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 146.

bribery he won the confidence of a Spanish monk who told him that an Irish bishop was busy in northern Spain raising forces for Ireland.[1] Later Dunne got into touch with the household of the Irish bishop himself and learned that he was organizing an expedition of twenty sails.[2] Dunne's reports were confirmed by those of John Ley, a ship captain of Lyme Regis. He also had exerted himself to gather information, and had learned of great preparations at Corunna and Santander. He spoke of eighteen ships and twelve thousand men.[3] It is pretty clear that both he and Dunne exaggerated considerably the magnitude of the preparations against Ireland which were under way in Spain. Nevertheless the information they gave served to put the Queen on her guard. The consequence was that she gave orders for reinforcements to be sent to Ireland and dispatched Sir William Winter with four ships of the royal navy to guard the Irish coasts.[4]

Meantime Walsingham was seeking information another way in France. An agent of his named Best wound his way into the confidence of the secretary of the Spanish agent in Paris. Best reported progress to Cobham, the English ambassador at Paris, and proposed to obtain information about the threatened expedition by posing as an English malcontent and offering his services to the enemy. Walsingham approved of the plan, but before Best had time to execute it he was killed under very suspicious circumstances in a street brawl in Paris.[5]

It is clear that Walsingham also had some idea of gaining information about the plans and projects of the Pope by kidnapping Cardinal Riario, the papal legate, on his way to France, and putting him to the question. He thought of employing Huguenot privateersmen from La Rochelle to this purpose, but for some reason or other he never did so.[6]

Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1580 Walsingham continued to receive from one quarter and another information of large preparations under way in Spain for Ireland. Naturally

[1] 2 June 1580, *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 289.
[2] *Cal. Irish*, 1574–85, p. 228. [3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 314.
[4] 8 and 14 July, 1580, *Cal. Irish*, 1574–85, pp. 231, 233.
[5] Cobham to Walsingham (with Walsingham's marginal comments), 23 May 1580, *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 272; for Best's murder, cf. same to same, 2 July 1580, ibid., p. 336.
[6] Cf. Cobham's letter of 23 May 1580, just cited.

he was alarmed, and he did his best to impress his fears upon the Queen. As usual she refused to take the news very seriously, and once again her luck triumphed over Walsingham's foresight. When the enormous expedition, estimated at anywhere from forty to sixty ships, finally landed in Ireland in September it had dwindled to two ships and some six hundred men. This little band, expecting reinforcements, fortified itself in a bad position at Smerwick. When they were attacked they made hardly any defence, and laid down their arms after three days' fighting. Almost all of them were massacred in cold blood.

The Spanish ambassador in England maintained with great vehemence that the King his master had had no hand in this Irish fiasco. He probably lied, but it is clear enough that the Pope was the real instigator of the expedition and that the great cause of its failure was that Philip, while lending it his countenance, lent it very little else. But Walsingham, who had sound reasons for believing in Philip's rooted hostility towards England, had no means of telling this. Even after the disaster of Smerwick he continued to receive reports of the preparations in Spain, and it was not until March of the next year that he finally reached the conclusion that Ireland was safe from Spanish attack for the present at least.[1]

But meanwhile a cloud had risen on the northern horizon. The 'postern-gate', Scotland, was gravely threatened by the enemy. This time the enemy was, or appeared to be, French. A hundred references have been made to the deep-rooted hostility of the House of Guise towards Elizabeth. This hostility was one of the constant factors at a time when political friends and enemies were made and changed with astounding rapidity. Elizabeth from the first exerted her efforts to weaken the power of the Guises in France. The Guises, on their part, constantly plotted her destruction. They were opposed to her on political, religious, and particularly on personal grounds. It must never be forgotten that Mary Stuart, the heir-presumptive to the English throne, was the first cousin of the Duke of Guise, and that they had everything to hope for if by any means whatsoever

[1] *Cal. Dom.*, Adda., 1580–1625, pp. 36, 39; *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 74; *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 651. There seems to be no reason for connecting Mary Stuart in any way directly with these expeditions against Ireland. She herself denied any connexion with them. Labanoff, v. 127.

she could be placed upon the English throne. Consequently they used all the influence which they had to arouse the French king to a sense of her wrongs and to induce him to support her cause.

Henry III of France, however, was not disposed to play entirely into the hands of these Lorrainers. His mother, Catherine de Médicis, was much less so. She did not look back with pleasure to the days when she had been forced to humiliate herself to their dictatorial power. Moreover, she had other irons in the fire. There was her troublesome young son the Duke of Alençon to dispose of. Elizabeth of England held out to him at this time prospects of marriage, which offered a convenient solution for many 'domestical' difficulties. Consequently, while the Guises aimed at the destruction of Elizabeth, Catherine and her son were disposed to cultivate her friendship. This fact has been set forth before, but it must be recalled again in order to make clear the situation in Scotland. The great reason why Henry of Guise succeeded no better than he did in his Scottish projects was that he never had any more than a half-hearted support from his sovereign. Henry III was willing to consider plans for subduing Scotland to French influence and for setting Mary Stuart upon the English throne, but the alternate policy of marrying his brother to Elizabeth and of strengthening his own position independent of the Guises appealed to him more.

The situation in Scotland at this time has already been discussed elsewhere. It will be remembered how Elizabeth's sparing policy had weakened her party in that country and had left strong elements among the nobility for the Guises to work their designs upon. Walsingham had repeatedly warned the Queen of the dangers of such a course, but had reaped little thanks for his pains. Elizabeth could not be induced to part with the money which was necessary to keep the covetous Scottish nobility on her side. The consequences were as Walsingham had foreseen. A dispute over the title and estates of the dukedom of Lennox gave the Guises their opportunity. The Sieur d'Aubigny, nephew of the late Duke of Lennox, was the French claimant to his lands. He was a good Catholic and devoted to the House of Guise. Consequently, when James summoned him to Scotland in the late summer of 1579, he went

with his head full of Guisan projects and a determination to win Scotland back to the Catholic faith.

His rapid growth to power and influence in Scotland is an old story. Walsingham watched it unfold with anxious eyes. From the first d'Aubigny professed the friendliest intentions towards England, but the secretary was never for a moment deceived. He knew several things about the young man already. He knew that d'Aubigny was an ardent Catholic, a follower of the Guises, a sympathizer in the cause of Mary Stuart. Paulet wrote from France that before he had left Paris d'Aubigny had held a long conference with Mary's ambassador there, and that the Duke of Guise himself had conducted him as far as Dieppe. It was easy for Walsingham to gather from facts like these how much faith he ought to pin to d'Aubigny's protestations of goodwill.[1]

Walsingham indeed had no doubt whatever that d'Aubigny would work against the English interests in Scotland. This was alarming enough, but it was not all or the worst. Walsingham was also afraid that d'Aubigny harboured dark purposes against England. He wrote to Robert Bowes, the English representative in Scotland, on the 3rd of May 1580, that he feared 'some great and hidden treason not yet discovered' was brewing in that quarter.[2]

It was part of Walsingham's business to find out what this great treason was and if possible to circumvent it. From all quarters he heard rumours but from nowhere definite facts. The English ambassador in Paris wrote now of a project to marry the King of Scots to a princess of Lorraine, now of a 'secret device' to carry off Mary Stuart, now of ships making sail in Normandy for parts unknown. From the south of France came a tale of a new Holy League among the Catholic Powers against England. But all this was very general, and though it hinted at impending dangers it gave Walsingham no clue as to how the blow would fall or as to what he ought to do to ward it off.

This was what he had to find out. His task was complicated considerably by the varying forms in which the threatened danger revealed itself to him. This business of d'Aubigny was

[1] Paulet to Walsingham, 29 Aug. 1579, *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, p. 50; Capt. Errington to Walsingham, 10 Oct. 1579, *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 355.
[2] Ibid., p. 414.

only one of several. Ireland, under the instigation of Sander, the papal agent, was in revolt. News came from Spain that great expeditions were preparing there to go to the assistance of the Irish rebels. The firstcomers in a systematic invasion of England by the Jesuits landed in south England and began to sow seeds of discontent among the English recusants. It was a critical moment, perhaps the most critical moment, in the whole reign of Queen Elizabeth. Walsingham hardly knew which danger to meet first and he needed a stout heart to face them all without faltering.

We have seen how he dealt with the Irish difficulty. We have seen also how he met the efforts of the Jesuits. For the present we have to consider what he did in the matter of d'Aubigny. Of course he worked against the man in Scotland itself. The story of his efforts to strengthen the party favourable to England in that country, to discountenance the French influence, and to win over the vacillating king, now by promises and now by threats, has already been set forth in detail. But d'Aubigny's strength in Scotland was never of itself a dangerous menace to England. What Walsingham feared was that d'Aubigny meant to use his strength in Scotland to serve the hostile purposes of Elizabeth's enemies beyond the seas; that he meant to throw open the 'postern gate' in order to admit Catholic armies into England. Already Walsingham had good ground for believing that d'Aubigny was in close alliance with the Guises in France. It was rumoured that he was also in touch with the Pope, the King of Spain, and Mary Stuart. A great many things pointed to the existence of a Catholic league against England which meant to work through d'Aubigny the destruction of Elizabeth, and by setting Mary Stuart on the English throne to restore the old faith in England. So much Walsingham assumed, and having assumed it he set to work to find out how this Catholic league intended to execute its purposes.

It is impossible to set forth in detail the means which he used to this end. He utilized a great many sources for obtaining information. Much of it came through the ordinary diplomatic channels. Representatives of England in France and elsewhere abroad maintained their own secret agents who listened at many keyholes and passed through many closed doors gathering news

which their masters placed at Walsingham's disposal. Besides this he could generally depend upon the friendly advices of men like the Prince of Orange and the King of Navarre, who were fighting the battles of Protestantism in Europe and who were deeply interested in the welfare of England. Merchants, commercial agents and other licensed travellers were usually glad of the opportunity to invite Walsingham's favour by sending him such bits of news as they came across. In addition to all these Walsingham had his own secret agents, some permanently stationed abroad, some whom he kept at hand and dispatched from time to time on special business. It appears from a list, drawn up after his death, of places from which he was accustomed to receive information, that one way and another he kept in touch with the course of events in almost every important centre in Europe. The list includes the names of twelve places in France, ranging from Lyons to Bordeaux and from Calais to La Rochelle, of nine places in Germany, of four places in Italy, of four places in Spain, of three places in the Low Countries, of Constantinople, Algiers, and Tripoli in the Turkish Empire.[1]

It is probable that in the year 1580 this elaborate system of espionage had not been fully developed. Certainly the letters of that year which survive reveal very few signs of it. Walsingham must have developed it little by little as he was able to impress upon the Queen the need for it. First to last, in this as in all other measures which he devised for the safety of the State, he was severely handicapped by the close-fisted policy of Elizabeth. It is not easy to trace the fiscal side of the secret service. The money appears to have been paid out of the treasury to Walsingham by warrants of the Privy Seal 'for such purposes as the Queen shall appoint'. A great deal of money was drawn from the treasury under such vague warrants as these, and it is practically impossible to discriminate between what was applied to secret service and what was spent otherwise, as the Queen might appoint. The difficulty is further increased by the fact that before the year 1585, when the Signet Book begins, the warrants for issue under the Privy Seal are in very bad shape. The first record of anything like a regular allowance to Walsingham for purposes of secret service appears in July 1582, when he

[1] S. P. Domestic, ccxxxii, no. 12.

was granted seven hundred and fifty pounds a year to be paid in quarterly payments.[1] Beginning with the year 1585 his allowance for this purpose appears to have been increased.[2] Two hundred and fifty pounds were paid him in April 1585; two hundred and fifty in October of the same year; six hundred pounds in February 1586; five hundred in June of the same year, and so on. These grants after 1585 amounted approximately to two thousand pounds a year, and in June 1588 Walsingham was granted a regular allowance of two thousand pounds for secret service purposes.[3] Two thousand pounds was a large amount of money in the later sixteenth century. The fact that Elizabeth, for all her cheese-paring, was willing to invest so much in secret service shows how important she conceived it to be. No doubt it was efficient. Elizabeth was the last person in the world to spend two thousand pounds unless she could see an adequate return.

In the year 1580, when Walsingham was faced with the further problem of searching out the ulterior purposes of d'Aubigny in Scotland, it is pretty clear that his secret service was not yet developed. He had to do what he could with the means at his command. He directed Bowes, the English agent in Scotland, to set spies at work and to spare no cost in order to get to the bottom of the matter.[4] He sent similar instructions to Cobham at Paris. Meanwhile he got news that there was a papal agent at Boulogne who had information to sell. Believing as he did that

[1] Warrants of Issue under the Privy Seal, Elizabeth, Bundle 124.

[2] Since 1585 was the date at which the Signet Book begins it is not impossible that the apparent increase was not actual, but that earlier records which might have revealed larger payments earlier are missing. Cf. T. Lake's Extracts from the Signet Book, in S. P. Domestic, ccxxix, no. 49.

[3] After the Armada again the allowance was reduced to £1,200 a year, Signet Book, Elizabeth, i, Feb. 1589/90. Thomas Lake, one of Walsingham's successors in office, drew up, probably for his own use, a list of the payments made to Walsingham for secret service from the year 1585 as he found them in the Signet Book (S. P. Domestic, ccxxix, no. 49). Lake probably knew how to discriminate between money paid out for secret service and money paid out for other private reasons. I have at any rate assumed that he did and have taken my figures from his record, confirming them in every case from the Signet Book. The allowance of £750 a year paid to Walsingham in July 1582, referred to in the text, seems likely to have been paid for secret service, but I cannot be sure of it. In addition to this Elizabeth on more than one occasion, notably in the case of Gilbert Gifford, granted secret service agents regular pensions.

[4] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 414.

the Pope was the root of all evil, he dispatched Lawrence Tomson, one of his confidential secretaries, to Boulogne at once, to talk with the papal agent and to wring what he could out of him. This man told Tomson that the Pope meant to send an army against England under the leadership of Jacomo Bonacampanini with intention to deprive Elizabeth both of her throne and of her life. He said that the enterprise was to be assisted by the Duke of Guise and other powerful princes and that it had many supporters among the English themselves, but he would tell no more, and what he did tell was altogether too general to be of great practical value.[1]

So Walsingham got very little nearer the light, and meantime alarming reports of d'Aubigny's practices came from divers places. In August Bowes wrote that the King had delivered Dumbarton, the old gateway of France into Scotland, into d'Aubigny's hands, and had dispatched a messenger into France 'to lay some plot for the disquieting of both realms'. In October Cobham wrote from France that two ships full of munitions of war were about to be dispatched to Dumbarton. A little later Walsingham heard that d'Aubigny was buying arms in the Low Countries.[2] 'We hear', Walsingham wrote on the 17th of January 1581, to Cobham, 'that messengers pass between them [the party of d'Aubigny] and the French and that the Duke of Guise has promised to embrace the action. Wherefore, it will behoove you to look carefully into their dealings in order to discover, if it be possible, how far they proceed and to advertise us, that we may provide accordingly, to impeach their purposes.'[3] When Randolph, Bowes's successor in Scotland, wrote to Walsingham that he believed d'Aubigny could be won over to Elizabeth's side, Walsingham replied that the Council supposed 'he did but jest' and bade Randolph 'harp no more on that string'.[4]

Late in January Cobham got possession of a copy of a letter from the Bishop of Ross to Cardinal Alciatus at Rome, in which it appeared 'that the platform was laid by the consent and counsel of the bishop, as also that d'Aubigny has promised to

[1] Cotton MSS., Caligula C v, f. 143.
[2] *Cal. Foreign*, 1579–80, pp. 414, 439.
[3] Ibid., 1581–2, p. 25.
[4] *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 598.

leave nothing undone for the advancing of the Scottish Queen and Catholicism'. Walsingham sent the letter to Randolph to be used against d'Aubigny in Scotland, but it was not otherwise of great service to him.[1] There was a sad lack of those 'particulars of the intended treason' for which he was eagerly looking.

Mary Stuart, in captivity, wrote to the Archbishop of Glasgow, her ambassador in France, that Walsingham was boasting that he knew all about the practices of the Duke of Guise for her deliverance,[2] but either Mary was deceived or else Walsingham was pretending to more knowledge than he possessed.

Walsingham, like most of his colleagues, rightly or wrongly identified the Jesuits who began to enter England in the year 1580 with the large plans of the Catholic Powers to overthrow Elizabeth. Consequently he looked upon them as possible sources of information as to these plans. This is apparent from his examination of Thomas Cottam, Luke Kirby, and several other priests who were captured in July 1581. He asked them what they knew of any attempt to be made against England, what dealings they had had with Mary Stuart or with her agent the Bishop of Ross, and finally, whom in England they accounted likely to be the principal supporters of a foreign invasion. He evidently suspected that they had been sent into England at the instigation of the Bishop of Ross who, he knew, had been in Rome the year before, but he found out very little from these priests, and he came to the conclusion that they had little to tell.[3]

In August 1581 Walsingham went to Paris on a mission connected with the marriage negotiations at that time under way between Elizabeth and the young Duke of Alençon. While at Paris he learned that in June a plot for the invasion of Scotland had been sent to the Pope, who had commended it to the King of Spain and won his promise of support. Perhaps Walsingham got this information from Thomas Rogers, who was acting at the time as his secret agent in Rome. There is reason to believe that it was not without foundation. In the spring of 1581 Father

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 34; *Cal. Scottish*, 1574–81, p. 626.
[2] 4 March 1581, Labanoff, v. 216.
[3] Walsingham to Burghley, 14 July 1581, S. P. Domestic, cxlix, no. 69; cf. also questions for the examination of these priests in Walsingham's hand, in S. P. Domestic, cxlvii, no. 97.

Creighton, a Scottish Jesuit, had gone to Rome to discuss the affairs of Scotland with the head of his order and with the Pope.[1] The Jesuits saw in d'Aubigny an instrument for the fulfilment of all their ambitions in England and Scotland. Creighton urged the Pope to seize the opportunity and by sending support to d'Aubigny to win the northern island back to the old faith. Whether he actually laid before his Holiness a 'plot' for the invasion of Scotland or not cannot be definitely said. It is, however, probable that either Rogers or some other English agent learned of Creighton's dealings in Rome and reported them to Walsingham.

Without doubt the great reason why Walsingham learned no more than he did up to this time about the purposes of the Catholic Powers in Scotland was that their purposes were hardly as yet formulated. The actual negotiations between d'Aubigny on the one hand and Henry of Guise, Philip of Spain, and Pope Gregory XIII on the other, for the invasion of Scotland by foreign forces did not begin until the early spring of the year 1582. From Rome Creighton had gone north to hold conference in Paris with the papal nuncio Castelli and with Mary Stuart's ambassador, the Archbishop of Glasgow. They agreed together that Creighton should go to Scotland and should propose to d'Aubigny an invasion of Scotland and England on a large scale. Creighton went and, acting apparently without warrant, assured d'Aubigny (now become Earl of Lennox) that if he would consent to such a plan, the Pope and the King of Spain together would supply him with fifteen thousand men. Lennox assented readily to the idea but demanded an army of twenty thousand men, to be paid for a year and a half and to be placed under his command. He also demanded that the Bull of Excommunication against Elizabeth should be renewed and that the Catholics in England and Ireland should be stirred to revolt.[2] This was a large order, but it formed at least a basis for negotiations and Creighton went back with it to France. There he conferred with the Duke of Guise, with the Archbishop of Glasgow, and with Dr. William Allen, later Cardinal Allen, the recognized leader of the English Catholics.[3] The outcome of this conference was that the Duke

[1] Kretzschmar, *op. cit.*, p. 60. [2] Teulet, *op. cit.* v. 246.
[3] Cf. Papal Nuncio to Cardinal Como, 8 May 1582, in *Letters of Cardinal*

of Guise endorsed the plan and even offered to lead a second army into south England himself. It was decided to appeal for support to the Pope and the King of Spain but to keep the whole matter secret from the King of France. Creighton was thereupon dispatched to Rome and Father Robert Parsons to Spain. Meantime Lennox had communicated his plans to Mary Stuart and had received her assent to them.

Creighton found Gregory XIII entirely agreeable to the plan but little inclined to lend active assistance without the co-operation of the King of Spain. Philip's half-hearted acquiescence in the ill-fated Irish crusade still stuck in the Pope's mind. Everything, in fact, depended upon Philip and he was tardy as usual in coming to any decision.[1] To tell the truth his hands were full with the affairs of Portugal and the Low Countries. While he delayed, the machinations of Lennox's enemies in Scotland accomplished his downfall and virtual banishment, and so the opportunity was lost.[2]

All these plans and plots were of course hidden from Walsingham's eyes. He knew of Creighton's visit to Scotland in the autumn of 1581 but could only guess at its import.[3] He heard from Cobham that the Duke of Guise was ardent with the King of France in advocating Lennox's cause, that the English Catholic refugees abroad were in high spirits, and that the King of Scotland had been won over completely to the Catholic cause, but he had to guess at all the rest. In October he intercepted a letter from Mary Stuart to the Archbishop of Glasgow which revealed the fact that she was acquainted with the designs of her cousin of Guise and entirely in sympathy with Lennox's schemes, whatever they might be, but this letter did not go far towards clearing up the mystery.[4]

In May 1582 some light came from the north. Some servants

Allen, p. 405. In this letter the nuncio says that nothing can be done just now 'owing to the illness of Father Robert [Parsons], a Jesuit who has just arrived from England, where he had had this affair in hand for the past two years'. This seems to indicate that the mission of Parsons and Campion was not so purely religious in its purposes as has often been stated.

[1] Phillip II to Tassis, 11 June 1582, Teulet, v. 257.

[2] On the details of this plot, cf. Kretzschmar, *op. cit.*, and the documents given in *Letters of Cardinal Allen*, Teulet, and the *Spanish Calendar*.

[3] *Cal. Foreign*, 1581–2, p. 464.

[4] Letter dated 10 Sept. 1582; Walsingham sent it to Somers, 24 Oct. 1582, who deciphered it, Labanoff, v. 308.

of Sir John Forster, Warden of the Middle Marches, intercepted a messenger from Mendoza to Creighton near the border. The man was disguised as a dentist and among the paraphernalia of his trade he carried a looking-glass in the back of which important letters to Lennox were concealed.[1] Unluckily Forster's servants, being bribable, let the man go and gave him back his baggage, but by some fortunate chance they kept his looking-glass. Forster got hold of this, examined it with some care, and discovered the concealed dispatches. These he sent to Walsingham in June.[2] There seems to be no precise record of the contents of these dispatches, but from Mendoza's account of them it is pretty certain that Walsingham found in them clear evidence of a conspiracy against England in which Mary Stuart, Philip of Spain, the Jesuits and Lennox were all involved.

On the 20th of September came further illuminating information from the north. The enemies of Lennox had laid hands upon George Douglas and had wrung from him a confession of his dealings abroad.[3] A copy of his confession was sent to the English Court. It revealed that Lennox had sent Douglas to France, where he had dealt with the Duke of Guise and had communicated with Mary Stuart through the medium of the Archbishop of Glasgow and the French ambassador in London. Douglas admitted that Lennox had communicated regularly with the Scottish Queen in this manner.[4]

This confession furnished Walsingham with a clue as to how to proceed. It revealed the fact that Mauvissière, the French ambassador in London, was the medium of exchange for Mary Stuart's secret correspondence and from this time forward Walsingham focused his attention upon Mauvissière, hoping by this means to find out the details of the ' great treason ' that was in the air. He directed Cobham to protest to the King against this action of his ambassador and to declare that all letters for the Scottish Queen must hereafter be transmitted through the medium of the English embassy.[5] What was more to the point, he set a spy upon the French ambassador himself.

Sometime in the autumn of 1582 young William Fowler, a

[1] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 351. [2] *Cal. Border Papers*, 1560–94, p. 85.
[3] Mendoza says that Douglas was tortured at the instigation of Elizabeth. *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 407. [4] S. P. Scotland, xxx, 38.
[5] Walsingham to Cobham, 26 Sept. 1582, S. P. France, viii, 13.

Scotsman, came to England, probably from France. He was a scholar, a theologian, and something of a poet. His father, Sir Thomas Fowler, had been the executor of the will of Margaret, Countess of Lennox, and had also, it appears, advanced money to Mary Stuart, so young William had excellent connexions. It seems that he had been studying in France and had been expelled because of his religion. He came to England and for some reason or other was imprisoned. It is probable that he procured his release by promising to serve Walsingham as a spy. His education, his connexions, and his mastery of French made him an ideal instrument for Franco-Scottish affairs. The fact that Mary Stuart had owed money to his father gave him an excuse for visiting the French ambassador in order to crave his assistance in collecting the debt.[1] Once that step was accomplished Fowler was intelligent enough to make the rest easy. He soon persuaded the French ambassador that he could supply useful information as to Scottish affairs, and posing as an agent for Mauvissière he contrived for some months to serve as an agent for Walsingham.[2] Through him Walsingham managed to keep pretty closely in touch with the dealings between Mauvissière and the Scots. Through him also Walsingham secured a copy of Fénélon's instructions, discovered Archibald Douglas's double purposes, and sounded Lennox's intentions.[3] Fowler was altogether a useful agent, but he does not appear to have gained any knowledge of importance respecting 'the great and hidden treason'.

Late in February a German envoy came to England with some papers of importance. His name was Haller and he had been sent by the Duke of Lützelstein, one of the small Protestant potentates who held his lands in fee from the Prince Palatine of the Rhine. Haller said that his master had intercepted the Bishop of Ross in his passage through Germany, had broken open his chests, and finding some papers of importance to England had sent them over.[4] Probably these papers were not of such great importance

[1] Cf. Fowler's Life in *D. N. B.*; also *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–4, pp. 196, 480.

[2] The last dated letter which shows him still employed in this work is of 8 July 1583 (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–4, p. 526). The letter which Boyd (ibid., p. 688) assigns to Dec. 1583 clearly belongs to February or March of that year when Fénélon was still in England.

[3] S. P. Scotland, xxx, 58; xxxi, 16, 23.

[4] Walsingham to Bowes, 20 Feb. 1582/3; S. P. Scotland, xxxi, 36. It appeared that this was only part of Haller's mission. By a false pretence he

after all. At any rate, Walsingham does not seem to have turned them to any use.

News of considerably more importance came from Scotland early in March of the same year. For some time William Holt, a Jesuit, who had gone to Scotland to work with Creighton in the cause of Roman Catholicism, had been living secretly in the house of Lord Seaton. Bowes and Davison, the English agents in Scotland, learned that Holt was planning to pass into France and thence to Rome. While he was waiting for a fair wind at Leith they caused him to be apprehended and searched.[1] Several letters in cipher were found upon him, but he apparently managed to conceal his most important papers before he was taken. The Englishmen, having made copies of the letters for Walsingham, delivered the originals to the king. Holt was thereupon examined. He confessed that there was ' a purpose in hand by the Pope and divers princes Catholic ' to make war on England in the cause of religion and for the benefit of the Queen of Scots. He admitted that the Pope had collected large sums of money for the purpose, and it appeared from his letters that the King of Spain was to be one of the principal actors, but this was all that Holt would say.[2] ' Of the time, the instruments to be used and other particularities ' he pretended, so Davison wrote to Walsingham, to know nothing.[3]

Walsingham was rejoiced at the news. He was satisfied that if Holt were strictly dealt with he could reveal the details of the whole conspiracy. On the 28th of March he wrote to Bowes ; ' Her Majesty doth look to hear of some further matter that may be discovered by Holt's confession, for that you have written he should be put to the boots by Colonel Steward, which her pleasure is that you should urge to be accordingly put in execution, for that the said Holt, having been used as a special instrument

secured the Queen's passport to Scotland ' where ', Walsingham wrote to Bowes, ' I hear he is to propose a match between the King of Scots and the Duke of Petitpierre's [Lützelstein's] daughter '.

[1] An interesting account of Holt's apprehension, through the medium of Roger Almond *alias* Vavasour, a renegade papist, is given in a letter from Bowes and Davison to Walsingham, 4 March 1582/3, in *Bowes Correspondence* (Surtees Soc.), p. 371.

[2] Copy in Bowes's hand of a letter of Seaton to the General of the Jesuits at Rome, 4 Nov. 1582, endorsed, found with Wm. Holt, 1 March 1582/3, S. P. Scotland, xxx, 60.

[3] 4 March 1582/3, S. P. Scotland, xxxi, 50.

between the French ambassador here and d'Aubigny and the other ill affected persons in that realm, there is no doubt but that he is able to discover much of the intended practices against both states.' [1]

Walsingham was wrong in assuming that Holt was Mauvissière's agent. He was as a matter of fact the agent of the Spanish ambassador in London, Bernardino de Mendoza. But Walsingham was right in believing that Holt knew much more than he had told, and was anxious to have him sounded to the bottom. When his examination was delayed, the Secretary grew impatient. On the 16th of April he wrote a second time to Bowes: 'Her Majesty doth earnestly desire that Holt might be substantially examined and forced by torture to deliver what he knoweth.' [2] But Holt's friends won the day after all and with the connivance of King James he succeeded in effecting his escape from prison and bestowing himself in a safe hiding-place, so that Walsingham was cheated once more out of a valuable source of information.

Meantime he kept watch through Fowler upon Mauvissière's dealings with Scotland. Sometime in March Fowler reported that Mauvissière was about to send letters 'by a gentlewoman' who was about to take ship for Scotland.[3] Walsingham straightway ordered the ship to be stayed and searched at Gravesend, with the result that three letters from Mauvissière to Mainville, a French agent in Scotland, fell into his hands. Walsingham directed Bowes in Scotland to apologize to Mainville for the seizure of his letters, bidding him explain that the searchers had been instructed to intercept letters passing between Jesuits in England and in Scotland, that by mistake his letters had been seized, and that as soon as the mistake had been discovered they had been sent forward to him at once without any attempt to open them. 'Notwithstanding', Walsingham added, 'in truth we have found means to open them, wherein being no matter of importance, yet of such as they carried you may see the extract by the enclosed copies.' [4]

[1] 28 March 1582/3, S. P. Scotland, xxxi, 76.
[2] Ibid., 99.
[3] *Cal. Scottish*, 1581–4, p. 689.
[4] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 155b. Bowes wrote in reply that he had followed Walsingham's directions, and that Mainville appeared 'to be partly satisfied' with his excuses 'the rather because he found the seals of the letters

While Walsingham was tampering thus with the letters of Mauvissière into Scotland, Bowes in Scotland found means to intercept the letters out of Scotland to Mauvissière. Mainville had chosen as his courier an Italian named Rocco Bonetti, the intimate friend of one Eustace Rogghe, a Fleming who had done service for Walsingham in the past. Through this Eustace, Bowes learned of Bonetti's commission and by some judicious bribery arranged to get a copy of all the letters which the Italian carried. These copies in due time came into Bowes's hands and he sent them at once to Walsingham.[1] Like the letters intercepted at Gravesend, they threw little or no light upon the great treason. Walsingham was of the opinion that neither Mainville nor Mauvissière put much faith in Bonetti, and on that account committed nothing of importance to his charge.[2] It does not seem to have occurred to the English Secretary that he might be on a false trail and that perhaps Mauvissière was not in the confidence of the conspirators after all.

At all events it was through Mauvissière, although indirectly, that Walsingham finally did lay hands on the man who could decipher the mystery for him. Sometime in April Walsingham had a second spy at work in the French Embassy. This man was a Frenchman who signed himself Henry Fagot. Whether this was his right name or not it is impossible to say. Neither is there any way of telling where Walsingham found him or how he managed to find a way into Mauvissière's household.[3] Somehow or other he induced Cherelles, one of Mauvissière's secretaries, to betray his master.[4] The outcome of this was that from this

whole and unbroken' (*Bowes Correspondence*, p. 382). One wonders by what trick Walsingham had managed to open the letters without disturbing the seals.

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxi, 76, 78, 81.

[2] Walsingham to Bowes, 16 April 1583, Ibid., 99.

[3] It is rather amusing to discover that Fagot warned Walsingham to take heed of a Scotsman named 'Foulair'.

[4] April 1583, S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xii, no. 61: An anonymous letter (in handwriting of Henri Fagot) probably addressed to Walsingham and endorsed by him 'April 1583 Fagot.' 'Monseigneur, je vous advertis que si votre excelence veut que je fais le secretaire de Monseigneur l'ambassadeur pour estre mon ami que s'il est consideré de quelque peu de monnaye qu'il ne est fait rien qu'il ne nous le donne à conaistre et que tout ce que ce fera touchant le royne de'escosse.' Labanoff concluded, by a comparison of handwritings, that this unfaithful secretary was Cherelles. There is a passage in one of Sir Edward Stafford's letters from France which proves that Arnault, another of Mauvissière's servants, also played the traitor. Stafford wrote, 7 Jan. 1588, that he had heard that Gilbert Gifford had brought Arnault into suspicion 'for dealing with you' (*Cal. Dom.* Adda., 1580–1625, p. 223).

time forward Cherelles provided Walsingham with a copy of practically every letter which Mary Stuart wrote to Mauvissière or received from him. Through the medium of Henry Fagot, also, Walsingham learned the names of those who 'haunted' the French ambassador's house, and of those who through the ambassador's means maintained a correspondence with the Scottish Queen. It was by means of information received in this way that Walsingham finally solved the mystery which had been troubling him for three years and more.[1]

In the same letter in which Fagot told Walsingham that Cherelles might be bought with money, he wrote: 'The chief agents of the Queen of Scots are Mr. Throgmorton and Lord Henry Howard. They never come to the ambassador's house except at night.'[2] On the 29th of April Fagot wrote

[1] Before the day of revelation came, Walsingham's attention was diverted for the moment from the main issue to a by-plot—if indeed it may be designated by the name plot—which came to light in Warwickshire. One Mr. Somerville, or Somerfield, a Warwickshire gentleman, in the presence of witnesses declared that he meant to shoot the Queen with a dagg and hoped to see her head set upon a pole, for she was a serpent and a viper (S. P. Domestic, clxiii, no. 3).

He seems to have had no accomplices, although Hall, a priest, and Mr. Arden, his father-in-law, were aware of his intentions. One cannot help feeling that Somerville was slightly mad. The idea which he had conceived of going alone to London and shooting the Queen with a dagg hardly bears the marks of sanity. The public manner in which he boasted of his intentions tends to strengthen the supposition. Some one who had heard him boasting notified the Council. He was apprehended along with Hall the Priest and Arden his father-in-law. All three were tried, condemned, and sentenced to be executed. Arden alone suffered death according to law. Somerville was found strangled in his cell. He probably committed suicide. It was an act consistent with the madness of his exploit. The idea that he was put to death in this fashion by order lacks foundation in fact. Neither is the declaration of one of Walsingham's spies that 'Somerville was hanged to avoid a mischief' by friends of the Catholic side to be very seriously entertained. (Secret Advertisement from Exeter, not dated. S. P. Domestic, clxxxv, no. 53.) When Somerville was brought up to London Walsingham examined him carefully in order to find out if he had any accomplices or any connexion whatever with the 'Great treason', but could learn nothing from him beyond that which has been briefly set forth already (S. P. Domestic, clxiii, nos. 21–2, 28 Oct. 1583. Questions put to Somerville with his answers to the same, all written in Walsingham's hand.) Except for this examination the part which Walsingham played in the matter cannot be distinguished from the general course taken by the Government, nor can he be held individually responsible for Somerville's or Arden's fate. It was doubtless through his contrivance that Hall the Priest bought his life by undertaking to be a spy.

[2] This is a free translation of Fagot's bad French which runs as follows: 'Le grande fauteurs de la royne decosse est le Sieur Frocquemorton et le milord Henry Howard et ils ne vienent jamais raporte chose d'icelle que la nuict' (S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xii, no. 61).

again: 'On the 29th of April Mr. Throgmorton visited the ambassador's house. He sent to the Queen of Scots some days ago fifteen hundred crowns of the sun, for which Monsieur the ambassador is security.' [1]

This gave Walsingham material to work upon. He set spies upon Throgmorton and watched all his movements with care. For six months these spies tracked Throgmorton up and down, until they had accumulated sufficient evidence against him to warrant his apprehension. Early in November two gentlemen of 'no mean credit and reputation' were sent to seize him at his house by Paul's Wharf in London.[2] He was made prisoner and his papers seized. Among the papers the searchers found a list of Catholic noblemen, a plan of certain harbours suited to the landing of foreign forces, and a number of 'infamous pamphlets against her Majesty printed beyond the seas'.

Immediately after his apprehension Throgmorton was examined by a committee of the Privy Council, in which Walsingham was probably included. When he was confronted by the incriminating papers, he 'impudently' denied that they were his, declaring that they had been 'foisted' among his own papers by those who had searched his house. Later he said that they had been left at his rooms by a man named Nutby who had afterwards fled the realm. The councillors, according to the official narrative, urged him to reveal his practices and promised him pardon if he would make a full confession. He denied that he knew any more and was sent away to the Tower to listen to the sterner persuasions of the rack.

He withstood the first torture with fortitude. On the 18th of November Walsingham wrote to Thomas Wilkes to join Mr. Norton, the notorious 'Rackmaster', for a second trial. 'I have seen', he added, 'as resolute men as Throgmorton stoop, notwithstanding the great show he hath made of Roman resolution. I suppose the grief of the last torture will suffice without any extremity of racking to make him more conformable than he hath hitherto shown himself.' [3] Walsingham was right. On

[1] S. P. Scotland, xxxi, 126. Mr. Boyd (*Cal. Scottish*, 1581–3, p. 432) renders the name 'Mr. Throgmorton' as 'Mr. James Norton'.

[2] Popham says in his summary of the case against Northumberland that it was the 4th of November. Lord Henry Howard was arrested at the same time (S. P. Domestic, clxxi, no. 79).

[3] Walsingham to Wilkes, 18 Nov. 1583, S. P. Domestic, clxiii, no. 65.

the 19th of November Throgmorton was placed on the rack a second time, but 'before he was strained to any purpose' he agreed to confess anything he knew.

Throgmorton's confession, complete as it was, did not reveal the whole of the 'great treason'. Many steps had been taken before he entered the service of the conspirators, and with those steps he was probably unacquainted. It will be remembered that the Duke of Guise and his confederates had intended at first to strike their blow at Elizabeth through Scotland, and had counted upon the new Earl of Lennox to open the gates in Scotland for them. The fall of Lennox and his departure from Scotland in December 1582 had interfered seriously with their plans. His death in May 1583, and the departure of Mainville, the Guisan agent, from Scotland in the same month interfered with them still further. Both the Pope and the King of Spain were inclined to draw back a little, but the Duke of Guise himself remained steadfast. He cherished for a time a scheme for murdering Elizabeth, which received the endorsement of the Holy See and of Spain, but which for some reason or other he abandoned.[1] Then he returned to the original plan of invasion, and having received encouraging messages from Rome and from Madrid, pushed it vigorously forward. There was some dispute between his Scottish and English advisers as to whether the invading army should be directed against Scotland or against England. The Scotsmen advocated the former, the Englishmen the latter. It was finally decided that a double blow should be struck and that while one army landed in Scotland a second army under the leadership of Guise himself should

[1] The Papal endorsement is clearly established by the letters exchanged between the Papal nuncio in France and Cardinal Como, the Pope's Secretary, in May 1583 (*Letters of Cardinal Allen*, pp. 412–13, with the comments by Father Knox, Introd., ibid., pp. xlvi ff.). Kretzschmar says (p. 88) that an English Catholic offered to murder Elizabeth. Who this Catholic was is not mentioned by him or in the sources. May it not have been George Gifford? John Savage, one of the Babington conspirators, confessed in August 1586 that George Gifford had promised the Duke of Guise that he would kill Elizabeth for 800 crowns (S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xix, no. 38). Robert Poley in his confession of 9 August 1586 says that Babington told him that George Gifford had been practised by Parsons to kill the Queen (S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xix, no. 26). Cf. Father J. H. Pollen in *The Month*, Sept. 1907.

Since this note was first written the evidence regarding George Gifford's plot has been printed in full by Pollen, *Mary Stuart and the Babington Plot* (Scottish History Society, 1922), pp. xxxvii–xl, 169–75.

strike directly at South England. To make way for the northern invaders Fentry, a nephew of the Archbishop of Glasgow, was to be dispatched into Scotland. Guise meanwhile, with the assistance of the English refugees, was to arrange for the invasion of England.[1]

It was in connexion with these latter arrangements that Francis Throgmorton was drawn into the plans of the conspirators. His confession took up the story of Guise's plans from this point onward. The plot which he revealed is ordinarily spoken of as the Throgmorton plot, but it is very evident that he was nothing more than an agent acting according to the directions which he received from overseas. He confessed that the Duke of Guise was preparing to invade England from the south in the cause of the Catholic faith, and with intent to liberate the Scottish Queen, that forces were in readiness, that the Pope and the King of Spain had undertaken to finance the enterprise and that nothing remained to be done except to arouse the Catholics in England and to fix upon a suitable place for landing. To this end, Francis Throgmorton declared, his brother Thomas had been sent from France into England in August 1583. Francis admitted that he had worked in co-operation with his brother, had 'set down in his own hand certain special havens for the landing of forces', and had 'also noted the number of persons of power as he thought fit to be drawn to that action with the aptness of their dwellings to each port'. On the basis of this list he declared that the Duke of Guise had fixed upon the port of Arundel in Sussex as best fitted to his purposes and had sent Charles Paget into England in September to survey the port and to sound the gentlemen who dwelt adjacent to it.[2]

This in brief was the sum and substance of Francis Throgmorton's confession. It came as a revelation to Walsingham. He had been expecting danger from the north and had been working hard in Scotland to provide against it, but he had

[1] Kretzschmar, pp. 92 ff. As a matter of fact no less than four separate attacks upon the British Isles were contemplated. While one army landed in Scotland and another in South England it was originally planned that a Spanish force should descend upon Ireland and an army of 5,000 Germans under the Duke of Bavaria should invade Norfolk.

[2] Cf. Popham's statement on the Throgmorton treason in S. P. Domestic, clxxi, no. 79.

hardly calculated upon a blow at the very heart of the south.[1] It was indeed almost by accident that he learned of it at all. Throgmorton had been arrested, not because he was suspected of any share in the plan of invasion, but because he haunted the French ambassador's house and was known to be sending letters underhand to the Queen of Scots.[2] If Throgmorton had remained steadfast under torture, as he swore to the Spanish ambassador he would do,[3] Walsingham might very well have remained ignorant of the whole design and the Duke of Guise might have carried his plan to fruition without interruption.

This fact is worth noting. It shows that Walsingham's secret service was not so perfect as has sometimes been maintained. It also helps to explain why it was that Catholic priests were so often subjected to what appears to have been unnecessary torture. Walsingham could never be sure, after Throgmorton's unexpected revelations, what conspiracies might be eluding his knowledge, or from what unexpected quarter he might get information indispensable to the preservation of his religion, his country, and his Queen.

One fact which Throgmorton brought to light proved to Walsingham that he had made a serious error in the measures which he took for discovering the 'great treason'. From the first he had been convinced that Mauvissière, the French ambassador at London, was the agent through whom the Duke of Guise and his conspirators were furthering their designs both in Scotland and in England. Consequently Walsingham had focused his attention on Mauvissière, had set spies upon his household, had corrupted his secretary, and had taken pains to intercept his correspondence. Yet, in spite of all Walsingham's pains Mauvissière had disclosed little or nothing of importance. Throgmorton's confession now made clear the reason for this.

[1] Froude asserts (xi. 637) that Walsingham already had possession of the details of the plot in September. Froude cites as evidence a manuscript endorsed 'Extracts from B's letters' to which he assigns the date (following Thorpe's *Scottish Calendar*), August–September 1583. Upon examination, this manuscript proves to be extracts from the letters of Thomas Rogers, *alias* Berden, written in August and September 1585. The letters themselves will be found among the S. P. Domestic. Some of them have been well calendared in the *Cal. S. P. Domestic*, Addenda. Belonging as they do to the autumn of 1585 they can of course have no bearing upon the Throgmorton Plot.

[2] Official narrative of the Throgmorton Treason, Harleian Miscellany, iii.

[3] Mendoza to Philip II, 16 to 26 Nov. 1583, cited by Froude, xi. 643.

Mauvissière, it now appeared, had had practically nothing to do with the whole matter. The Duke of Guise and his confederates had decided at the very first not to admit the King of France into their confidence and they consequently could make no use of his ambassador in England. On the other hand, as Throgmorton's confession very amply revealed, the Spanish ambassador in London, Bernardino de Mendoza, had been their close confidant. He had known all about Creighton's dealings in Scotland and had sent William Holt, the English Jesuit, out of England to second Creighton's efforts. He had been the medium for Mary Stuart's correspondence with the confederates abroad. He had kept in touch with the disaffected English Catholics throughout. It was with him that Guise directed Throgmorton to co-operate in his efforts to stir up a rebellion within the realm; he to whom Throgmorton commended the care of his most important letters when he was about to be captured. If Walsingham had watched Mendoza as carefully as he watched Mauvissière, he might have got to the heart of the plans and purposes of the conspirators long before he did.

It is difficult to say why Walsingham neglected what appears now to have been such an obvious source of information, especially in view of the hint he got from the capture of the false dentist on the borders in May 1582. Possibly it was because Mendoza, who was a much shrewder man than Mauvissière, hid the traces of his dealings more cleverly and more carefully avoided the beguilements of Walsingham's secret agents. More probably Walsingham was led astray in the first place by his own presuppositions regarding the conspiracy and was encouraged to persist in the course which he had marked out by the fact that he learned just enough from the French ambassador to persuade him that he was on the right track.

Throgmorton, after some months' delay, paid the penalty of his treason at Tyburn. As for Mendoza, on the 19th of January 1584 he was invited to meet certain members of the Privy Council at the house of the Lord Chancellor. When he got there, he found the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chamberlain, Leicester, Burghley, Hunsdon, and Walsingham assembled to meet him. They rose as he entered, bowed, and conducted him to a small inner chamber. There Walsingham, who spoke Italian better

than the rest, addressed him. The Queen, he said, was well aware of Mendoza's efforts to disturb the peace of her kingdom. She knew all about his dealings with the disaffected Catholics, with the Scottish Queen, and with those who were planning the invasion of England. She consequently preferred his room to his company and was graciously pleased to allow him fifteen days to get out of England. Mendoza stormed at this. He declared hotly that he knew nothing whatever of the charges made against him. He challenged Walsingham to produce his proofs. The Queen would do well, he declared, to mend her own ways of practising with his master's rebels before she began to accuse innocent men. Finally he protested that he would go if she wished, but that he must first inform his master. The councillors quietly convinced him that he would do no such thing. He must leave at once and might congratulate himself at having escaped so easily. And so he left in a great passion, with many threats upon his lips, closing behind him the doors of the Spanish embassy in London for some years to come.[1]

Mendoza was not the only man in England who suffered for his complicity in the Throgmorton plot. Throgmorton had accused many others. There was, for instance, Thomas his brother, but Thomas was safe in France. There was also Charles Paget, who had come over in September. Paget also had got away, but what of the people he had dealt with? That was the question which now occupied Walsingham and his colleagues of the Privy Council. Throgmorton's confession threw no light upon the matter. Lord Paget, Charles Paget's brother, and Charles Arundel at once implicated themselves in the plot by fleeing the realm as soon as the news of Throgmorton's arrest reached them. But they were out of reach. What of the others? Grave suspicion fell upon William Shelley of Michelgrove in Sussex and upon the Earl of Northumberland. Both of these men had houses near the port of Arundel and both had been named in

[1] Mendoza to Philip II, 26 Jan. 1584, *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 513. Walsingham, now fully realizing what a dangerous fellow Mendoza was, hastened to set spies upon him. Mendoza had got no farther than Calais when one of Walsingham's secret agents, John Jernegan by name, wrote that he had spoken with Mendoza and had discovered the malicious designs of Spain against England. Jernegan offered to be the medium of further intelligence, but apparently his offer was not accepted. Jernegan to Walsingham, 8 Feb. 1583–4, *Cal. Domestic*, 1581–90, p. 158.

Throgmorton's list of gentlemen likely to favour the plans of the conspirators. Both were accordingly arrested and examined. By their own confession and by the confessions of their servants it became clear that both of them were involved to some extent in the plan of invasion. It is not necessary to trace their careers further;[1] neither is it necessary to inquire into the exact degree of guilt of that old offender Lord Henry Howard, who had been arrested at the same time as Throgmorton. The fate of all three men was decided by Elizabeth herself or by the Privy Council as a whole. Walsingham, so far as can be judged from existing records, played no separate part in determining it.[2]

It will be remembered that Throgmorton had been arrested in the first place because he was found to be in communication with Mary Stuart. In his confession he admitted that he had written many letters to her and had conveyed many between her and Thomas Morgan in France. He also confessed the names of some of those who had assisted him in the carriage of those letters, naming Godfrey Foljambe and William Ardington in particular.

Foljambe, it appeared, had fled the realm as soon as he received news of Throgmorton's apprehension. What became of Ardington does not appear, but Walsingham laid his hands upon one man who had assisted in this secret correspondence. This man was George More. Walsingham somehow or other became aware of More's complicity in the matter and promised him that he would be dealt with mercifully if he confessed all he knew. Relying upon this, More made a clean breast of the matter. He said that he had met Charles Paget some four years before,

[1] The question of the death of Northumberland in the Tower in 1584 had evoked much discussion. It need not be gone over here, since even those who maintain that Northumberland was murdered do not charge Walsingham with the crime. They point to Sir Christopher Hatton (Lingard, *Hist. of England*, vi, p. 192, n. 4).

[2] There is a paper, partly in Walsingham's hand, dated 12 Feb. 1584, among the S. P. Domestic (clxviii, no. 14), entitled 'To be propounded to the Lords in commission for the examining of such as are committed to the Tower'. This paper consists of a number of questions which Walsingham evidently proposed for discussion to the Privy Council or some committee of it, such as:

'First, what shall be further done concerning the Earl of Northumberland.

'2. Whether it be not intended that William Shelley shall be drawn to confess those things that in probability he can say touching the Earl of Northumberland,' &c.

This paper shows clearly enough how every step in the proceedings against Northumberland and the rest was determined by the Privy Council, and was by no means taken arbitrarily by Walsingham.

and that Paget had persuaded him to convey certain letters to the Scottish Queen, promising that if he did so he should be paid two hundred pounds which Mary had borrowed of his father. Since that time he confessed that he had carried many letters between Mary Stuart and the French and Scottish ambassadors in London. He also admitted that he had supplied the Scottish Queen with such news as came to his ears. He said that he had managed this correspondence through the instrumentality of his uncle, Edward More, who had a house some four miles from Sheffield. He denied having had dealings with any of Shrewsbury's servants.[1]

It was quite evident to Walsingham from the confessions of Throgmorton and More that Mary had had ample means at her command to correspond with Mendoza and the other parties to the great treason. Throgmorton had admitted that one of the chief ends which Guise and his confederates had in mind was her liberation. Walsingham therefore had grounds for presuming that she was cognizant of the whole matter and probably assistant to it. This presumption was strengthened by the confession of one of More's servants in January that he had carried letters from Mary to the Earl of Arundel, one of the suspected Catholic noblemen, a year and a half before. It was practically confirmed by a letter of Mary's to Mauvissière dated the 26th of February, of which he secured a copy through the instrumentality of Mauvissière's secretary, Cherelles. In this letter Mary had written, ' If you can, get access directly or indirectly to Throgmorton or [Lord Henry] Howard, for the third [Northumberland] I have never had to do with him ; assure them in my name that I shall never forget their affection for me and their great suffering in my cause.' [2]

Throgmorton had admitted that the plot was designed to release Mary Stuart and that the Spanish ambassador was one of its principal promoters. George More confessed that he had carried many letters between Mary and the Spanish ambassador, and now Mary in her own letter sent thanks to Throgmorton for his suffering in her cause. These facts taken together convinced Walsingham and his colleagues that the Scottish Queen had been

[1] George More to [Walsingham], 20 Dec. 1583, S. P. Domestic, clxiv, no. 44.
[2] Labanoff, v. 424 and note.

a party to the Throgmorton plot. If they could have seen all of Mary's correspondence, or caught a glimpse of Mendoza's letters to his master, any small doubts which they might still have cherished would have been banished. No doubt Mary was privy to the Throgmorton plot. It was the second time she had been caught in a conspiracy against the State. Those who conspired for her died by the axe and the rope. But what of the woman herself who had encouraged their designs and was to reap the benefit of them if they succeeded? What, indeed, of her! That was the question which faced Elizabeth and her councillors in the year 1584 as it had faced them when Norfolk laid his head upon the block thirteen years before.

For some time Elizabeth had been dealing with the Scottish Queen about the affairs of Scotland. After the fall of Lennox, Elizabeth had expected that she could have things her own way in that country, but she had very soon found James inclined to resent her dictatorial attitude. When she sent an envoy to him early in the year 1583 to arrange a friendly understanding James refused to receive him. This assertion of independence on his part, after so many years of tutelage, irritated Elizabeth if it did not alarm her. She considered the possibility of playing the mother against the son, and that was probably the thought at the bottom of her mind when she sent Walsingham's brother-in-law Beale to confer with Mary at Sheffield in April 1583.

As for the Scottish Queen, her attitude towards Elizabeth varied with the complexion of affairs in Scotland and abroad. In January 1580, when the star of her hope was high, she had written to Glasgow, her ambassador at Paris, that she would not leave her prison house except as Queen of England. Placing her confidence in Lennox, she had made great plans for transferring her son into France or Spain, where he might be removed from the machinations of Elizabeth, be won over to Catholicism, and set at the head of a Catholic army which was to overthrow Protestantism in Scotland and England, destroy the heretic Queen, and transfer Mary herself from a prison house to the highest seat in both realms. Lennox himself had encouraged her hopes and so had the Duke of Guise and her other friends abroad. Consequently she played the great lady and the injured Queen with Elizabeth, assuming an exalted tone in her letters, deman-

ding rights rather than requesting privileges. One would have looked for something else in a twelve years' prisoner, and one cannot help admiring her undaunted spirit and her unfaltering confidence in the outcome.

The fall of Lennox and his virtual banishment from Scotland in December 1582 dealt a shrewd blow to her hopes. She felt that she could no longer count upon a victorious Catholic army to unbar the gates of Sheffield and to lead her forth in triumph. She saw herself obliged to resort once more to the less splendid courses of diplomacy. Consequently, after some pretence of hesitancy she welcomed Beale when he came to Sheffield in the spring of 1583 and diplomatic relations between her and Elizabeth were thereby resumed.

It is clear that Walsingham was at first opposed to any treaty with the Queen of Scots which contemplated her release. He stated his opinion on that subject in a letter which he wrote to Burghley on the 16th of November 1582. On the 8th of November Mary had written a letter to Elizabeth in what Walsingham called 'very proud and arrogant terms'. The letter was in fact a long and passionate statement of her grievances and ended with an appeal that she might be allowed to retire into some quiet corner and prepare her soul for death. Mary had sent this letter open through the French ambassador, choosing this method to publish her grievances before the world.[1] Elizabeth had accordingly directed Walsingham to instruct Burghley to prepare a defence of her treatment of the royal prisoner. Such was the burden of Walsingham's letter of the 16th of November. 'The best answer', he added, 'in my poor opinion that her Majesty could yield unto the letter were to assure Scotland and to provide that the said Queen may be so kept as she might not have liberty to practise as she hath done, which can hardly be performed in the place where she is, notwithstanding that I know my Lord doth use as great care as any man may use to prevent the same.'[2]

Far from treating with Mary for her release, Walsingham was in favour of keeping her more closely than ever. But Elizabeth thought differently and so negotiations began and for some months dragged their slow length along. Mary, having

[1] Labanoff, v. 319–33.

[2] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 72.

resolved if she could to gain her liberty by diplomacy, made very large offers.[1] She promised to ratify the treaty of Edinburgh, to maintain a close alliance with Elizabeth, to make no attempt to change the religion in Scotland, and to provide any honourable assurances from her friends and allies in pledge of her sincerity.[2] In fact she promised everything, answering for her son as well as for herself with a confidence which James was not likely to justify.

It is curious to observe that Walsingham, who had a little while before been altogether hostile to any treaty which contemplated Mary's liberation, was inclined to accept her offers.

'Surely sir,' he wrote to Robert Bowes on the 12th of June 1583, 'if her offers were accompanied with good meaning, which former proceeding rendereth very doubtful, then with the cautions and restrictions by her offered, I see no great inconvenience likely to ensue, but rather in some sort may prove profitable. But where the faith of contractants is doubtful, there it is hard to make sound foundation of any contract. . . . In the debating of this cause of her liberty, it fell into deliberation whether it were better to send her into that realm or to keep her here. It was concluded that in no case she should be sent thither and yet is it thought meet that you should think of such inconveniences as might ensue thereby and to foresee how the same might be prevented. For if she should be well placed in that state [Scotland] without working any dangerous alteration, she might be well spared here.'[3]

Walsingham was guarded in his statements. He was inclined to pin little faith to Mary's promises, but he was clearly in favour of the treaty. What is more, it appears from the last sentence just quoted that he inclined to support the plan of returning the Scottish Queen to Scotland. Certainly he wrote from a point of view widely at variance with the one from which he had written to Burghley some months before.

Some explanation must be sought for this apparent revolution in Walsingham's attitude towards the problem of Mary Stuart. It can hardly be believed that within a few months, especially in those months at the beginning of 1583, when England was

[1] Her sincerity may be judged from her letters to Mendoza of 14 January, 6 and 8 April 1582, in *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, pp. 257, 330.

[2] S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xii, 62.

[3] Cotton MSS., Caligula C vii, f. 209.

threatened with dangers from so many sides, he had altered all his former opinions regarding her whom he had thought of for years as the bosom serpent. Probably Walsingham believed in 1583, as he had believed ten years before, that the shortest and safest way with her was to cut off her head. But Walsingham had learned much during his ten years in Elizabeth's service. He had found out that unless he could convict Mary of greater crimes against the State than any of which she had yet been guilty, Elizabeth would never consent to proceed to extremities. Knowing this, he seems to have come to the conclusion early in the year 1583 that Mary would be less dangerous to the welfare of England if she were released than if she were kept a prisoner to serve as the stimulus and as the excuse for every enemy who had designs against the State.

More than this, Walsingham evidently thought that Mary might be made to serve Elizabeth's purposes in Scotland. 'I am of opinion', he wrote to Sir Ralph Sadler some time later, 'that without that Queen's [Mary's] assent (who doth altogether direct the King [her son]) there will be no hold taken of Scotland. And therefore I am (as I always have been) persuaded that there should be some trial made of her offers, with such caution as she promiseth to give, wherewith I see no cause but that her Majesty should rest satisfied. The impediment groweth principally through a jealous conceit that either of the two princesses hath of the other, which I see will hardly be removed.'[1]

There is very good reason to believe that Walsingham was wrong in ascribing to the Scottish Queen so much control over her son. James seems to have held his mother's advice in very light esteem, and probably if Mary had been allowed to go into Scotland the issue of her journey would have been far different from what Walsingham anticipated. Be this as it may, Mary's supposed influence upon James was a large factor in Walsingham's calculations, and it goes far to explain why he was willing that she should be liberated with proper 'cautions and restrictions' and sent over the border.[2]

[1] Walsingham to Sadler, 17 Oct. 1584, *Sadler Papers* (Edinburgh, 1809), ii. 420.

[2] Walsingham's views on this subject are set forth in a paper in his own hand in the Record Office (S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xi, 74). The paper is

One curious by-product of Walsingham's support of the treaty for Mary's release was something like an attempt on Mary's part to win Walsingham over to her side. She was at this time, through the medium of Mauvissière, in communication with Archibald Douglas, who was in London trying to beguile Walsingham on the one hand while he served Mary Stuart on the other. Mary bade Douglas find out how Walsingham stood upon the point of her liberation. Douglas reported that Walsingham was favourable. Then Mary ordered Douglas to write to her a letter, to be sent in such wise that it would fall into Walsingham's hands, in which Douglas was to bear testimony to Walsingham's good offices in her behalf and to persuade her to continue in her good opinion of him. 'For truly', Mary added in writing of the matter to Mauvissière, 'if I could be once assured that Walsingham would deal honestly, I would be very glad to establish a friendship with him, reserving always his duty to his mistress, for I hold him to be a frank and straightforward kind of man and I believe he would assort well with me if he knew me otherwise than by the reports of my enemies.'[1]

Through the French ambassador's false secretary, Cherelles, Walsingham got a copy of this letter not very many days after it had come to Mauvissière's hands. He must have read Mary's tribute to his frank, straightforward nature with mixed emotions. At all events he found it convenient for the time to play up to the part which she had assigned to him. He consequently took

undated. A contemporary copy of it is in Cotton MSS., Caligula C viii, f. 151. Froude (xi. 506) assigns to this document the date April 1582, but it probably belongs to the autumn of 1583. It reads as follows:

'Reasons to induce her Majesty to proceed to the treaty: That such plots as of late years have been devised to the raising of trouble within this realm have grown from the Scots Queen's ministers and favourers not without her allowance and setting on. That the means used by the said ministers to induce Princes to give ear to the said plots is principally grounded upon some commiseration had of her restraint.

'That the stay why the said plots have not been put in execution hath proceeded for that the said Princes have been for the most part entertained with home and domestical troubles.

'That it is greatly to be doubted that now their realms begin to be quiet that somewhat will be attempted in her favour by said Princes.

'That it is also to be doubted that somewhat may be attempted by some of her suitors in an extraordinary sort to the peril of her Majesty.

'That for the prevention thereof it shall be convenient for her Majesty to proceed to the finishing of the treaty not long since begun between her and the said Queen.'

[1] 14, 22, and 25 July 1583, Labanoff, v. 349, 357.

occasion in conversation with Mauvissière's secretary to complain of Mary's unkind feelings towards him. He said she judged him to be a very bad man and her mortal enemy, whereas he had laboured harder than any man in England to secure her liberty. Of course, as Walsingham had intended, all this reached Mary's ears. Mauvissière, in reporting it, added that he meant to sound Walsingham further and find out if he could not be 'reconciled'.[1]

A few days later Mauvissière sent Archibald Douglas to Walsingham with directions to entreat him to continue his favour towards the Scottish Queen, and to assure him that Mary was and would be a very good friend to him and to all of his if he would do good by her. Walsingham answered Douglas with many protestations of his goodwill. He promised that if the Scottish Queen would inform him more particularly of her purposes he would do all he could for her. How much he hoped to win from her by these methods it is not easy to say. At any rate his game was brought to an abrupt ending by the arrest of Francis Throgmorton on the 5th of November 1583.

Walsingham had no doubt of Mary's complicity in the Throgmorton plot. He had evidence enough in his hands to satisfy himself upon that point. This new revelation of her ill will towards Elizabeth and Protestant England could not have come as any surprise to him. He had been certain for years that Mary would never miss an opportunity to conspire against Elizabeth's government. That was the reason why he had kept so careful a watch on her correspondence. It now appeared, from the confession of Throgmorton, George More, and others, that in spite of all Walsingham's efforts she had succeeded in maintaining her correspondence with her Catholic friends both in England and abroad. That to Walsingham was one of the most alarming revelations of the Throgmorton plot. He had always regarded the mere presence of Mary in England as a dangerous menace to the welfare of his country. If in addition to that she was to have

[1] Mauvissière to Mary S., 5 Nov. 1583, S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xii, 92; cf. also Mauvissière to Cath. de Médicis, 10 Aug. 1583: 'Walsingham told me that it seemed to him that one ought to content the said Queen of Scots and that she might remain there [in Scotland] with assurance to the Queen of England to remain securely in that kingdom without doing any evil or displeasure to the said Queen.' Teulet, *op. cit.* iii. 238, translated.

opportunity to plot and conspire as she would, then indeed he could not help thinking that he and his colleagues might as well close the book and sit them down and die. He made up his mind that at all events Mary must be removed to some place where she could be more strictly looked to. He was certain that Sheffield was no fit place for her. Whether he distrusted the Earl of Shrewsbury or not it is difficult to say. He protested to Burghley that he did not.

It happened that just about this time a dispute of long standing between Shrewsbury and his wife reached its climax.[1] Mary accused Walsingham of having fostered this quarrel,[2] and there is some reason for believing that she was not altogether wrong, although there were private matters enough to ' breed a pike ' between the Earl and his wife. At all events these domestic difficulties came very aptly to Walsingham's purposes. Shrewsbury petitioned Elizabeth to be allowed to come up to Court and clear himself of the charges against him, and in April 1584 Elizabeth gave him leave to come, appointing Sir Ralph Sadler and Sir Henry Neville to watch over the Scottish Queen in his absence.[3] But the Queen, with her usual mutability, recalled her permission as soon as she had given it and it was not until August of the same year that Sadler was sent and Shrewsbury relieved of his royal prisoner.[4]

This change of keepers was the net result of the Throgmorton plot so far as it concerned Mary Stuart. On the face of it, it appeared to mean little. Elizabeth herself protested that it meant nothing at all, but it was indeed a significant step, and no one realized that fact better than Mary herself. In Shrewsbury's charge she had been in semblance at least the guest of the Queen of England under the entertainment of one of her chief noblemen. Sir Ralph Sadler was a fine gentleman, but he was no nobleman of distinction, no ' cousin ' by courtesy of the Queen, and by no means of sufficient dignity to play the host to a visiting Queen. With his appointment, temporary though it was, Elizabeth began to lift the veil of pretended hospitality with which for some sixteen years she had shrouded her detention

[1] *Cal. Salisbury MSS.* iii. 158–62.
[2] Mary to Mauvissière, 26 Feb. 1584, Labanoff, v. 424.
[3] Eliz. to Shrewsbury, 1 Apr. 1584, *Cal. Scottish*, 1584–6, p. 54.
[4] Leader, *op. cit.* p. 589.

of the Scottish Queen. Early the next year she was to tear it off altogether and to reveal Mary to the world as her prisoner of state.

Meanwhile, after some decent intermission caused by the revelations of the Throgmorton plot, Elizabeth resumed negotiations with Mary for her release. It is hard to take these negotiations seriously, although Elizabeth evidently intended them to be so taken. Her object in resuming them was, apparently, to gain Mary's assistance in the affairs of Scotland. Events in that country had for the year past been quite out of tune with Elizabeth's ideas. In July 1583 the same party which had overthrown Lennox had been overthrown in its turn, and James, under the influence of Arran, his new favourite, was showing a contempt for the Queen of England's wishes which displeased her mightily. Among other things he had driven out of Scotland some of her staunchest friends. Elizabeth now sought to gain Mary's intervention for these banished noblemen and through her representations to re-establish the English party in Scotland. She calculated that Mary would be willing to do that much in order to regain her liberty.

Walsingham was in favour of trying the plan. It is hard to believe, in view of the Throgmorton disclosures, that he seriously advocated Mary's liberation, but he was evidently convinced that something might be gained by a show of negotiations. He persisted in thinking that the Queen of Scots had much greater influence over her son than she actually possessed.[1]

The negotiations came to nothing. Mary insisted that the treaty should be signed and sealed before she undertook to intervene in Elizabeth's behalf in Scotland. Elizabeth insisted that Mary should undertake to intervene in Scotland before she was set at liberty. Neither of the two women would trust the other and so the whole matter came to nothing. Walsingham, during the course of the negotiations, resumed for a time his show of friendship for the Scottish Queen. In October Mary wrote in her own hand to him that the Countess of Shrewsbury had made many charges against him to her, had declared him her mortal enemy, and had even accused him of directly plotting to take her life. She assured Walsingham that she pinned no faith to

[1] Walsingham to Sadler, 17 Oct. 1584, *Sadler Papers*, ii. 420.

such inventions and prayed him to remain her friend.[1] Walsingham sent her his assurances of goodwill as before,[2] but he very soon saw that little was to be gained from the Scottish Queen by pretences of this sort.

Late in the year 1584 he secured even more convincing evidence of her close connexion with the so-called Throgmorton plot. It will be remembered that the Duke of Guise and his confederates, when they had contemplated an invasion of England in 1582, had intended to effect it through Scotland with the assistance of d'Aubigny; that d'Aubigny's fall in December of that year had caused them to revise their plans; that a new plot had been formed in 1583 which contemplated a double invasion, one south into England and one north along the old lines into Scotland; and finally that Throgmorton, who had been made privy only to the plans for invading the south, had not revealed by his confession the larger designs against Scotland. Walsingham in fact never knew the exact intentions of the confederates against Scotland until September 1584.

Some time early in the year 1584 he learned from one of his spies in France that Creighton the Jesuit, who, he knew, was deep in the confidence of the confederates, was about to set out for Scotland in disguise.[3] It was probably at Walsingham's prompting that the Admiral of Zeeland intercepted the ship on which the priest had taken passage, captured him, and sent him a prisoner to England. Creighton had carried with him a 'discourse', written in Italian, which set forth in full the designs which two years previously had been intended against Scotland.[4] When he saw himself about to be taken he had torn the paper to pieces and tried to throw it overboard, but unfortunately for him he was standing on the windward side of the ship at the time. Consequently most of the pieces blew back on deck. They were carefully collected, and though some were missing, enough were saved to reveal the whole story to Walsingham.[5]

It is not necessary to repeat that story again. It will be

[1] Labanoff, vi. 42.
[2] Somers to Walsingham, 7 Nov. 1584, S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xiv, 29.
[3] Paper endorsed, 'Secret Advertisements out of a letter of J. G.'; undated, S. P. Domestic, clxxv, 74.
[4] Walsingham to Sadler, Sept. 1584, S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xiii, 61.
[5] 3 Sept. 1584, S. P. Domestic, clxxiii, 4.

remembered that the plan of 1582 had contemplated the unseating of Elizabeth and the setting of Mary Stuart in her place. All this was set forth in detail in Creighton's paper. Taking it together with Throgmorton's confession Elizabeth was able to judge how far-reaching the designs of her enemies had been and how completely her royal prisoner had been involved in every detail of them. Perhaps it was nothing more than a coincidence that within a week after Elizabeth had examined Creighton's paper she had Mary removed from Sheffield to Wingfield. It was certainly something more than a coincidence that in the following January Mary was led away to the stern and gloomy castle of Tutbury under the charge of that austere Puritan Sir Amias Paulet.[1]

Scarcely a month after this change of residence there came to light a new ' device ' which has long gone by the name of the Parry Plot. It is not easy to get to the truth of this matter. Dr. William Parry was charged with having conspired to murder Elizabeth and being found guilty was executed upon that charge in March 1585. Whether he was guilty in the strict sense of the term or not is hard to say. He was accused by Sir Edmund Neville early in February 1585 with having proposed the murder of the Queen.[2] At his examination he confessed as much without torture.[3] He later confirmed his confession by a letter to Elizabeth [4] and by another letter to Leicester and Burghley.[5] As further proof against him there was produced a letter from Cardinal Como, the Papal secretary, urging him to put his ' holy and honourable purposes into effect ', and granting him plenary absolution from the Pope.[6]

[1] Henderson, *Mary Stuart*, ii. 583 ff.

[2] 9–11 Feb. 1584–5, S. P. Domestic, clxxvi, 47–8, printed in Holinshed (ed. 1587), iii. 1383.

[3] Holinshed, iii. 1385.

[4] Lansdowne MSS. 43, f. 117, in Holinshed, iii. 1387.

[5] Harleian MSS., 787, f. 107, in Holinshed, iii. 1387.

[6] There are several copies of this letter in the British Museum; cf. for instance, Cotton MSS., Caligula C ix, f. 120. Father J. H. Pollen testifies that the translation of the letter as printed in Holinshed (iii. 1388) exactly corresponds with the original draft (Italian) preserved in the Vatican archives. Father Pollen further proves by printing other letters from the Vatican archives that Cardinal Como very probably had reference to a project for the assassination of Elizabeth and that his letter was not merely, as Lingard suggested, ' a civil answer to a general offer of services '. Pollen, ' The Politics of the English Catholics during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth ', *The Month*, July 1902.

This in brief was the case for the Government. Parry himself admitted all the facts, but urged in his defence that in spite of all his plottings he had never intended the killing of the Queen, and he appealed to Elizabeth herself, to Burghley, and to Walsingham to confirm his statement.[1] Such a defence appears at first sight to be absolutely inconsistent with his own confession and so it was maintained by his accusers at the trial, but some explanation for it may be found in a brief review of Parry's life during the four or five years just preceding his apprehension.

William Parry was a spendthrift and a profligate and in his life, no doubt of it, had done enough evil to deserve hanging.[2] After squandering all the money he had and all the money he got by two rather fortunate marriages, he very nearly brought a just retribution upon his head by trying to murder a gentleman who was suing him for a just debt. Parry was in fact committed to Newgate, and upon a conviction for burglary was sentenced to be hanged. He succeeded, however, in gaining the Queen's pardon and after some delay passed over to the continent. There he enlisted himself in the Government secret service. At least as early as June 1580 he was sending reports about the movements of English Catholics in France to Burghley from Paris.[3] In September 1582 he went from Paris to Lyons, where he continued his secret service.[4] On the 10th of May 1583 he wrote thence to Burghley: 'If I am not deceived I have shaken the foundation of the English Seminary at Rheims and utterly overthrown the credit of the English pensioners at Rome.'[5]

Late in the year he returned to Paris, and early in January 1584 went over to England. Immediately upon his arrival in London he sought audience with Elizabeth, and confessed to her that he had had dealings with the Pope and with Thomas

[1] Holinshed, iii. 1390. [2] Cf. Pollard, art. 'W. Parry' in *D. N. B.*

[3] *Cal. Dom.* Addenda, 1580–1625, p. 6.

[4] Cobham to Walsingham, 26 Sept. 1582, *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 344.

[5] Lansdowne MSS. 39, f. 21. In a letter of 17 Aug. 1583, Parry wrote to Burghley that Aldred was about to depart from Milan to Rome (*Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 75). Now this Aldred a little later became Walsingham's agent in an attempt to sow dissensions among the English Catholic clergy at Rheims. Parry's knowledge of Aldred's movements taken in connexion with his boast that he had overthrown the English seminary at Rheims suggests that he had something to do with Walsingham's later efforts to the same effect.

Morgan, Mary Stuart's agent in Paris, to attempt 'somewhat' against her life. He declared, however, that he had done this with no treasonable intent, but simply from the desire to 'discover the dangerous practices devised and attempted against her Majesty by her disloyal subjects and other malicious persons in foreign parts'.[1] In March he received a letter from Cardinal Como which tended to confirm his story. He showed this letter to the Queen and seems thereby to have established himself in her confidence. He was forgiven for his past crimes, favoured, and finally given a seat in the Parliament of 1584. There he made himself unpopular by attacking the new Bill against the Catholics, so that he was 'committed to the Sergeant's ward' by the order of the House. He was, however, released again the next day (the 18th of December 1584) at the request of the Queen herself.[2] This was his last taste of the Queen's favour. Falling again into financial straits, he undertook to repair his purse by playing the spy in England. He proposed to Edmund Neville a plot to assassinate the Queen, hoping perhaps to draw from Neville, who was strongly suspected of sympathy with the cause of Elizabeth's enemies, some treasonable answer. Neville instead, on the 8th of February, betrayed Parry's dealings with him to a gentleman of the Court who immediately made it known to Elizabeth. On this evidence Parry was apprehended. He was charged at his trial with having plotted the Queen's destruction, partly upon the evidence furnished by Neville, but principally upon the admission which he himself had made to the Queen. He was found guilty, sentenced to death, and on the 2nd of March 1585 hanged at Westminster.[3]

On the basis of these facts, Parry's defenders argue that he was unjustly executed. They urge that as an acknowledged secret agent of the Government he had a kind of commission to betray

[1] Holinshed, iii. 1382. [2] D'Ewes, *Journals* (ed. 1682), p. 340.

[3] A detailed account of the proceedings against him is given in Holinshed, iii. 1382 ff. The excellent account of the whole conspiracy in Holinshed suggests that John Stow, who wrote this part of Holinshed's *Chronicles* was utilized as a kind of publicity agent by the Government to bring the matter before the reading public. When one considers the innumerable editions of Stow's Chronicles in various forms which were published during Elizabeth's lifetime (cf. Stow's *Survey of London*, ed. Kingsford, introd.) one is tempted to conclude that the English reading public of those days used Stow as we now use annual almanacs and other periodical literature dealing with current history.

the Catholics by whatever means he found convenient; they point to the fact that Parry, before he was ever accused, confessed to Elizabeth herself the part which he had played in designs against her life, as a proof of his honest meaning, and they maintain what Parry himself maintained, that he had intended no treason but had merely made a pretence of plotting in order to discover and thwart the wicked purposes of the Queen's enemies.[1]

The whole question of Parry's guilt or innocence is really a question of motive. There is very little doubt that what he confessed about his dealings abroad was substantially the truth. There is independent evidence enough to prove that he had dealt with the papal secretary and with Thomas Morgan in Paris about a plot to make away with Elizabeth. But it is not easy to decide what he intended. His confession to Elizabeth immediately after his return to England certainly argues strongly in his favour.

Where Parry made his fatal mistake was in undertaking his negotiations with Edmund Neville upon his own responsibility. A very exaggerated sense of his own importance was one of his many shortcomings, and perhaps it had as much to do as anything else with the accomplishment of his ruin. Even on the assumption that Parry's intentions were innocent, he was playing a very dangerous game when he undertook to advocate the murder of the Queen, although it were in the interests of the Queen herself. He was no longer a secret service agent. He had become a member of Parliament and, what was more, a member of Parliament under some suspicion for having attacked the Bill against the Catholics. Whatever his intentions were, he had no manner of right to talk treason with Neville without some commission from a responsible minister of the Government. Technically guilty of treason he certainly was on these grounds alone and on these grounds might have been punished according to law. But the Government, to strengthen its case against him, made use of his earlier dealings with the Pope and Morgan, for which he had a kind of commission, and by so doing weakened its case in the eyes of posterity. One thing is certain, that whether he was innocent or guilty, England was the better off with Parry

[1] Cf., for example, Lingard's account of the Parry plot in his *History of England*, vi. 185 ff.

under ground. That fact was as patent to sixteenth-century eyes as it is to the eyes of the modern historian, and it probably lies somewhere near the root of his whole tragedy. Men of the sixteenth century had not quite outgrown the medieval idea that a man should be judged according to what was known about his character rather than upon the evidence presented against him in a particular case at law.

It is impossible to set down in any detail Walsingham's connexions with Dr. Parry and his plot. In his capacity as secret agent on the continent Parry acted throughout as Burghley's man. He did indeed write more than one letter to Walsingham from France, but there is very little doubt that Burghley was his chief confidant and the councillor to whom he looked for such royal favours as he hoped to receive. This is apparent from so much of Parry's correspondence as survives. He emphasized the fact himself in one of his first letters to Burghley. 'If my advice', he wrote, 'do not under my own name pass beyond her Majesty and yourself, I have my desire. It shall not cost me a quill to gain the favour of any third.'[1] It may be concluded from this that Walsingham was not responsible for Parry's employment abroad in the first place, although it is evident that he made use of the man from time to time in his capacity as secret agent.

Sir Robert Naunton, in his slight sketch of Walsingham,[2] has confessed surprise that the Secretary allowed Parry to remain at liberty and even to have access to the Queen long after he was acquainted with his guilty purposes. Sir Robert, however, seems to have been ignorant of the facts in the case. Walsingham, as one of Elizabeth's most trusted councillors, probably was informed by the Queen herself of Parry's dealings with the Pope and with Morgan. Like the Queen, he probably accepted Parry's explanation that he had been acting a double part in order to gain information. Even if Walsingham, as has been suggested, intercepted the letters which Parry wrote in February 1584 to Charles Paget and to Thomas Morgan in Paris, there is no reason to assume that they excited his suspicions.[3] It was quite in

[1] 30 July 1580, *Cal. Dom.*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 10.
[2] *Fragmenta Regalia* (ed. Arber), p. 36.
[3] The letter to Paget is in S. P. Domestic (cf. *Cal. Dom.*, 1581–90, p. 160), the letter to Morgan in *Cal. Dom.*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 113.

keeping with the part which Parry proposed to play for him to have written such letters.

As soon as Elizabeth was made acquainted with the contents of Neville's confession she ordered Parry to be apprehended and conducted to Walsingham's house in London. There Walsingham undertook to examine him. Without making any mention of Neville's name he told Parry that the Queen had been informed of an attempt to be made against her person and that she hoped he might have gathered some inkling of it from among his Catholic acquaintances. Parry said he knew nothing of such an attempt. Then Walsingham bade him consider whether he had 'let fall any speech unto any person (though with an intent only to have discovered his disposition) that might draw him in suspicion as though he himself had any such wicked intent'. Here was Parry's chance to reveal his dealings with Neville and perhaps clear himself of the charge of treason. Upon his answer to this question of Walsingham's his fate in large manner hung. But he denied 'with great and vehement protestations' any such practice. Thereupon Walsingham began to press him more closely and told him that a gentleman of very good quality was prepared to accuse him of so much before his face, but Parry persisted still in his denial and 'would not in any respect yield that he was party or privy to any such motion enterprise or intent'.

He slept the night in the Secretary's house and the morning brought counsel. As soon as he was up he asked leave to speak with Walsingham, and when this was granted he proceeded to tell Walsingham that he had called to mind, during the interval, an argument which he had held not long since with a kinsman of his named Neville about a statement set forth in a recent Catholic book to the effect that it was lawful to kill a prince in the cause of religion. But Parry protested once again that he had never spoken with Neville of an attempt against her Majesty's person. That same night he was taken to Leicester's house and examined once again before Leicester, Hatton, and Walsingham. There he was confronted by Neville in person, who avouched his treason before his face. But Parry denied the fact once again. He was forthwith sent to the Tower.

On the 11th of February Walsingham joined with Lord

Hunsdon and Sir Christopher Hatton to examine Parry a third time. It was on this occasion that Parry made his full confession and set it down in writing. Three days afterwards he confirmed it in a letter to the Queen.

Walsingham examined Parry again on the 20th of February concerning the letter which he confessed he had received from the Cardinal of Como to encourage him in his purpose. At first Parry declared that he had burned it, but later admitted that he had left it in London, and told Walsingham where it might be found. It was found and was used against him in his arraignment, which took place on the 25th of February.[1]

It is evident from these details that Walsingham played a large part in the examination of Parry and in the collection of evidence against him. It has been suggested that he was Parry's worst enemy and was mainly instrumental in compassing his destruction.[2] This would be a hard matter to prove. Certainly at his first examination of Parry he gave the man every opportunity to clear himself, going so far as to suggest the very line of defence which Parry subsequently took. It is clear that Walsingham was active above his fellows in gathering evidence against Parry, but this work fell to him as part of the duties of his office and cannot fairly be used as evidence of a personal animus one way or the other.

There is no evidence whatever to connect the Scottish Queen directly with Parry's project. She herself pronounced it a 'horrible and detestable plot' and invited the strictest examination in case her innocence should in any way be questioned.[3] It does not appear that either Elizabeth or Walsingham harboured any suspicions against Mary herself on this point. They certainly did harbour the very gravest suspicions against her friends among the English Catholic refugees in Paris. The

[1] These details are taken from Stow's account in Holinshed.

[2] Cf. J. H. Pollen, 'Dr. Parry', *The Month*, April 1909. It may not be without significance that Parry was examined first at Walsingham's house and afterwards at Leicester's. This fact gives some slight foundation for Father Pollen's surmise that Parry's death was occasioned by the conflict between Walsingham and the extremists and Burghley and the moderates. What seems more probable, however, is that the earlier relations of Burghley with Parry made it advisable that the Lord Treasurer should take no part in the examination.

[3] Mary to Mauvissière, 2 March 1585, Labanoff, vi. 107; Mary to Elizabeth, 23 March 1585, ibid. vi. 139.

consequence was that Walsingham began to spy more closely upon their doings. It was through this channel that he eventually got wind of the Babington plot and was able to accomplish Mary's complete undoing.

The device of gaining information concerning the plans and purposes of Elizabeth's enemies by keeping watch upon English Catholic refugees had long been practised by her ministers. These refugees had always been regarded as a dangerous menace to the welfare of their country. Many of them were men of influence, and as such might prove convenient intermediaries between the large body of discontented Catholic subjects in England and the enemies of the state abroad. The consequence was that the English government from the first felt the necessity of keeping a close watch upon them and of using every means in its power to prevent them from indulging in treasonable practices against the Queen's person and against the state.

There were considerable migrations of Catholics out of England from the very beginning of Elizabeth's reign. Sir Francis Englefield, for instance, who had been one of Queen Mary's Privy Council, fled to Spain in 1559. Dr. Allen, a scholar, afterwards Cardinal Allen, left the next year. Another notorious example is that of Dr. Story, who escaped from the Marshalsea prison in 1563 with the assistance of the Spanish ambassador, and who made considerable trouble for the English government in the Low Countries until he was finally kidnapped, brought back to England, and executed in 1571. These early refugees were for the most part clergymen. The first considerable emigration of English laymen took place in consequence of the failure of the Rising in the North in 1569–70. The Earls of Northumberland and of Westmorland, the principal leaders of the rebellion, both fled the country. Northumberland was obtained from Scotland the next year and executed in 1572, but Westmorland made good his escape to the continent. There he joined with Sir Leonard Dacres, another of the ill-fated leaders of the rebellion, with Lord Morley, Thomas Copley, the widowed Countess of Northumberland, Richard Norton, generally known as 'Old Norton', and some others of less importance. They took up their residence for the time in the

Low Countries and very soon became pensioners of the King of Spain.

As early as January 1571 Burghley, at that time still Sir William Cecil, Principal Secretary to the Queen, had set a spy named John Lee upon them in Antwerp. Lee was arrested in November 1572, but his place was soon filled by a second spy named Edward Woodshaw, a man of disreputable character but of considerable skill in his craft. By means of these two men Burghley had kept close watch upon Westmorland and his associates. When Walsingham became Principal Secretary, late in the year 1573, he assumed with many other duties this task of watching the Catholic refugees. During his first five or six years in office he appears to have learned very little of importance concerning them. For the most part they remained in the Low Countries and they seem to have done little or nothing of political moment. As a matter of fact this group of men, who had been involved in the Rising of the North, were a singularly inefficient lot and were not likely to prove any more dangerous as conspirators abroad than they had shown themselves to be as leaders of rebellion at home. Perhaps they had some little to do with Don John's projects for invading England. Walsingham heard in February 1577 that Sir Francis Englefield and the Countess of Northumberland had been intriguing with him about Mary Stuart. But Don John's death in October 1578 put an end to whatever hopes they based on him, and shortly afterwards most of them seem to have left the Low Countries for France. Possibly, as the English ambassador at Paris suggested to Walsingham, Westmorland and his colleagues had some project in mind against England in 1580 when Philip of Spain was contemplating a second expedition against Ireland. If so, nothing came of it.

It becomes necessary about the year 1580 to distinguish between two groups of Catholic refugees. Men like Westmorland and Dacres, who had been caught red-handed in the act of rebellion, had little or nothing to expect from the mercy of the Queen. Westmorland in fact had been attainted of treason in 1571 and had lost his estates. There was on the other hand another group of refugees, among whom the most conspicuous perhaps was Thomas Copley, who still had some hope of winning the Queen's pardon. Charles Paget, who had long been in Paris

as secretary to Mary Stuart's ambassador there, was another member of this group. Neither of these men was charged with any specific offence against the state. Both held large properties in England and were anxious to enjoy the fruits of them. Copley had been corresponding with Burghley for some years in the hope of winning permission either to return to England or to serve the Queen abroad. It seems likely that when Walsingham went over to Paris in the late summer of 1581 he had private conference both with Copley and with Paget.[1] The object of this conference was apparently to induce these men to abstain from any conspiring against the Queen and possibly to hold out vague hopes that they would be permitted to return to England. Copley and Paget, it seems, both gave Walsingham assurances of their fidelity. How far he was sincere in his proposals, or they in their responses, it is difficult to say. At all events, after Walsingham's return home he began an active correspondence both with Copley and with Paget.

It can be gathered from this correspondence that Elizabeth had confiscated the revenues from Copley's lands and that he was anxious to have them restored to him. Paget probably was after something of the same sort. It is interesting to observe that whereas Copley in the past had sought to gain the Queen's favour through Burghley, he was now placing his main dependence on Walsingham. This was doubtless due in part to the fact that he was distantly related to Walsingham's wife. Probably, however, a statement which Paget made to a man who was secretly one of Walsingham's agents offers a better explanation. He said that the only way to gain favour with the Queen was through the Secretary.[2] Both Copley and Paget proceeded to act upon this basis by offering bribes to Walsingham. Paget sent a token which Walsingham returned. 'If you think me mercenary', he wrote, 'you mistake me.'[3] Copley offered to bestow upon 'his cousin' Lady Walsingham an annual pension from his lands to the value of one hundred pounds yearly.[4] He explained that this was not a bribe and that it was usual even for great princes to receive some such recognition of favours

[1] Paget to Walsingham, 30 May 1582, *Cal. Dom.*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 60.
[2] Chas. Doyley to Walsingham, 14 Nov. 1582; ibid., p. 79.
[3] Walsingham to Paget, 4 May 1582; ibid., p. 58.
[4] Copley to Walsingham, 5 July 1582; ibid., p. 66.

bestowed. But Walsingham saw through the sophistry and would have none of it.[1] Indeed it is evident that Paget at least quite defeated his own purpose, for a little later the Queen ordered Cobham, her ambassador at Paris, to call Paget before him and formally, in the presence of three witnesses, to command him to return to England. Paget of course refused to go, except on conditions that Elizabeth would not grant. He threatened, moreover, that if his lands were confiscated he would seek employment from some other Prince.[2]

For all this, Walsingham kept up his correspondence with Paget and Copley for about a year longer. There can be little doubt that he was merely entertaining them with false hopes in order to keep them out of mischief. Copley himself came to appreciate this at last. In July 1583 he wrote to Walsingham that he despaired of the Queen's favour and that since 'she answered his petition with words, he would have to reply in words. *Venter non habet aures.*' In the same month Cobham wrote to Walsingham that Copley had become a pensioner of the Pope.[3]

As for Paget, he was probably playing a double game from the start. In October 1582 he wrote to Walsingham that he was going to Rouen to drink English beer,[4] but he had more serious purposes in mind. In September 1583 he stole over to England in order to make arrangements for an invasion of his country by the Duke of Guise. He failed in his purpose; his confederate Throgmorton was captured; the whole secret got out and Paget was exposed.

The Throgmorton plot sent two other Englishmen flying to Paris, Charles Paget's brother, Lord Paget, and Charles Arundel. From the end of 1583 onwards this group of men, Charles Paget and his brother and Charles Arundel, formed the centre about which the more active Catholic refugees gathered.

Through Sir Henry Cobham and the secret service attached to the English Embassy in France Walsingham kept himself informed of the movements and to some extent of the purposes of the English Catholic refugees in France. When Sir Edward

[1] Copley to Walsingham, 24 July 1582; ibid., p. 69.
[2] Cobham to Walsingham, 26 Sept. 1582, *Cal. Foreign*, 1582, p. 351.
[3] *Cal. Dom.*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 89; *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 3.
[4] Paget to Walsingham, 23 Oct. 1582, *Cal. Dom.* 1581–90, p. 73.

Stafford succeeded Cobham in September 1583, he had special instructions to keep an eye upon the English fugitives in France and to send information from time to time as to their movements. Walsingham supplemented these instructions by a letter which he wrote to Stafford on the 1st of December. 'I am willed by her Majesty', he wrote, 'to make this present dispatch to you thereby to require you in her name that you do carry a very watchful eye over the Lord Paget and Charles Arundel, who of late have conveyed themselves away without licence, seeking very carefully to understand what they may practise or deal in to the prejudice of this crown; wherein her Majesty hath willed me to signify to you that she is assured that the alliance that my lady your wife hath with them shall not make you the more remiss to perform your duty towards her with that trust that she doth specially repose in you.' [1]

Stafford was, not unnaturally, greatly provoked at the tone of this letter and protested indignantly at the imputation which it conveyed against his fidelity.[2] Nevertheless it is quite evident that the refugees hoped to make capital out of their 'alliance' with the ambassador's family. Stafford had not been many days in Paris before Charles Paget, the same who had been in England a month before, arranging for an invasion by the Duke of Guise, came to visit him with protestations of fidelity and offers of service. 'I mean to use them all well,' Stafford wrote to Walsingham, 'if they come to me . . . for my own part I am of a mind to use the devil himself well if he come to me in the likeness of a man to serve the Queen withal.' [3]

In another letter to Walsingham dated four days later Stafford revealed the fact that he was in reality about to play a double game with Paget and his colleagues. 'I doubt not', he wrote, 'but I will keep that hand over them here that I will keep credit with them here and yet serve her Majesty truly and well. And if her Majesty do seem to the French Ambassador there or sometimes openly to stand in some jealousy of my partiality of their part, so it be not so often and openly that he may easily find it, I do not doubt but to serve her turn with that manner of dealing very well.' [4]

[1] S. P. France, x, f. 226.
[2] Ibid., f. 269.
[3] 27 Oct. 1583, S. P. France, x, f. 65.
[4] Ibid. x, f. 67.

Upon these lines Stafford proceeded to act. On the 15th of December he wrote to Walsingham again:

'I had afore your letter taken the same show of careless course you writ to me of, thinking it the best, and truly I find it so by experience, for by that means they [Paget and Arundel] *take less heed* of me. I have one lodged by *them*, but I am fishing for one that is daily *with them* and *their* servant. I am not out of hope to have him. They have yet dealt themselves with nobody nor seen any man of importance. What *Charles Paget* doth for them I can hardly learn it, for he is inseparable with *Morgan* who is hand in hand with the *Archbishop* of *Glasgow*. Yet *Paget* and his fellow both protest that neither they do or will do anything against the *Queen* nor hang upon the *King* of *France*, the *Duke* of *Guise* nor any so long as the necessity for meat does not drive them to it.'[1]

How careful a watch Stafford was keeping on these refugees is evident from his letter to Walsingham of the 27th of December. 'For their manner of living here,' he wrote, 'I can render a good account of it, for there neither cometh any one to them, or they go any whither, but for the most part I have one giveth me account of it.'[2]

Stafford had another visit from the Pagets and Arundel early in February 1584. He took occasion to advise Lord Paget and Arundel to return home and throw themselves upon the mercy of the Queen. When Charles Paget argued against this course Stafford told him plainly that he was an evil counsellor and that 'by his dealings he had deceived and undone his best friends'. Finally, when they all declared that they could not depend upon the Queen's mercy, Stafford dismissed them with the remark that he preferred their room before their company.[3]

This interview may be said to mark the end of Stafford's direct dealings with Lord Paget and Charles Arundel. Four days later Stafford wrote again to Walsingham: '*Lord Paget*, *Charles Arundel*, and *Charles Paget* no more care now what company they keep. As far as I can find out *Lord Paget* meaneth to go into *Spain*, but not yet. I hope to find a way very certain to find *Morgan's* and *Charles Paget's* greatest secrets. If it hit right, it is the surest way.'[4]

[1] S. P. France, x, f. 103, original draft in Galba C vi, f. 192.
[2] S. P. France, x, f. 112.
[3] Stafford to Walsingham, 13 Feb. 1583/4, S. P. France, xi, f. 50.
[4] Ibid. f. 66.

There can be little doubt that this 'very certain' way to which Stafford alludes was none other than through the instrumentality of Charles Arundel himself. He never said as much to Walsingham, but there is plenty of other evidence to prove that he made use of Arundel's services from this time until his death. Walsingham did in fact learn of Stafford's dealings with Arundel through other sources, and the effect of the discovery was to increase a distrust of the English ambassador at Paris which Walsingham seems to have entertained from the first and which Stafford certainly reciprocated.

This ill feeling between the two men was in part personal, but it was in large measure also a reflection of the factional rivalry which divided the English Privy Council into two pretty well-defined groups, one under Burghley, the other under Leicester and Walsingham. Stafford was, as the Spanish ambassador designated him, 'a creature of Burghley's'. He confessed as much himself in a letter to Burghley written when he was still in doubt as to whether he would accept Walsingham's offer of the French embassy or not. 'Good my Lord,' he wrote, 'do me the favour to give me your advice, first if you will like of it at all, then how far and how much you like of, assuring your Lordship I will follow your advice and commandment in every point and observe it; if you like not of it, never to speak of it more, if you like of it, then only to depend upon your preferment to her Majesty which I humbly crave, and if I have it, then I protest to follow the course I have done heretofore in all my negotiations, to depend upon nobody's favour but her Majesty's will and your honourable counsel.'[1] If this letter were not sufficient there is plenty of evidence in Stafford's voluminous correspondence to prove beyond peradventure on what side his sympathies lay.

It is difficult to say how far his attitude was determined by political and how far by personal reasons. He was certainly no radical in his religious views, although he was evidently no conservative in his temperament, which was choleric and independent to a degree. Possibly his family connexions with the Howards brought him to share with the old nobility their instinctive distrust of Leicester and the new men. Doubtless his marriage to Lady Sheffield, whom Leicester had married and then

[1] 12 June 1583, Harleian MSS. 6993, f. 44.

cast off, bred in him a rooted antipathy for the Queen's favourite and all his tribe.[1]

Very likely Stafford's distrust of Walsingham had something to do with Walsingham's distrust of Stafford. Suspicion has a way of breeding suspicion. But Walsingham had more solid ground than this to build upon. Stafford's mother was one of the Queen's ladies-in-waiting. She was Catholic in her sympathies and she used all her influence with the Queen to oppose Walsingham at every turn. The religious views of Stafford's wife were not above suspicion. He himself was certainly no Puritan either in his theology or his politics. The key-note of Walsingham's foreign policy was a vigorous support of the Protestant rebels both in France and in the Low Countries. Stafford made no secret of the fact that he took issue with the Secretary upon both these points. What was more, he revealed a strong disposition, from the moment he assumed his duties as ambassador at Paris, to run the embassy according to his own ideas. He never took Walsingham altogether into his confidence, and the consequence was that Walsingham, learning from other sources information which should properly have come to him from Stafford, conceived a distrust for him which increased as time went on.

An incident which occurred in the spring of 1584 in the relations between the two men will serve to illustrate the feelings which they cherished towards each other. Early in March, whether by accident or by design, the searchers at Rye intercepted and opened certain private letters which the ambassador and his wife had sent into England. Stafford complained about

[1] On this whole subject, cf. my article 'The Fame of Sir Edward Stafford', *American Historical Review*, xx. 292 ff. Stafford's attitude towards Leicester may be gathered from his letter to Burghley, dated 6 Nov. 1586: 'Let me give your Lordship warning . . . that if *Leicester* by *Walsingham's* means and all the friends he is able to make at his coming home can be revenged of you either in your honour or your life . . . for crossing him in his absence in those matters, he will do it. I am not worthy my Lord to give your Lordship counsel, for I am both young and far unfit for it, but as one that honoureth you, and where I profess friendship and love I will continue to the death, if I might be bold to tell you what I think . . ., if I had as much credit as your Lordship hath and he born to do no more good than he is, I would keep him where he is [in the Low Countries] and he should drink that which he hath brewed. Her Majesty is not for his tarrying there bound to do more than she shall see cause, but I would keep him there to undo himself and sure enough from coming home to undo others.' (S. P. France, xvi, f. 139, passages in italics in cipher).

this at once. 'In truth,' he wrote, 'I think it is a thing has never been done to one in my place.'[1] Walsingham replied on the 27th of March. 'I am sorry', he wrote, 'that the commissioners did so far forget themselves as to open any of your letters, for the preventing of which inconvenience hereafter, you shall do well to packet up all your letters in a packet by themselves directed to me and subscribe it with your hand, as I will likewise take the same order with those private letters that shall be sent to you from hence, if your man may be directed to bring them unto me for that purpose.'[2] This looks very like an ingenious plan on Walsingham's part to keep watch upon the ambassador's private correspondence. Certainly it looked so to the jealous eyes of Stafford. He wrote to Burghley on the 13th of April: 'I writ a letter to Mr. Secretary to complain of them of Rye that have opened certain private letters of mine. I see by his answer that there is half a consent of his in it, though he showeth to find great fault with them for it.' Stafford then went on to describe the arrangements which Walsingham had proposed for the conveyance of his private letters. 'Truly, my lord,' he added, 'it were too much pains for him and therefore I will not trouble him so much, for I am sure there is no letter I shall write to your Lordship or anyone else but shall be opened. . . . I write plainly to your Lordship, but I am contented that Mr. Secretary shall think I am a child and cannot find the bondage he would bring me in, and therefore I pray your Lordship say nothing to him about it.'[3]

There can be no doubt that Stafford by this time had established close relations with Charles Arundel and was constantly receiving information from him touching the movements of the refugees. Without revealing this fact to Walsingham he wrote in general terms, 'I could never find so good and sure a way to be acquainted with their dealings as by them themselves.'[4] Walsingham in the same general terms ratified his course of proceeding. 'For the matter of the fugitives,' he wrote in December 1584, 'it shall not be amiss that you suffer them to have access secretly unto you for that purpose that you mean to use them and that you advertise me in your private letters of the things that you may learn from them.'[5]

[1] Stafford to Walsingham, 9 March 1583/4, S. P. France, xi, f. 109.
[2] Ibid. f. 142.
[3] Ibid. f. 175.
[4] Ibid. xii, f. 303.
[5] Ibid. f. 329.

And so Stafford carried on his dealings with Arundel. It seems that they met ordinarily at the house of Simier, who had formerly been in England in connexion with the Alençon marriage and who was one of Stafford's bosom cronies. Through Arundel Stafford approached the Duke of Guise and the Spanish ambassador at Paris, convinced them both that he was willing to sell information for money, and received large sums both from Guise and from the King of Spain. It is conceivable that his intentions in the matter were quite honourable, but he did not take the Secretary into his confidence, and Walsingham, already suspicious, when he got rumours of these dealings from other sources, not unnaturally came to the conclusion that the ambassador was playing the traitor.[1]

The effect of all this upon the business of searching out plots against Elizabeth was profound. Walsingham, feeling uncertain of Stafford's integrity, began to make other provision for securing information.

An excellent means of accomplishing this presented itself very opportunely. Among Walsingham's secret agents was a certain Thomas Rogers, otherwise called Nicholas Berden. He had been in the service of Mr. George Gilbert, one of the most active and influential of the English Catholics. When Gilbert fled abroad to escape the consequences of his dealings with Campion and Parsons, Berden went with him. Somehow or other he was won over to the service of Walsingham. In 1583 he was corresponding with Walsingham from Rome[2] and on the 1st of January 1584 he wrote to Thomas Phelippes: 'I profess myself a spy, but am not one for gain, but to serve my country. . . . Whensoever any occasion shall be offered wherein I may adventure some rare and desperate exploit, such as may be for the honour of my country and my own credit, you shall always find me resolute and ready to perform the same.'[3]

[1] The case against Stafford's honesty of purpose is, however, a very strong one; cf. *American Historical Review*, xx. 292 ff.

[2] Pollen, *The Month*, Sept. 1907, p. 11; S. P. Mary, Queen of Scots, xxi. no. 43. Cf. also on Rogers in Rome, 'Memoirs of Father Parsons', in Catholic Record Soc., *Miscellanea*, iv. 85 f.

[3] S. P. Domestic, clxvii, no. 3. This letter is unsigned. It is endorsed by Phelippes 'From B.' The identity of the handwriting with the letter in S. P. Domestic, clxxxvii, no. 81, which was undoubtedly written by Berden, is sufficient to establish him as the writer of it.

Berden's offer was accepted. If not at once, at any rate within a year, he was engaged in spying upon papists and priests in London and elsewhere. His service with George Gilbert had given him unrivalled opportunities for making the acquaintance and winning the confidence of the leading English Catholics, and he now turned this to great advantage in Walsingham's service.

It happened that sometime in February 1585 a certain priest named Ithell came over to England from Paris. He was commended to Berden by a fellow priest and Berden secured him lodgings at a tailor's house near Clement's Inn. Ithell evidently enjoyed the confidence of the Pagets, Arundel, and the other Catholic refugees in Paris. Indeed part of his mission seems to have been to provide these refugees with some trusty man in London who would undertake to receive their letters from abroad, see them delivered, and return their answers. 'Ithell', so Berden wrote to Walsingham, 'earnestly implored me to take upon me this task, promising to give me wide credit and to make me acquainted with Large, the post. I have not promised to undertake this until I know your honour's pleasure.' [1]

This supplied Walsingham with material to work upon. It is impossible to say whether Walsingham instructed Berden to accept Ithell's proposal or not, but it is clear enough that Walsingham saw in it a means to place a watch over the Catholic refugees independent of Stafford. In July 1585 Berden, doubtless by prearrangement, was cast into prison. There he made the acquaintance of Edward Stransham, a priest, and obtained from him credentials to Thomas Fitzherbert. From Ithell he doubtless secured letters of recommendation to the Pagets and Arundel. With all these in hand he set out for Paris late in July 1585. On the 3rd of August he reached Rouen, where he met Charles Paget and travelled to Paris in his company. There he presented his credentials and established himself without delay in the confidence of the Catholic refugees.[2]

[1] S. P. Domestic, clxxviii, no. 72. This paper is endorsed 'Secret advertisements to Walsingham'. It is written in Berden's hand. From this letter it becomes clear that Father Pollen's version of the story as printed in *The Month*, Sept. 1907, is an incorrect one. Evidently Berden's journey abroad was made in the first instance at the instigation of the Catholics themselves and not by prearrangement with Walsingham.

[2] Cf. Berden to Walsingham, 11 Aug. 1585, *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 148. This is the first of Berden's reports from Paris. Like many of his other reports it was written in invisible ink.

He began to send reports to Walsingham at once. On the 11th of August he wrote that he found the Catholics divided into two factions. Lord Paget, Charles Paget, Thomas Morgan, and Thomas Throgmorton, along with some others, he found banded together on the one hand, and opposed to them Dr. Allen, Robert Parsons, Thomas Fitzherbert, the rest of the lay refugees, and all the Jesuits.[1] He seems to have depended for his news chiefly upon Thomas Fitzherbert, with whom his relations were very friendly. Fitzherbert indeed invited Berden to lodge in his house in Paris, but Berden did not accept the offer, partly because it was too expensive and partly because he did not wish to alienate the Paget-Arundel faction by showing himself too close with Fitzherbert.

It was nevertheless largely through Fitzherbert's means that Berden gathered such news as he sent to Walsingham. He reported a project to invade England with four separate armies, one under the leadership of the Earl of Westmorland against North England, a second under Charles Arundel against Scotland, a third under Thomas Throgmorton against the South, and a fourth under a Spanish general against Ireland.[2] This bit of information probably represented what the Catholic refugees were led to hope for. It is certain that neither the Duke of Guise nor the King of Spain, whom Berden reported to be the supporters of the project, seriously contemplated in the autumn of 1585 any such magnificent design. Walsingham probably knew how to value such news. He certainly does not appear to have been greatly alarmed by it.

Berden sent other information of a less imposing nature which was more reliable and useful. He learned the names of those whom the Catholics accounted friends at the English Court. He advised Walsingham that Paget and his colleagues had made arrangements with Châteauneuf (who was about to succeed Mauvissière as French ambassador at London) by which they could convey letters to their friends in England in his official packet. He sent news, which must have been welcome news to

[1] Cf. upon this Autobiography of Father Parsons, Catholic *Miscellanea*, ii. 35 ff.; T. G. Law, *Jesuits and Seculars in Conflict, passim*; Pollen, *English Catholics under Elizabeth*, i. 271 ff.

[2] Berden to Walsingham, 11 Aug. 1585, *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 148.

Walsingham, that Morgan and Paget had as yet no means of intelligence with the Scottish Queen.[1] But undoubtedly the greatest service Berden rendered to Walsingham was by establishing himself firmly in the confidence of the Catholics at Paris.

It has been asserted that Walsingham sent Berden to France in order to tempt Morgan to use him as a means of correspondence with the Scottish Queen, his mistress.[2] As a matter of fact Berden appears to have had little or nothing to do with Morgan while he was in France, and only to have concerned himself in the affairs of Mary Stuart indirectly. It was not so much upon Mary Stuart as upon the Pagets and Arundel that Walsingham was focusing his attention at this time. Charles Paget had proved himself to be a 'dangerous instrument', and the flight of his brother and Charles Arundel to France upon the discovery of the Throgmorton plot seemed to argue that they were hardly less dangerous. It was not unnatural for Walsingham to assume that all these men, whom he believed had plotted with the Duke of Guise from England, would plot further with him in France. Berden's commission was to investigate their doings. Perhaps Walsingham had Mary Stuart in his mind as well, but there is no reason to assume that in sending Berden to France the Secretary was directly seeking to compass her destruction.

Late in December Berden wrote to Walsingham that the papists, having no safe means to convey any man into England, were trying to persuade him to go over. Sometime early in the year 1586 he did in fact return as the accredited agent of the Catholic refugees. 'I have been thought meet', he wrote to Walsingham, 'to be employed by Charles Paget, Charles Arundel, Stephen Brinckley from Allen and Parsons, Godfrey Foljambe, and Thomas Fitzherbert, to be their correspondent here for the receiving and delivery of such letters as they shall send unto me, and to give them intelligence from England.'[3] Berden then went on to explain the details of his arrangements with these different men. 'The reasons', he added, 'that moved me to

[1] Most of Berden's correspondence is printed in *Cal. Dom.* Adda., 1580–1625, pp. 148 ff.; some of it is reprinted in *Cal. Foreign*, 1585–6, Appendix. Much is also printed in full in the correspondence of Philip, Earl of Arundel (Catholic Records Society, xxi).

[2] Pollen, *Thei Month*, Sept. 1907, p. 11.

[3] *Cal. Domestc*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 162; S. P. Domestic, clxxxvii, 81.

accept of the premises are for that I was always persuaded by Sr. Palavicino to get the credit of all the aforesaid affairs into my hands, the better to serve your honour with their whole practices and intentions, for the gaining whereof I have used all diligence and industry; by which means I hope your honour shall be served to your full content, for by Paget I expect the letters of the lord his brother, Throgmorton, and many others of his party; from Arundel I expect the letters of Sir Francis Englefield, from Brinckley the whole affairs of Allen and Parsons, from Foljambe the Scottish Queen's, from Fitzherbert the devices of the Queen Mother together with all occurrents general. And amongst them all, I doubt not but Don Bernardino [de Mendoza], his master's and his own letters will also come to your honour's hands.'[1] Berden had evidently done his work well, and though the results of all his arrangements did not reach his expectations he did maintain some sort of correspondence with the Catholics abroad for over two years, whereby Walsingham gained some information of importance.

Berden was one of many agents whom he sent to France for that purpose, and Berden seems to have served well, not only while he was in France in the autumn of 1585 but also after he had returned to England in the spring of 1586. But in 1588 Walsingham saw fit to withdraw Berden from the service. The Catholics abroad had apparently begun to question his integrity. He began a more respectable career in March 1588, having secured through Walsingham's influence the position of Purveyor of the Poultry to the Royal Kitchen.[2]

Gifford, the second agent whom Walsingham employed, came to grief in Paris, as will appear presently, because of his connexion with the Babington plot.

Walsingham, however, soon had another man to fill their places. Thomas Barnes, who was more or less implicated in the Babington conspiracy, apparently bought his pardon from the Queen by agreeing to spy upon the Catholic refugees in Paris.[3] In March 1588 he crossed over to Paris and soon had established himself as firmly in the confidence of Morgan, Paget, and their

[1] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 162; S. P. Domestic, clxxxvii, 81.
[2] S. P. Domestic, ccix, 19.
[3] Cf. Barnes to Walsingham, 17 March 1586–7, *Cal. Scottish*, 1586–8, p. 335.

confederates as Berden had done before him. In April 1589 he returned to London, and from there maintained with the refugees in Paris a correspondence which outlasted Walsingham's lifetime.[1]

These three men were Walsingham's chief agents abroad, but he had many other sources of information as well. Painter, for instance, who was one of Walsingham's ordinary carriers of letters, dabbled occasionally in secret service. Walter Williams, a man of no character, went abroad more than once upon secret business. On one occasion Stafford made Williams very drunk, and when he was ' merry ' succeeded in learning from him some details of the intrigue which Walsingham was directing against him.[2] Then there was a man named Roger Walton whom Walsingham dispatched abroad some time in the midsummer of 1588. Stafford, who apparently did not suspect that Walton was an agent of Walsingham's, sent home the following account of him : ' He was once ward and I think page to my Lady Northumberland. He lieth here not far from me. . . . To some he showeth himself a great papist, to others a protestant, but as they take him that haunteth him most, he hath neither God nor religion, a very evil condition, a swearer without measure and tearer of God, a notable whoremaster. . . . This Walton is young, without any hair of his face, little above twenty, lean faced and slender, somewhat tall, complexion a little sallowish, most goeth appareled in a doublet of black carke, cut upon a dark reddish velvet.' [3] It appears from the report which Walton made to Walsingham when he returned home that he had wormed himself into the confidence of the Duke of Guise and of Father Darbyshire, the leader of the English Jesuits in Paris, and had learned from them some important secrets.[4]

It would take too long to enumerate all the agents of Walsingham's in France who sent him reports from time to time about the movements of the Catholic fugitives. There was a certain Friar Boucher in Paris. There was Dr. William Parry. There was a certain Thomas Beckner who appears to have been an English merchant at Rouen. There was also an English mer-

[1] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, pp. 267 ff.
[2] Cf. Stafford to Burghley, 6 Nov. 1586, S. P. France, xvi, f. 139.
[3] 10 July 1588, Harleian MSS. 288, f. 218.
[4] S. P. Domestic, ccix, no. 57.

chant, William Lewkner, at Lyons. There was Francis Needham whom Walsingham used also on another occasion to keep an eye upon Leicester's behaviour in the Low Countries. There was a certain David Cobrett at Dieppe. There was a certain Thomas Moffett at Rouen.[1] There was one Antony Pointz, who seems to have been in the service of the Spanish ambassador at Paris, and there were many others of a more casual sort. Of course all of these men were not employed primarily to spy upon the Catholic refugees. They were in large measure simply news gatherers and news senders, but amongst the lot of them it is certain that the Pagets and Arundels and their coadjutors did very few things of importance that did not come sooner or later to Walsingham's ears.

Among all these sources of information there is a consensus of opinion that after the Pagets and their colleagues had given up all hope of reconciliation with Elizabeth, they proceeded to plot against her with great diligence. Charles Paget, Morgan, and Thomas Throgmorton were certainly mixed up in the Throgmorton plot and probably Charles Arundel was as well. On this account Walsingham instructed Stafford to demand their delivery of the King,[2] and Stafford did as he was commanded, but the influence of the Guises at Court was too strong at that time for the King to give his consent. Dr. William Parry accused Morgan of complicity in the conspiracy against Elizabeth which is generally called the Parry plot. Once again Walsingham ordered Stafford to demand Morgan's surrender.[3] This time the King went so far as to imprison Morgan in the Bastille and to allow Stafford to examine his papers, but it was apparent to Stafford that all of Morgan's letters had been sorted over before they came into his hands and those which bore testimony against him extracted.[4] When Stafford again demanded Morgan's delivery, the King, doubtless at the prompting of the Guises, once again refused on the grounds that among Morgan's papers had been found certain matters which intimately concerned France, and that he must be tried for those before he was delivered.[5] Morgan, in fact, was never delivered, but was

[1] Cf. *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–6, *passim*; on Thomas Moffett, cf. Harleian MSS. 287, f. 47.
[2] 3 May 1584, *Cal. Foreign*, 1583–4, p. 483.
[3] 12 Feb. 1585, *Cal. Foreign*, 1584–5, p. 277.
[4] Ibid., p. 457.
[5] Ibid., p. 359.

released from prison at the instance of the papal nuncio some two years later.[1]

If we are to believe Berden, and certainly there is little reason for disbelieving him upon this point, the refugees were deeply interested in a project of invasion which the Duke of Guise was contemplating in the autumn of 1585.[2] Morgan and Charles Paget were certainly involved in the Babington plot and Elizabeth took occasion to demand their bodies once more of the French King.[3] Her demand was once again refused.

Arundel himself set out for Spain in the autumn of 1586. Stafford and Mendoza both reported his departure to their sovereigns. Stafford said that he was going in the service of England, Mendoza that he was going in the service of Spain, but it is clear that Mendoza had some suspicion that he was playing false, and this fact ought to be recorded in Stafford's favour.[4]

Arundel returned to Paris in 1587 and died very suddenly in December of that year. Stafford said that he had been poisoned by Charles Paget and declared that Arundel had died with protestations of fidelity to the Queen upon his lips.[5] His death was like his life, violent and 'choleric'. It would be hard to make any final pronouncement upon the part which he played in the curious relations which he fostered between Stafford and Mendoza. Those who look at his career with Spanish eyes will declare him an agent of Spain who betrayed Stafford into the hands of his master. Those who look at him from Stafford's point of view will see in him an agent of England. Probably he was playing a double game and drawing pensions from two masters. It was certainly a despicable one and one entirely unworthy of his noble lineage.

Meanwhile the Pagets and their colleagues continued to plot and hope for the overthrow of the Queen and the triumph of their faith in England. When they heard from Spain in the spring of 1588 that Philip was making ready to set forth his Armada for England the news put them in great spirits. Mendoza gathered them all about him and told them to make ready to

[1] Cf. Wm. Lily to Walsingham, Aug. 1587, S. P. France, xvii, f. 254.
[2] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 148.
[3] 29 Sept. 1586, Instructions for Mr. Wotton, S. P. France, xvi, f. 108.
[4] *Cal. Spanish*, 1580–6, p. 575.
[5] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 221.

pass into England with the Spanish army. He promised Westmorland that he should be restored to his full estates. Thereupon they all went off to Lord Paget's lodgings and made merry. Lord Paget and his brother ordered new campaign uniforms from their tailor, and in high hopes they all set forth in June to join the Duke of Parma in Flanders. Stafford heard that they were boasting publicly that their Spanish master would have mass said in St. Paul's before October. 'I tell them that tell it me,' he wrote, 'that if he [Philip] come there himself he shall be hanged in Tyborn afore that time.' [1]

Westmorland, who was always a bad traitor, repented. His patriotism at the last moment got the better of his religion. He sent word to Stafford in April of the projected Spanish invasion, saying 'that his stomach is against a stranger's setting foot in his country'.[2] But his colleagues made their way merrily to Flanders.

Other fellow refugees had set out just as merrily with the Armada itself.[3] It is not necessary to recall the disappointment that awaited them all. Some of those who embarked in Spain finished their lives in English prisons. As for Paget and his colleagues, the next we hear of them is in September 1588, when they were busy quarrelling among themselves in Flanders.[4] The spring of 1589 found Lord Paget in Brussels, 'sickly and wearing away apace'. It found Westmorland in Antwerp, 'as careless and full of youth as ever'.[5] It is not necessary to follow their careers any farther. Westmorland and Lord Paget died in exile. Charles Paget, who had always an eye to the main chance, began to play the traitor to his Spanish host the year after the Armada. He threw up his Spanish employment in 1599 and his estates in England were restored to him at the accession of James the First. He was probably the worst of the lot of them, and by a curious trick of fate he had the best end.

Thus far Walsingham's behaviour towards the Catholic

[1] Cf. Stafford to Walsingham, 24 April 1588, S. P. France, xviii, f. 145; same to same, 25 April 1588, Harleian MSS. 288, f. 187; same to same, 6 June 1588, S. P. France, xviii, f. 232.

[2] Cf. Harleian MSS. 288, f. 187, just cited.

[3] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda. 1580–1625, p. 254.

[4] T. Moffet to Walsingham, 5 Sept. 1588, Harleian MSS. 287, f. 47.

[5] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 265.

refugees abroad has been made manifest with regard to lay refugees alone. We should perhaps expect to find him no less active in intrigues against the Catholic priests, against, for instance, such men as Cardinal William Allen and Robert Parsons, who were certainly doing everything they could to arouse the hostility of Catholic monarchs against England. And yet this was not so. Walsingham's various agents abroad sent him news from time to time regarding the priests and their activities, but he himself never gave them anything like the consideration which he gave to such men as the Pagets and Arundel. Some hint as to the reason for this may perhaps be gathered out of the statute books. While the English Government made every effort to prevent lay Catholics from fleeing abroad and to induce them to return when they were abroad, it took precisely the opposite attitude towards the priests. It forbade them to come into England. To those in England it gave forty days to clear out or be hunted down as traitors. On one occasion it deported some forty priests to Normandy at its own expense. Clearly the Government regarded the priests as much less dangerous abroad than at home.

This was probably because the priests were personally men of little importance and little influence. They were dangerous because they preached dangerous doctrine and stirred subjects to revolt against the established order of things, but they were not the leaders of the English Catholics nor could they be regarded while abroad as representatives of Catholics in England. Men like Lord Paget and the Earl of Westmorland, on the other hand, were men of considerable influence in England. They came of the oldest families in the land. Their words had weight among English Catholics at large and they could always be sure of a following among the people of their particular districts. Consequently their presence abroad was especially dangerous. By virtue of their rank they could always declare themselves, with some measure of truth, as the representatives of their afflicted brethren at home. This fact alone gave them the entrée to such great personages as the Duke of Guise and the King of Spain. Affiliated with them on the one hand and with the Catholics in England on the other, they might easily have served to bring foreign and domestic enemies of Elizabeth into harmony.

They were indeed by way of being ambassadors between discontented Englishmen at home and enemies of England abroad. The part which Charles Paget played in the Throgmorton plot illustrates this fact clearly enough. It was for this reason that Walsingham kept so close a watch upon their comings and goings and set guards over the ports and opened letters without much scruple in order to prevent them from arranging conspiracies and planning invasions. He could afford to neglect the priests. They were declared enemies and he had taken the measure of their influence. If he could keep them from spreading abroad their doctrine in England he was satisfied.

And yet there is at least one instance of Walsingham's intriguing among the English priests abroad which is worth recording. It achieved no permanent results, but it is significant as illustrating his methods. It came about in this wise. Some time early in the year 1583 Mr. Edward Unton, an Englishman, was taken prisoner in Italy and cast into the prisons of the Inquisition at Milan. His brother, Henry Unton, at Walsingham's advice, set out from Lyons to see if he could not secure his brother's release. From Lyons, Henry Unton opened negotiations with the officers of the Inquisition. It soon appeared that they meant to bleed his brother well before they let him go. Henry Unton, in fact, was forced to pay through the nose. Cobham, who was ambassador at the time in Paris, wrote that the inquisitors meant to employ what money they wrung out of Unton for the support of the English Jesuits,[1] and it appears upon the authority of Father Parsons that Dr. Lewis, one of the leading English Catholics at Rome, actually sent a certain Solomon Aldred to represent his interests in the transaction.[2]

The interest in the whole affair, from Walsingham's point of view, turns upon this man Aldred. Aldred, who seems to have been an Englishman by birth, had somehow or other got over to the continent and set up a tailor shop at Lyons. He had left with his wife to go to Rome. At Rome he had been granted a pension by the Pope. Father Parsons says that Aldred was among those who sowed the seeds of dissension between the Welsh and the English students at the English College at Rome.[3]

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, p. 280 and *passim*.
[2] Catholic Record Society, *Miscellanea*, ii. 34.
[3] Ibid., ii. 88 f.

It was from Rome, at the instigation of Dr. Lewis, that Aldred proceeded to Lyons to bicker over terms with Henry Unton. What passed between him and Unton is not recorded, but the upshot of the matter was that Unton succeeded in inducing Aldred to go over to England. Unton wrote to Walsingham on the 2/12th of June: 'I have won over Aldred, the player of my brother's tragedy, to come into England upon your honour's assurance of his safety. He is one in show simple but better acquainted with Romish practices against England than any. He hath delivered much to me, and promised me upon my writing to him out of England and performance of certain conditions, he will become a right Englishman. Whereas now he is unnatural and of little honesty, yet he is one very worth the winning.'[1]

Henry Unton returned to England towards the end of June 1583. He sent Aldred all the assurances which he demanded, and some time during the next year Aldred went to England.

In England Aldred doubtless saw Walsingham and talked with him. Shortly afterwards he returned to the continent again, and the next we hear of him is in a letter which he wrote to Walsingham from Lyons on the 15th of November 1584. In dealing with a treacherous fellow like Aldred it is difficult to judge how much credit should be given to what he says, but the tenor of this letter from Lyons certainly indicates that while in England he had definitely pledged himself to Walsingham's service. 'I assure you', he wrote, 'of my faithful and true service both to her Majesty and to your honour. If you ever have cause to doubt me, cause one of your servants to write to me and I shall show myself an honest man.'[2]

In the same letter Aldred went on to say that news of his journey to England had been spread abroad, and had made some suspicious of him, so that he had to be very careful about writing. It appears indeed that Aldred got into considerable trouble at Rome about the matter. The Pope stopped his pension, and it was even said in some quarters that if he ventured to go to Rome 'he would be evil entreated even to the death'. 'Whereupon,' wrote William Lewkner, an English agent in Lyons, to Walsingham, 'this poor snack, not having other means to live

[1] *Cal. Foreign*, 1583, p. 383. [2] Harleian MSS. 286, f. 56.

than by his pension, was constrained to hazard himself and to strain his conscience God knows how for the obtaining of his stipend, the which he hath obtained and hath brought himself into more credit than ever he was, insomuch as he is one of the Inquisitors.' Lewkner of course did not know that Aldred was in Walsingham's employ. He consequently warned Walsingham that Aldred was about to set forth for England, and bade him be on the watch to take the man as soon as he landed.[1]

Aldred was in fact on the way to England, taking in his company a certain Batsona or Batson. Stafford reported his arrival in Paris on the 6th of January 1585. He was coming over to England with Batson, Stafford wrote, 'on a matter of great importance'.[2]

It seems somewhat strange that Aldred, who had but just succeeded in restoring his credit in Rome, should have set off once more to England. The truth of the matter is that he seems to have gone with the Pope's consent. Parsons, in his autobiography, wrote: 'He [Aldred] became so expert as he, with the said Batson (sent by the Inquisition without privity of his general) went to England and dealt with Hatton, Cecil, and Walsingham and other councillors about moderation in religions, and brought both Pope Gregory and Sixtus after him into hope that much would be done this way if Dr. Allen and Father Parsons would cease to exasperate them with books, &c.'

'But all fell out afterwards', Parsons went on to say, 'to be subtle dealing.'[3] There cannot be much doubt that all was subtle dealing from the first. It is hard to explain what motive prompted Walsingham to hold out these hopes of clemency to the Catholics, but there is little reason to believe that either his mistress or he at this time seriously contemplated any mitigation of the penalties imposed by statute upon the English Catholics.[4] As events fell out afterwards, it seems likely that Walsingham's aim was to deter the Catholics in general from concerted hostile action against Elizabeth by holding out hopes of her reconciliation with Rome. This game had been played with some success

[1] 18 to 28 Dec. 1584, *Cal. Foreign*, 1584–5, p. 193.
[2] Ibid., p. 231.
[3] Catholic Record Society, *Miscellanea*, ii. 34.
[4] Parsons said that Batson told him that the Queen had promised to hear mass said privately in her chapel, ibid., ii. 34.

at the beginning of the Queen's reign, and in 1585, when the Prince of Orange had just been assassinated, and the Guises, in league with Philip of Spain, were asserting their supremacy in France, it is not surprising to see the English Government resort to it again. More immediately, Walsingham's purpose seems to have been to take advantage of the dissension which had broken out at Rome some years before at the English College, and by stimulating these 'domestical' difficulties to impair the strength of the Catholic refugees as a whole.

It is not necessary to enter into the details of this contention in the Roman College. It arose apparently out of a racial rivalry between the English and the Welsh students who were in residence there, but it developed immediately into a conflict between the English Jesuits and the English Secular priests.[1] Aldred himself, who was one of the leading spirits in this dissension at Rome, belonged to the Welsh faction. Probably on his first visit to England he informed Walsingham of all the details of the controversy, and suggested measures by which it might be turned to the advantage of the Queen.

It has already been noticed that there were dissensions among the English Catholics at Paris. Stafford claimed the credit of having tossed the apple of discord into their midst, but it is pretty plain that these difficulties in Paris were essentially an extension of the Roman troubles into the north, where they were aggravated by personal jealousy among some of the leading lay refugees. The Welsh faction at Paris was represented among the laity by Charles Paget, Thomas Morgan, and Thomas Throgmorton, among the clergy by Dr. William Gifford, Father Edmund Grately, and Father William Clitherow; the English or Jesuit faction, among the laity by Charles Arundel and Sir Thomas Fitzherbert, among the clergy by Father Robert Parsons with the strength of the Jesuits behind him.[2] Cardinal William Allen, if we are to believe Berden's report, in 1585 occupied a more or less neutral position between the two factions, or, as Berden put it, 'played on both hands',[3] although later no doubt he went all the way over to Parson's camp. Now

[1] Law, *Jesuits and Seculars*, pp. viii ff.

[2] Catholic Record Society, *Miscellanea*, ii. 36.

[3] Cf. Berden to Walsingham, 11 Aug. 1585, *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 148.

Walsingham apparently determined to play upon the Welsh faction, partly because Aldred was of that side and partly, it may be presumed, because the Welsh faction or Seculars seem to have been on the whole more inclined to compromise than their Jesuit opponents.

Without doubt one of the leading figures among the English Catholic clergy in north France was Dr. William Gifford. Since 1582 he had been Professor of Theology at the English College at Rheims. There is plenty of evidence to prove which way in the controversy among the Catholics his sympathies lay. 'They [the Welsh] think Father Gifford is quite their own,' wrote Dr. Barrett, late head of the college at Rheims, in April 1583, '. . . and I think [that he is so] . . . I hope he will by little and little lay aside his over great familiarity with the Welsh. My hope of this, however, would be stronger, if I did not mark that they showed him so many signs of favour, honour and esteem.' [1]

Dr. Gifford was, in fact, a strong supporter of the Welshmen or Seculars. So also was his companion in exile, Father Edmund Grately. Grately had been private chaplain to the Earl of Arundel. He had fled out of England into France in the summer of 1584 and had gone at once to join Dr. Gifford, who was an old friend of his, at Rheims. Against these two men Walsingham directed his intrigues. Solomon Aldred was, of course, an instrument well suited to his purpose. Walsingham dispatched Aldred to Paris some time in the spring or summer of 1585, and Aldred set to work at once.

At about the same time Thomas Morgan was trying to induce Dr. Gifford to go over to England to represent the Welsh faction among the Catholics there. Dr. Gifford declined, but his cousin, Gilbert Gifford, at Grately's suggestion, consented to go instead.

Gilbert attempted to enter England in December 1585, was arrested at Rye, and sent up to London. There Walsingham made arrangements with him to enter the Queen's service.

[1] Butler and Pollen, *Doctor Gifford in 1586* (reprinted from *The Month*, March and April, 1904), pp. 5 ff. The friendly letters which Father Pollen quotes to prove that the utmost good feeling existed between Dr. Gifford and Parsons, the leader of the Jesuit faction, are dated in 1597. They cannot be held to establish, what Father Pollen apparently intended them to establish, that there had always been the same cordiality of feeling between Gifford and Parsons which seems to have existed at the time when they were written. Cf. on this subject Parsons's Autobiography in C. R. S. *Miscellanea*, ii, *passim*.

Leaving out of account for the moment Gilbert Gifford's connexion with Mary Stuart and the Babington Plot, it is quite clear that his apostasy offered to Walsingham another excellent channel through which he could pursue his intrigues with the English Catholic refugees. Gilbert was not only hand in glove with the Welsh group in Paris and at Rome, but he also seems to have exercised a peculiarly strong influence over the somewhat plastic character of his cousin William. In addition to other more notorious business which Gilbert had in hand, Walsingham certainly employed him during the early months of 1586 to further his intrigues with Grately and Dr. William Gifford.[1]

It is not easy to discover just exactly what Walsingham hoped to accomplish by these intrigues. He seems to have had at least two ends in mind. In the first place he wanted to increase the breach between the Seculars and the Jesuits. This is apparent from the dealings of Aldred with Grately. On the 27th of March 1586 Aldred wrote to Walsingham, 'Mr. Grately means before he is discovered to go to Rheims and feel Dr. Allen thoroughly of all matters and to set a faction between Parsons and him.' And again, Aldred reported of Dr. Gifford: 'At my last parting he [Dr. Gifford] told me the more he thought of it the more forward he was to perform it, that he has five or six scholars that will follow his course and that he does not doubt to bring Dr. Allen into this action after he had set Parsons and him at variance, if it be your pleasure he shall so proceed.'[2] It is clear enough from these extracts that Parsons and his Jesuits were regarded as the enemy, and that both Grately and Gifford were hoping to win Dr. Allen over to their way of thinking.

[1] Thos. Wilsdon to Walsingham (in hand of Gilbert Gifford), dated 1 June, no year, endorsed 1585, but clearly from the context 1586, Harleian MSS. 288, f. 161.

Father Pollen (*Mary Stuart and the Babington Plot*, p. xc) takes the position that Walsingham was merely using Dr. Gifford as a stalking-horse by which he might destroy Mary Stuart, but this view of the matter seems hardly justifiable. No doubt the intrigues of Gilbert Gifford with the Welsh faction helped to conceal darker purposes in which he was engaged, but it is clear enough that Walsingham's dealings with Dr. Gifford and Grately began some months before Gilbert Gifford was drawn into them and probably some months before the so-called 'Death Trap' for Mary was set. A dispassionate view of the whole affair leads one to the conclusion that the scheme developed as it did and the fate of Mary Stuart got mixed up in it because Walsingham was quick to take advantage of opportunities as they presented themselves.

[2] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 170, 174.

In the second place Walsingham aimed to create a split in the ranks of the Secular party itself by dividing off Dr. Gifford and his clerical followers, whose grievances against the English Government were purely religious, from the lay element in that party, that is to say, from Charles Paget and his colleagues, who were using a cloak of religion to conceal political plots and conspiracies.[1] In order to accomplish these ends Walsingham held out hopes to Gifford and Grately that the Queen meant to relinquish her hard measures against the Catholics. The Secretary hoped to induce Dr. Gifford to come to England, in fact sent him a passport and certain 'crowns of convoy' for the purpose. It need not be assumed that Walsingham was trying to lure the priest over to his destruction. More probably Walsingham's object was in accord with a letter which Gilbert Gifford wrote to him on the 1st of June 1586. 'My only fear is', Gilbert wrote, 'lest Dr. Gifford for want or fear of discovery faint not, for truly he hath no maintenance. He would willingly leave them [presumably Paget and his colleagues] if otherwise he could live, and then they lose their credit as all the world knows. I tell him he shall want nothing, and I beseech your honour at this beginning, help him forth, for once being gone from thence he can never return.'[2]

Upon these lines the negotiations proceeded, Aldred undertaking the bulk of the work and Gilbert Gifford lending his aid as he passed into France from time to time on other business out of England. The Ambassador Stafford was taken into the secret, and early in April 1586 he had secret conference with Dr. Gifford and Grately in Aldred's house at Paris. 'I find them both', he wrote to Walsingham on the 15th of April, 'very good and proper wise fellows and fit to do that which your intent is. I hope and do persuade myself very assuredly that they will deal very honestly. . . . If you think good and that Dr. Allen could be gotten into the same faction, truly I do think it a conquest well gotten, and that all their corns would be cut here, for he is their apostle here.'[3]

It is not necessary to enter into the details of the negotiations

[1] On Dr. Gifford's attitude, cf. his letter to Walsingham, 18 April 1586, in Butler and Pollen, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[2] Cf. p. 430, n. 1, above.

[3] Printed in Butler and Pollen, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

between Walsingham's agents on the one hand and Gifford and Grately on the other. Of the two priests Dr. Gifford was obviously much the more wary. As late as August 1586, when the negotiations were well in hand, Stafford wrote to Walsingham: 'I find he [Grately] holdeth himself not very well assured of Dr. Gifford.'[1] It had taken some urging to induce him to confer with Stafford. He had found excuses for not going to England, and in the end the dealings with him came to nothing.

Grately, on the other hand, was very enthusiastic from the first. In April 1586 Aldred wrote to Walsingham: 'Grately is so forward that he with pain refrains from declaring himself an open professor.'[2] 'I do find the man', wrote Stafford on the 4th of August, 'very affectionate to follow the course that you expected.'[3] He himself wrote to Walsingham on the 9th of August: 'I remain a true born subject to her Majesty and most affectionate to you, and will not alter though you should change to me.'[4]

It was from Grately indeed that such small results as sprang from the intrigue were obtained. 'Upon Gilbert Gifford's coming over,' Aldred wrote to Walsingham on the 24th of April 1586, 'they will join [that is to say, Gilbert and Grately will join] in making a book to justify her Majesty's proceedings.'[5] This book, which was in the form of an answer to Dr. Allen's pamphlet justifying Stanley's treachery against the Queen in the Low Countries, was completed towards the end of June 1586. Grately by his own confession was the real author of it. He sent it over to Walsingham late in June.[6] The book was a 'mad' book, as Phelippes himself admitted. It had no good effect, but it got Grately into a great deal of trouble afterwards. He spent five years repenting his temerity in the prisons of the Inquisition at Rome.[7]

[1] 4 Aug. 1586, Harleian MSS. 1582, f. 57.
[2] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 174.
[3] Cf. n. 1 above.
[4] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 184; signed Jno. Foxley but endorsed by Walsingham, 'from Grately.' In Stafford's letter, cited n. 1 above, he speaks of forwarding a letter to him from Grately 'which is signed Foxley'.
[5] *Cal. Domestic*, Adda., 1580–1625, p. 174.
[6] Foxley (*alias* Grately) to Walsingham, 11 to 21 June 1586, *Cal. Domestic*. Adda., 1580–1625, p. 179. Cf. also Gifford to Phelippes, 5 Aug. 1588, S. P. Domestic, ccxiv, no. 35; same to same, 1 Oct. 1588, ibid. ccxvii, no. 3.
[7] Catholic Record Society, *Miscellanea*, i, p. 87.

There is some reason to believe that all this time both Gifford and Grately had been playing a double game, and that while they were making large promises to Walsingham on the one hand they were privately informing Thomas Morgan that 'without all doubt they will overtake Mr. Secretary' on the other.[1] Thomas Morgan himself bore testimony to this in a letter which he wrote to Mary Stuart. The letter was intercepted, fell into Walsingham's hands, and led Walsingham to write to his secretary Phelippes: 'I return you Morgan's letter by the which it appeareth what trust is to be given to Papists. It shall now suffice to assure G. G. that both he and I have been greatly abused.'[2]

This letter of Walsingham's, dated the 26th of August 1586, practically marks the end of the intrigue, though it is clear that Walsingham kept up a desultory correspondence with Dr. Gifford for some time after Mary Stuart's death.[3] It came, as I have said already, to no positive results, except perhaps that it may have increased the breach between the Jesuits and Seculars, which opened so wide a little later in Elizabeth's reign. Dr. Gifford's reputation has received a dark stain from the part he played in it. Grately found his reward in the prisons of the Holy Office. As for Walsingham's two agents, Aldred was still in the Secretary's employ in July 1589.[4] The end of Gilbert Gifford belongs to another chapter.

[1] Butler and Pollen, *op. cit.*, p. 31. [2] Ibid., p. 10.

[3] Phelippes wrote to G. Gifford some time after the Queen of Scots' death, 'I received your letter by Mr. Wade as also your last accompanied with one from D. G. to Mr. Secretary. I pray you set down how far they have proceeded in their practice since the death of the Scottish Queen. . . . We cannot resolve what to answer Dr. Gifford' (S. P. Domestic, ccii, no. 38). This seems sufficient to establish my point in the text, notwithstanding Father Pollen's statement to the contrary in Butler and Pollen, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[4] Cf. Aldred to Walsingham, 28 July 1589, S. P. France, xix, f. 205.

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